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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at five case studies of attempted co-operation between British political parties. The 
objective is two-fold: to provide an explanatory framework to better understand instances of potential co-
operation within the institutional context of British politics, and to build analytical narratives that shed light 
on the inter- and intra-party dynamics when co-operation between parties has been mooted in Westminster. 
It addresses a lacuna in the study of British Politics by providing a temporal comparison of understudied 
examples of attempted co-operation. This comparison inductively draws out what lessons can be learnt 
about why co-operation is attempted, and the factors that inhibit it. 
 
This framework suggests that these examples of mooted co-operation constitute disruptions of the 
majoritarian norms which inform the British Political Tradition. It does so through a historical 
institutionalist lens: the cultural norms of Westminster provide a strategic context, but elite political agents 
strategically interact with this institutional environment. This tradition is manifested through intra-party 
pressure against co-operation, and a belief that co-operation is electorally disadvantageous. Equally, actors’ 
interpretation of what is possible or desirable within the perceived constraints of Westminster party politics 
really matters. This suggests a role for situated agency and strategic leadership, captured through the 
concept of a disruption/defence of existing institutional equilibrium derived from heresthetics. This thesis 
contends that the discourse around co-operation holds a rhetorical and performative purpose beyond the 
success or failure of formal co-operation. Institutional context and memory create incentives for actors to 
either accentuate or downplay the effect of co-operation, but do not determine the shape and aims of co-
operation. As a result, both culture and calculus are all-important to inter-party co-operation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Theoretical Framework – the history and 
construction of two-party politics, and its attempted disruption 
 
 
‘Atkins:  It doesn’t work, Michael. One party governs, and one party opposes. That’s our system. That’s this 
building. Two sides of the house, two sides of the argument, facing off against each other: the gap between 
the government and opposition benches the precise length of two swords drawn. Their tips, touching. We 
are not built for co-operation, Michael. You get the chance, we try and stop you. We get the chance, you 
try and stop us. That’s our way.’ This House, Act 2, Scene 4 (Graham, 2013) 
 
‘Third parties are like bees; once they have stung, they die’, Richard Hofstadter (1955: 97) 
 
 
The most striking fact of the coalition government in 2010 was that it was so unexpected. The political 
actors involved seemed to be unprepared for the realities of a hung parliament. For many academics and 
commentators, the frenetic five days in May prior to the announcement of a Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition were, as Philip Norton (2011: 243) put it, ‘largely a case of muddling through’. But as 
the dust settled on the coalition negotiations, and primary accounts began to emerge from key figures 
involved in negotiations, this was less clear-cut. George Osborne and David Laws had, years prior to the 
2010 negotiations, discussed the Liberal Democrats’ key demand of electoral reform in the event of a hung 
parliament (Laws, 2011). As ‘Cleggmania’ surged during the short campaign, William Hague took some of 
the press pack aback by openly discussing the prospect of a Liberal-Conservative coalition, in the event of 
a hung parliament (Macintyre, Interview 2016). Upon completing negotiations, Hague recounts telling his 
wife ‘I think I’ve killed the Liberal Democrats’ – suggesting, if the Conservative Party were operating in 
blind uncertainty, it was with a surer eye for the future than their coalition partners (Parker, Financial Times, 
25/3/2015). The widespread assumption that the political DNA of the Liberal Democrats made them 
inherently politically compatible with the Labour Party was found wanting, and the parliamentary arithmetic 
alone could not explain their entrance into coalition government. This led to some key questions. To what 
extent can, or do, politicians look back to the past, or attempt to forecast and redefine the future, when 
they think about co-operation across party lines? Were the negotiating priorities of both parties in some 
sense structurally determined, or explained solely by the strategic impulses of the leaders and elite politicians 
negotiating the deal? And did the fact co-operation was taking place in Westminster, where majority 
governments are normal, mean there were other informal rules in play, shaping negotiations? The 
contention of this thesis is that these questions are partially answerable by looking back to when co-
operation has been tried before, and finding out whether there are some recurrent themes in the way co-
operation is talked about, and approached, by political parties in British politics. 
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Immediate academic discussion of the coalition was right to point out that, in the post-1945 context, 
coalition government was untested (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2010; Lee, 2011; Hazell and Yong, 2012). 
However, inter-party co-operation between parties had been mooted, attempted and discussed more often 
than this would suggest. So, while the constitutional and governance implications of coalition were largely 
unknown, the party politics of inter-party co-operation had much more recent precedent from which to 
draw upon. In cross-national and comparative work on co-operation and coalition building ‘the sordid tales 
of bargaining failure are rarely told’ (Strøm, 1994: 112). This is also true in the study of British Politics: the 
five case studies analysed in this thesis shed light on what are all, to varying degrees, understudied examples 
of mooted co-operation between political parties in Britain. Reconstructing chronological analytical 
narratives within each chapter therefore has its own clear empirical and academic value. Each case brings 
with it fresh insight into the inter and intra-party dynamics that affected the direction of the parties involved. 
Each, therefore, fills a lacuna in the study of British politics. Some of these cases ended in formal agreement; 
others in failure. But this thesis proposes a new analytical lens of analysis, that goes beyond identifying 
formal agreement. Instead, it a framework that tries to understand the strategic goals actors have when they 
entertain the idea of co-operation, and their interaction with the institutional and organisational 
impediments that effect their ability to achieve these aims. 
 
Existing Literature and Case Study Selection 
 
The case studies analysed within this thesis are primarily flashpoints where inter-party co-operation was 
ultimately not formally pursued; or, when squared with the interpreted strategic objectives of at least some 
of the elite agents that initiated negotiations, co-operation fell short in the change it brought about in the 
structure of British party politics. Either no formal national-level co-operation was taken forward, or inter-
party politics as enacted was not seen to create any sustained effect on party politics. Following a 
chronological path, Chapter 2 traces the inter-party discussion and interaction between the Conservative 
and Liberal parties in the immediate post-war period. Beyond fragmented accounts within memoirs and 
biographical work (Addison, 1992; Jenkins, 2001; Wyburn Powell, 2004) and broader single-party accounts 
of the parties in question (Cook, 2010; Harris, 2011; Bale, 2012; Dutton, 2013) there is no detailed or 
sustained analysis of these inter-party negotiations. Chapter 3 analyses the politics of co-operation in 1974, 
and begins by reassessing the post-electoral negotiations between Ted Heath and Jeremy Thorpe. There 
has been some effort to retrace these post-election negotiations, prompted by the obvious parallels with 
the 2010 coalition negotiations and newly released archival evidence (Dorey, 2008). However, the inter-
election period between February and October in 1974, as the plausibility of cross-party co-operation 
gained increased traction, is an overlooked period in contemporary British political history that can tell us 
just as much, if not more, about the politics and discourse of co-operation than those immediate Liberal-
Conservative negotiations. Kirkup’s (2012) thorough work on the Lib-Lab Pact supplemented existing 
contemporaneous journalistic accounts, as well as diaries and memoirs from some of the key figures present 
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(Steel, 1981; Donoughue, 2008; Michie and Hoggart, 2014 (1977)). Key to taking this work and the archival 
evidence forward is analysis of the institutional factors that affected how both parties viewed co-operation, 
and the contextualised understanding of the strategic imperatives behind those negotiations that Chapter 4 
provides.  
 
Likewise, though not the principal focus, the relationship between the SDP and the Liberal Party was 
masterfully dissected by Crewe and King’s (1995) SDP. Given the SDP continues to act as a touchstone 
and heuristic for the inherent problems and dangers of political realignment, the lack of subsequent work 
on the party is notable – although there has been some recent renewed focus on lessons to be drawn from 
the party (Liddle, 2017). A focus on the early formation of co-operation, and the role of the Liberal Party 
within the SDP’s creation, is an important addition to our understanding of the party. The party has yet to 
be fully placed within an institutional context in which it was fostered, and Crewe and King’s work could 
only gesture towards understanding what many SDP politicians argue was its key success – its impact on 
New Labour. The role and reappraisal of a progressive Labour-Liberal lineage in the New Labour project 
has not been stressed in the extensive literature on the period, bar some key exceptions (Freeden, 1999; 
Vincent, 1999; Fielding, 2003: 45-56). ‘The Project’ of co-operation between Blair and Ashdown was 
extensively detailed in Ashdown’s (2000; 2002) diaries but, as the Liberal Democrat observer and 
practitioner Duncan Brack (2016: 214) recently noted, ‘no comprehensive or objective assessment of ‘The 
Project’ has yet been carried out’. This thesis addresses both of these key gaps in Chapters 5 and 6.     
 
There have been valuable and important empirical contributions to the way co-operation works in Britain. 
Philip Williamson’s (1994) high politics analysis of the formation of the national government during the 
inter-war party turbulence provided a guide on how to approach the interaction between elite political 
actors, during periods of party system change. The sustained period of small electoral majorities and hung 
parliaments from 1974 to 1979 compelled the field of British Politics to focus on the disruption of two-
party politics. David Butler’s (1978) edited collection Coalitions in British Politics provided detailed case 
expositions of coalitions from Lord North to the creation of the Lib-Lab Pact, and Henry Drucker’s (1979) 
Multi-Party Britain provided serious analysis of ‘minor’ parties in Britain. Following the formation of the 
SDP a second set of studies, notably Butler’s (1983) Governing Without a Majority and Bogdanor’s (1983) 
Multi-Party Politics and the Constitution sought to draw together some of these themes, asking the question of 
what the constitutional and political effect of a shift-change towards multi-party politics could mean. The 
prompting of this work was itself significant, an indication that the underlying assumptions of party politics 
were shifting. While Butler (1986: 55) described each case of co-operation as ‘one-off concatenations of 
circumstance’, these works also rested on an assumption that hung parliaments would become increasingly 
prevalent. Taking a step back, we need an understanding of why co-operation remains counter-cultural in 
British (or at least Westminster) politics, and whether (and if so, how) this manifests itself in recurrent ways 
whenever different types of co-operation are tried. There has yet to be an approach that links case studies 
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of inter-party politics to broader theoretical developments in the field of British Politics, as a means of 
mapping the obstacles and incentives to cross-party co-operation in Britain. Each incident of mooted co-
operation defies preconceived notions of British politics as inherently a two-party majoritarian system, and 
provides examples of understated complexity and diversity shrouded by the Westminster Model. Yet the 
all-encompassing nature of this way of viewing politics, particularly among the politicians and political 
actors that shape the direction of party politics, is self-perpetuating and reinforcing. This means identifying 
processes of continuity and change, and the relationship between the role of institutional structures and 
strategic agency.  
 
Case Study Selection: why 1945 to 1999? 
 
The historical range of this thesis – and the dates of 1945 and 1999 which bookend the analysis, and set 
the time-frame for these case studies – is an explicit attempt to trace the development of the institutional 
context in which inter-party politics (including more recent discussions around co-operation) takes place in 
Britain. In turn, this creates a picture of an institutional equilibrium recurrent across each of the case studies 
examined in Chapters 2 to 6. This two-party norm provides a context in which actors operate, when making 
decisions about inter-party politics. There has been little attempt to either understand the nature of this 
equilibrium in British politics, or political agents’ interaction with it. This is the lacuna this thesis seeks to 
fill.  
 
This two-party adversarialism of Westminster did not appear from nowhere after 1945. But the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 2 shows the strategic and rhetorical reinforcement of two-party politics in the 
immediate post-war flux – in large part through the attempted co-option of the Liberal Party, by the 
Churchill-led Conservatives – was a significant formative moment. Understanding 1945 as a critical juncture 
in British party politics brings with it a whole range of questions about continuity and change in the 
ideational structures of British politics. As Roy Jenkins (1998) pointed out when advancing the case for a 
change in the electoral system: 
   
On the factual record it clearly cannot be sustained that … there is anything shockingly 
unfamiliar to the British tradition about government depending on a broader base than 
single party whipped votes in the House of Commons. 
 
Jenkins was right in thinking that the post-war ‘golden era’ of two-party politics is viewed as such not only 
because of voter dealignment from the 1970s onwards, but also the party-political instability that preceded 
it in the inter-war period. The post-1945 development towards the archetypal two-party system of strict 
adversarialism was swift – by 1955, the political scientist Robert McKenzie described Labour and the 
Conservatives as ‘two great monolithic structures’ (McKenzie, 1955: 586). Even if this is viewed as solely a 
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result of the electoral system that operates in British general elections, there is a strong case for 
understanding how one of the paradoxical characteristics of the immediate post-war period and the 
‘political consensus’ – a rejuvenation of two-party politics and the collapse of the centrist Liberal party – 
came about, and how elite agents managed (or, as this thesis argues, shaped) this process (Addison, 1975; 
Pimlott, 1989).  
 
Why not study 2010? The use and purpose of an explicitly historical study of inter-party co-operation 
 
The historical and theoretical focus of this thesis will act as groundwork for analysis of more contemporary 
instances of inter-party co-operation and realignment. The framework sketched out in this chapter and 
developed throughout this thesis can become part of the analytical toolbox for those – including the author 
– who are seeking an historically and theoretically informed way to understand more recent, and future, 
case of inter-party co-operation discussion. A model is developed and tested, which can be used as a lens 
to understand the strategic motivations of actors engaged in contemplating cross-party co-operation in 
British politics, both now and in the future. The framework developed here draws on these five case studies, 
examined with access to participants and key party documents and archives. It is a framework that can then 
be used to examine recent instances of co-operation, for example: the 2010 coalition negotiations between 
the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative and Labour parties; the pre-emptive intra-party discussions 
around coalition prior to the 2015 general election, within (and, potentially, to some extent) across these 
same three parties; as well as future instances, where British party politics grapples with co-operation within 
a two-party cultural and institutional norm. 
 
The existing literature around inter-party politics in Britain has naturally been bolstered by the Coalition 
which governed from 2010 to 2015. However the focus of this thesis – on path dependent historical 
continuity, across instances of inter-party co-operation – is in striking contrast to the majority of treatments 
of inter-party co-operation that have appeared since 2010, which view the 2010 negotiations as a unique 
political juncture and an ‘exception to the rule’ (Evans, 2011: 45; Quinn, Bara and Bartle, 2011: 295). This 
is understandable, given that the Coalition was the first peacetime inter-party government since the 1930s. 
But using a different lens and a small but crucial difference in categorisation – viewing the Coalition as a 
case of inter-party negotiation and discussion, rather than as just an example of government formation – 
shows it is one of a small, but important, number of instances where co-operation has been attempted by 
elite political actors in Westminster politics. Without a thorough analysis of what has happened in these 
previous cases, political scientists and commentators – who acknowledge that the Westminster model could  
pose institutional difficulties for comparative, cross-national theories of coalition politics – have analysed 
the 2010 coalition without all the tools at their disposal (Matthews, 2011; Bale, 2012). This thesis, through 
seeking to provide a full understanding of historical instances of negotiation around co-operation in British 
politics, seeks to provide this context and this analysis. 
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Indeed, this thesis is intended as the foundation for a further study from the author, once the dust has fully 
settled, of the political period from 2010 to 2015. With each passing day and with each seismic political 
moment since May 2010, the key actors involved in the negotiations of 2010 have drifted further away from 
the levers of power. The methodology and primary resources used in this thesis – extensive party archives 
and records, as well as elite interviews across each cases study examined here – are triangulated with primary 
accounts from actors involved. This is a methodology available principally due to the historical nature of 
these case studies but, as equivalent access opens up, can be utilised to analyse both more recent and future 
attempts to forge cross-party co-operation. Nine of the ten elite participants in the coalition negotiations 
within the Conservatives and Liberal Democrat negotiating teams sat in the House of Commons in 2010. 
Following the 2017 general election just one, Oliver Letwin, remains an MP. The ability and, above all, the 
willingness of these key elite actors to provide both insight and self-reflection into the imperatives and 
incentives which drove the decision to enter coalition is only set to increase. There have been detailed 
expositions on the Liberal Democrat side in diary form from David Laws (2011; 2017) and in the form of 
a political-tract-come-reflective-account of government from Nick Clegg (2016). Laws’ account of Labour-
Liberal Democrat negotiation is supplemented but, more often, directly challenged by the account of 
Andrew Adonis (2010), released months after the coalition’s creation. At the time of writing, David 
Cameron’s memoirs are due for release in a matter of months. Close analysis of the period, drawing on 
access to elite political figures has also come, particularly, from the journalistic account of Matthew 
d’Ancona (2012) and the contemporaneous history of both Philip Cowley and Dennis Kavanagh (2011) 
and Anthony Seldon and Mike Finn (2015).  
 
These accounts provide a snapshot that, with the important ingredient of historical time, will become the 
full picture. In discussions around the source material used in political science, there has often been an 
artificial boundary between ‘interpretive’ analysis that sees self-reflective accounts from elite actors as 
important, and a ‘modern empiricism’ that shuns this sort of access to history (Diamond and Richards, 
2012; Rhodes, 2012). The role of resources like biography and life history in political science is instructive, 
but contested: ‘acting as valuable sources on the inside story but often hav(ing) less to say on the wider 
context … the structures of power that shape British power and the British state’ (Gamble, 2012: 493; see 
also Diamond and Richards, 2012). This thesis is an attempt to sketch out a framework for understanding 
how the structures of power in party politics affect decision-making. However, it is also, crucially, about 
the interaction between the structures of power, and the elite agency of key actors. The framework of this 
thesis argues that elite agency and strategic decision-making is all-important, and that the behaviour of 
actors is consciously intertwined with their institutional context when it comes to inter-party politics. Peter 
Hennessy (2012) described the process of writing contemporary history as ‘distilling the frenzy’. The point 
here is that the time necessary to decipher the signal from the noise will come once the dust has settled 
fully on the 2010 coalition, and full accounts are given by the key participants. Only then can the underlying 
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structural ideas which this thesis sets out be fully tested in the context of 2010. This elite access – available 
in one form or another in all the cases analysed in this study – was not available to any degree when this 
thesis was first undertook. The combined effects of institutions and the processes of elite decision-making 
can only be fully pieced together with the access that this thesis did not have. The personal accounts 
necessary to conduct this analysis on the Coalition are fast-forming, two years after the end of the Coalition 
government, are fast forming. This thesis provides a fully formed – institutionally, historically and 
theoretically – framework to draw on when conducting this analysis.  
 
So, the cases chosen here are about elite access. But they are also about theory-building. The merits and 
drawbacks of much of this analysis of coalition politics since 2010, and discussion of inter-party politics 
since, are not necessarily just about access to high-level decision-making. Instead it is the lack of any lens 
that is historically or theoretically grounded through which to explore the claims made by key actors. The 
framework used in this thesis suggests agency is inherently important. The strategic decisions of political 
actors can really matter. But analysis of decision-making benefits from being understood as part of a wider 
process of continuity and change, with political actors – depending on their strategic objectives – using 
political co-operation as a means either to disrupt or defend the institutional equilibrium of two-party 
politics in Westminster. Analyses of inter-party politics in British politics today which tries to build theories 
of inter-party co-operation without making full use of the building blocks provided by these under-
examined instances of co-operation are missing the wealth of empirical evidence provided by contemporary 
political history. 
 
A lack of engagement with the history of inter-party politics in Britain was a recurrent complaint among 
those interviewed for this thesis. A revisionist look at these instances of co-operation, from 1945 up to the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat negotiations in the late 1990s, has both an empirical and an analytical purpose: 
empirically, the focus on inter-party politics provides a fresh way of looking at the politics of these historical 
periods; analytically, and more crucially when it comes to understanding the future utility of this thesis, 
through a framework which aims to understand political co-operation in the politics of Westminster. This 
framework, set out in this chapter below and utilised in the five case studies explored in this thesis, could 
be most readily and directly applied when understanding further cases where co-operation between political 
actors and political parties have been discussed in British politics. The argument and the framework pursued 
here opens the prospect of further case studies examining both contemporary and future instances of co-
operation in British politics. This could build on the work of Heppell (2013) to explore the 2010 coalition 
through the lens of heresthetics, as conceptualised in relation to the institutional equilibrium of British 
politics. This literature that is building up around the 2010 negotiations – made up principally of 
contemporaneous political history, political journalism and political memoir – suffers from one clear 
deficiency, and one ever-developing strength. The strength lies in its fast-growing breadth. Its weakness, 
beyond some key exceptions, lies in questions of theoretical depth and historical detachment. Both this 
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strength and this weakness provide a justification for the specific empirical focus of this thesis, and for the 
theoretical framework outlined here – providing a historical grounding, and an analytical basis through 
which to analyse instances of inter-party negotiations in the past.  
 
This thesis explores what these strategic objectives were, and how they interacted with existing conceptions 
of the structure of political opportunity within British politics. It attempts to uncover the connection 
between the embedded majoritarian and two-party nature of the British political system and what was, at 
least until the coalition government of 2010, seen as a high level of continuity in inter-party (in)activity (see 
Yong, 2012: 1; Seldon, 2015: 1-2). Each case provides a political context where this continuity was 
challenged. But their analysis may also uncover new continuities – primarily in the way the ideational 
institution of party political adversarialism was both questioned and defended. If there is a cumulative path 
dependency in the way political co-operation is conceived, it is likely to evolve during, and revolve around, 
these formative moments. Understanding this will shed light on the way the institutional constraints of 
British party politics are produced, and reproduced – a study, explored through the context of inter-party 
negotiations, of the impact (and, potentially, the discrete evolution) of the British Political Tradition (BPT) 
on party politics.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter provides an epistemological justification and explanation for this approach, and sets out the 
theoretical lenses that are applied to the five case studies within this thesis. This involves assessing how the 
ideational concepts within the BPT, expressed largely in terms of political culture, impact upon the 
perceived political possibilities of cross-party co-operation. Hay (2009, 262) has cautioned against treating 
‘the relationship between conduct and context, agent and structure, as an empirical, rather than an 
ontological one’ given that ‘no interpretation of the evidence is itself ontologically innocent’. However, as 
Chadwick (2000: 288-89) notes, any ‘distinction between real politics and ideas is artificial … (and)… our 
understanding of any political practice is incomplete if it does not refer to the discourses that surround and 
construct it’. The opposite is also true: discourses and ‘traditions’ can only be fully understood by analysing 
the way in which they are produced and reproduced. Ideas such as the BPT must be applied to empirical 
puzzles and contexts. The BPT has been applied to studies of nationalism and anti-politics, devolution and 
House of Lords reform, the regulatory state and the policy making process (McManamon; 2012; Diamond, 
2013; Vines, 2014; Richards and Smith, 2015ab; Fitzpatrick, 2016).  
 
This thesis provides its empirically-driven application to the study of inter-party politics and political co-
operation. It is an inductive attempt to describe and interpret whether (and if so, how) a seemingly 
predominant majoritarianism creates the perception of co-operation as counter-cultural, and how agency-
led strategic disruption (or, as Riker (1986: 1) termed it, the ‘dynamic manipulation’) of pre-existing political 
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dimensions can potentially act as a causal mechanism for change. It proposes new lenses through which we 
can understand and trace inter and intra-party processes, as well as the interrelations between continuity 
and change, and context and conduct. British politics has in this respect been criticised as deficient, with 
an emphasis on gradualist change that risks underplaying the extent to which settled ideas and norms have 
been challenged, albeit rarely overturned (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 151; Hall, 2011: 2).  
 
The actions of those involved in negotiations need to be reinterpreted: the success or failure of inter-party 
negotiations, as categorised in the existing literature, does not encompass the strategic aims that led political 
co-operation between parties to be mooted and pursued. This means analysing the strategy behind 
behaviour as well as the effects of institutional inheritance and memory and stressing that the actions of 
political actors are not an inevitable ‘social “output’ abstracted from the specific strategic context’ 
(Finlayson, 2004: 530). As Sartori (1976:44; see also Maor, 1997: 23-31) argued, party systems can be defined 
as ‘the system of interaction resulting from inter-party competition’. Political parties have an agenda-setting 
role, and inter-party co-operation is potentially as crucial an aspect in defining a system and its ideational and 
material properties as competition (Webb, 2000: 1). Historical institutionalist approaches, despite being 
sometimes characterised as inflexible in their capacity to explain agency-led change (Shepsle, 2001: 321-25; 
Thelen, 2003: 1-6), have stressed that ‘institutions are sometimes pliable as instruments in the hands of actors, 
generally in periods of structural indeterminacy, or critical junctures’ (Riedl, 2016: 228). If inter-party 
negotiations are potentially a political instrument, we need to ask what political actors who initiate or agree 
to inter-party bargaining are intending to achieve.  
 
There is a settled view within the historical institutionalist approach that significant institutional changes – 
such as, for example, the pursuit of an inter-party agreement for the purpose of political positioning, 
governing survival, or as a means of advancing constitutional change – are possible, particularly during 
periods of flux. But there have been calls for historical institutionalists to provide answers to the twin 
questions, posed by Riedl (2016: 234), namely:  
 
When can parties shape the rules and when are they constrained by and shaped by the 
existing rules? When does the process of parties acting to change the rules actually 
reinforce the significance of the rules themselves? 
 
Within this thesis are cases prompted by specific electoral or legislative imperatives. For others, negotiations 
are less straightforwardly a result of immediate circumstances. Some political actors may be reacting to their 
political context to secure specific short-term tactical goals, such as the maintenance of office and the 
pursuit of specific policy objectives. As a result, they may downplay the structural effect inter-party politics 
might have, emphasizing the temporary nature of co-operation and its limitations. Other actors involved 
in the very same negotiations may have a longer temporal horizon, believing co-operation could beget 
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longer-term change in competitive dynamics between parties and the in-built assumptions of the party 
system. Neo-statecraft theories have integrated the idea that ‘bending the (formal) rules of the game’ may 
be an important element of political leadership (James, 2012; 2016), and in the comparative study of both 
government formation and electoral reform there is an increasing understanding the temporal horizons of 
actors can matter (Renwick, 2010: 29; Strøm, 1990: 88). Inter-party agreements, if framed as a challenge to 
majoritarianism, could be used to pursue what Duverger (1954: 215) called ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ 
outcomes – or alternatively, in the lexicon of critical political analysis, ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ (Marsh and 
Hall, 2015) – changes to the electoral ‘rules of the game’. They could form part of a wider strategy of party 
political realignment, redefining and repositioning the electoral identities of parties. Or inter-party 
agreements could be, as Riedl (2016: 235) suggested, short term changes born from necessity that ultimately 
reinforce and restate existing ways of thinking about political co-operation in the British party system. 
 
These are potentially significantly divergent aims, but they might intertwine when parties negotiate. Teasing 
out these distinctions is important, as the goals actors bring to these negotiations do not necessarily or 
straightforwardly adhere to typologies of inter-party co-operation – typologies defined by the functional 
make-up of agreements, while not necessarily accounting for the motivations of actors in instigating and 
pursuing negotiations (Golder, 2006; Müller et. al. 2008; Johnson, 2016). Yet coalition negotiations are 
processes inherently constituted of elite actors and require their initiative and support, perhaps particularly 
if (as in the case of British politics) they are perceived as counter-intuitive. This requires a focus on 
leadership, and on the endogenous processes and strategies involved in the pursuit of inter-party politics. 
We are seeking to describe the effect of the existing institutional template of party politics, on the agents that 
pursue inter-party politics. But we are also attempting to understand why and how elite agents go about 
challenging, and defending, seemingly entrenched traditions of majoritarianism and adversarialism.  
 
This means an historical, institutionalist focus on continuity must be complemented by a realisation that 
political agency matters, too. This thesis suggests approaching strategy and agency through the concept and 
schemas of ‘heresthetics’ – forged within the field of rational choice but insistent on the ‘art’ rather than 
‘science’ of politics, and the creative rather than the determinative. Riker (1980: 445; 1986) describes a 
subtly different answer to the question of what conditions cause change to the political and institutional 
environment: heresthetically-inclined politicians can work to create disruption of existing equilibrium 
through ‘political manipulation’, in the pursuit of new institutional settlements or ‘issue dimensions’. Riker’s 
argument, summarised, is that, ‘when institutions stand in the way of rational individuals, individuals will 
act to change the institution’ (Schneider et. al, 1995: 36). 
 
There is an increasing awareness within the study of British politics that elite agents have a performative 
role which makes ‘examination of the use of language in the “construction” of reality by both leaders and 
the led’ (Atkins and Finlayson, 2012: 2) particularly important. This has been framed largely as a call for 
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greater understanding of political rhetoric, an emphasis on critical discourse (Fairclough, 2001) and 
rhetorical analysis, and a reassertion of the fact that ‘rhetorical techniques that were originally identified by 
the ancient Greeks are still very much alive and well today’ (Crines, 2013: 209).1 Riker (1986: x) argued his 
concept of heresthetics, while related, was subtly different to political rhetoric – setting out that while 
‘rhetoric is concerned with the persuasion-value of sentences … heresthetic is concerned with the strategy-
value of sentences’. Riker’s (1986: ix) work on heresthetics describes how, as a politician, you attempt to 
‘structure the world so you can win’. This means understanding how actors use and interpret elements of 
British political institutions and traditions in a ‘performative’ way, with politics as: 
 
a creative art in which the political actor seeks to create, out of the materials bequeathed, 
new ways to think about political problems (crisis and dilemmas) and to persuade others 
to see things in these terms. (Finlayson, 2004: 155) 
 
There are important, but reconcilable, contradictions here. The British Political Tradition is broadly 
conceived as an elitist, top-down, power-hoarding mechanism defended by self-serving politicians. Yet we 
are also assessing whether its manifestation in party politics is being challenged, predominantly, by some of 
these same elites. The historical institutionalist assumption we are testing is that threads of continuity run 
throughout cases – threads that show the recurrent perception of inter-party co-operation as electorally 
damaging, and institutionally unworkable. But we are also looking at how political actors and parties attempt 
to radically reshape their political environment through strategy in relation to their competitors. This 
involves seeing political action in relation to cross-party politics as potentially iterative and shaped by 
institutional memory (Strøm et. al, 1988: 925). It is also about realising political actors feel these traditions 
can be utilised and ‘through the artful use of political terms and concepts … convince themselves and 
others of the utility, truth or virtue of their perspective’ (Finlayson, 2004: 530). It suggests institutions can 
be important, but there must also be a focus on the ‘specific, strategic contexts of political action within 
which, alone, ideas can be understood’ (Finlayson, 2004: 530). Put simply, this involves seeing elite agents 
as situated, but also strategic.  
 
British Political Tradition and Two-Party Politics 
 
The concept of a British Political Tradition is an increasingly well-used shorthand for a majoritarian, top-
down, ‘power hoarding’ approach to political power, and a political and electoral system based on weak, 
limited principles of representation which privilege stability over proportionality (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 
Evans, 2003; Hall, 2011; Diamond, 2013). This has clear implications for the prospects for inter-party co-
operation. The idea the electoral system inherently disqualifies political co-operation as a practical outcome 
has meant the role the party system plays within the pathologies of the BPT is largely implicit within both 																																																								
1 The Rhetoric and Politics specialist group with the UK Political Studies Association was set up in 2010 
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classical (positive) and critical (negative) approaches to the concept. Those approaches are united in 
describing a broadly elitist conception of democracy, with a primary focus on executive stability and 
consistency over representation and participation. Contemporary theorists of the BPT focus on the top-
down, hierarchical centralisation of power as the key underpinning of this concept of stability. The two-
party system, and the inherent production of single-party majority governments, is left largely implied 
(though see Evans (1995: 19-30); Richards and Smith, (2015)). Hall (2011, 156) notes that the ‘equation of 
single-party governance with strength and coalition government with weakness has achieved an almost 
‘common-sense’ status’ within debates on UK politics about constitutional reform’. Hall (2011: 156-7) also 
points out that attempts to incrementally change the mechanics of the electoral system, through the 
attempted introduction of the Alternative Vote in 2011, reflected a ‘predominant view of coalition 
governance’ – with debates about electoral reform, and the coalition, ‘conducted within an environment 
whose parameters had been shaped by the BPT’. 
 
Although disrupted by the coalition government of 2010-15, this implicit majoritarianism within party 
politics reinforces the concepts of governance on which the BPT is principally centred: as Butler (1986: 8) 
put it, the ‘unwritten rules of the game in British politics are deeply intertwined with the assumption that 
one party will win a clear majority and rule the roost’. Voters’ ability to directly select the executive continues 
to be seen by comparative theorists as a key aspect of British party politics, despite it becoming increasingly 
apparent plurality or majority voting may have a weak tendency to produce decisive outcomes (notably 
Lijphart 2012; for a convincing critique of Duverger see Dunleavy, 2012). The Westminster Model, used 
interchangeably with ‘majoritarianism’ by some comparativists as the epitome of a two-party system 
(Whitehead, 2013), provides a common understanding of how British political institutions work and 
continues to ‘reflect how most politicians and officials perceive the system’ (Hall, 2011: 156). It defines the 
way politicians think about their relationship with voters and, it is widely assumed, vice versa. The continuing 
perception of two-party politics and single-party government as the status quo, despite the Coalition 
Government that ran from 2010 to 2015, led to exasperation among many long-term political reformers. 
David Marquand (2011), for example, criticised the Coalition government given it had not encouraged 
‘lateral thinking and a more deliberative, less partisan governing style’. As Nick Clegg noted to the 
anthropologist Emma Crewe (2015: 67): 
 
people divide up the world into good and bad, sacred and profane – they wrap things up 
in opposites. British politics was dominated by two parties and with a pendulum that 
swung between them. 
 
Indeed, cross-national evidence belies the idea that inter-party politics is inherently discounted by single 
member plurality voting systems, and the continued viability of Duverger’s Law continues to come under 
scrutiny (Singer, 2012; Dunleavy 2015). As McLean (2012: 8) notes, the operation of Duverger’s Law is 
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‘perfectly consistent with a multiparty system in the House of Commons; that is possible whenever the 
geography of voting brings it about’. Tentative quantitative comparative work and theoretical frameworks 
concerning pre-electoral coalitions has suggested they are encouraged by majoritarian systems and electoral 
thresholds prohibitive for the representation of smaller parties (Golder, 2006: 658–660; Strøm, Budge and 
Laver, 1994: 316; Ware, 2009). 
 
However, the folk perception of two-party politics as largely unchallenged is a significant theme that 
permeates these case studies – as Jonathan Powell (2016, Interview) noted, ‘people tend to project things 
in straight lines but, if you actually look back at the history books, they do change’. This perception of 
continuity in relations between parties led Ware (2009:102) to note the complete dearth from the ‘mid-20th 
century onwards’ of ‘temporary alliances’ between parties within Britain. This was the result, he argued, of 
the fact that: 
 
parties no longer wanted to be seen ‘fraternising with the enemy’, and coalitions are an 
especially strong form of fraternization, because it will both weaken their own claims to 
be offering a distinctive policy agenda and leave them tarnished by the failures (including 
failures in government) of that party. 
 
Ware (2009, 100-101) went on to point out five ‘conditions’, in a two-party system which could plausibly 
incentivize an alliance between a ‘larger’ and a ‘smaller’ party: 
 
1) Electoral rules that allow candidates to be ‘shared’, or allows candidates to be withdrawn by one party to 
aid another. 
2) There is a competitive two-party system, creating a strong incentive to stunt the growth of smaller parties 
or absorb them if they become electorally successful. 
3) Local party organizations have autonomy to initiate inter-party negotiations, while national parties 
simultaneously can impose national arrangements. 
4) Parties are not concerned about maintaining a specific, independent policy identity on key issues that is 
strong enough for a national political presence. 
5) Where political co-operation does not necessitate co-operation in government. 
 
Ware does not order these conditions, or assess whether any are necessary or sufficient for inter-party 
collaboration to take place. Yet he makes it clear that both structure and agency do matter, and that the 
institutions of Westminster could – on their mechanical properties alone – facilitate electoral co-operation. 
This raises the question of what, exactly, contributed to the settled view of two-party politics as an 
undisrupted norm. Anthony King (1982: 241), in the context of the SDP-Liberal Alliance’s continued 
polling success, wrote that: 
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The British two-party system – that that seemingly immutable product of the "first past 
the post" electoral system, Britain's social structure and the enduring party identifications 
of Britain's voters – shows every sign of breaking up, not slowly and gradually, but with 
something approaching Mount St. Helen's force. 
 
In King’s analysis, the question of who was doing the breaking up of the ‘two-party system’ had two 
answers: it was ‘taking place both down below, among voters, and up above, among members of Parliament 
and other prominent politicians’ (King, 1982: 241). If a two-party system based on ‘impermeably 
dichotomous class sensibilities’ (Fielding, 2010: 102) was drawn up as the result of class alignment in the 
1920s that were solidified by the Second World War, gradual dealignment from the 1970s – largely 
perceived to be gradual but undeniable – should have had the reverse effect, prompting a realignment of 
party politics. After all, as Fielding (2010: 106) notes, the existence of challenges to the two-party system 
showed ‘tensions and instabilities inherent in the Westminster party system even in its pomp’. This was a 
process that Marquand (1988: 109) argued had created ‘a heterogeneous, pluralist society in which authority 
had been demystified, cultural values had changed (and) the political system had lost legitimacy’.  
 
Ware and King’s observations are worth probing and developing. Ware argues an aversion to inter-party 
politics was not an inherent, mechanical function of the First Past the Post electoral system. King’s 
comments suggest that, while glacial developments may slowly dilute the link between the core drivers of 
two party stability, were change to occur it could happen relatively quickly. Both suggest the impermeability 
of party identities and competitive dynamics between the parties created institutional, organizational and 
systemic barriers to change. This raises the key question of continuity at the heart of this thesis: the ways 
in which this institutional opposition to inter-party politics is produced, and reproduced within the context 
and discourse of British party politics during flashpoints of challenge. This thesis suggests two things impact 
on elite agent’s understanding of the party system and limit their ability to pursue inter-party co-operation: 
the perception of an electorate sceptical about such co-operation (voter-facing), and intra-party opposition to 
the weakening of ‘tribal’ identities and policy goals (party-facing). This creates research questions RQ1a and 
RQ1b, which are both explained and explored below: 
 
Institution-Facing Constraints  
 
That dealignment does not automatically prompt realignment, and party systems can subsequently be 
‘frozen’ and unresponsive to structural change, is not a new idea (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1998: 3-
18). But why the British party system remained largely impermeable to underlying structural change is not 
straightforward. McLean argues large swings in votes, first to the Conservatives from 1979-1992, then 
Labour from 1997-2010, disguised underlying shifts that meant single-party majorities were increasingly 
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difficult to achieve. According to Webb (2000: 8), rather than a movement from two-partyism to moderate 
pluralism, the electoral system had created a ‘latent moderate pluralism’. A ‘majoritarian institutional 
framework and ethos’ (Ibid: 15) limited the impact of underlying electoral change. This makes a focus on 
alliances and their perceived electoral consequences important: mechanical aspects of the British 
institutional framework may potentially facilitate (though far from guarantee) decisive majority electoral 
outcomes, but this does not necessarily explain why parties would be resistant to working in combination 
to achieve them. A resistance to doing so could be the result of an assumption of single-party electoral 
victory either because of, or in spite of, the evidence. But it could also result from an expectation that inter-
party co-operation would be electorally unpopular and counter-productive, which would have more to do 
with the ‘institutional ethos’ rather than the ‘institutional framework’ of British politics. 
 
As one commentator put it before the 2015 general election, ‘all party leaders scorn coalitions before an 
election: to do otherwise smacks of defeatism and indecision’ (Johnston, Daily Telegraph, 23/3/2015). This 
is not true comparatively, where indications are that collaboration prior to elections increases support for 
the parties involves, and turnout overall (Tillman, 2015). This suggests the party system is dictated by 
perceptions of voter demand, born from a pervasive desire for strong (single-party) government. The extent 
to which the 2015 general election result was predicated on a rejection of the possibility of a coalition has 
been one of the dominant themes of psephological analysis (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2015; Cutts and Russell, 
2015: 81). The general election results of 2015 consolidated a multi-party politics dictated by geography, 
which McLean (2012: 8) described as a possible outcome of Duverger’s assumptions on plurality elections. 
However, opinion polling on the concept of coalition between 2010 and 2015 appeared to reinforce the 
idea that coalition government was intrinsically weak and disfavoured, a result of the ‘majoritarian frame of 
mind’ (Riddell, 2011) that prevailed among voters, and in Westminster and Whitehall. The British Social 
Attitudes Survey (2015) found just 29% of people wanted the government to be a coalition, down from 
40% in 2010 and among the lowest levels in the 30 years in which the question had been asked. 
 
It is potentially more complicated than that: Green et al (2015) appeared to prove, utilizing BES data, that 
the possibility of hung parliament increased the vote share for minor parties. But the perception of coalition 
as counter-cultural was widely perceived as one of (though by no means the only) reason for the Liberal 
Democrats’ electoral collapse in May 2015. The Conservative mantra in the 2017 General Election – 
‘strength’ and ‘stability’ weighed against the possibility of a ‘Coalition of Chaos’ – suggested the party felt 
the possibility of a hung parliament was, in and of itself, a vote-repellent proposition. Bogdanor (2011: 76) 
argues that the only circumstance where British voters would openly welcome an electoral pact between 
parties is when there exists an overriding cause beyond the machinations of party politics, on the grounds 
of a “national” appeal’. Similarly, he previously argued that only structural reform of Britain’s electoral 
system could remove the inherent inelasticity and rigidity of the party system (Bogdanor, 1992: 165–187). 
This is echoed in Crewe’s (2015: 64) anthropological account of the House of Commons, which observes 
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that, while cross-party friendships and informal alliances are a part of parliamentary life, overt co-operation 
across parties is reserved for defined periods of crisis. Crewe observed that the extent to which parties and 
politicians collaborate on a day-to-day basis is often downplayed. The Coalition government’s rhetorical 
justification was consistently framed as ‘the right thing to do… in the national interest’, with an emphasis 
on unity overriding any clear ideological justification for the creation and continuation of the inter-party 
arrangement. David Cameron (2010) put it thus: 
 
Given the massive challenges this country faces, particularly the deficit, the national 
interest was not served by a minority government limping along. It was served by strong, 
stable, decisive government that could really act in the long-term interests of our country. 
 
Cross-national study has found that, while smaller parties frequently incur losses as a result of a diluted 
political identity, larger parties typically carry the electoral costs and benefits of incumbency (Merson, 2002). 
But a key question is whether perceptions of coalition and the party system are thought to accentuate this 
process, due to the perceived norms of strong, single party government within British Politics (Kidd, 2014). 
This has had significant contemporary resonance and import. Caroline Lucas, the Green Party co-leader, 
argues that movement towards a ‘progressive alliance’ have been stalled not due to a lack of ideological or 
policy overlap, but the fact that ‘working with others can sometimes be perceived as a form of weakness’ 
(Bienkov, 2017), which echoes the BPT’s focus on centralized and strong leadership. Despite the immediate 
inescapable logic for smaller parties if office and policy goals are to be achieved, there is also a sense 
coalition government may be particularly injurious for small parties, creating a “black widow’ effect’ that 
sees the senior coalition partner swallowing its junior (Bale, 2012). This may be the result of the institutional 
mechanisms of a Single Member Plurality voting system, but also that the electorate may not be ‘used’ to 
coalition. If a system has a tendency to produce single-party government, this in turn makes the possibility 
of inter-party politics less likely even in circumstances that might otherwise be electorally or political 
propitious. As Butler (1978: 84) suggested: 
 
Coalitions between two unequal parties may turn out to be like the relationship between 
the tiger and the young lady of Riga. The electorate may soon prove unable to distinguish 
between the parties. The lesser fry may quickly lose their identity, and with that their 
goodwill and electoral base. 
 
If the entrenched party and electoral system creates structural disincentives for cross-party collaboration, 
we should see empirical evidence for it when inter-party negotiations are considered and take place. This is 
ultimately something that is explored here through analytical narratives of the process of inter-party 
negotiations. Tracing and identifying the empirical evidence for this hypothesised continuity and 
evolutionary change within British inter-party politics, particularly between understudied and 
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underdeveloped cases, is an important addition to a British literature that has often viewed these cases of 
contemporary history in isolation, and a comparative literature which has often ignored incomplete 
negotiations (Strøm, 1994: 112). The empirical work within this study is also a significant addition to a 
historical institutionalist literature that has often struggled with, as Hall and Taylor (1996: 950) describe:  
 
a sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour, and some of its 
works are less careful than they should be about specifying the precise causal chain through 
which the institutions they identify as important are affecting the behaviour they are meant 
to explain. 
 
This study seeks to understand the causal mechanisms that construct the British Political Tradition’s take 
on, and effect on, electoral party politics – primarily through the way that elite political actors understand 
the limits of their strategic environment and the possibility of inter-party co-operation. This leads to the 
first research question, explored here: 
 
RQ1a) Do ideational institutional norms exist in British Politics that inhibit inter-party co-
operation?  
 
Party-Facing Constraints 
 
The case for the sort of temporal comparison conducted in this thesis is born from an historical 
institutionalist position, and a belief that change in the party system towards co-operation would have to 
occur within an institutional context that potentially discourages inter-party activity. Approaches to political 
statecraft in the UK have emphasized that the concepts of collective leadership and party government are 
important areas where a distinctive approach to British politics may be required, along with the need to 
account for the adversarial nature of politics in Britain (Bulpitt 1995: 518; James, 2013: 9, 13). 
Understanding this institutional context, in which strategic decisions about party politics are made, is 
important. But historical institutionalism also focuses on the idea that attempts at co-operation can be 
cumulative. What may be the result of a strategic reading of the rational possibilities for a situated agent in 
a given moment may, over time, ‘ossify … into worldviews, which are propagated by formal organizations 
and ultimately shape even the self-images and basic preferences of the actors involved in them’ (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 940). Actors and political parties may explicitly or implicitly link attempts at cross-party co-
operation with previous negotiations.  
 
This idea that attempts at inter-party cooperation are mutually dependent, iterative events is not new. As 
Riker (1986: ix) said of the practice of heresthetics, ‘there is one partial substitute for practice … and that 
is the vicarious experience of instruction’. Indeed, this process may be amplified in the case of Britain: as 
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Butler (1986: 10) noted, ‘with an unwritten constitution we rely on precedent … when analysing a problem 
or procedure the experts describe what was done the last time it arose’. This experience may be the result 
of elite actors’ political biography and lived memory, and what Marquand (2010: 5) described as ‘the subtle, 
often ambiguous relationship between individual character and experience, and political action and belief’; 
it could be party specific, and the result of shared experience of previous negotiations and their effects; or, 
it could cut across party lines to form a more general understanding about how cross-party co-operation 
functions, or does not function, in Westminster. To touch upon the field of social psychology (usefully) 
shoehorned into the case-study comparative volume Puzzles of Government Formation, ‘bargaining theory 
predicts changes in the player’s expectations and outcomes, as a function of the outcomes of previous trials’ 
(Van Beest, 2011: 27). 
 
If politics is shaped within the context of a two or two-and-a-half party system, with parties essential to the 
reproduction of the Westminster Model through a reproduction of club government and club rules (Moran, 
2003:32; Richards and Mathers, 2010), then this suggests both a striking consensus across parties, and across 
time, to what Evans (2003:16) calls an ‘all party elite tradition’. Yet inter-party politics involves looking at 
political parties sui generis, as well as their interaction within the party system – with the ‘party-as-a-system’ 
being a different level of analysis to the ‘party system’ as a whole (Sartori, 1976: 44). Bevir and Rhodes 
(2016: 196) suggest political scientists should ask whether ‘different sections of the elite do not draw on 
different traditions to construct different narratives about the world, their place within it and their interests 
and values’. British political parties all have institutional memories to call upon, and identities that can be 
called into question, when co-operating with a competitor. Inter-party deals are intrinsically emotive in their 
invitation to look simultaneously outward and inward. This can be an attraction or a turn off for actors and 
parties contemplating them, but pacts or deals are an act with symbolic resonance in and of themselves.  
 
What pervades many of the interviews conducted with Liberals and Liberal Democrats in this thesis is an 
emphasis on the role of party identity, and the place of party democracy within this identity as a constraining 
force over elite decision-making (Hughes, Interview, 2016; Meadowcroft, Interview, 2016). Comparative 
work is split on whether tightly centralized parties have more freedom for manoeuvre in coalition 
negotiations (Pedersen, 2010; contra view, Maor, 1995). While inter-party politics have organizational effects, 
they are also an example of positioning, strategy and tactics – the area of party activity most tightly 
centralized within the Liberal Democrats (Sanderson-Nash, 2011). What this also implies is a potential 
divide in enthusiasm between party leaders, party elites and grassroots members (Wager, 2017), with leaders 
tending to be keener on co-operation strategies as a path towards policy goals like constitutional change. 
 
Critical voices in favour of radical constitutional change have questioned whether consecutive Liberal 
(Democrat) leaders were as committed to a radical, participatory tradition as they claimed, particularly in 
the context of their support for movements like Charter 88 (Erdos, 2009). A core idea of constitutional 
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reform advocates within Charter 88 was that ‘proportional representation could follow from a new 
settlement rather than be gained within the old one’ (Barnett, 2008: 35). Liberal leaderships consistently did 
not sign up to this idea. Change had to be pursued through Westminster, via strategies of inter-party co-
operation. This divide, between a party elite viewing co-operation as a route to constitutional reform, and 
a radical wider party demanding bottom-up reform, also runs head-into into a Liberal ethos of internal 
democracy. Tracing how this works in practice within these case studies – whether these perceived 
constraints are pre-emptively considered by party elites, and if organizational barriers are cumulative and 
are partially dependent on past experience – is important.  
 
Prior experience of bargaining and co-operation within the Labour and Conservative parties may display a 
less clear longitudinal development. There is a potential arc of continuity between these case studies within 
the Liberal geneaology. But the institutional memory and folklore of the two largest parties in British politics 
is less determined by inter-party co-operation. There is a clear danger of constructing a logical trajectory, 
or a ‘retrospective rationality’, that artificially inter-links flashpoints of inter-party activity, underplays the 
contingency and complexity of decision-making and, ultimately, creates theory which does not bear relation 
to the way in which actors themselves experience discussions and negotiations (Kay, 2005: 561-2; Mahoney, 
2000: 527). Indeed, there might be a much greater degree of stability and stasis in the way the strategic limits 
of the British Political Tradition are approached. Instead of incremental path dependence, this would mean 
an overwhelming continuity – the result not of institutional memory and patterns of behaviour, but instead 
webs of significance that see little significant challenge to party duopoly in the Commons. As Diamond 
(2016: 126) notes: ‘institutions are always changing, but the impact of stasis and inertia is too often 
underestimated’. Process-tracing these historical flashpoints of inter-party activity will help us understand 
when changes are contingent, and when they follow wider patterns and paths (Immergut, 2006: 246). 
 
History could also be invoked more generally rather than in response to specific prior events and key 
figures, with past co-operation part of an aggregate concept of tradition and how the party views itself in 
relation to its competitors. Within the Labour Party, Drucker (1979: 25) argued that ‘the sense of its past is 
so central to its ethos that it plays a crucial role in defining what the party is about to those in it’. While this 
is primarily a construct emanating from the trade union movement, a key element of the party’s ethos is 
loyalty. Or, to use the case of Labour and its none-too-complex relationship with the National Government, 
‘the ghost of Ramsay MacDonald hangs heavy over the Labour Party, and no leader wants to be seen as a 
Judas, clinging on to power by selling out’ (Powell, 2011: 35). Within Labour, as Crosland put it, the figure 
of Ramsay MacDonald is ‘a potent reminder of the risks involved in giving too much deference to party 
leaders’ (Diamond, 2016: 199). The SDP’s creation was viewed as traitorous; dissecting whether this had a 
direct effect on subsequent co-operation is key. Labour Party historians have also noted an apparent gulf, 
evidenced in the Gladstone-MacDonald Pact, between a leadership less wary of being dependent upon 
Liberal support, and a grass-roots with a greater emphasis on union power (McKibbin, 1974: 54; Callaghan, 
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2003: 120-21). While the language of the 2010-15 coalition government was primarily about redefining the 
concept of coalition through an appeal to stability and unity, there was a further counter-intuitive approach 
to ‘progressivism’ born, Emily Robinson (2016: 118-19) argues, from the lack of a contemporary 
Conservative–Liberal dynamic or contemporary narrative to reach for. The idea of history as something 
that can be utilized, of ‘using the past as a ‘radical resource’ to unsettle the present’, is something that 
Robinson (2016: 120) argues is particularly prevalent among political actors from all parties, who are 
‘particularly assiduous users and creators of historical narratives’. How this manifests itself in negotiations 
– whether the objections of the grass-roots are embodied in, and pre-empted by, political leaderships of 
the parties – can be understood by historically analyzing these negotiations in detail. This leads to the 
further, party-centred area of exploration: 
 
RQ1b) Do British political parties provide ideational hurdles and/or organizational barriers to 
inter-party co-operation? 
 
 
Agency Disruption: The Art and Construction within Political Rationality 
 
Uncovering whether there is continuity and path dependence within approaches to inter-party negotiations 
is important. However, the causes and drivers of challenge and change must also be understood. This means 
each case study focusing not just on the historical, institutional aspects of political co-operation but the 
effect of agency too. Ideational political institutions like the British Political Tradition are not immune to 
what can seem like relatively arbitrary change – change originating in political actors challenging, railing 
against and pushing the boundaries in their pursuit of rational (or, potentially, irrational) goals and gains. 
This means analysis that ‘decentred’ our understanding of inter-party machinations away from the 
performance, rhetoric and strategy of individual elite agents would not take in the whole picture.   
 
The fact cases of the sustained pursuit and formal enactment of inter-party co-operation remain exceptional 
rather than normal does not undermine a thesis exploring an indeterminitive ontology, which emphasizes 
the role of the ‘will’ of agents in affecting social outcomes. Neither does the idea, as outlined above, that 
the BPT potentially sustains structural disincentives for pursuing inter-party co-operation. Indeed, it 
compels the study of change and disruption (and, even, failed attempts at change and disruption). The core 
belief of historical institutionalism is that political agents and actions are nested within political traditions, 
which in turn shape political actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 529). This does not mean the subject of study 
when analyzing political co-operation, the political actors themselves (and, in the case of inter-party 
negotiations, primarily elite-level actors), fulfil little more than a functional role. In fact, these agents both 
work within and shape the future development of party politics. This demands further in-depth study of 
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the interaction between structure and agency within cases that, due to problems of categorization – or, 
equally, relative disinterest given their perceived failure – may not have been fully empirically explored.  
 
Historically tracing coalition negotiations provides cases where institutional constructs have been contested. 
Work on historical institutionalism has stressed that political change is a discrete process punctuated by 
periods of conflict, which act as ‘formative moments’ (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005: 1276). While these 
are often assumed to be externally imposed crises or dilemmas, they could also be the result of internal 
action deriving from strategic disruption (Finlayson, 2004). The attempted forging of co-operation provides 
flashpoints where the viability of inter-party alliances is contested, and where this viability can be challenged 
and potentially reformulated. More practically, this also allows for analysis of flashpoints where the 
characteristics of the BPT are challenged and overtly discussed – a chance, perhaps, to observe what tends 
to be unobservable: how the institutional and social constructions that condition British party politics 
interact with, and shape, 'rational’ attempts to gain office, enact policies and maximise votes. But before 
going on to explain how the concept of heresthetics will be used as an analytical framework, it is worth 
fleshing out why this intersection between rational choice and historical institutionalism offers a useful path 
to explore inter-party negotiations. This requires a firm understanding of the concept of heresthetics, and 
its applicability to analysis of inter-party politics in the British context.  
 
What is heresthetics, and how does it fit with a historical institutionalist approach? 
 
If we accept that strategic agency has a role to play in the operation of inter-party politics, heresthetics 
provides a lens through which to understand it. Essentially, heresthetics is an attempt to conceptualise and 
unpack how politicians use political strategy to achieve defined political objectives. If political actors operate 
within an unfavourable political environment or institution, then they must go about shifting the terms of 
engagement and the institutions and political dimensions that shape the structure of political opportunity. 
Riker (1986: 142-52) outlines a schema that allows for attempts both at long-term change in the structure 
of political debate, as well as  short-term tactical manoeuvres such as redefining majorities within political 
legislatures. This means achieving a richer understanding of why political actors may pursue co-operation 
with a competitor than currently – not just how the institutions political actors’ inhabit frame goals, but 
how strategies also attempt to affect change (or stasis) on these same (ideational and material) institutions.  
 
In the messy sphere of inter-party politics, actors and parties are clearly (indeed, are inherently) operating 
with divergent objectives and imperatives. While they may converge and overlap in the creation of an 
agreement – such as in the creation of the Lib-Lab Pact, or the SDP-Liberal Alliance – that does not mean 
the reasons for pursuing co-operation are wholly aligned. Likewise, if a formal agreement is not reached, 
this does not mean that the actors involved did not achieve all, or some of, their objectives: inter-party 
negotiations themselves may have had a performative, signalling or symbolic function. Indeed, politicians 
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could also couch agreements within the existing norm of majoritarianism, utilizing inter-party politics for 
exclusively short-term advantage, while minimizing the disruptive change co-operation might cause. 
Heresthetics provides a lens through which to judge these flashpoints of inter-party activity, one focusing 
in on the processes as well as the outcomes of inter-party case studies.  
 
If ideational and institutional factors weigh heavily on flashpoints of political co-operation, and the elite 
agents and parties who constitute and conduct these negotiations, it is perhaps counter-intuitive that 
William Riker – synonymous with an axiomatic and predictive behaviouralism, in which the preferences of 
actors are fixed, external and universal – should provide the frame with which to understand events 
concerned with structural and institutional change. Riker posited heresthetics specifically as a supplement 
to rational choice and institutionalist approaches to political phenomena. It is not all that different to the 
idea explicit within game theoretical approaches to coalitions that some political actors will miscalculate 
choices, while others will not (Andeweg, 2012: 201). In a sense, despite negative connotations, ‘the art of 
political manipulation’ is just a positive (in both senses) restatement of this rational choice idea: rather than 
just blunder their way to sub-optimal results within a fixed set of alternatives, creative political agents can 
also expand their temporal range and strategic horizons, composing new alternatives rather than strategic 
choices solely defined by those they inherit. Riker’s conception of heresthetics was a ‘quite conscious 
attempt to grapple with and transcend the limitations of a narrowly interest-based approach to political 
behaviour’ (Hay, 2009: 278). Heresthetics confronts one of the core historical institutionalist criticisms of 
rational choice, the assumption of actors as self-interested utility-maximisers with ‘extensive (often perfect) 
information’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998: 594). It can be both true within the heresthetical paradigm that actors 
normally work within institutional norms but that some actors – skilled herestheticians – contest these 
institutional norms if they are not beneficial. As the historical institutionalists Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 
10) argued:  
 
Institutional analysis … allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as 
objects and as agents of history. The institutions that are at the centre of historical 
institutionalist analysis … can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, 
but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political 
strategies of political conflict and of choice. 
 
Heresthetics is a way of conceptualising and interpreting these political strategies. Put simply, not all 
political actors possess the requisite strategic initiative and ‘craft’ (or alternatively the political 
‘entrepreneurship’) to pursue the most effective strategic ends. This thesis does not provide judgements on 
the success or otherwise of strategic initiatives – or, as Dunleavy (2002: 3) put it, we accept the idea that 
‘someone behaves “rationally” if they optimise their preferences in a consistent fashion, however ill-advised 
we may judge their preferences to be’. But heresthetics would also argue that some actors (perhaps 
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particularly leaders) are more clearly and decisively able to optimise their preferences. So, it is also necessary 
to look at the upshot: if we accept political actors may disrupt existing institutional equilibria in the pursuit 
of strategic aims, they may pursue action that most observers (including academics) may see as irrational 
given existing institutional structures. This suggests that ‘exogenous interventions of imaginative 
individuals’ (Aldrich and Shepsle, 2000: 41) can make a difference. 
 
The idea that varying levels of leadership skill can affect political outcomes is a key feature in academic 
exploration of political statecraft and leadership. The core components of ‘political argument hegemony’ 
and a ‘winning electoral strategy’ speak to how leaders can use available levers and powers to define the 
political space to their benefit. Neo-institutional approaches and perspectives ‘cognisant of historical 
context, critical junctures and context dependent regularities’ (Byrne, Randall and Theakston, 2016: 204) 
have supplemented the apparent ‘stark simplicity’ (Bale, 1999: 31) of a traditional, institutional approach to 
statecraft. Skowronek’s (1993) typology of leaders introduced the idea Prime Ministerial behaviour and 
motivation is defined by stances towards the existing ‘political regime’, and recent applications of statecraft 
to British politics include a politician’s ability to bend the ‘rules of the game’ (James, 2012). This hints at 
what Riker termed, in his exploration of constitutional-making in the US context, moving beyond utility 
maximisation in fixed institutional contexts to the study of ‘creative adjustment’ (Riker, 1984: 18).  
 
In any case, rational choice need not be antithetical to attempts to understand the effects of institutions on 
political behaviour. Norms and culture, long the priority of historical institutionalists and 
sociological/constructive institutionalists, appear to be assuming an increasingly important role in rational 
choice analysis. Ferejohn (1991: 285) argued that ‘culturally shared understandings and meanings’ are crucial 
to selecting among the many possible strategic equilibria. Thus, when it comes to explaining action, rational 
accounts, no less than interpretive ones, must appeal to principles external to the individual agents 
(Ferejohn 1991: 285). There is a clear benefit in grounding theory within the existing assumptions of the 
current literature on inter-party politics, government formation and coalition negotiation: that British 
political actors act in their structured rational interest, leaning on the idea actors are led by a desire for office 
attainment and policy goals, achieved through vote attainment. As Hall and Taylor (1996: 951) argued: 
 
rational choice analysts can incorporate into their analyses a much more extensive 
appreciation for the role that human intentionality plays in the determination of political 
outcomes, in the form of strategic calculation, integrated with a role for structural variables 
understood primarily in terms of institutions. 
 
That, after all, is where current literature is situated, with increasing movements to understand how 
theoretical innovation can help explain ‘puzzles’ of government formation. The idea of interdependence 
between rational choice and historical strands of new-institutionalist thinking is hardly a new one 
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(Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). Comparativists are increasingly alive to the idea that rational choice 
theories of coalition can be bolstered through empirical analysis. It makes sense that these thick, in-depth 
analytic narratives should be theoretically informed by perspectives that take ideational concepts, like the 
British Political Tradition, seriously. As the rational choice theorist Hugh Ward (2002: 65) has argued, this 
means rational choice developing an understanding of ‘why individuals have the interests they do, how they 
perceive those interests, and the distribution of rules, powers and social roles’. 
 
There has been some criticism of attempts to redefine historical institutionalism as some sort of synthesis 
or compromise between a ‘cultural’ or ‘calculus’ approach to empirical questions, instead of a distinctive 
contribution to transcending the ‘unhelpful dualism between institution and intention’ (Hay and Wincott, 
1998: 953). But the idea that political actors are both agents and objects of history, that ‘politics creates 
policies, policies also remake politics’ (Skocpol, 1992, 58), is where a concept like heresthetics can be 
integrated into historical institutionalist assumptions. This could, as Hay and Wincott (1998: 955) argue for, 
help in developing a theory ‘capable of linking the subject in a creative relationship (emphasis added) with an 
institutional environment’. In the context of inter-party co-operation, that is what the five case studies in 
this thesis hope to achieve: an understanding of how political actors perceive the possibility for inter-party 
co-operation, and their own role within it, given pre-existing contexts of institutional assumptions and party 
structures.  
 
How can heresthetics be used as a tool to understand inter-party co-operation? 
 
Heresthetics can potentially add insight into how political actors, but particularly elite political actors and 
party leaders, view their political power within the BPT. The BPT assumes a strong top-down centralization 
that should be relevant when coalition at a national level is being discussed. After all, such negotiations are 
to some extent inherently about elite bargaining anyway. If we disaggregate political parties into the 
leadership of parties, their parliamentary elites and the national party at large, this may expose different 
levels of interest in, and opposition to, inter-party alliances. A separation between leaderships and 
parliamentary parties in these case studies could be particularly important when viewing the possibility of 
inter-party co-operation as a heresthetic device. These negotiations are, by their nature, discussed and 
initiated at a leadership level. This means, in effect, a focus principally on ‘elite’ or ‘high’ politics, one in 
which there are ’fifty or sixty politicians in conscious tension with one another’ and where what matters is 
‘how politicians perceive the public’ (Cowling, 1971: 3; Craig, 2010: 459). As Paine (1989: 36) argued, for a 
political issue dimension to be changed requires both ‘the existence of an audience (the electorate) that could 
be persuaded to accept the dimension as relevant’, as well as a change within the ‘beliefs of manipulated 
actors (parliamentary parties) about that audience (parties-at-large, and the electorate)’. In effect, as described above, 
this would be both a voter and party-centred approach: persuading voters of the legitimacy of inter-party 
action, and leaders persuading political parties that voters could welcome inter-party co-operation. 
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Heresthetical strategies, if the balance of power within parties and systems is key, should be easier to achieve 
in British politics. That this is not the case, intuitively (and rationally) comes down to strategic incentives. 
It is clearly not the case that British politicians when they are in opposition, or in a political position where 
sustaining a single-party majority government appears unlikely, pursue inter-party alliances as a matter of 
course. Political actors from the two largest parties may emphasize a rational case for the maintenance of a 
stable two-party system, while also pursuing co-operation with smaller parties. This would involve 
grounding inter-party politics within the framework of two-party politics, emphasizing continuity and 
downplaying the long-term erosion of single party government and two-party electoral politics. The 
temporal horizon of actors here is important but, as Laver (1997: 149) notes, ‘the mutual interaction of 
elections and coalition bargaining generates some very complex strategic analyses’. If the existing 
dimensions of two-party politics are electorally propitious – if, in effect, the swinging pendulum of two-
party politics is seen to be still swinging the way of the larger party often enough – then actors involved 
may be anxious to defend it. This is something cross-national studies of electoral reform processes have 
uncovered as important (Renwick, 2010). 
 
Finlayson talks about the importance of rhetoric in ‘engendering change through giving us new perceptions 
of old phenomena’ (Finlayson, 2004: 541). Riker (1986: x) positions heresthetics as a fourth addition to 
Aristotle’s core tenets of logic, grammar and rhetoric, concerned with the manipulation of the order of 
choices and the strategic value of sentences, rather than their truth value (logic), communication value 
(grammar) or their persuasive value (rhetoric). In the case of political co-operation, both are true – co-
operation can conceivably be both a rhetorical signalling, symbolic mechanism to change perceptions, and 
a way of shifting and manipulating political options and alternatives among competing parties and 
politicians. The political import of attempts to forge co-operation does not just rest with the formation of 
agreements in and of themselves, but their impact on the wider strategies of parties. So, whether an 
agreement is ultimately formalised is ultimately not the whole story. Without contextualizing the intent and 
purpose of inter-party bargaining, their outcome cannot be properly understood. To categorize cases where 
inter-party politics was discussed but not initiated as examples of failure is to ignore the possibility that inter-
party bargaining could be used as a strategic instrument to advance short-term party interests, and that 
these goals can be achieved through engaging in negotiation but not formal agreement, or by limiting the 
perceived institutional effects of inter-party action. What may be perceived as a success may, on the other 
hand, lead to not enough, or too much, change in the existing institutional structure. In a majoritarian two-
party system, third parties and their leaderships could prioritise a dismantling of institutional rules and 
norms, which give the two major parties a predominant position; larger parties could grasp hold of inter-
party agreements to maintain or hold office, but would not be keen for their party or the electorate to 
emphasise their long-term significance.  
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In the messy sphere of inter-party politics actors are, by implication, operating with conflicting political 
imperatives. Clashing strategic rationalities mean that the instrumental outcome may appear to be two 
parties working towards achieving mutually beneficial objectives, but the performative function of inter-
party negotiations for each party could be very different. There have been various ways to frame and 
understand different types of heresthetic strategy. Riker (1986: 141-52) split the concept three ways, and 
differentiated between ‘strategic voting’, ‘agenda control’ and ‘manipulation of dimensions’. Strategic voting 
meant securing legislative majorities through voting strategically for particularly measures; agenda control 
meant the introduction of new issues, or changing the ordering of the political agenda to secure priorities; 
manipulation of dimensions meant redefining the political situation, creating new salient cleavages which 
restructure the political environment on more favourable lines for the heresthetician. Another theorist to 
take forward the heresthetic concept was Jack Nagel (1993), who divided it between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ 
heresthetics. Nagel bracketed together ‘control of the political agenda’ and ‘manipulation of dimensions’ as 
examples of ‘macro’ action. Macro-heresthetics were grand, overarching strategies with the aim of 
preserving legislative and electoral majorities, and shaping specific tactics and practices both inside and 
outside Parliament. ‘Micro-heresthetics’ were equivalent to Riker’s strategic voting – manoeuvres to exploit 
parliamentary rules and specific legislative provisions, determining the fate of particular bills.  
 
However, these categories do not get to the heart of why particular forms of inter-party agreement are 
pursued, and therefore struggle to produce a framework that understands the strategic intention behind 
heresthetical action when it is clearly interacting with institutions and the written and unwritten ‘rules of 
the game’. As North (2005: 3) argues, “the key to understanding the process of change is the intentionality of 
the players enacting institutional change and their comprehension of the issues”. We suggest here an additional way of 
conceptualizing heresthetics, in the context of inter-party politics in a two-party majoritarian system: a 
binary categorisation of attempts to disrupt the existing institutional equilibrium, and attempts to defend the existing 
institutional equilibrium.  
 
Disrupting ‘existing institutional equilibrium’ 
 
William Riker (1982) was convinced of the empirical evidence for the link between a two-party system and 
plurality voting, but suggested the operation of Duverger’s Law was the result of an institutional equilibrium 
and, like all equilibrium, subject to change and contestation. The idea of ‘institutions-as-equilibria’ is that 
interactions, and expectations of the parameters of interactions, create structures and formal institutional 
rules (such as a plurality voting system). Riker chimes with historical institutionalism in his belief that layered 
accumulative norms sustain institutional arrangements. However, if creating an inter-party alliance subverts 
the expected behaviour of political parties in the Westminster system, it is possible that the institutional 
norm of majoritarian two-party politics could be undermined, and cease to be self-reinforcing. As Anthony 
King argued in 1982, this would mean that change could happen quite quickly, an endogenous and 
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determinative process resulting in political recalibration. Whether institutional change is swift and abrupt 
depends on how actors respond, and whether they are ‘cognitively aware of the process leading to change, 
who is aware of it, and how they can institutionally respond’ (Greif and Kingston, 2011: 39). So, while the 
possibility of inter-party agreements can arise due to ‘exogenous shocks’ – for example, an election result 
that creates the possibility for inter-party bargaining – actors’ strategic responses dictate whether, and if so 
how, institutions change as a result. 
 
Elite actors representing smaller parties – who are, in every case here, the Liberal Democrats or their 
antecedents – have a clear strategic incentive to undermine the idea Britain is an innately two-party system. 
The expectation would be that they will attempt to use inter-party bargaining and negotiation as a means 
of challenging existing and longstanding institutional rules and norms. This means attempting to portray 
agreement as part of a wider, long-term shift change in party politics, towards an expectation of inter-party 
governance. This is likely to be supplemented by attempts to shift institutional rules – particularly changes 
that will be thought of as more likely to produce indecisive, or non-majoritarian, outcomes. In inter-party 
negotiations, it is commonsensical that they should see an opportunity to enact changes to the electoral 
rules – particularly if, as Riker did, actors believe that institutions both structure political competition and 
are the result of that competition (Aldrich, 2004: 323-4). This involves the conventional heresthetical 
manoeuvre of using the opportunity to create a legislative majority for constitutional change. As Iain 
McLean (2012: 8), an advocate of the heresthetical approach, notes ‘electoral systems are obviously 
endogenous. They are (invariably) chosen by legislative majorities’. Inter-party discussions are, therefore, a 
rare mechanism to create this legislative majority, not through changing minds but through reordering the 
political agenda. 
 
If the negotiation of co-operation was inherently disruptive to the norms of two-party majoritarianism then 
all five of these case studies would be enough. If the unambiguous formation of co-operation inevitably 
beget a new style of politics at least two cases here – the Lib-Lab Pact and the SDP-Liberal Alliance – would 
have disrupted the two-party norm. This suggests while elite-level negotiation may be a necessary condition 
for co-operation and the pursuit of a more pluralistic politics, it is not sufficient. If the aim is to disrupt the 
existing equilibrium of two-party politics this clearly has a performative and rhetorical element, beyond the 
operation of inter-party machinations. Colin Hay (2009) used heresthetics and the illustrative example of 
King Canute’s attempted halting of the tide as a case study in the power of agency (and performative 
strategic decisions) to affect ideational structures. Hay argues it is credible to see Canute’s attempt to part 
the waves as born not from a belief he could subvert natural structures, but rather him seeking to 
‘demonstrate something to those watching’ – a means to a political end. Hay argues Canute’s failed attempt 
were motivated to subvert his followers’: 
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overinflated expectations about his powers …  a public drama whose form is predicated, 
and relies for its effect, upon a set of prior expectations on the part of those for whom it 
is staged, which it sets out to challenge. (Hay, 2009: 274-6) 
 
So, an important distinction here is how an inter-party agreement is framed and what its purpose is, 
something discussed in each case study at an inter and intra-party level. But the public pronouncements 
that hang on the negotiations between parties, regardless of their ultimate success or failure, are also 
important. If co-operation is motivated by an attempt to overturn two-party politics’ cultural and 
institutional underpinnings, there should be clear evidence of attempts to disrupt the material institutions 
maintaining majoritarianism. This means using co-operation to change institutional rules. But there should 
also be evidence of an attempt to address ideational structures, and to recalibrate public perceptions to 
make co-operation beget co-operation through rhetoric and the way co-operation is publicly sold. 
 
Defending ‘existing institutional equilibrium’ 
 
However, it is possible that inter-party politics could act to reinforce the institutional status quo. This could 
be achieved if rhetorically framed and strategically pursued as a continuation of existing parameters and 
rules, or as a short-term and exceptional deviation. Understanding how multi-party co-operation could 
reinforce single party majoritarianism could help answer the question posed to historical institutionalists of 
when, and how, attempts to change institutions can reinforce existing rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009; 
Riedl, 2016). Rather than redefining the parameters of party politics, inter-party co-operation, through 
rhetorical processes and strategic manipulation – could act to reinforce existing institutional assumptions. 
As Nagel (1993: 141) outlined, ‘stability occurs when disruptive issues are suppressed, usually through 
structural constraints or agenda control’. It is possible the disruptive effects of co-operation can be 
minimalized, a strategic motivation particularly plausible for larger parties with a stake in the maintenance 
of a predominant two-party narrative. Indeed, this might be the more likely outcome of inter-party 
flashpoints – the parties that are (instinctively) more likely to pursue co-operation are the larger party, with 
more influence over both the policy platform and public presentation of any agreement. This could be 
achieved by painting co-operation as the exception rather than the norm. Bogdanor (2011: 76) spoke of 
coalition as justified (in popular terms) in times of crisis. This dynamic reinforces the idea that times of 
stability will involve single-party government and two-party politics. It could be achieved (if the profile of 
both parties makes this plausible) through utilising co-operation to achieve an electoral recalibration of the 
centre ground, encompassing the smaller party in a coalition. And it could also be achieved by dampening 
the prospects of long-term changes in the mechanical as well as the ideational ‘rules of the game’. 
 
Heppell’s (2013) innovative application of heresthetics to David Cameron’s coalition negotiations with the 
Liberal Democrats in 2010 argues Cameron’s strategy encompassed many of these strategic impulses. 
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Heppell described Cameron’s adaptation of ‘political dimensions’, to achieve a more favourable political 
environment and position for the Conservative Party through manipulation of the post-election political 
landscape. Heppell (2013: 273) saw Cameron’s co-operation with the Liberal Democrats as an example of 
party repositioning, aiming to ‘construct a strategy that could fix dimensionality to sustain the existing 
equilibrium in order to retain political stability’ (by limiting the extent of constitutional change caused by 
the coalition), while also forging a realignment of the centre-right by repositioning and redefining the centre 
ground. Cameron was attempting to dampen down the possibility of rules-based changes. Nick Clegg 
(2016) felt this was achieved, in part, through Cameron’s grip on many of the symbolic institutions over 
power, later saying that: ‘what I hadn’t appreciated at the start of government was that the symbols of 
power are there for a reason: in making the powerful appear powerful, they provide a vital signal to the 
public’. This projection of Conservative power, through their symbolic control of the key institutions, was 
matched by internal power within government (Bennister and Heffernan, 2012), both a strategic 
undermining of Liberal Democratic strength and its rhetorical reinforcement. 
 
The act of coalition was seen not as an outcome of Cameron’s modernisation project but a process to 
achieve it, conforming to a unidimensional view of politics where redefining and maintaining the ‘centre 
ground’ is key. The strategic expectation, rather than hope, was that coalition government would lead to a 
fundamental shift in party politics and the electoral enveloping of the Liberal Democrats. That Cameron 
attempted to use inter-party bargaining, opening up to coalition to both attain office and retain an 
institutional framework favourable to the Conservative Party, is a strategic elite-level manoeuvre; that he 
succeeded in doing so was also a matter of political performance and rhetoric. 
 
This distinction between strategic attempts to disrupt and defend institutional equilibrium have a potentially 
clear power of classification and explanation. Its application to these new case studies of inter-party politics 
should be an instructive way of understanding the dynamic interaction of political institution and political 
agency and strategy, and leads to RQ2: 
 
RQ2: Do strategic rationales of actors instigating and negotiating co-operation conform to the 
framework of ‘disruption’/‘defence’ of the existing institutional equilibrium? 
 
The ‘analytical narrative’/case study method  
 
The concept of heresthetics benefits, in part, from the fact it is an empirical and puzzle-led exercise – it is 
not easy to define, Riker argued, ‘other than by examples’ (Riker, 1983: 56). In a valedictory article for the 
APSA, Riker (1984: 15) implored future study to look for ‘regularities in the way rhetorical positions are 
established, appeals, for example, to well established references and symbols’, which chimes with the 
prospect of structurally recurrent goals and obstacles within inter-party politics in Westminster, But, 
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principally, the focus was on historical examples within two-party systems left unexplained by theories of 
the median voter – not least Riker’s textbook example, the electoral success of Abraham Lincoln, in a four-
way Presidential contest, in forging an anti-slavery electoral coalition (McLean, 2002: 552-3; Riker, 1986). 
This is similar to the language used by advocates of the ‘analytic narrative’ approach (Bates et al 1998: 3-8) 
when they call for systematic explanations drawn from historical case studies, a methodological logic 
recently applied on a cross-national basis to puzzles and theories of government formation in Western 
Europe (Andeweg, 2012). This thesis does much the same. It seeks to examine the existence of institutional 
and organisational hurdles, and the plausibility of a binary model of disruption and defence, through the 
production of analytic narratives – theoretically driven case study analysis – of five key flashpoints of co-
operation in Britain. But it is first helpful to explain the steps behind analytical narratives, as well as 
sketching out what this case study led approach can uncover, and what it is well placed to achieve. The 
main strength of the case study lies in its capacity for depth — its ‘detail, richness, completeness, and within-
case variance’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 314). The case study method is a particular way of defining cases and, as 
John Gerring (2004: 341) has argued, given its utility its methodological reputation and status is in need of 
being defended and understood. is partially in need of being defended both as a method of theory building 
and theory testing (Eckstein (1975, 80). The analytical narrative approach provides a way of both testing 
and creating theory using the case study approach. 
 
Creating analytical narrative of these five cases of inter-party co-operation allows for a layered picture of 
the ‘principal players, their preferences, the key decision points and possible choices, and the rules of game, 
all in a textured and sequenced account’ (Levi and Weingast, 2016: 2). It is a method of historical research 
that combines deep knowledge of specific cases with an explicit theoretical model (Levi, 2002: 2). This is a 
way to pursue the value-added aspects of exploring novel case studies, both carving out previously 
unexplored historical nuance and creating a way to explain the story by uncovering continuity across cases 
and across time. The creation of historical narratives, and the use of sources and data previously not utilised 
to examine inter-party politics in these five case studies, is a key contribution of this thesis. The case study 
method provides a way of analysing these individual cases of inter-party co-operation which is intensive 
and evidence-rich. But it also requires a theoretical model to provide analytical discipline and purpose and 
helps us understand causality across these cases, even if it does not necessarily lead to determinative causal 
propositions. This means explicating and building upon theoretical explanations to create a model that can 
help us understand what actors are trying to achieve when negotiating co-operation across party lines, and 
to create empirically driven accounts of political phenomenon that in turn provides new empirical evidence. 
The case study method allows for the analysis of the specific but also, through an attempt to understand 
the causal mechanisms that drive the behaviour of actors in these five cases studied here, can also make 
more general claims about the way the ideational institutions of British politics frame the choices and 
strategic decision-making of elite political actors.  
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So each case study here has unique historical properties, is conducted within different political 
circumstances, and by a variety of political agents. The case study method allows for an exploration of this 
nuance and complexity and can, for example: draw out the time order and sequence in which events around 
co-operation unfold; the interaction between different agents from different political parties, and within 
political parties; interpret the discourse and language used to when co-operation was supported or opposed; 
and . There is also an inherent focus on agency within the analytical narrative approach – a focus on the 
behaviour and strategy of key actors, and how they interact – that makes it particularly well suited to 
understanding the way in which agency interacts with structure, and consequently the way in which 
continuity interacts with change. The analytical method means that the role of agency can be at once both 
front and centre of the analysis, while also contextualised and understood within broader frameworks of 
explanation. The following five chapters (Chapters 2-6) provide these analytical narratives, and apply the 
theoretical framework outlined here. These are drawn together from archival material, elite interviews, 
memoirs and diaries, contemporary media coverage, and the existing secondary literature within each case 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Churchill and the Liberal Party 1945-51 
4 June Winston Churchill delivers an incendiary ‘Gestapo Speech’, which held a fervent anti-socialist line 
but also criticised the Liberal Party for ‘spurning’ a national coalition. 
15-16 June Churchill accuses Liberal Party candidates of claiming ‘a vote for them is a vote for Churchill’; 
Liberal leader Archibald Sinclair says his party is campaigning as an ‘absolutely independent party’ 
26 July The 1945 general election result is declared: a Labour majority of 146, with the Conservatives 
reduced to 197 seats. Liberal representation is reduced to 12 MPs. Archibald Sinclair loses his seat. 
3 August Clement Davies is announced as leader (with the official title Sessional Chairman) of the 
Liberal Party in the House of Commons. 
1946 
1 September Harold Macmillan calls for a rebranding and renaming of the Conservative Party. 
3 October A resolution at Conservative Party conference in Blackpool, calling for the party to take 
‘uniting all those who oppose the Socialist Policy’ of the Attlee government, is roundly defeated. 
1947 
17-18 May Churchill uses his first public speech following the release of the Conservative Party’s 
Industrial Charter to make a clear pitch for Liberal voters.  
27 November Liberal Party release a ‘declaration of independence’, in response to growing noise about 
the possibility of a fusion with the Conservatives. 
16 December At a meeting of the Liberal Party Committee – which operated as the party’s shadow 
cabinet – a resolution supporting negotiations with the Conservative Party is defeated. 
1950 
4 February Officially opening the 1950 general election, Churchill attacks the Liberal decision to fight the 
election across the country, and publicly reveals he had attempted to forge co-operation in 1947 
24 February The result of the 1950 general election is announced. Conservative support increases and 
the Labour majority is cut to 5. Liberal representation continues to decline, from 12 to 9 MPs. 
7-9 March Churchill, replying to the King’s Speech, suggests the creation of a Select Committee to 
discuss electoral reform. The 1922 committee strongly rebuffs the proposal. 
29 March Churchill creates a working group, comprising key parliamentary elites, to discuss the options 
for an electoral agreement with the Liberal Party. It meets on two occasions.  
1951 
23 March Colne Valley Conservative Party announce they will support the prospective Liberal candidate, 
Violet Bonham Carter, in a straight Liberal/Labour contest. 
15 October Churchill speaks in support of the Liberal candidate Lady Violet Bonham-Carter. 
26 October 1951 general election result declared: a 17-seat Conservative majority. Liberal support and 
representation declines, from 9 to 6 MPs. 
28 October Churchill offers Clement Davies the position of Minister for Education and a place in his 
Cabinet. Following consultation with senior Liberals, Davies refuses the offer. 
	 38	
Figure 1: General Election 1945, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: General Election 1950, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Seats (% of total) 
Labour  393 (61.4) 
Conservatives  197 (30.8) 
Liberal  12 (1.9) 
Liberal National   11 (1.7) 
Independent  10 (1.7) 
Ind. Labour  5 (0.8) 
Ind. Liberal  3 (0.3) 
National  2 (0.3) 
Nationalist  2 (0.3) 
Communist   2 (0.3) 
Ind. Conservative  2 (0.2) 
Common Wealth  1 (0.2) 
Party Seats (% of total) 
Labour  315 (50.4) 
Conservatives  298 (47.7) 
Liberal  9 (1.4) 
Ind. Labour  2 (0.3) 
Nationalist  1 (0.2) 
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Figure 3: General Election 1951, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Seats (% of total) 
Conservatives  321	(51.4) 
Labour  295	(47.2) 
Liberal  6	(1.0) 
Ind. Labour  2	(0.3) 
Nationalist  1	(0.2) 
	 40	
‘I saw a cartoon the other day of a lion, with its mouth wide open confronting the Liberal Party. On the 
lion’s stomach was inscribed the word ‘Toryism’. This was evidently a mistake on the part of the gifted 
cartoonist. The true word would have been ‘Socialism’. They have not only devoured the bulk of the Liberal 
Party; they have digested it’ Winston Churchill to Clement Davies, 25 January 1950 (CHUR2/64/131) 
 ‘The idea of a small centre group of MPs acting as a moderate, balancing force, able to exert pressure on 
both the main parties, might continue to attract a substantial minority of the electors – if the role of 
moderator could be shown to be practicable. The result of the Liberal divisions in the last three weeks has 
been to suggest that it is not practicable.’ The Times, 27 November 1950: 7 
Overview: Political Context and Heresthetic Strategies 
Between 1946 and the formation of his first peacetime cabinet in October 1951, Churchill made a concerted 
effort to form an electoral arrangement with the Liberal Party. The basis for his efforts was the shifting 
promise of shared policy principles, a reconstruction of the electoral system, mutually assured short-term 
electoral benefits for both parties and, with increasing traction as his time in opposition progressed, a belief 
in the logic, practicality and inevitable implications of an ‘Anti-Socialist Front’. The 1945 general election, 
and Churchill’s attempts to define the Liberals while in opposition, suggested the Conservative Party were 
principally aiming to absorb the electoral identity and support of an institutionally and structurally weak 
independent Liberal Party. The Liberal identity was clouded by a Liberal schism and their role in the party 
system was unresolved and uncertain. This made the Liberal Party’s political positioning more susceptible 
to characterisation by competitors, but also lessened intra-party pressure to reach an agreement or 
accommodation with the Conservative Party.  
There was some success in creating localised Lib-Con electoral pacts and, after the general election of 1950, 
the immediate electoral logic of an agreement became clearer. The Conservative Party’s shock defeat in 
1945 had been reversed, and parliament was in near deadlock. As the Liberal Party was electorally weakened 
its role and importance in the arithmetic of the House of Commons was heightened by Labour’s thin 
majority of five seats. But back-channel attempts at an arrangement were constantly rebuffed by leading 
Liberals (and, eventually, by Clement Davies, the Liberal leader) and diluted by some – though certainly by 
no means all – of Churchill’s own party. The 1951 general elections aw the Conservative Party return with 
a small but sustainable parliamentary majority. Churchill’s offer of a cabinet seat for the Liberal Party 
demonstrated that inter-party dynamics, rather than simple short-term government formation, was a key 
driver behind Churchill’s pursuit of the Liberal Party. 
Assessments of Winston Churchill’s influence on the Conservatives’ time in opposition, between 1945 and 
1951, are principally defined by a striking disconnect between leader and party (Bogdanor, 1994: 90-91; 
Ramsden, 1995; Bale, 2012: 13-49; Theakston, 2012: 7-19; Heppell, 2014: 11-19). The relative tenacity of 
Churchill’s pursuit of Conservative-Liberal co-operation is therefore surprising, given the limited extent to 
which Churchill was thought to have strategically pursued much at all within the sphere of domestic party 
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politics, while Leader of the Opposition. A focus on ‘politics over policy’ (Addison, 1992: 397) meant, in 
practice, a continuing preoccupation with foreign affairs, a ‘reactive’ rather than ‘active’ strategy to 
opposition (Theakston, 2012: 10), and delegation of the organisational and policy change key to the party’s 
striking electoral rejuvenation (Hoffman, 1964: 81; Ramsden, 1980: 117-148).  Attempts to foster political 
co-operation with the Liberal Party, as one of Churchill’s few concerted imprints on party politics in this 
period, provide a significant insight into his view of the electoral and political landscape. The concept of 
Conservative-Liberal co-operation was, as Churchill’s biographer Roy Jenkins (2001: 839) put it, the result 
of ‘sensible self-interest combined with an old man’s nostalgia’ – a seeming merger of strategy and political 
memory. It also highlighted the limitations of a leader with a broad strategic vision, but without a keen 
interest in the party management required for its implementation.  
As a result, viewing the history of Churchill’s period as leader of the opposition through the lens of inter-
party co-operation provides a challenge both to perceptions of Churchill as a leader of the opposition and 
the causes of the Conservative Party’s resurgence after 1945. Churchill’s party political instincts were widely 
seen as poor, and he comes near the bottom of historical and political science analyses of leadership in 
Britain that focus on the arena of party politics (e.g. Clarke 2012). This is in large part because he was widely 
seen as ineffectual organisationally unsuited (Macmillan, 1969: 41) and uninterested in the minutiae of the 
role (Gilbert, 1988: 163). The ‘clear consensus among historians and contemporaries’ is that Conservative 
recovery can be said to have occurred despite Winston Churchill, rather than because of him (Bale, 2012: 
39; Ramsden, 1995: 17; Seldon, 1981: 5; Theakston, 2012: 7).   
Key historical analyses of the 1945 general election have centred on four factors as the cause of Labour’s 
landslide defeat: a misplaced belief among the Conservative party that gratitude for Churchill’s wartime 
leadership would reap clear electoral benefits, leading to a failed leader-focused strategy (Lindsay and 
Harrington, 1974; Ramsden 1999); a feeling the policy of appeasement that the Conservative party had 
pursued in the 1930s was being punished (Willets, 2005; Wyburn-Powell, 2015); and an inability to embrace 
and understand the changes brought by the Beveridge Report (Fielding, 1992). There has been less 
emphasis on the disruptive impact of the reformation of party politics caused by the Liberal Party’s collapse, 
which undoubtedly itself shifted the terms of the political in a way that was difficult to calculate prior to 
the election. Steven Fielding’s (1992: 623-639) analysis of Labour’s surge points towards the lack of any 
plausible vehicle for left-wing liberal votes, and widespread calls for the enactment of the Beveridge Report, 
as leading to an outcome few expected; Richard Toye (2010: 655-680) has analysed the Gestapo Speech 
(see p. 40-41 below) principally as an appeal to Liberal votes. The extension of this inter-party framing into 
understanding the wider tenets of the Conservative party’s behaviour from 1945 to 1951 offers a fresh 
perspective. 
Likewise, the focus of historical analysis on how the Conservative Party bounced back from a landslide 
defeat – winning 213 seats to Labour’s 393 in 1945, and returning to office with a slender majority of 17 in 
1951 – has centred principally on two areas: the reorganisation of the party machinery (Bale, 2012); and the 
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recalibration of the party’s policy offer towards a ‘new’ Conservatism – led by modernising figures within 
the party such as Rab Butler and Anthony Eden – which retuned the party’s offer to a new post-war reality 
(Bale, 2012: 38; Heppell, 2014). This chapter is a challenge to aspects of this analysis, and suggests that the 
Tory identity was shaped by its interaction with the Liberal Party, which was driven by the heresthetic 
strategy behind Churchill’s leadership, as well as changes to policy and organisation less affected by his 
leadership. The modernisation of 1945 to 1951 has been variously seen as a mirage, with a great deal more 
continuity with pre-1945 policy than was often presupposed (Ramsden 1986; Denham and O’Hara, 2007: 
172-3).  
It was ironic, if perhaps inevitable, that the post-war Liberal Party believed that Winston Churchill wished 
to destroy them at the same time as, on Conservative benches, he was suspected of nostalgically propping 
up a dying and redundant political opponent. The truth is that both viewpoints held a kernel of truth. 
Churchill had a clear and stated desire for a larger Liberal Party, one that continued to be independent and 
respected in a way that the Liberal Nationals – though ‘loyal allies’ who should be treated ‘properly’ – were 
not (Churchill to Woolton, 2/8/1946, CPA CCO 3/1/63). But Churchill’s heresthetic strategy was to 
consistently reasserted a single-issue dimensionality based on ‘anti-socialism’ that, as Taylor (2005: 429-463) 
has convincingly argued, had been successfully utilised by Stanley Baldwin in the inter-war period to 
marginalise the Liberal Party. Churchill argued ‘the two sides of the House are deeply divided by ideological 
differences … separated by a wider and deeper gulf than I have ever seen before in our island’ (Hansard, 
HC, 7/3/1950 v. 142, c. 154). This strategic divide and device – a reassertion and entrenchment of two-
party politics as the party system norm – successfully undermined dogged, but limited, Liberal attempts to 
define their electoral offering and political identity from out of Churchill’s, and the Conservative Party’s, 
shadow.  
Despite a chastening defeat in 1945, Churchill was still uniquely placed to impact on the political and 
national conversation. Although he was ‘often absent, and did not always fire at the right target, he was 
invariably “news” whatever he said or did’ (Blake, 1985: 262-3). Churchill’s reflexive relationship with grand 
political rhetoric – the source of much of his political capital, and the cause upon which it was often 
expended – make him an interesting study of the interplay and comparative efficacy of public rhetoric and 
private action, when attempting to restrict the choices and paths available to contemporaries and 
opponents. A biographer has noted that ‘the case against Churchill has always been that the rhetoric was 
mainly for show: a magnificent façade of sham statesmanship concealing the movements and mistakes of 
a faulty politician’ (Addison, 1993: 5). The mistake would be to believe that these two traits cannot be 
demonstrated at once. Political speech can be grandiose and self-aggrandizing, seemingly magnanimous 
while also strategically partisan. This interaction between strategy and rhetoric is a key concern for the 
theory of heresthetics, and Riker puts it as an interaction between manipulation and persuasion (Riker, 
1996: 8-9). But Churchill’s rhetorical strengths also acted as strategic weakness. Riker argued that rhetorical 
appeals in political campaigns can constrain heresthetical strategies as well as enabling them – making it 
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more, not less, easy in the arena of parliament to form coalitions of support at the same time as forging 
them among the electorate. 
Beneath these strategic impulses and real drive to redefine the political choice for Liberal MPs, and the 
collective choice of the electorate, there was a sincerity to Churchill’s belief in the benefits of political co-
operation for both parties: he argued to his powerful Party Chairman, Lord Woolton, that ‘I am quite sure 
there is no possibility of a Conservative majority without not only an arrangement about seats, but active 
co-operation’ (Churchill to Woolton, 2/8/1950, CPA CCO 20/1/2). However, if Liberal candidates and 
votes could not be formally co-ordinated the Liberal Party could be, and should be, subsumed. Clement 
Attlee gleefully noted this complexity of the Churchill-Liberal relationship was such that often he ‘gives her 
a slap in the face, then offers her a bunch of flowers’ (Hansard, HC, 9/3/1950, v. 472 c. 592). 
The Liberal Party, and its leader Clement Davies, were principally concerned with the party’s continuation. 
As a result, the aims and long-term strategies of the two parties were often fundamentally conflicting. 
Conservative and Liberal discord meant there were strong voices both advocating and discouraging an 
electoral agreement within both parties. Ultimately, dissenting voices won out and attempts to create 
nationwide electoral co-operation were dropped. Yet, while a pact was not successful, the Conservatives 
did much to align with Liberals throughout their period in opposition, and the ‘Liberal vote’ began to act 
as a synonym for centrist ‘floating’ voters. Contemporary electoral post mortems in the media in 1945 and 
more prominently in 1950 focused heavily on the role of the Liberal vote, and which of the two largest 
parties could successfully attract Liberal voters was ‘the subject of eager calculation by sanguine partisans’ 
(The Times, 27/2/1950: 5). It was also the subject of significant internal research by the Conservative Party 
who were, in the end, successful in attracting a large segment of ex-Liberal voters in the elections of 1950 
and 1951.  
That the Liberal’s historic opponents, rather than their successors on the left, were the chief beneficiaries 
of Liberal collapse is, perhaps, counterintuitive. Butler and Stokes (184-85: 201-2) argued this was the result 
of the Conservatives’ disproportionate accrual of working class Liberal support, caused by two factors. 
Firstly, the Conservatives’ electoral and policy adaptability, with the post-1945 resurgence as a credited 
example. But, also, a residual and structural anti-socialist feeling based on historical allegiance. It was the 
second of these themes that Churchill accentuated through his claims to the Liberal Party’s lineage, 
alongside a pronounced ‘anti-Socialist’ rhetoric that belied the modernisation of the party’s policy platform. 
Although inter-party negotiations did not create national co-operation, inter-party dynamics and an 
increasing number of ex-Liberal votes did sustain the Conservatives’ electoral recovery. The belief of Frank 
Byers in 1949, then Liberal Chief Whip, that ‘there is tremendous antagonism in all sections of the party, 
especially among the wage earners, to a Tory administration’ (The Times, 19 November 1949: 4) turned out 
to be less the case than he might have assumed or hoped.  
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1945 General Election 
Reaching out to Liberals was an intrinsic part of Churchill’s attempt to re-structure a political landscape 
that, after Labour’s 1945 victory, was markedly uncertain. John Charmley (2009: 647-50) describes in just 
three pages ‘the aftermath’ of the 1945 election as one in which Churchill never regained his political stature. 
Charmley (2009: 647) argues that: 
Churchill stood for the British Empire, for British independence and for an ‘anti-Socialist’ 
vision of Britain. By July 1945 the first of these was on the skids, the second was dependent 
solely upon America and the third had just vanished in a Labour election victory. 
The truth is more complex. From June 1945 and the break-up of the war-time coalition, Churchill adopted 
an increasingly strong ‘anti-Socialist’ stance and platform – much to the chagrin of pro-modernisation 
colleagues and Conservative activists, who viewed a more proactive and interventionist industrial strategy 
as the key antidote to negative perceptions of the Tory-led government of the 1930s (Heppell, 2012: 12-13; 
Willetts, 2005: 178). An appeal for ‘national unity’ and the post-war caretaker government’s claim to the 
label ‘National’, despite the non-involvement of Labour and independent Liberals, had, besides greatly 
antagonising Clement Attlee, seemingly been of little electoral benefit in 1945 (McCallum and Readman, 
1945: 48; Bew, 2016: 334-36). Churchill’s first (infamous) election broadcast framed the contest as 
‘Socialism versus the Rest’, evoking the possibility of ‘some form of Gestapo’ as a necessary instrument to 
enact Labour policy. It was an unexpectedly bombastic appeal that ‘caused surprise in all parties’ (Daily 
Mail, 5/6/1945: 1), and it was far from clear that success lay in this decisive, broad-brush (and, Labour’s 
Herbert Morrison argued, ‘crazed’) anti-socialist direction (Daily Herald, 5/6 1945: 1; Toye, 2010: 655-57). 
In his criticism of Sinclair and the Liberal Party’s decision to leave the coalition, Churchill argued the party 
has ‘yielded to the tactical temptation natural to politicians to acquire more seats in the House of Commons, 
if they can, at all costs’ (Churchill, 4 June 1945). The Liberal Party faced the spurious charge (less true than 
perhaps the party would have liked) of acting as an effective political force, seeking to effectively maximise 
their representation and votes.  
Ill-conceived or otherwise, the resultant Labour landslide created a feeling that fundamental electoral 
certainties had been recalibrated towards radicalism and collectivism. Contemporary academic observers 
queried whether the failure of the electorate to respond to these tactics was ‘entirely due to the dispirited 
mood of the moment, or if it signified in the elector an interest in politics that is both more critical and 
more intense than heretofore’ (McCallum and Readman, 1945: 213). The extent to which the 1945 general 
election result was a positive endorsement of Labour’s vision of social reform and a planned economy 
remains historically disputed (Hinton, 1983: 169; Fielding, 1992; McKibbin, 2010: 128-139). What does 
seem indisputable is that Churchill’s claim to embody the ‘national’ cause – associating a depleted caretaker 
government of Conservative and National Liberals with the wartime coalition – was clearly not the success 
that, up to election day, had been widely assumed. City estimates of a Conservative majority of between 
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100 and 150 at the start of the campaign floated down due to ‘fears of voter apathy’ (Daily Mail 5/7/1945: 
1), but the assumption within all parties was that a majority was likely. The Manchester Guardian’s election 
day editorial railed against a large Conservative majority of 1931 proportions, rather than the fact of a 
Churchill-led government (Daily Mail 5/7/1945: 1; Manchester Guardian, 5/7/1945: 4).  
The medium-term effect of Churchill’s binary National/Socialist framing, particularly on the Liberal Party, 
may have been partially disguised by the ultimate failure of 1945. Churchill’s incumbency, political stature 
and much-touted association with ‘liberalism’ gave him the capacity to define the Liberal appeal, and 
squeeze the Liberal vote – a strategy clear from his opening campaign address (Hennessy, 1993: 84). A Daily 
Mail (5/6/1945: 1) editorial felt it was ‘noticeable that Mr Churchill went out of his way to warn Liberals 
of the dangers of supporting any but National candidates’. Churchill’s belief that there was ‘scarcely a 
Liberal sentiment which animated the great Liberal leaders of the past which we do not inherit and defend’ 
was one that, as Dutton (2012) has noted, ‘would become a Conservative commonplace over the next 
decade’. Criticism for conducting ‘the most hateful general election campaign in memory’ from the Liberal 
supporting Manchester Guardian (5/7/1945: 4) – who had attempted to foster the idea of non-Conservative 
co-operation, through their tacit endorsement of the Labour Party – was therefore levelled partially at 
Churchill’s attempt to limit and curtail the ‘electoral choice’ of voters. This framing of the vote as a clear 
two-way battle was important: this was the first ‘straight fight’ between the three parties since 1929. In 1943 
debates about the reconstruction of the chamber gave an indication of the extent to which the physical 
institutions of Westminster impacted on the ideational, and the degree to which, despite various forms of 
national coalition government operating from 1931, the two-party framework remained in-built. Churchill 
argued that: 
The semi-circular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual 
or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as 
the weather changes. I am a convinced supporter of the party system in preference to the 
group system … The party system is much favoured by the oblong form of Chamber. 
Logic is a poor guide compared with custom. Logic which has created in so many countries 
semi-circular assemblies … has proved fatal to Parliamentary Government (Hansard, HC, 
28/10/1943, v. 393, c. 403) 
The entrenchment of a two-party choice clearly made the Liberal task difficult. Evidence from the Mass 
Observation study appears to suggest their 1945 result was partially as the Liberal Party was so 
organisationally weak – their lack of a full spread of candidates was thought to make any claim towards 
national strength difficult. Indeed, McCallum and Readman (1945: 118) believed the idea the Liberal Party 
could no longer plausibly claim to be a party of single-party government was crucial, for ‘electors like their 
votes to count one way or another; they do not like to feel that they are casting waste-paper into the ballot-
box’. As one Liberal candidate in 1945 recalled: 
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The one clear fact was that the choice was between a Labour and Conservative 
government. Very few people were prepared to vote for any other party without first being 
assured that the Party or Member, if elected, would support the preferred major party on 
any major issue. (Thorn and Thorn, 1996: 7)  
While a Churchill victory was seen as overwhelmingly likely, the plausibility of a coalition government 
remained. Gallup recorded support for a ‘Grand Coalition’ of all three parties at 43% in favour and 43% 
against in April 1945 (McCallum and Readman, 1945: 16; Cantril and Strunk, 1951). As Liberal leader, 
Archibald Sinclair swerved hypotheticals about a hung parliament, arguing that 'it would be unwise and 
impractical to try to decide now what form of government should be constructed, in a parliamentary 
situation which none of us can accurately foresee' (De Groot, 1993: 224). The Labour left were set against 
bi-partisanship and although (remarkably accurate) polling was not given much use or weight by the parties 
and the national press (Eatwell, 1979: 30-31; Pelling,1980: 408; Hennessy, 1993), not all believed the result 
would be clear-cut – Hugh Dalton saw a hung parliament a s a possibility (Dalton, 1957: 466), and Liberal 
leader Archibald Sinclair was expecting one (Baines, 1995: 54). Labour pledged that under no circumstances 
would they join an all-party coalition but Harold Laski, in response to a conference resolution the party 
should form a minority government if the largest party and ‘stand or fall by its Socialist programme’, argued 
that the resolution ‘touched on an issue of extraordinary delicacy and complexity’ and ‘beg(ged) the 
conference not to tie the hands of the party’ (Daily Mail, 25/5/1945: 4).  
In the event, the principal distinguishing feature of the Labour victory in 1945 from the progressive 
landslides of 1906 and 1997 lies in the uncoupling of Labour and Liberal fortunes. Sloman (2011) has 
persuasively set out the case that Liberal failure to ride a ‘progressive wave’ provides clear evidence that 
1945 was a Labour victory born from radical enthusiasm, rather than widespread apathy. Liberal-Labour 
tactical voting was almost non-existent, supporting the hypothesis that demand for radical social reform 
was real, but could only be met by Labour. But this rests on the Liberal Party’s unabashed progressive 
programme – effectively fronted by Beveridge and led by calls to ‘Back Beveridge’, along with acquiescence 
to wide-scale if not wholesale nationalisation (McCallum and Readman, 1945: 107-08; Sloman, 2015: 159-
164) – being part of a plausible bulwark against a Churchill-led Conservative government, but not radical 
enough for an electorate with a clear preference for a socialist, rather than a progressive Lib-Lab, alternative. 
However, the Liberals’ ‘progressive’ credentials were far from clear. Stokes and Butler (1969: 251-2) showed 
throughout the rapid growth of the Labour electorate in the 1920s that ex-Liberal voters, by a ratio of 4 to 
3, had turned to the Conservative Party. In the election of 1935 Labour had struggled to attract the Liberal 
vote. Contemporary academic observers like G.M Trevelyan put the lost Liberal vote as ‘one third Labour, 
two thirds Conservative’ (Stevenson and Cook, 1992: 274).  
By 1945, the Liberal Party had a newly-developed Churchill Problem, retaining their distance and 
independence as he tried to ‘smother (them) with soft words and reproaches’ (Manchester Guardian, 
5/7/1945: 4). Simultaneously, and much to Sinclair’s chagrin, Churchill claimed that 'the Sinclair Liberals 
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are representing to their electors that they are standing in support of me and are telling their electors that 
'a vote for me is a vote for Churchill" (Manchester Guardian, 15/6/1945: 6). The Liberal emphasis, from the 
moment Sinclair opted to abandon the coalition, was to differentiate the Liberal Party from Churchill’s 
Conservatives and the totem of a 'national' cause, and this was a key focus of the party’s election addresses 
(McCallum and Readman, 1945: 141; British Pathé, Sinclair Broadcast, 14/6/1945). The party was forced 
to defend itself against the twin charges of disloyalty in splitting the 'sensible vote’. And, on the other, railed 
against the Labour briefing they ‘might split the progressive vote, (and) therefore wipe out the possibility 
of anything akin to the Liberal election programme being put into operation’ (Joyce, 1997: 7). But defending 
themselves against the charge they were a Conservative subsidiary was the principal concern because it was 
their principal strategic problem.  
After the inter-war flux, a two-party norm was embedding itself within British party politics. The Liberal 
Party’s place within this electoral landscape was uncertain. The 1945 campaign was seen retrospectively as 
a ‘watershed election’ (Baines, 1995: 49) for the Liberal Party, but it was only following further failure in 
1950 that their electoral ambitions were fundamentally recalibrated. Neither during the campaign nor 
immediately afterwards was the party reconciled to entrenched third party status. Beveridge had campaigned 
throughout the country as effective co-leader of the party on the grounds he saw anything other than a 
substantial Liberal parliamentary presence as barely worthwhile, energised by campaign meetings he felt 
hinted at a national surge (Beveridge, 1953: 347). But within this recalibration was the role of the Liberal 
Nationals, whose leadership vigorously pursued an anti- ‘Sinclair’ Liberal line that abandoned the pretence 
that Liberal and Liberal National forces were only temporarily separated (Rosebery, Daily Mail, 28/6/1945: 
8). Their leader John Simon performed two functions: acting as an effective attack-dog against the Liberal's 
insistence upon electoral independence, while also providing a signal and a message that a Churchill-led 
Conservative government retained a keen interest in social reform (Dutton, 2008: 142-43). On top of this, 
Sinclair’s leadership was problematic for many on the ‘radical’ wing of the Liberal Party. In July 1944 Sinclair 
had stated that he wished to stay in a post-election agreement with Churchill, and fight any election on that 
basis (Egan, 2009: 8). This was an opinion that shifted due to increasing internal pressure from the Liberal 
Party Council, and the Liberal Party Assembly. The intra-party Radical Action grouping, who had 
consistently opposed the decision not to fight by-elections during wartime, gained increasing traction. There 
was significant, if unfounded, suspicion that the party’s leadership was gearing up to move towards a 
Liberal/Liberal National merger and, throughout the 1945 campaign, 
much was said and done for the purpose of putting a shot across the bows of those 
contemplating a virtual merger with the Lib Nats under the Tories, and needs to be 
interpreted in that light (Thorn and Thorn, 1996: 8).  
The Liberal Party, fundamentally divided, could present a case as an independent party, set apart from 
Churchill’s attempt to align all non-socialist parties under a ‘national’ umbrella, was increasingly difficult. 
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1945-1950 
Liberal National Party, and the Woolton-Teviot Agreement, 1946-47 
As a result, it is unsurprising that the hollowed-out Liberal Party that emerged was vulnerable to a hostile 
takeover. A distinct, positive liberalism was viewed as increasingly untenable – the Liberal Party’s inter-war 
collapse and decline was accelerated rather than arrested, leaving the party ‘on the brink of oblivion’ 
(Dutton, 1992: 425-50). The selection of Clement Davies as Liberal leader was emblematic of the party’s 
myriad strategic problems. Davies symbolised the party’s internal incoherence and inconsistencies. Having 
joined the Conservative-inclined Liberal Nationals in 1931, Davies returned to the party in 1942 to play a 
key role in advocating Radical Action’s attempts to lever the Liberal Party away from the wartime electoral 
truce (Wyburn-Powell, 2003: 126-27; Egan, 2009: 9).2 He was chosen due to a dearth of candidates and 
talent, with the party’s representation stripped back to the Celtic Fringe: the fact that seven of the party’s 
12 remaining MPs represented Welsh constituencies was a key factor in his selection (Wyburn-Powell, 2003: 
143). The fact Davies was chosen as ‘Sessional Chairman’ of the Parliamentary Liberal Party, on the 
continuing (forlorn) assumption that Sinclair would soon return to the Commons through a by-election, 
suggested a party shorn of its core identity and leading figures (Wyburn-Powell, 2003: 154; Douglas, 2005: 
250-2).  
It was fundamentally important that Clement Davies emphasised the continuation of the Liberal Party as 
the key strategic priority. Davies’ emphasis on Liberal independence meant he pursued reuniting the Liberal 
and Liberal National parties with significantly less enthusiasm than his predecessor Sinclair was likely to 
have done. Sinclair felt the possibility of Liberal-Liberal National amalgamation would mean ‘people would 
begin to take the Liberal Party seriously again’ (Dutton, 2008: 150). The Liberal and Liberal National parties 
in Scotland and London did sign a compact in the summer of 1946. However, the Liberal’s continuing 
electoral independence was a pre-requisite to any national-level talks. As a result, the negotiations were 
working at fundamental cross-purposes: Liberal National leader Simon saw the 1945 result principally as 
indicating the electorate’s ‘desire to return to a two-party system’ (Dutton, 1989: 359) whereas even pro-
fusion figures in the Liberal Party like Sinclair saw the strengthening and redefinition of an independent 
Liberal Party as the sole purpose of talks. Lord Woolton, the Conservative Party Chairman from July 1946, 
used failing Liberal-Liberal National talks to force Simon and his party into a national agreement, telling 
Lord Teviot the party had to ‘make up their minds at once as to whether they were going to associate with 
the Liberals, or with us’ (Dutton, 2013: 155).  
Woolton had been appointed with virtual autonomy over intra-party organisational decision making, with 
one caveat – that he explore the possibility of amalgamation with Liberals. There was a key tension between 
Woolton and Churchill here: Churchill argued that the Woolton-Teviot agreement should be used to build 																																																								
2 Though Davies did join the Liberal National Party ostensibly for ‘left-wing’ reasons, believing the ‘Simonite’ policy 
to be more economically redistributionist than the ‘Sinclair’ Liberals 
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momentum for an agreement with the independent Liberal Party, for ‘a party is not a club, becoming more 
and more eclectic. It ought to be “a snowball starting an avalanche” (Churchill to Woolton, August 1946, 
CCO 3/1/63/333); Woolton saw permanent Conservative-Liberal National co-operation as sufficient to 
appease Churchill’s desire for a ‘United Front’, without the need for a national agreement with the Liberal 
Party. Churchill was largely, and indeed Kandiah (1992: 69) argues deliberately, uninterested in the process 
and substance of the negotiations with the Liberal Nationals. He believed a Liberal-Conservative agreement 
was the much greater prize, and made little attempt to give the impression the Conservatives were willing 
to promote a fair deal for the Liberal Nationals as junior partners (Dutton, 1989). Despite the Woolton-
Teviot agreement, Churchill continued to reject requests by Lord Simon to be further integrated into the 
Conservative parliamentary party, and indeed his shadow cabinet after 1950 (Woolton to Churchill, 
9/3/1950, MS Woolton 21/16). Woolton, on the other hand, was key in insuring the Conservative-Liberal 
National relationship, and consistently viewed the retention of Liberal National support as an alternative 
to co-operation with the Liberal Party.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Liberals viewed this dynamic as less a benign club-building exercise, more an 
existential threat to their continuing existence. The Liberal National Party’s lack of leverage was particularly 
eye-opening. Archibald Sinclair likened the Liberal Nationals to ‘a mule, in that they have no pride of 
ancestry and no hope of posterity’; Herbert Samuel argued that ‘the Conservative Party has been nourished 
and sustained by absorbing in each generation a fresh group of Liberal faint hearts, first the Liberal 
Unionists, then the Liberal Nationalists’ (Manchester Guardian, 18/11/1947: 4). This did not have the effect 
of convincing the mass of the independent Liberal Party of the merits of following the Liberal National 
lead. Samuel, speaking of the Liberal National-Conservative relationship, noted the: 
process of deglutition has been complete and the process of digestion is very far advanced. 
We observe these facts as we remember a similar case of the Liberal Unionists in a previous 
generation, who were swallowed up and disappeared for ever, and we beware accordingly. 
(Hansard, HL, 20/7/1949, v. 164, c. 254) 
Andrew McFadyean, a President and later Vice President of the Liberals, wrote to The Times in 1949 to 
argue that ‘National-Liberals (sic) have pretty consistently supported the Conservative Party and are a 
standing warning to the rest of us of the result of that liaison’ (The Times, 21/11/1949: 8). The way the ‘pact’ 
between the parties was negotiated and conducted was brutal, the exploitation of weakness summed up by 
the Conservative Chief Whip, James Stuart, commenting that he was ‘not worried about their complaints: 
without the Tories, where would they be?’ (Stuart to Woolton, 25/1/1947, MS Woolton 21/58).  
Conservative Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
In August 1947, Churchill wrote a letter to Lord Woolton urging him to ‘do everything in your power to 
promote unity of action with the Liberals on the basis of an Independent Liberal Party. On this being 
achieved depends the future revival of Britain.’ (Churchill to Woolton, 11/8/1947, CHUR 2/64/19).  
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Woolton was more than sure that he meant it, for Churchill threatened that ‘he would, of course, resign’ if 
he did not achieve his aim (Woolton to Salisbury MS Woolton, 1/6/1950, 21, 73-83). The ‘light touch’ 
nature of Churchill’s political leadership between 1945 and 1950 is difficult to question. But his rare 
interventions and actions were often an explicit challenge to Conservative introversion. Churchill’s position 
was weak – Gallup polls commissioned by Woolton had showed there would be a positive effect on the 
Conservative Party’s electoral position, if Churchill was no longer leader (MS Woolton 21/15, 5/10/1949). 
Chief Whip James Stuart received, and informed Churchill of, the cumulative and near unanimous call from 
the Shadow Cabinet for Churchill to resign (Stuart, 1967: 146-7). But Churchill’s strategy was borne from 
the fact that his priority was not the contentment or even necessarily the continuation of the Conservative 
Party, beyond its usefulness as ‘a vehicle which would carry and enhance his ideas’ (Woolton, 1959: 349). 
Lord Woolton, his Party Chairman, believed he had ‘little respect for party political organisation and 
regarded it as an instrument that would be ready to serve him whenever he wanted it’ (Woolton, 1959: 348).  
Woolton’s view of Churchill as a non-party man was hardly a controversial judgement. Churchill stood for 
the Commons under no fewer than five banners. It would have been six if his attempts to transform the 
Conservative name, post-1945, had come to fruition. Churchill’s clearly viewed the party’s organisational 
rejuvenation as important, once praising Woolton by telling him that ‘the man who makes the organisation 
possible is the man who delivers the votes, and he doesn’t deliver them by oratory’ (Churchill to Woolton, 
3/11/1947, MS Woolton 21/43). However, one area that Churchill was insistent upon Woolton exploring 
was efforts to move towards Liberal-Conservative collaboration, not least as Woolton expressed clear doubt 
about the plausibility of an agreement with a ‘violently partisan and anti-Tory’ Liberal Party (Woolton to 
Churchill, 7/8/1947, CHUR 2/64/21). Churchill felt it important to share his interpretation of the role of 
the electoral system with Woolton. Churchill forwarded a letter from the Conservative MP Hugh Molson, 
with a note of approval, that argued for reform to the First Past the Post system given it acted as a ‘distortion 
of the steady political judgment of the electorate’. The need for reform arose, Churchill agreed, from a 
desire to ‘avoid violent political changes which must result from alternative governments of Right and Left’ 
(Churchill to Woolton, MS Woolton 21/5, 20/9/1947). Toye (2007: 39) points out that Churchill’s claim 
to the Liberal creed had been constant throughout the previous twenty years and was employed 
‘systematically and with much fervour in the final decade of his career’. It is difficult to prise apart a tactical 
impetus in enhancing the Conservatives electoral support, from a long-term political vision entirely separate 
from party interests.  
Churchill was not alone in arguing for the electoral necessity of attracting moderate support and floating 
voters and, ergo, Liberal support. D.R. Thorpe (2010: 244) argues Macmillan’s call at the 1946 conference 
for a rebranding to ‘The New Democratic Party’, as the country was ‘faced with a new Socialist and 
Communist menace’, was ‘music to Churchill’s ears’. Macmillan’s idea was trailed with much publicity in 
the weeks prior to the conference, and Churchill’s support for the concept was hinted at (Manchester 
Guardian, 19/9/1946: 6). Woolton supported the concept but saw the move as possible only from a position 
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of electoral strength – in his memoirs he argues he was the driver behind attempts to quash the proposal, 
‘loyally supported by many who did not entirely agree with me; some of whom have risen to eminence in 
the Party’ (Woolton, 1959: 334-6). Subsequently, Macmillan’s idea received a particularly bad reception at 
the 1946 annual conference. To wide applause, those opposing argued that the name change was ‘a proposal 
by despair out of defeat’, and it was ‘better to lose 58 seats (the number arrived upon by Macmillan, as 
caused by split centre-right voting) than to lose their self-respect’ (The Times, 4/10 1946: 2). The 1922 
Committee, with Churchill present (notable and noted, given how irregularly he attended meetings) 
considered the prospect of a change in the party’s name, with the MP Peter Thorneycroft arguing the case 
that the change would ‘make it easier for the Liberals to come together and join in the fight against 
Socialism’ (Goodhart, 1973: 149). Churchill’s view was well known and, according to an MP present, the 
‘meeting broke up, with Sir Winston not entirely delighted by the outcome’ (Ibid.) 
Churchill was not without support for his position within the parliamentary party: Macmillan was meeting 
with Liberals, both privately and publicly, to symbolise co-operation and to facilitate the withdrawal of 
Liberal by-election candidates – notably in the Gravesend by-election of November 1947 (Churchill to 
Woolton, 7/11/47, CHUR 2/64/61). But those in favour of Conservative modernisation were arriving at 
different conclusions. Quintin Hogg, later Lord Hailsham and a key figure in the Conservative-Liberal 
discussions of 1974, produced modernizing policy documents that explicitly sought the support of Liberal 
figures and, in a letter to The Spectator (Hogg, Spectator, 21/9/1945), suggested policies he believed held ‘no 
striking difference to the Liberals’. He felt that ‘if only the Liberals would come and help we could, together, 
capture the Conservative Party’. Hogg was also one of just five Conservative MPs, among 111 Conservative 
and Liberal MPs and prospective candidates, to sign Peter Thorneycroft’s modernising call, Design for 
Freedom – a pamphlet that proclaimed the merits of the free market, and explicitly called for centre-right co-
operation. Yet both Hogg and Thorneycroft, the two leading lights of the Tory Reform group in the 1945-
50 parliament, presented opposing cases to the 1922 committee on a change in the party’s name. 3 
Thorneycroft argued the case in favour, given the inter-party benefits in promoting Liberal party links; 
Hogg against, on the grounds policy recalibration should be prioritised (Goodhart, 1973: 149).  
 
While a party name-change was touted in the build-up, the clear message at the 1946 conference in 
Blackpool was for a renewed statement of policy (Addison, 1992: 393). The creation of the Industrial Policy 
Committee, led by Rab Butler, was reluctantly conceded by Churchill following the 1946 conference. Upon 
being given lines on the Charter to read in his 1947 conference speech, Churchill had told Maudling – then 
a member of the Conservative Research Department – that he did not ‘believe a word’ of the document 
(Ramsden, 1980: 114; Howard, 1987: 156). Churchill continued to argue, in the face of calls within 
parliament for greater policy definition, that ‘it is dangerous to prescribe until you are called in’ (Goodhart, 
1973: 140; Ramsden, 1980: 108). But the fact he signed off on the Charter showed he saw its strategic and 																																																								
3 The Tory Reform group was set up with the aim of being ‘a kind of Right-Wing Fabian Society, a political 
laboratory and a power-house of ideas’ (Profile, Quintin Hogg, The Guardian, 15/2/ 1948, 6) 
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symbolic import. It was notable that Churchill saw the Charter’s symbolic usefulness in pressuring the 
Liberal Party towards co-operation as ‘a broad statement of policy to which all who are opposed to the 
spread of rigid Socialism can now rally’ (Manchester Guardian, 17/5/1947: 5). In his first speech following 
the Charter’s publication, Churchill used a Scottish Unionist rally to explicitly link the Charter to the Liberal 
Party’s continuing independence. Just as Toye’s (2010: 657) rhetorical analysis of Churchill’s 1945 ‘Gestapo 
Speech’ argues his campaign that year was ‘a failed attempt to appeal, in particular, to wavering Liberal 
voters’, so analysis of Churchill’s acquiescence to the Charter should not downplay the inter and intra-party 
significance he saw in it. Churchill used wartime language to evoke the coalition government, arguing for 
Conservative-Liberal co-operation:  
 
there is no reason why we should not be what was called in the war co-belligerents, or why 
reciprocal services of goodwill, courtesy and mutual aid should not be interchanged 
whenever there is an honourable and sincere agreement on fundamental principles. 
(Manchester Guardian, 17/5/1947: 5) 
 
Liberal Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
 
The Liberal reaction to the Industrial Charter could hardly have better augmented Churchill’s framing. 
Clement Davies argued the Industrial Charter was ‘a copy of parts of the Liberal industrial policy issued as 
long ago as 1928’ (Manchester Guardian 18/5/1947: 5). As Macmillan noted: ‘the Socialists are afraid of it; 
Lord Beaverbrook dislikes it; and the Liberals say it is too liberal to be fair. What more could one want?’ 
(Thorpe, 2010: 248). Clement Davies consistently warned of the ‘Tory spider’ trying to capture Liberal 
votes (Wyburn-Powell, 2003: 164). The principal object following the general election was the rejuvenation 
of the Liberal Party’s internal organisational standing and strength. Beveridge argued that ‘any kind of 
election pact with another party means the end of Liberalism for all time’, with the urgent need instead to 
‘rebuild a third party’ (Manchester Guardian, 18/11/1947: 6).  
 
It was those most deeply invested in the rejuvenation of the party’s organization – figures such as Philip 
Fothergill, Frank Byers and Edward Martell (Douglas, 1971: 250) – who expressed opposition to a pact to 
Lady Rhys-Williams, the co-ordinator within the Liberal Party for the Design for Freedom document. There 
was some initial debate about how to receive Rhys-Williams and Thorneycroft’s initiative. But, ultimately, 
the Liberal Party Committee – set up in 1944 as a forum for party opinion, and used as a de facto shadow 
cabinet by Davies –  issued a statement to candidates telling them the document was not ‘a prelude to any 
movement for a right-wing alliance or agreement or understanding’ (Manchester Guardian, 19/2/1947: 6). 
Evoking the idea that Liberals supporting cross-party co-operation were repeating old mistakes, the Liberal 
MP Emrys Roberts argued Design for Freedom was ‘the greatest act of sabotage to the Liberal Party since 
1931’ (Douglas, 1971: 253). 
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Rhys-Williams kept in contact with Churchill throughout attempts to construct support within the Liberal 
Party for co-operation, and Churchill forwarded at least some of this correspondence to Lord Woolton. In 
the early months of 1947, the idea of an agreement appeared to gain some traction within the Liberal Party, 
though the party’s headquarters remained firmly opposed. Violet Bonham Carter emphasised the rationale 
of institutional change and the possibility of Proportional Representation for the ‘big towns’ could be ‘the 
means through which it could be possible to persuade some recalcitrant Liberal leaders’; equally, she was 
‘very much afraid of sinking into the undignified position of the Liberal Nationals’ and the possibility of 
the dilution of Liberal independence (Rhys Williams to Churchill, 20/4/47, CHUR 2/64/4). Rhys Williams’ 
canvassing of the elite of the Liberal Party appeared to show near-universal support for a pre-electoral 
agreement – with ‘only the mad ones remaining obstinate’ (Telephone Conversation, Rhys Williams 
17/4/47 CHUR 2/64/7). Rhys Williams’ belief in growing pressure towards co-operation was optimistic: 
Liberal News’ (14/3/1947: 2) editorial reaction to Design for Freedom was ‘Design, for what?’. Rhys Williams 
believed Philip Fothergill, the Liberal Party Chairman, was ‘isolated’ in opposition to co-operation. But the 
main news to emanate from the Liberal Party Assembly of April 1947 was an emergency motion 
proclaiming the party’s independence.  Fothergill defined the party as a bastion between ‘subtly organised 
Communism, and Fascist influences at work in the Conservative Party’, an appeal that was received 
‘rapturously’ (Liberal News, 2/5/47: 1). Partially, this was blamed on a lack of strategic leadership given there 
was ‘not one of them in the Liberal leadership with the pluck to make a move’ (CHUR 2/64/43 
7/10/1947). Ultimately, in December 1947, a Liberal Party Committee Meeting voted on a motion to enter 
in to negotiations with the Conservative Party – and was defeated by four votes among (approximately) 18 
attendees (Rhys Williams to Churchill, 18/12/1947, CHUR 2/64/73).  
 
While attempts to co-operation clearly did not gain much traction, Churchill continued to lace his 
parliamentary rhetoric with language that forced Clement Davies to define his party in relation to the 
Conservative Opposition. The introduction of an Iron and Steel bill in 1948 (legislation eventually 
postponed until 1951) was painful for the Liberal Party – while Davies opposed the measure, parliamentary 
colleagues, including Megan Lloyd George, wanted to support the bill subject to further amendment 
(Wyburn Powell, 2003: 171). Churchill asked Davies to address a private meeting of Conservative MPs on 
the subject, worked with him on aspects of the bill and, in the Second Reading debate, self-referentially 
noted that ‘I used to say in bygone days, and I repeat it gladly now, “Socialism attacks Capital, Liberalism 
attacks Monopoly’ (Hansard, HC, 16/11/1948, v. 458, c. 223). Churchill felt contentious measures of 
nationalisation would unite the two parties: he predicted to Woolton that the nationalisation of Steel would 
mean ‘all this (Lib-Con co-operation) will come to an issue in 1948, and it is my belief that we shall all be 
together in one line’ (Churchill to Woolton CHUR 2/64/19, 11/8/47).  Churchill clearly felt the increasing 
possibility of electoral defeat would force the Liberal leadership’s hand, arguing it was therefore ‘better to 
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let things develop in a natural way’ (Churchill to Rhys Williams, 1/11/47, CHUR 2/64/45). Ultimately, 
Churchill claimed with some truth in February 1950, during the general election campaign, that: 
Nothing would have given me greater comfort two or three years ago than to have made 
an honourable and friendly arrangement with all who hold the Liberal faith, which would 
have enabled all true Liberals and Conservatives to work together as separate and 
independent parties… but when overtures were made we were repeatedly spurned, and 
mocked for our efforts (Churchill, 4/2/1950) 
The 1945-50 parliament saw the institutional adjustment from a three party to two-party system. Clement 
Davies’ election alarmed those on the right of his party who feared a drift ‘into the Labour fold’ (Sloman, 
2015: 169), and who were united with Churchill in viewing Davies as lacking both intellectual clarity and 
political competence. The malleability of the Liberal Party lay in the fact it was a new party born out of the 
contested embers of the old; Clement Davies, in exasperation, privately commented that the Liberals were 
‘a number of individuals who, because of their adherence to the Party, come together to express completely 
divergent views’ (Graham Jones, 1984: 414).  
This was epitomised by the antagonism between Megan Lloyd George and Violet Bonham Carter, the 
daughters of Lloyd George and Asquith. Lloyd George was a radical left MP and Deputy Party Leader, who 
defected to Labour in 1955; Bonham Carter was the Party President, in favour of Lib-Con co-operation. 
Bonham Carter wrote to Lloyd George towards the end of 1948 as efforts to produce co-operation were 
coming to a head, and emphasised the key strategic difficulties for the Liberal Party: its ideological split and 
weakness ‘what can a Party of 10 do? Containing at most 4 ‘effectives’?? (& even these not always agreed 
on major issues?); its structural problems as a third party ‘3⁄4 million new votes could only give us at most 
6 seats. Meanwhile what is going to happen to the 10 we’ve got?’; as well as calls for reform, couched in the 
language of long-term institutional change ‘the only condition which will ensure the ultimate survival of a 
3rd Party in this country is Electoral Reform, & in saying this I’m thinking ahead – far beyond the next 
General Election’ (Bonham Carter to Lloyd George, 17/11/1947, NLW MS 20475/1368). But there was 
also throughout the parliament a suspension of electoral reality, and a belief that, as Liberal News put it, ‘half 
a dozen good by-elections will create the confidence in our cause that will be worth literally millions of 
voters when the General election comes’. Co-operation was, as Churchill described it, ‘a difficult road’ 
(Telegram, CHUR 2/64/100 30/11/47). But it was only following the 1950 general election that the Liberal 
Party felt they reached a fork in the road. 
1950 General Election 
To counter the idea that voting Liberal was futile, and to form the perception of an alternative government, 
the party’s key strategy post-1945 was maximising the total number of Liberal candidates in constituencies 
across the country. This ‘broad front’ strategy was both a reaction to a new structural environment and a 
proxy for continued independence. It was organisationally successful – the call to fight on the ‘widest 
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possible front’ had meant the party expanded impressively – but the electoral effects were chastening (Cook, 
2010: 131). Clement Davies had been pessimistic about his own prospects of re-election in February 1950, 
and the decision to insure with Lloyds of London the loss of up to 250 deposits showed an understanding 
of their national fragility.4 Publicly, until January 1950, Herbert Samuel mooted the possibility of a Liberal 
minority government following an indecisive result (The Observer, 29/1/1950: 4). The 1950 manifesto’s claim 
to offer ‘the opportunity of returning a Liberal Government to office’ was hardly David Steel-esque 
bravado. But it did show, along with the consistent unbridled optimism of the Liberal News that, for many 
in the party, the organizational disintegration of the Liberal organization that occurred after 1950 was 
relatively sudden.  
 
Churchill’s early speeches in the 1950 election campaign showed a determination to hoover up Liberal 
support. The Conservative Party’s manifesto document, This is the Road, was not drafted explicitly with 
Liberal policy overlap in mind. However, Churchill rejected the Conservative Research Department’s 
foreword to its precursor document The Right Road For Britain, writing his own to argue the document spoke 
for ‘the spirit of liberalism’ (Ramsden, 1980: 140). As the Manchester Guardian (6/2/1950: 4) sympathetically 
noted, the election’s dynamics ‘put peculiarly heavy tasks on a third party … (for) the centre of gravity 
within the Conservative Party has, on paper at least, shifted a long way to the Left since 1945’. Churchill 
rallied against a ‘very small and select group of Liberal leaders who conceive themselves to be the sole heirs 
to the principles and traditions of Liberalism’. This was a broad critique of the Liberal Party’s claim to offer 
a distinct electoral offer. Conservative Central Office was aware of Liberal target seats – though estimates 
over-estimated Liberal success in two seats, while incorrectly forecasting Liberal defeats in three, including 
Clement Davies’ Montgomery constituency (Piersenné Memorandum, CHUR2/64/150, 10/1/1950). On 
an individual constituency basis the Liberal Party posed little direct threat. The interaction between the two 
parties instead was about the extent to which Liberal voters could be integrated into the Conservatives’ 
electoral coalition.  
Churchill was seeking to isolate Clement Davies and saw inter-party co-operation as a means of sharpening 
cleavages within the Liberal Party. Churchill publicly noted Violet Bonham Carter and Archibald Sinclair 
were excluded from the Liberal’s election broadcast in 1950 and, with destructive kindness, Churchill 
offered two of the five Conservative spots to them, on the grounds both were sufficiently ‘anti-Socialist’. 
This was a gesture grounded, at least in part, in sincerity – he thought they had been unfairly side-lined as 
big hitters and personal friends. It posed the question to Clement Davies of whether more exposure (and 
implicitly, more seats and votes further down the line) was worth the sacrifice of Liberal independence. 
Churchill’s choice of Bonham Carter and Sinclair underlined (and deliberately exacerbated) the seemingly 
unresolvable tensions in the Liberal Party. In earlier drafts of his invitation, which Churchill was persuaded 
to retract, Churchill referred to a ‘’Clement Davies Group’ within the Liberal Parliamentary Party as being 
																																																								
4 Eventually costing the underwriters £25,000, as the Liberals went on to lose 311 deposits. 
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responsible for promoting the ‘extraordinary policy of four hundred dummy candidates, in the hope of 
splitting votes’ (Churchill Draft Statement, 30/1/1950, CHUR2/64/110). Although Churchill wished to 
create the impression of Davies and the parliamentary leadership as detached from nationwide Liberal 
feeling, it was telling that Bonham Carter principally feared the charge she was ‘a Quisling, a Tory puppet, 
a ventriloquist’s doll’, and privately she spoke of her concern about letting down the Liberal ‘rank-and-file’ 
(Bonham Carter and Pottle, 2000: 28-29).  
The most public form of Liberal frustration with the tactics of the Conservative Party during the 1950 
campaign was what they saw as a deliberate misappropriation of the word ‘Liberal’ in the candidatures of 
Tories and their recently reaffirmed electoral partners, the Liberal Nationals. Davies was frustrated by at 
least four newly created associations were christened ‘United Liberal and Unionist Associations’, giving no 
hint that this involved only Liberal Nationals, despite the continuing presence of an independent Liberal 
Party in these areas. 5  It was clear Churchill and Woolton viewed the mixed nomenclature of these 
associations to be a positive thing: Churchill had suggested, in late 1948, that the ‘most impressive’ list of 
constituency names should be published (Churchill to Woolton, 12/12/1948, CHUR 2/64/86). They did 
not need to bother. Instead, Clement Davies was prompted to write a public letter to Churchill, published 
in The Times (which also reported that solicitors had been consulted), protesting this ‘unworthy subterfuge’. 
Davies asked whether ‘it is too much to ask that the Conservative party should fight under its own name, 
or at least one which does not clash with that of another Party recognized throughout the world’ (Clement 
Davies to Churchill CHUR 2/64/140-42; The Times 24/1/1950). This clearly continued to rankle after the 
election and, in his response to the King’s Speech of 1950, Davies attacked the fact that, on ballot papers, 
there had been ‘Liberal-Unionists, National-Unionists. Liberal-Conservatives and Conservative Liberals – 
in fact, the Conservatives have done their very utmost to make the fullest use of the name Liberal’ (Hansard, 
HC Debs, 7/3/1950, v. 472, c. 156).  
Churchill’s response – aired publicly via The Telegraph – was both insouciant and lethal. Firstly, he thanked 
Davies ‘for writing to me amidst your many cares’, before going on to provide an exposition of the decline 
of the Liberal Party’s strength since 1914 (which required a briefing to make sure he got the exact figures 
right, despite being among their number at that stage of his political career (Memorandum, undated, CHUR 
2/64/131)). Churchill pointed out both that Davies had been a member of the National Government, a 
source of some intra-party difficulty for Davies as well as a swipe at Liberal differentiation, and went on to 
argue that – by fighting the election on as broad a front as possible – the Liberals had committed to ‘a 
policy of vote-splitting on a fantastic scale’ (Memorandum CHUR 2/64/130). Churchill’s strong anti-
Liberal position led Conservative candidates reliant upon Liberal votes in Con-Lab seats to implore him, 
despite ‘Liberal stupidity’, to ‘sound a note of regret, rather than one of antagonism’ at the lack of a formal 
inter-party agreement (Gibson Watt to Churchill, 8/2/50, CHUR 2/64/156).  																																																								
5 He cited Dunstable, Kirriemuir, North Angus and Torrington (Davies to Churchill, 23/1/1950, CHUR 2/64/140-
141)  
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The two parties ultimately did not come all that close to forming a national agreement, and had drifted into 
increasing conflict by the 1950 campaign. Given that, the exception of a localised co-operation agreement 
between the Conservative and Liberal parties in Huddersfield is striking. The circumstances and context of 
Huddersfield sheds light on why it was difficult to replicate on a national scale, and the way it was discussed 
by both parties provides an indication that they wished to put different symbolic weight on the agreement. 
Firstly, there were clear localised dynamics conducive to an inter-party agreement. Evans and Taylor (1984: 
261) argued the local political culture of Huddersfield was important, given the ‘locally dominant ‘image of 
society’ was of an interdependent whole in which conflict was a product of self-interest, obduracy and 
ignorance’. The towns also had a self-image as nonconformist Liberal strongholds, in which the perception 
of Liberal strength was resilient in the face of the party’s structural electoral decline. And, furthermore, 
there was a social cohesion between Conservative and Liberal elites that, by January 1950, was certainly not 
in evidence between the national Conservative and Liberal hierarchies. There were clear and instructive 
differences in the way both parties wished this localised co-operation to be framed in the national press. 
While welcoming co-operation the Liberal Party were quick to state there was ‘no pact, no arrangement, no 
bargain’, pre-empting comparisons to the National Liberal Party (Manchester Guardian, 14/1/1950: 7); 
Conservative Central Office, on the other hand, was clear it was an ‘anti-Socialist front’, and a ‘reciprocal 
arrangement’ (Manchester Guardian, 17/1/1950: 8). 
March 1950-October 1951 
 
Conservative Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
The Liberal candidate in Huddersfield West was one of nine Liberal MPs returned in the 1950 election, and 
the Conservatives fell short with a Labour majority of six. Constituency-level analysis on the effect of 
Liberal intervention found a Liberal candidate predominantly split the Labour vote in urban constituencies, 
and the Conservative vote in rural areas (Piersenné Memorandum, The Liberal Vote 15/3/50, CHUR 
2/64/193). It is perhaps no surprise, therefore, that the idea of a mixed system of proportional 
representation in urban areas, and the Alternative Vote in rural areas, was gamed and analysed by the 
Conservative Party. The effects of both, either with or without further boosting through a Lib-Con pre-
electoral coalition, were beneficial to the Conservatives – ‘eating into the Socialist blocs’ in urban areas 
(Macmillan and Catterall, 2003: 5/10/1950, 21), and consolidating Liberal preferences into second 
preference votes for the Conservatives. Calculations showed Conservatives would gain 18 ‘county’ seats 
under the Alternative Vote from Labour if the Liberal vote split as Gallup polling showed, and 69 if Liberal 
votes translated wholly to the Conservatives (Memorandum, ‘Application of Second Ballot to Minority 
Seats’, Piersenné, 13/3/50). Surveying the Leicester North East by-election in September 1950, Macmillan 
noted that he felt the benefits of an alliance could be augmented by the Conservatives ‘offer[ing] 
proportional representation in the big cities in exchange. It could do no harm and It could do good’ 
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(Macmillan and Catterall, 2003: 5/10/1950, 21)’. He also felt that the relationship between the two parties 
in non-proportional seats could be additive, noting: 
There is a great difference between the mere non-intervention of a Liberal and the active 
support of the Liberal Party. If we could get this we could win the general election. 
Without it, I fear there are as many places where there being no Liberal candidates will 
injure us as there are constituencies where it will help us. (Ibid.) 
This was clearly the interpretation of the electoral landscape that Churchill subscribed to, and he told 
Woolton that practical co-operation between the parties was needed given the clear short-term electoral 
challenge (Churchill to Woolton, 2/8/1950, CPA CCO 20/1/2). Duncan Sandys, founder of the European 
Movement grouping that had worked with prominent Liberals (as well as being Churchill’s son-in-law) 
appeared to follow the same logic. Sandys noted that, for a comfortable Conservative-friendly majority, the 
Conservatives needed Liberal co-operation in twenty constituencies if the Conservative vote remained 
static.  He named 13 examples of seats, noting a much larger list of 66 constituencies could be produced 
where the Liberal Party had polled higher than the gap between the two big parties (Sandys Memorandum, 
undated, CHUR/2/64/212-6). There was, however, little pondering on whether the pact would be additive 
and eat into Labour support, or subtractive and detrimental to the possibility of joint constituency gains.  
Throughout, a divide existed between those in favour of absorbing the Liberal Party wholesale, and those 
who were more in favour of a co-operative agreement: Lord Woolton and his effective deputy, the General 
Director Stephen Piersenné, believed a mass exodus from the Liberals and a Liberal National style 
‘arrangement’ possible; those such as Butler who were in favour of promoting proportional representation, 
‘took it for granted throughout that a Liberal Party would be in existence for some time ahead’ (Wager, 
2017: 120). Woolton told Macmillan that ‘the less we talk about making arrangements with the Liberals the 
better - it only flatters them’ (Woolton to Macmillan, 6/5/1950, CCO 20/1/2) and told Churchill that 
Clement Davies had ‘vastly over-estimated his following in the country’ (Woolton to Churchill, CHUR 
2/64/150). But Churchill, on 29 March 1950, had set up a five-man study group with the express purpose 
to ‘examine any possibilities that may exist in improving the relations of the Conservative and Liberal 
parties’, and taking advantage of the renewed enthusiasm for co-operation. It contained three out of four 
of what Bale (2012: 32) calls ‘the inner shadow cabinet’ – Macmillan, Butler and James Stuart – and excluded 
those such as Salisbury and Bracken who had explicitly voiced their opposition to party name changes and 
Liberal co-operation. Churchill chose Butler, who he knew was in favour, to chair the committee.  
 
While the committee had been formed in a meeting which Woolton was notably absent, Churchill clearly 
felt he had no choice but to give Woolton full access to its deliberations (Salisbury to Woolton, 1/10/1950, 
MS Woolton 20/128-131). Woolton saw his role as checking the enthusiasm for formal co-operation. In 
the first meeting of the committee, in which he was present, Woolton argued the party should ‘throw the 
doors of constituency associations open to Liberals’, but also argued the undesirability of entering into 
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‘deals’ and suggested they should examine electoral reform as they did any ‘points of difference, in the spirit 
of a general appeal for unity’. In the second meeting of the four core members, in which Woolton was 
absent, there was a consensus that a party-led enquiry (and they had in mind a Chair in favour of co-
operation) into electoral reform had two merits: persuading the party-at-large that electoral reform was not 
being ‘put upon’ them by those in favour of reform, as well as signalling to the Liberal Party who would be 
‘comforted that the subject was being honourably examined’ (Questions Arising Between Conservatives 
and Liberals, 15/5/1950, CCO 20/2/1). Butler’s summary of the meeting also suggested the 1922 
Committee would be too leaky to be a forum for discussion – any arrangement would need to be agreed, 
then offered wholesale rather than being discussed within the parliamentary party. 
 
The dynamic between Churchill and Woolton was key to explaining discussions around a Con-Lib 
agreement. Churchill believed in the symbolic value of reaching out to the Liberal Party. He placed the 
Liberal Party’s electoral showing at the heart of his reply to Attlee’s King’s Speech of 1950. Churchill 
simultaneously called for a Select Committee to examine electoral reform while also attempting to pre-empt 
and delegitimise the Liberals’ relative power: calling for ‘regard for national rather than party interests’, and 
against ‘petty bargaining’ and the influence of smaller parties on the grounds that: 
we do not wish to emulate some foreign Parliaments where small parliamentary parties are 
able, by putting themselves and their favours in the balance, to sway the course of 
considerable events (Hansard, HC, 7/3/1950 v. 472, c. 144). 
 Yet he also argued the 2.6 million Liberal voters were ‘voting upon a strong tradition’, and appeared to 
allude to the Liberal Party when he argued that the new parliament, fresh from facing the electorate, was a 
‘more potent body than the mere numerical aggregate of its parties suggests’ (Ibid). In essence, this was a 
call for co-operation on the grounds of mutual co-existence: he privately described his strategy as ‘live and 
let live, neither set out to destroy the Liberal Party, nor build them up’ (Salisbury to Woolton, 1/10/1950, 
MS Woolton 20/128-131). The Conservative parliamentary party, who continued to be largely opposed to 
electoral reform (The Times 3 May 1950: 6) but two days following the King’s Speech debate Churchill 
defended it in front of the 1922 Committee and, in the view of Conservative backbencher, made: 
a somewhat ineffective defence of his ill-considered proposal … it was clear the majority 
of people in the room were also opposed to it. Clearly this upset Winston terribly and for 
a moment I thought he was going to threaten to resign the leadership … it will cause a lot 
of trouble in the Party, Winston Must Go is already being whispered. (Ball and Headlam, 
1999: 622 (9/3/1950)) 
Woolton argued that political gravity would draw Liberals to the Conservative Party, and urged Churchill 
to ‘be patient for a while, and I think we will get what we want’ (Woolton to Churchill 12/5/1950 221), 
believing that ‘spontaneous constituency level agreements’ would only occur if ‘those of us who are 
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occupying important positions were to leave the matter alone for a while’ (Woolton to Teviot 23/9/1950, 
MS Woolton 25). Woolton told Butler and Churchill that he would begin a discussion with Clement Davies 
about the constituency-level co-operation, but did not do so (Butler to Bonham Carter, 3/8/50; Howard, 
1987: 264). There was a difference in perspective: Woolton saw a slow drift caused by the Liberal’s 
organisational decline as the best route forward to soak up Liberal support, while for Churchill the public, 
performative embrace of the Liberal Party was pivotal.  
This power struggle was well known. As an editorial in the Lib-Con hotbed of co-operation, the Huddersfield 
Examiner (8/5/1950: 8) – edited by the pro co-operation, former Liberal President Elliot Dodds – put it: 
‘the prospects for an understanding between the two parties … appears to depend on whether the direction 
of Conservative strategy is to rest with Mr Churchill or Lord Woolton’. In simple terms, this was a 
distinction between a party organisation concerned with intra-party discontent and cohesion, and elite 
politicians concerned with gaining and retaining office. This was an organisational dynamic exacerbated by 
the idiosyncrasies of a party leader detached not just from his parliamentary party but also from many elite-
level colleagues beyond his core circle: Churchill claimed not to remember the names of some of his 
younger members of cabinet (Wyburn Powell, 2003: 266). While previous attempts to get rid of him as 
leader had receded, and both contemporary and historical opinion was that his performance had improved 
as the parliamentary battle heated up, he was still lacking support on negotiations for co-operation with the 
Liberal Party: Lord Salisbury argued he had ‘not been straight with his colleagues’, who felt Churchill, in 
the weeks following the agreement and his comments in parliament, was attempting to force it through 
without consultation – a tactic that was ‘apart from anything else, likely to impair still further Winston’s 
position in the party; and that is not good as it is’ (Salisbury to Woolton, 1/10/1950, MS Woolton 20/130). 
Churchill argued he was ‘getting a good deal of support in the course I am taking’ (Churchill to Howard 
204 13/4/50). But he was clearly wary – following the 1922 Committee meeting – that lack of support in 
the party for an arrangement with the Liberals could kill the idea stone dead: the suggestion from a 
Conservative candidate and Liberal defector for a resolution in support of negotiations, at a meeting of the 
Central Council of the National Union, was rebuffed on these grounds (Ibid.). Indeed, a motion against 
Proportional Representation on the grounds it ‘would wreck the two-party system on which our 
Parliamentary government is founded’ was carried at the meeting (Central Council Annual Meeting Agenda, 
29/4/50, CHUR2/64/180). There was also a sense among many Tories that the internal contradictions 
and difficulties were tearing apart the Liberal Party’s electoral and organisational coalition – a survey 
commissioned to focus explicitly on Liberal voters found that ‘Conservatism appears less abhorrent than 
Socialism to the Liberal voter … this distinction, however, becomes less obvious at Party Executive Level’ 
(July 1950, Public Opinion Summaries, CCO 180/2/3). Woolton encouraged area Chairman Reports on 
the Liberals to be compiled and presented to Churchill at the Party’s Blackpool Conference in 1950, and 
the idea of Liberal co-operation was near universally panned. The expectation was that the rival party would 
soon collapse: the London Area Chairman representative in arguing that ‘the Liberal Party in London is 
	 61	
dying and, broadly speaking, is already too weak to matter’ (Blackpool: Area Chairman Reports, The 
Liberals, CCO 20/1/2).  
Liberal Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
After the result of February 1950, senior Liberals, including the previously anti ex-leaders Lord Samuel and 
Lord Sinclair, began to warm to the idea of Conservative-Liberal co-operation, and informed Rab Butler 
of their change of position (Butler to Churchill, 3/5/1950, CHUR 2/64/222). Certainly, there was a feeling 
a broad front strategy, fighting as many constituencies as possible and portraying the party as a truly national 
force, had been tested to failure. Lord Reading, a key opponent of this strategy, resigned the party whip 
and argued the ‘attempt to hold the balance between the two main parties’ as a truly third force in the party 
system ‘is calculated by all the precedents of recent political history to lead to ultimate destruction’ (Reading 
to Samuel, 5/4/1950, MS Woolton 20/17). What was clear, even among those in favour of an agreement, 
was that electoral reform should be pivotal. Some Conservatives, even those sympathetic to Liberal 
demands, felt electoral reform could be fudged. Macmillan felt that ‘in the event of a Conservative-Liberal 
alliance, or entente, coming into being, the Liberal demand for electoral reform would, in fact, become 
much weaker’ (Macmillan to Woolton, 21/4/1950, CCO20/1/2). Equally, Butler felt the prospect of 
electoral reform had such low support within the Conservative Party that he told Bonham Carter that, if 
pressed, it would get ‘so resounding a negative answer as would do us all harm. I am particularly anxious 
not to bring the matter to the front for the time being’ (Bonham Carter to Butler 1/8/1950 In: Howard, 
1987: 244). Intra-party concerns for pro-merger figures meant they were less sympathetic for the clear need 
for a statement on electoral reform, if negotiations were to gain traction. But Bonham Carter was clear that 
‘the absence of any reference to electoral reform will hit every Liberal in the eye and they will draw the 
conclusion that the battle has been lost’ (Ibid.).  
 
It was around this period, at the start of May, when Davies was most clearly in two minds, moving from 
‘an attitude of co-operation with us to one of hostility to any negotiations’ (Butler to Churchill, 3/5/1950, 
CHUR 2/64/222). In response to a push from Woolton to secure further defections by highlighting nine 
areas of Liberal-Conservative policy overlap – and again bringing up the spectre of the Liberal National’s 
deal in 1947 – the Liberal leadership was prompted to make a public statement pronouncing the party’s 
independence. As The Times (3/5/1950: 6) noted, the Liberal Party Committee’s statement pronouncing 
independence seemed ‘sufficiently non-committal not to rule out the possibility of co-operation with the 
Conservatives’. However, institutional functions of Westminster continued to squeeze the party and make 
its claim to act as a bold, independent and cohesive counter-weight to the two main parties, such a large 
element of Clement Davies’ broadcasts in 1950, increasingly difficult. As focus on the machinations of 
parliamentary votes was increased by close parliamentary arithmetic. Liberal divisions and splits were 
increasingly mocked and highlighted (Douglas, 1971: 170). For Churchill, the new parliament was more 
potent in the sense that it was more susceptible to party political gaming – he flatly refused Davies’ 
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suggestion the parties could agree to a limit on hours in which divisions could be called, arguing it could 
‘create a dangerous precedent affecting the whole position of the House of Commons (Churchill to Davies, 
9/5/1950 CHUR 2/64/230). Churchill attempted to strong-arm the Liberals by highlighting the pro and 
anti-nationalisation dimension to the parliamentary make-up – arguing that ‘the electors, by a majority of 
1,750,000 have voted against the advance to a Socialist State, and, in particular, against the nationalisation 
of steel and other industries’ (Hansard, HC, 7/3/1950, v. 472 c. 155). By pressing nationalisation as a key 
cleavage issue, Liberals were forced to clarify whether they would work in active co-operation with the 
Conservatives throughout the parliament, or prioritise the delaying of an election. Churchill added an 
amendment to the King’s Speech denouncing steel nationalisation and prior to the division, Attlee gleefully 
asked: 
what really is the design of this? The design, of course, is directed to the Liberal Party 
more than to the Government… (and) the right hon. Gentleman, is much more interested 
in trying to destroy the Liberal Party than the Government (Hansard, HC, 9/3/1950, v. 
472, c. 592).  
This dynamic ran in parallel to private attempts to persuade Davies of the merits of an inter-party 
agreement: emphasising both the merits, and the inevitability, of political co-operation. 
 
1951 election and the offer of coalition 
 
By 1951, given the increased certainty of Liberal disintegration following their sharp organizational decline, 
Attlee was aware that the outcome would turn ‘on the way the Liberal electors cast their vote’ (Crowcroft 
and Theakston, 2013: 79). The Liberal electoral map – the number of seats in which a Liberal candidate 
stood – had shrunk from 475 to 109 constituencies between 1950 and 1951. The Liberal Party was, 
ultimately, effectively squashed into submission by a reversion to a two-party system that, David Butler 
concluded, meant that the 1951 election ‘was a battle between two teams of men, two alternative Prime 
Ministers and Cabinets, to win the support of the people’. The Liberal Party’s electoral irrelevance in large 
swathes of the country made their continuing independence increasingly moot. Liberal HQ sent 
questionnaires to candidates in each constituency in which there was no Liberal candidate, asking a series 
of policy questions on the premise that those closest to Liberal views would be endorsed. Conservative 
Central Office sent guidance to candidates on how to answer these questions – defending policy on 
conscription, for example, on the grounds of a defence of the authority of the United Nations – while 
Labour did not (Questions of Policy, Liberal Questionnaire, CPA CCO 3/2/112). David Butler’s account 
of the 1951 election argued that these questionnaires were significant while also being inconsequential, the 
Liberal activity that attracted ‘most publicity’ in the campaign, but which had no or ‘very small’ effect on 
whether depleted Liberal associations actively endorsed candidates. Butler (1952: 65) also remarked that: 
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Mr Davies’ broadcast, it was widely noted, attacked only the Labour Party and, on points 
of policy, said little that would have caused surprise if it had come from a Conservative ... 
in an election in which a large number of Liberals had no candidate of their own, this 
emphasis was regarded by many as particularly significant.  
In his element when speaking for Violet Bonham Carter as a joint Liberal-Conservative candidate in Colne 
Valley, Churchill argued that ‘the British nation now has to make one of the most momentous choices in 
its history, between two ways of life, between individual liberty and State domination’ (The Times, 
16/10/1951: 5).  
Clement Davies and the Ministry of Education 
Churchill’s post-election offer of a cabinet position for Clement Davies, in which the Liberal leader ‘present 
at the formulation of all government policy’, has been interpreted in two ways. The historian of the Liberal 
Party Chris Cook believes the offer was ‘presumably one of genuine goodwill to the Liberals’. Graham 
Jones (2000: 13) points out that the Ministry of Education, which was offered to Davies, was ultimately not 
appointed cabinet status in the Churchill administration. However, Churchill had kept key members of his 
cabinet waiting while Davies considered the offer, including Harold Macmillan. In truth, both 
interpretations speak to the core of Churchill’s calculations on the Liberal Party. They also provide an 
accurate reflection of Davies’ leadership style and instincts. The offer shows Churchill’s belief in the 
importance and strength of liberalism, as well as his impatience at continuing attempts to maintain its 
electoral and political independence from the Conservative Party – the offer of coalition did not come with 
any offer, note, to look at the prospect of electoral reform (The Times, 30/10/1951: 4). It also aligned with 
his style and the importance he placed on political symbolism and the historical, structural effect on the 
party system he wished to create was clear: Churchill had wanted the sons of Lloyd George and Asquith in 
the cabinet, and wished to include Violet Bonham Carter as a junior minister (Wyburn Powell, 208-09).6 
Davies rejection of co-operation was also emblematic of the his intra-party strategy and positioning: it 
followed consultation with both wings of his party, and led to a modest party statement which offered ad 
hoc ‘support for measures clearly conceived in the interests of the country as a whole’ (The Times, 
29/10/1951: 10). If it was ‘the final ringing affirmation of the Liberal determination to survive as an 
independent political force’ (Sell, 1987: 48), the defiance involved was understated. 
Conclusion 
Institution-Facing Constraints 
The 1951 General Election is a key touchstone for political scientists charting the rise, fall (and potential 
resurgence) of two-party politics in Britain: the combined Labour and Conservative vote share of 96.8% 
																																																								
6 Gwilym Lloyd George, a Conservative MP, was made Minister of Food. Cyril Asquith was not. 
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had not reached that peak before, and is highly unlikely to do so again (Curtice, 2010: 626). The 2015 
general election and the post-coalition collapse of the Liberal Democrats prompted a revisit of the political 
geography of the Liberal Party’s electoral squeeze in the immediate post-war period, and a historical 
comparison with their concentrations of support. The immediate post-war period was formative in 
entrenching orthodoxies about party politics, which would go largely unchallenged until the Liberal 
resurgence in the 1970s (Butler, 1986). The idea of the Westminster system as a byword for two-party 
politics was obviously not a new one in 1945. But the British polity had emerged from an inter-war period 
defined by successive coalition governments (Williamson, 1992). It is also true that the Liberal leadership 
in 1945 did not foresee their electoral collapse, and continued until the election of 1950 to believe a party 
system in which they could be strengthened and resurgent was an immediate short to medium-term 
possibility, plausible within two electoral cycles. Classical conceptions of the British Political Tradition that 
rest on an essential continuity and dualism in British Politics have to account for the fact Westminster’s 
institutions had not hindered an inter-war period of three party politics and coalition governance. But they 
also need to give greater thought to the causal mechanisms that led to the clear post-1945 squeezing of the 
Liberal Party, and an extended period of effective two-party politics. If 1945 is one of the ‘bookends’ of 
modern political history (Kavanagh and Morris, 1994: 9), the processes involved in the transition from a 
period of coalition and three-party politics to two-party politics is crucial to understand. As Ben Pimlott 
(1989: 13) argued, the electorate quickly became: 
sandbagged in their electoral trenches … anonymous infantry of two implacably opposed 
armies in an era of adversarial politics, with the middle-way Liberals floundering in no 
man’s land. 
Pimlott argued that levels of support for the two main parties belied the idea that a post-war consensus 
existed beyond the arena politics of parliament. Pimlott criticised Samuel Beer, a progenitor of the concept 
of a British Political Tradition, for arguing there was broad agreement on common social goals – pointing 
to the sharp division in electoral choice between two rival parties as evidence of conflict rather than 
consensus (Ibid.). But Pimlott and Beer are in greater agreement than first appears. Key to Beer’s (1965) 
classical conception of the British Political Tradition was that its pathologies (or, Beer would argue, its 
strengths) emanated from values and ideas present within the collective public consciousness, refracted 
through a political elite as much as determined by the political leaders themselves. If two-party politics and 
a corresponding distrust of inter-party co-operation existed in British political culture, this suggests it 
emanated from the voters. As a result, a key question when tracing the electoral process from June 1945 to 
November 1951 – the disbanding of the wartime coalition, through to the Conservatives’ return to office 
– is the extent to which the Liberal Party’s electoral trajectory was institutionally driven by a dislike of inter-
party co-operation among voters, and determined by an electoral system that prohibits individual level 
multi-party choice while fostering artificial parliamentary majorities.  
	 65	
This was an interpretation that the Liberal Party subscribed to, and led an unspoken paradox at the heart 
of the Liberal electoral pitch. The party’s leadership believed the electorate favoured a two-party system. 
But they were already treated as an implausible party of majority government in the 1945 election, and the 
result cemented their third-party status. The Liberal leadership subsequently framed their potential 
resurgence as an immediate transition to minority government, or an alternative opposition. There was little 
public attempt to sell the party as offering possible co-operation in government, with the fear this would 
mean they would be little more than an adjunct to one of the two largest parties. Particularly among Liberal 
politicians against co-operation with the Conservative Party, there was a belief that the voting public bought 
into a majoritarian political culture, and a concern the party could only be taken seriously if they continued 
to be seen as a national force, capable of forming a single party government. Likewise, Conservative 
advocates and opponents of co-operation with the Liberals as a means of achieving office cited public 
opinion as a hurdle to overcome. The supporter of co-operation, Harold Macmillan (Draft Speech: 
Macmillan to Woolton’, CPA CCO 20/2/1), argued that ‘anything that savoured of a ‘political deal’ from 
expediency rather than principles, would be badly received by the public’, while Stephen Piersenné, who 
argued against an agreement within Conservative Central Office, felt that: 
a pact which had as its object the defeat of a third party would be stigmatised as an unfair 
political ruse, and would be so regarded by the electorate. (CPA CCO 20/1/2 Piersenné 
Memorandum, ‘The Approach to Liberals’, 24/1/1950) 
This evident self-reflection on the elitist, secretive nature of British politics – a key pathology identified by 
theorists critical of the BPT – suggests elite agents were keenly aware that co-operation might be badly 
received or poorly understood. The Liberal Party’s further retreat in the general election of 1950 appears 
to support the hypothesis that voters had little appetite for gaming a system where the norm remained a 
single party executive. Yet it is not clear whether the extent of this scepticism of co-operation was grounded 
in electoral reality. A Gallup poll, with fieldwork conducted following the 1951 general election, asking 
whether ‘you approve or disapprove if the winning party formed a Coalition government?’, found 48% 
approval, and 30% disapproval of a coalition (CPA CCO 180/2/3 ‘Public Opinion Summary’ 1/11/1951). 
There was clearly a belief among some supporters of the idea that overt calls for co-operation could be 
beneficial: one Conservative candidate, in a seat where a Liberal did not stand in 1950, felt the ‘psychological 
effect of Conservative-Liberal unity in this by-election would, I am certain, have swept to my support a 
large proportion of the hesitant and " floating " voters’ (Taylor, Letter ‘The Liberal Function’, The Times 
30/9/1950: 7). The Liberal Party’s one gain in the 1951 general election, Bolton West, resulted from a Lib-
Con pact in operation. Within discussions of the idea of electoral reform, tentatively kicked around in the 
early months of 1950, discussion centred on calculations of how advantageous it would be to the 
Conservative Party. Indeed, in some senses it is remarkable how much the Liberal vote held up in 
constituencies in which they continued to fight the 1951, in spite of their significantly reduced spread of 
candidates, and the mathematical impossibility they could form even the largest opposition party (Butler, 
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1951). There was clearly a belief that framing politics as a two-party competition was electorally expedient, 
and that support would continue to drain from the Liberal Party because voters viewed the party as an 
unserious electoral proposition.  
Party-Facing Constraints  
Primarily, accounts of Liberal decline have focused on structural cleavages within the electorate that made 
the existence of a third party, representing neither class-based interest, electorally redundant. This idea of 
structural determination is well-grounded, but is not the whole picture. If nothing else, this electoral division 
had to transplant itself, messily, onto a political system in which the Liberal Party were a continuing 
presence, despite pre-war attempts to grind the party out of the British politics. The language and rhetoric 
used to do so between 1945 and 1951 often hung on the ethos and preconceptions of the institutions of 
Westminster, as much as the defence of particular social interests per se. What was notable was how actors 
within the two largest parties, particularly the Conservative leadership, produced rhetorical arguments that 
emphasised a two-party divide and used a narrative of two-party politics as a means of limiting Liberal 
votes, and encouraging Liberal members to join the Conservative Party.  
Lord Woolton, in particular, saw the electoral redefinition of the Conservative Party as an effective 
alternative to pursuing cross party co-operation. Woolton argued that overt discussion of co-operation 
would be counter-productive as ‘many Liberals in the country (who) have come to the conclusion that the 
two-party-system is more likely to be effective than a three-party-system, would hesitate about leaving an 
independent Liberal Party’ (Woolton to Teviot, 13/2/1950, MS Woolton 125-26). There was an assumption 
Liberal members could be persuaded of the merits of joining the Conservative Party by the Liberals’ 
diminishing electoral weight and its uncertain ideological direction in Westminster. The morale of Liberal 
members was thought to be weakened, causing ‘dismay in Liberal ranks’ and making them more susceptible 
to defection (Public Opinion: December 1950, CPA CCO 180/2/3). There is little evidence for this. True, 
Violet Bonham Carter railed against the fact the ‘lunatic fringe seems to have complete command’, and 
there was discontent the Liberal leadership was refusing to acknowledge the party’s new electoral realities, 
while an amendment that the party should oppose any inter-party localised ‘pacts’ was defeated (The Times, 
2/10/1950: 2). But it was Clement Davies’ cry that ‘we refuse to get out. We refuse to die. We are 
determined to live and fight on’ (Graham Jones, 2000: 100) that resonated most, and a resolution strongly 
opposing a limit on Liberal candidates – effectively, the kind of deal that would mean a national co-
operation with the Conservative Party – was roundly rejected.  
Many Liberals, not least Davies, felt any abandonment of independence and autonomy would be both 
permanent and terminal. Liberal Party elites held a clear narrative on the Liberal National split, making the 
possibility of co-operation much more difficult than advocates within the Conservative Party realised. 1931, 
and the spectre of Ramsay MacDonald it induces, is particularly important in the shared history of the 
Labour Party. But the split it created in the Liberal Party was also raw, and powerful, throughout this period 
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for Liberals. It had a direct effect on the strategy and identity of the party. As a result, the Liberal Party was 
increasingly self-defined by the fact it was not the Liberal National party. Violet Bonham Carter told Megan 
Lloyd George that, despite operating on separate wings of a polarised and reduced party, the Liberal Party 
was the ‘soil in which our roots were planted – almost at birth – & from which they never could be torn’ 
(Bonham Carter to Lloyd George, 17/11/1947, NLW MS 20475/1368). A belief in insuring the continuity 
of an independent Liberal Party existed among the bulk of Liberals in parliament after 1945, encouraged 
by a strategy that was increasingly concerned with strengthening intra-party organisation as a clear 
alternative to inter-party co-operation. Nor was any split between a Liberal parliamentary elite that after 
1950 was increasingly supportive of an agreement and a party in the country that remained opposed by any 
means a clean one. Ex-leaders and senior figures were increasingly uncertain about the party’s future 
existence without it clearly operating in the slipstream of the Conservative Party. Yet the Liberal Party’s 
MPs were too divided to suggest they were cohesively pro co-operation, or to lobby for it in the wider 
party. Instead Clement Davies’ leadership, much like the party he led, operated in a state of indeterminate 
uncertainty.  
Within the Conservative Party there was a clear disconnect between Churchill and a select core of elite 
cabinet members from the Conservative Parliamentary Party, and the organisation at Conservative Central 
Office. Churchill’s detachment from his party and the divide in the party that meant parliamentarians were 
set against co-operation was problematic. Clearly, there was a contemporary belief this was due to the 
personal and political history of Churchill, who professed himself ‘a Liberal as much as a Tory’, and the 
belief ‘he definitely – emotionally – desires a rapprochement with Liberals’ (Bonham Carter, 2000: 22/4/1947, 
28-29; Toye, 2007). However, there was little that linked other Conservative advocates of co-operation such 
as Rab Butler and Harold Macmillan to the Liberal Party, beyond the idea the new post-war political 
situation and settlement required new strategic thinking. Lord Woolton represented a broader party 
membership sceptical of any agreement with the Liberal Party. Woolton utilised this scepticism as a 
blockage to an agreement. Conservative activists and members held strong anti-Liberal sentiment that 
meant co-operation – particularly as Woolton continued to emphasise each constituency was autonomous, 
guided but not directed from Conservative Central Office – was difficult to achieve.  
Churchill: Defending ‘existing institutional equilibrium’?  
The two-party politics that settled after 1945 was not determined by the agency and heresthetic strategy of 
Winston Churchill. However, what is clear is that Churchill saw an opportunity within the collision between 
the received tradition of two-party politics and the continuation of a frail and near-defunct Liberal Party. 
Both Labour and the Conservatives emphasised battles over policy and ideas fought along a libertarianism 
versus collectivism divide, which Greenleaf (1983) set out as the key organising principle of the British 
Political Tradition. But only Churchill attempted to define and claim the Liberal Party as inherently part of 
his side of that divide. The radical nature of this should not be overstated: this was the encouragement of 
a pre-existing trend for the Liberals to disproportionately shed voters to the Conservative Party. Noting 
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only that the electoral logic was partially achieved by 1951, despite elite negotiations eventually falling well 
short, also underestimates the extent to which Churchill desired a formal rapprochement with the Liberal 
party as an end in itself. But it was, nevertheless, a clear use of the concept of co-operation as a heresthetic 
strategy to reshape party politics for specific strategic ends. This meant public dismissal of the Liberal Party, 
but also reaching out to key figures in the party. This explains what is at first sight a curious advocacy of 
proportional representation after 1950, with a continuing and strident belief in two-party politics.  
Churchill was attempting the balancing act of acquiring Liberal support while leaving the Liberal Party on 
life support and reliant upon Conservative goodwill. Churchill’s multi-faceted approach and offering – 
public pronouncements and private backchannels, policy convergence and the prospect of electoral 
salvation – was an attempt to bind and direct a drifting Liberal Party, particularly those at the top, into the 
inevitability of an agreement with the Conservatives, or at least to force them into a choice between an 
agreement with either the Conservatives or the Labour Party. This can be read as a clear example of using 
inter-party politics to establish and maintain a two-party system, using Liberal support to reinforce a claim 
to national government that had not succeeded in 1945. It was a strategy with two key elements: the squeezing 
of Liberal support and the decisions open to their leadership, and the embracing of the Liberal party and an 
offer of a way out through Conservative life support. Churchill’s his ‘tough love’ approach was a successful 
five year-long attempt at strategic manipulation, a prolonged pursuit of the Liberal party that was based 
upon a belief in their electoral interdependence and a very clear reading of his political environment.  
Clement Davies: disrupting ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
If the performative and the rhetorical have any weight, then Clement Davies – the ‘forgotten leader’ of the 
Liberal Party – must be the antithesis to Winston Churchill’s bombast. There was also a clear strategic 
difference between the two leaders: Davies’ principal aim was a defence of the Liberal Party’s independence, 
rather than the acquiring of office (which he personally rejected) or even any redefinition of the party’s 
political and electoral positioning (when he failed to achieve). There was little attempt to interlink this 
survival with any medium-term interest in the logic or purpose of electoral reform. The party’s drift to the 
right was principally a result of the fact Davies was a ‘jellyfish swung by every tide’ (Butler to Churchill, 
3/5/1950, CCO 20/1/2). Far from an attempt to hold back those tides, Davies’ strategy was essentially to 
prove the Liberal Party could float instead of sinking into political history.  
This frustrated more proactive politicians on both the left and right of his party. But it was a strategy caused 
by antagonisms between these two sets of politicians within the Liberals. The concept of openly pursuing 
co-operation would have uncovered the policy differences that split the Liberal Party down the middle. 
These Liberal divisions in parliament were seen, despite little evidence, as particularly destructive to the 
party’s standing by Liberal politicians, rival parties and contemporary commentary. This was an ideological 
dispute which had its roots in the Liberal Party’s accommodation with class-based structural cleavages that 
dominated party politics. But as the party’s grim electoral prospects became ever-clearer, it was fought 
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partially through the proxy of the rationale behind electoral co-operation. Clement Davies’ overwhelming 
priority was intra-party healing rather than inter-party bargaining.  
Disciplinary difficulties about policy ends and strategic means in the 1950-51 parliament were increasingly 
framed as damaging to the Liberal Party’s fundamental place in the Westminster system. Davies’ strategy 
was, therefore, an attempt to gain a small foothold for the Liberal Party within the dominant institutional 
equilibrium of two-party politics. Birch’s (1964: 245) influential interpretation of the British Political 
Tradition argued it was essentially formed as a tension, in descending order of importance, between ‘first, 
consistency, prudence and leadership, second, accountability to Parliament and the electorate and third, 
responsiveness to public opinions and demands’. The Liberal Party was thought to provide neither of the 
first two. The continuing (albeit barely sustained) delusion the party could operate as an alternative 
government was shattered by the 1950 result. Operating on a ‘broad front’, and ensuring as many national 
candidatures in constituencies as possible – and, by definition, avoid an inter-party, pre-election 
constituency carve-up with the Conservative Party – was viewed as all important by many Liberals, as it 
spoke to the inherent purpose of the party as a party of government. This made the significant drop in 
candidates in the 1951 election significant. But, in any case, the Liberals were also not an effective or 
cohesive parliamentary grouping. Davies’ calculation was that this rupture in the party’s small parliamentary 
party would have grown into a chasm if Liberal-Conservative links had been fully pursued in electoral or 
governing co-operation. This meant that, for Clement Davies, any electoral strategy predicated on co-
operation was not just moot, but harmful to his electoral aims.  
Birch’s ideas of what constitutes the viability of political action in Westminster do not exist independent of 
strategic rationale – as McAnulla (2006: 22) argues, traditions and norms ‘tend to be used as instruments or 
tools that politicians use to manipulate opinion and to gain power’. There was a growing consensus, fostered 
by politicians from the two larger parties, that it was hard to see where a divided Liberal Party – operating 
neither as a theoretical alternative government nor a cohesive legislative force, and struggling to claim to 
represent a defined liberal creed – could fit within the British political system. Geoffrey Sell (1987: 10) 
argues Davies’ legacy ‘was that he passed on a separate, independent national party further from extinction 
or engulfment by either of the major parties than when he took up the task’. This meant a short-termist 
strategy and little attempt to create distinct institutional changes to the structure of party politics.  Perhaps 
that is why the greatest success of Davies’ leadership, if it is remembered at all, was ensuring survival – a 
success, paradoxically, predicated on leadership inaction and weakness. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Heath-Thorpe Negotiations and a ‘Government of National Unity’, 
February-October 1974 
 
1973 
3 October – Harold Wilson, in his speech to the 1973 Labour conference, rules out co-operation with 
any party. 
9 November – A by-election victory for the Liberal Party in Berwick-Upon-Tweed suggests they could 
be an electoral force in any imminent election – though the prospect of a hung parliament is downplayed. 
1974 
28 February – The general election results in a hung parliament, with Labour the largest party 
1 March, 9am-3.30pm – When results become clear, Heath hold a number of meetings with senior 
cabinet colleagues, discussing the prospects of an agreement with the Liberal party. 
1 March, 5.45pm – A full cabinet meeting discusses the political situation, and agrees that the Liberal 
party should be approached. 
2 March, 4.00pm – Heath and Thorpe meet for negotiations around the prospects of a coalition. 
2 March 6.00pm – Meeting of senior members of cabinet, where another round of negotiations is 
endorsed. 
3 March 5.40pm – Heath and Thorpe have a conversation by telephone, discussing the prospect for an 
agreement. 
March-June – Significant research and internal discussion within the Conservative party about the 
prospects for an inter-party agreement with the Liberals. 
11 June –Whitelaw takes over from Lord Carrington as Conservative Party Chair, seen as the end of an 
possibility of a pre-election Lib-Con agreement. 
25 June –Thorpe and Steel announce the Liberal party’s willingness to enter coalition in a party political 
broadcast. There is a backlash within the party. 
26 June – In a speech to the Press Club, Heath proposes a programme of ‘national unity’ – but does not 
make clear whether this would involve political co-operation with other parties.  
3 September – The Conservative manifesto is released, promising to involve figures from outside the 
Conservatives, regardless of the election result. 
6 October – Heath refers to the possibility of a ‘coalition’ for the first time during the election campaign. 
10 October –Labour win the general election, with a majority of 4. Wilson remains in government 
without any inter-party agreement. 
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Figure 1: General Election February 1974, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
   
Figure 2: General Election October 1974, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Seats (% of total) Labour	  301	(47.4)	 Conservative	  297	(46.8)	 Liberal  14	(2.2)	 SNP	  7	(1.1)	 UUP	  7	(1.1)	 Vanguard	  3	(0.5)	 Plaid	Cymru	  2	(0.3)	 Independent	  2	(0.2)	 SDLP  1	(0.2)	 DUP  1	(0.2)	 
Party Seats (% of total) 
Labour  319 (50.2)  
Conservative  277 (43.6) 
Liberal  13 (2.1) 
SNP  11 (1.7)  
UUP  6 (0.9)  
Vanguard  3 (0.5) 
Plaid Cymru  3 (0.5)  
Independent Rep.  1 (0.2)  
SDLP  1 (0.2) 
DUP  1 (0.2)  
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Friday 1 March, 1974. BBC Studios. 5.45am: 
Robin Day (BBC): I have been asking questions all last night and all today. I would permit myself one 
comment, with all the humility at my command. And that is that I think it is rubbish to talk about a coalition 
any more, there is not going to be a coalition. It is rubbish to talk about deadlock, there is not deadlock.  
Ian Waller (Sunday Telegraph): All this theorising by Robert MacKenzie and David Butler on deadlocks and 
coalitions and things is absolutely, totally irrelevant to the practical politics of British political life. First of 
all, there is no deadlock. As you say, government will continue. And the second point is that there will be 
no contact with the Liberals, either by Mr Heath or Mr Wilson. 
Alan Watkins (New Statesman): I agree. Coalition is being used by some people not as membership of say 
the Liberal Party in a Labour cabinet but Liberal support in a Labour government. Now that is not coalition 
according to my definition of the term. 
Andrew Alexander (Daily Mail): I entirely agree about the use of the word coalition. What they are talking 
about is minority government … it is almost impossible to have a deadlock under our parliamentary system. 
Almost impossible.  
--- 
‘This much is clear: the February general election has broken the Conservatives pretension of being the 
natural governing party; destroyed the two-party system as we have known it, substituting a multi-party 
set-up; given us a taste of minority rule for the first time since 1929; and changed the political outlook 
both inside and outside the Commons’   
Prof Myles Mackie, University of Cambridge (The Times, 13/8/1974: 12) 
Overview: Political Context and Heresthetic Strategies 
1974 was, if not ‘the year that everything changed’ (Terry, 2012), at the very least a significant breakaway 
from the type of governance and election result that British voters had been used to since 1945. Certainly, 
lots of politicians thought British politics had transformed, for better or worse, irrevocably. The two 
elections of 1974, and the party-political machinations in between, provide a case where both pre- and post-
election coalitions were contemplated by both Heath’s Conservative party and the Liberal Party, led by 
Jeremy Thorpe. This upheaval in parliamentary politics had been precipitated by a period of significant 
political uncertainty and crisis, centred principally around industrial strategy and rising inflationary pressures 
(Taylor, 1996: 139-160). Heath had taken office with a Conservative manifesto heavily influenced by the 
‘Selsdon’ doctrine, which promised to revolutionise industrial relations: a laissez faire approach to political 
economy, a tax-cutting agenda and a confrontational approach to trade union relations (Bale, 2012; Heppell, 
2014). Ultimately he was forced – in part by contingent events, in part by a characteristic favouring of 
‘action over inaction’ when economic results were not immediately forthcoming – into a dramatic reversal 
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of his economic stance and a series of policy u-turns: a compulsory incomes policy, an increase in public 
expenditure and interventionist moves towards nationalisation of some failed industries. What this did not 
achieve was a reversal of Heath’s political problems – not least of which was a growing confrontation with 
the National Union of Miners (NUM). This uncertainty translated from governance to electoral politics and 
the question of whether, and if so when, Ted Heath would call a general election in the opening months of 
1974, to gain authority to face down the NUM. This culminated, after a great deal of deliberation and 
hesitation – with cabinet members who would later be key figures in the dynamics of Conservative-Liberal 
negotiations, such as Willie Whitelaw, firmly opposed – in the calling of a general election under the 
confrontational header of ‘Who Governs Britain?’ (Gamble, 1988: 75-78; Hughes, 2012; Kavanagh, 2004: 
355) 
The timing of the decision to call an election for 28 February 1974 is seen as one of the key ‘what ifs’ of 
twentieth century British politics (Bale, 2012: 185; Hughes, 2012: 208-13; Ramsden, 372-75). Both Heath 
and the government he led were ‘gripped with indecision’ and internal conflict over the decision (Heppell, 
2014). This mixture of tactical boldness and a lack of surefootedness consistently emanated from the 
Conservatives’ leader, Ted Heath, a strategic paralysis and association with that had come to define the later 
years of his leadership (Ball, 1996: 328; Campbell, 1994: 577-78; Ziegler, 2010: 423; Heppell, 2014). This 
weakness when it came to acting on his instincts was a defining feature of the political approach of a leader 
‘whose name is almost synonymous with the u-turn’ (Hennessy, 2000: 333). It extended into his relationship 
with the Liberal party, with whom he shared his key policy aimed of a statutory incomes policy and, notably, 
membership of the EEC. The ultimate, and often overlooked, irony is that his policy of ‘national unity’ 
explored in this chapter – half-heartedly pursued and thought through, but nevertheless a radical departure 
from the institutional equilibrium of British politics – was a bold strategy that came too late. Heath believed 
in the idea but undertook it from a position of political weakness when he lacked the capital and 
organisational control to make it happen. It helps us develop and flesh out our existing understanding of 
both Heath and Jeremy Thorpe as political leaders and their political strategy and statecraft. It is a piece of 
the Heath story that needs to be further understood. 
Discussion of inter-party co-operation was prompted by the result of the 28 February snap election. An 
unexpected hung parliament led unsuccessful negotiations between Heath as the incumbent Prime Minister 
and the leader of the Liberal Party, Jeremy Thorpe. These lasted for four days, but were unsuccessful. They 
began the afternoon following the election and lasted until Monday 4 March, with Harold Wilson appointed 
head of a minority Labour government, 17 short of a majority. Immediately, speculation began as to when 
Wilson would call another election. The Conservatives, to counteract their weak electoral position, seized 
on what they saw as (and what the polls told them was) a significant upsurge in the popularity of collegiate 
and inter-party government, to adopt a policy of ‘national unity’. From March to June, the prospect of this 
reinforced by a mutually binding pact over seats with the Liberals was discussed in elite Conservative circles. 
The Liberal Party also discussed at length the possibility of joining a government with the Conservatives. 
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This then moved to pressure on Heath to provide a guarantee of the presence of other parties, particularly 
Liberals, in any hypothetical government, pressure that was ramped up as the election approached and the 
Conservatives’ chances of success on their own remained doubtful. A slim Labour majority ultimately 
punctured the prospect.  
This period between February and October 1974 is an interregnum often ignored in the few concerted 
analyses of Conservative-Liberal relations in the 1970s (Bogdanor, 1996 is an exceptions). This is true of 
analysis of Heath’s leadership of the Conservative Party – with, for example, a recent otherwise 
comprehensive tome on Heath and Thatcher’s periods in opposition pointedly devoting one sentence to 
the period of March-October 1974 (Caines, 2017: 112). Heath’s time in opposition between the failed 
election in February 1974 and his resignation in February 1975 is largely viewed as a period of inexorable 
decline (Kavanagh, 2005: 219-222). The perception of the elections from February to October as a near-
inevitable two-step process, given the unsustainable parliamentary arithmetic facing Wilson, have also 
meant historical assessments of Thorpe’s leadership of the Liberal Party in the inter-election interregnum 
do not delve into understanding the decision-making processes behind Thorpe’s attitude to the 
Conservative party (Cook, 2010; Dutton, 2013).  
It is true that the immediate political implications of the February 1974 general election for inter-party co-
operation were of course determined by the arithmetic of the House of Commons. As this chapter outlines, 
Labour’s 301 seats to the Conservatives’ 297 partially shaped the strategic rationale for a Conservative-
Liberal government, as well as limiting its ultimate appeal given that no two parties could form an overall 
majority – Conservative-Liberal coalition would have fallen two seats short of a majority. The October 
election ended the Liberal party’s brief flirtation with the concept of executive political office. But other 
factors and dynamics self-evidently played out: the interaction between Wilson’s strategic calculus and 
Labour party culture to reinforce a ‘no co-operation’ stance’; the role of the perception, hard to sustain 
given the hung parliament in the House of Commons, that Heath had ‘lost’ the election and Wilson had 
won it. Indeed, it is a key contention of this chapter that elite advocates of inter-party co-operation were 
spurred on not just by short-term political expediency, at first the primary concern for Ted Heath’s 
Conservatives, but also by an historically underappreciated belief that ‘the need for good relations with the 
minor parties is unlikely to be confined to this parliament’ (Ian Gilmour to Heath’, 26/3/1974, CCO 
20/2/7).  
Inter-party dynamics in 1974 can be separated into two distinct types and stages. Firstly, the post electoral 
government formation discussions that ran between 1-4 March, although having a spill over effect on the 
parliament that followed, were self-contained within the uncertainty that ran from election night until 
Harold Wilson’s confirmation as head of a minority Labour administration on 4 March 1974. This chapter 
first sets out the key events that led to a hung parliament following the election of February 1974 and, 
subsequently, the negotiations between Ted Heath and Jeremy Thorpe on forming a Conservative-Liberal 
coalition. The behaviour of elite actors in the February campaign and immediately afterwards was reactive, 
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responding (and floundering) in the face of unforeseen parliamentary arithmetic. Subsequently, coalition 
discussions were instinctive, short-termist and reluctant. These negotiations displayed scant connection to 
wider electoral strategies or agenda setting for either party, beyond a realization that power was about to be 
lost and what that would mean – most likely, Conservative cabinet ministers thought, Labour in power until 
at least 1980. (Resignation of Mr Heath, 16/3/1974, PREM 16/231/7). 
What followed was different. Speculation and internal discussion throughout the parliament of 1974 was 
based on the potential of two forms of arrangement: a pre-electoral pact between the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, and widespread discussions on the basis upon which these parties (and, wholly 
elusively, the Labour Party) would form a hypothetical post-election government under the banner of 
‘National Unity’. The Labour Party, as in the post-election negotiations in March, took a position entirely 
opposed to any agreement. This was based upon Wilson’s belief that discussions of coalition would be 
electorally advantageous for Labour and detrimental to its competitors, a position not wholly shared by 
close advisors and colleagues (Donoghue, 2005: 24/6/1974, 146; Campbell, 2015: 434). Within the 
Conservative and Liberal parties advocates of a bold strategy of electoral co-operation, or a clear indication 
of a Conservative-Liberal coalition, ultimately foundered in the face of elite and wider opposition.  
Significant uncertainty had been injected via the electorate, unforeseen and largely unpredicted by the actors 
it most affected, into a political system that had been characterised and defined by post-war, two-party 
stability. The general election of 28 February 1974 saw a third force vote twice as large as any that had been 
recorded since 1929 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 15). How elite agents the Conservative and Labour parties 
reacted to novel political circumstances differed at almost every turn. Two elections that year, the first in 
February and the second in October, were defined in different ways by attitudes to cross-party co-operation. 
On 28 February, the result meant a hung parliament, and ultimately fruitless ex post negotiations between 
the Conservatives and Liberal parties led to the creation of a minority Labour government. From that 
moment, until 10 October of the same year, and a second election, ex ante speculation and internal 
indecision within the Conservatives and the Liberals – in stark contrast to Harold Wilson’s consistent ‘no 
negotiation’ strategy – meant the possibility and plausibility of a coalition government dominated political 
discussion. 
In part this was due to a bold Conservative move – helped along in part by Heath’s ideological attraction 
to the idea – to co-opt the idea of coalition and ‘National Unity’ for strategic electoral advantage. It was a 
heresthetic manoeuvre designed to blunt the electoral strength of the Liberal party while also benefiting 
from the perceived enthusiasm for political change, aiming to redefine the Conservative party under Heath 
that was going stale without changing the party’s core policy offer. In this sense, it really was about the 
heresthetical restructuring of political competition.  But it was fundamentally restricted by Conservative 
indecision about how far the idea should be developed, and wariness within the wider party machinery 
about committing wholeheartedly to a Conservative-Liberal coalition. Throughout, a significant tension 
existed in the Liberal Party, a discernible divide persisting between an office-orientated leadership and a 
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party keen to retain electoral individuality. This chapter will analyse how politicians responded to, if not a 
seismic change in their electoral environment, then certainly one that put overt discussion of hung 
parliaments, coalitions and inter-party agreements to the fore of British political discourse. The outcome – 
both the Conservative and Labour parties continuing to operate wholly independently of the Liberals and, 
in October, a slim Labour majority – can be understood through analysis of the inter and intra party 
dynamics at each juncture and stage in what was, in the end, an elongated and fruitless bargaining process. 
The Liberal leadership’s appeal for coalition was muted by association with Heath’s Conservative Party, 
and the more Heath pushed the idea of coalition the more Thorpe distanced himself from it. Labour’s no-
negotiation strategy, and significant pushback from the Liberal Party Executive at the prospect of a two-
party coalition, made an appeal for co-operation much more difficult. But it was not an agency-led attempt 
to actively disrupt the two-party system. Thorpe gambled that he did not need to push the prospect of 
coalition at any cost, instead prioritising the maintenance of the fragile electoral coalition and internal 
cohesion that had created the hung parliament in February. The hope in 1974 – and, for at least some of 
the inter-election period, the expectation –  was that the flux of the February result would solidify into an 
entrenched multi-party system, necessitating co-operation that would carry the Liberal Party into coalition. 
This positioning on co-operation avoided key questions about the Liberal’s place within the party system, 
and suited a leader with a narrow political focus. It was, however, ultimately an unsuccessful interaction 
with the political structures of party politics. Jeremy Thorpe’s aimed, as Colin Hay’s (2009) put it when 
describing the concept of heresthetics, to part the tide of British politics through strength of rhetoric alone. 
Instead, the Liberal wave was subsumed in the general election of October 1974 by Labour and the 
Conservatives. 
The politics of co-operation pre-February 1974 
The renaissance in Liberal fortunes was foreseen but largely ignored prior to February 1974. At the 
beginning of 1973 the party was still being dismissed in Conservative Research Department briefing notes 
as a ‘paper tiger’ offering ‘quack remedies’ (CRD: Liberal Policy Brief, 1/4/1973, CPA CCO 500/25/8). 
More importantly, growing Liberal electoral strength was little more than ‘the mid-term expression of 
disappointment by a highly volatile electorate’ (Henderson to Morrison, 26/7/1973, CPA SC14/74/29-31). 
Senior figures from both major parties viewed four by-elections held on 9 November 1973 and, particularly, 
the two most closely fought, Berwick-Upon-Tweed and Hove, as important signals of Liberal staying power. 
James Callaghan, for example, believed that ‘if they took Hove and Berwick they (the Liberals) would 
certainly remain stronger than in previous upsurges’ (Meeting with James Callaghan, 23/10/1973, 
Hetherington 21/43). The overriding interpretation of results – Liberal victory by 57 votes in Berwick, and 
a 5000 majority for the Conservatives in Hove – was that they were extremely bad for Labour (Jay, 1997).  
Despite a significant victory in Berwick, The Times reported that: 
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nearly all Labour and Conservative politicians are profoundly convinced that if they can 
survive the present spasm of protest voting, British politics will surely return to its 
familiar two-party rivalry’  
(Wood, The Times, 10/11/1973: 1).  
In January 1974, Barbara Castle believed that ‘an election in the current circumstances could wipe (the 
Liberals) out’, due to the ‘intense competition’ between the two main parties (Meeting with Barbara Castle, 
21/1/1974, Hetherington 21). The Conservatives’ Chancellor, Anthony Barber, was clear in November 
that he ‘didn’t believe they would hold the balance, or anything like that’ (Meeting with Anthony Barber, 
15/11/1973, Hetherington 21). A key figure from Conservative Central Office, who played a co-ordinating 
role in the Berwick by-election, says that both Conservatives and the media-at-large were ‘so used to Jo 
Grimond as an elegant loser that they refused to acknowledge a groundswell for the Liberal Party’ (Private 
Interview, 2016). 
This was not, as The Times hinted, a reading to which all subscribed. There is evidence that Harold Wilson 
did not fully buy into the thesis of inevitable Liberal collapse, and had clearly seen any Liberal consolidation 
as an unalloyed positive for Labour. In public, he made it clear in his October 1973 party conference speech 
that: 
there will be no electoral treaty, no political alliance, no understanding, no deal, no 
arrangement, no fix, neither will there be any secret deal or secret discussions. Whatever 
the results of the election, a Labour Government will go forward boldly on its policy 
programme. (Wilson, 1973)  
In private, Guardian journalist Ian Aitken put it to Wilson that he had focused his ire on Liberals and 
coalition to give ‘notice to disaffected Conservative voters that they could safely vote Liberal without 
creating a Lib-Lab coalition’ – a suggestion the Labour leader accepted, though with the caveat that he was 
further driven by a genuine hostility to the idea of coalition (Wilson Lunch at Blackpool, 4/10/1973, 
Hetherington 21). When Guardian editor Alastair Hetherington pondered whether some may view a Liberal 
brake on Labour policies to be a positive (a view that was, in the end, the paper’s editorial stance in both 
elections of ’74) Wilson ‘uncharacteristically rather froze … and changed the subject’ (Ibid.). James 
Callaghan held much the same view, and felt post-conference that the Liberal upsurge ‘might let the Labour 
Party in by default. He did not mind that as long as they got power’ (Callaghan, 23/10/1973, Hetherington 
21). This rationality was augmented by intra-party realities and a strong ethos against deals of this kind. 
Wilson, Heath pondered to Thorpe, ‘would wish at all costs to avoid the role and fate of Ramsay 
MacDonald’ (Meeting with Mr Thorpe 2 March, PREM15/2069/7). Therefore, in Labour circles, readings 
that a strong Liberal vote could certainly play a role in any upcoming election were not dismissed, but 
instead perceived to be no bad thing.  
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Opinion polling usage expanded significantly, and daily private polling was conducted for the first time by 
both main parties (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 135). Yet they had little impact on broader electoral strategy 
or tactical considerations in the short campaign (Ibid: 135). In any case, the results of private and public 
polls skewed towards the Conservatives and few expected the result, or anticipated the pattern of Liberal 
inroads.7 This meant, ultimately, that there was little to no internal party discussions of prospects for a hung 
parliament. At the start of the short campaign for the general election of 28 February 1974, polling showed 
the Liberals at 12%. On the eve of the election, two polls showed the party at 25%. Jeremy Thorpe, 
triumphant and unrestrained, declared ‘we are out for the jackpot’ and speculated that, with 25% of the 
vote, his party could expect 65 seats (Bloch, 2014: 381). The weekend before polling day a feeling existed 
in the Liberal Party that anything less than 50 MPs would be a disappointment – though there continued 
to be little discussion of a hung parliament and its ramifications for the party (Steel, Interview, 2016). Private 
Conservative estimates continued to put their majority at 40 or 50. Wilson anticipated defeat or, in his most 
optimistic estimates, a situation akin to 1964 and a Labour majority of low double digits (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1974: 110). In the end, with 19% and 6 million votes, the Liberals held 14 seats in the Commons. 
Jeremy Thorpe was left disappointed, but surprised that his party had not been attacked more as the 
campaign wore on (Bloch, 2014: 384-5). 
Post electoral inter-party discussion between the Conservatives and Liberals, 1-4 March 1974 
The prevailing wisdom prior to the election of 1974 was, therefore, that the outcome would be a single 
party (almost certainly Conservative) government, and a ‘clean-cut’ result (Armstrong, Interview, 2016; 
Robin Butler, Interview, 2016). Despite suggestions by Professors Robert McKenzie and David Butler in 
media coverage that the post-election deadlock would precipitate immediate cross-party dialogue, the 
immediate post-results consensus was that their emphasis on Europeans portents were an off-kilter 
preoccupation, and inter-party negotiations would either be minimal or non-existent. Within 48 hours the 
Conservative cabinet position was that Heath should attempt to negotiate a Lib-Con coalition, an outcome 
seen as favourable to minority government (Cabinet Conclusions 1/3/1974, 5.45pm CAB 128/53). But 
Heath’s decision to ignore voices calling for him to relinquish office, and instead start a negotiation with 
the Liberals, was taken in the face of the broad prevailing wisdom and accepted practice. Given the 
circumstances a minority, single-party government seemed not just one option, available to rational actors 
free to manoeuvre to best effect. It was instead the inevitable, and the only legitimate, outcome.  
This damaged the perceived legitimacy of the resulting talks. Historical interpretations of the negotiations 
as ‘three days of much-criticised procrastination’ (Harris, 2011: 475) are, in part, a reflection of the shaky, 
even unsustainable, parliamentary arithmetic. Others have questioned whether Heath played his hand too 
soon, and suggested the plausibility of another Heath-led government would have strengthened from 
opposition had unsuccessful negotiations not exhausted the prospect (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 258; 																																																								
7 The Chairman of ORC, T.F. Thompson, wrote a mea culpa, saying ‘we are deeply humiliated. We shall do 
everything we can to see what went wrong’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 261) 
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Jenkins, 1992: 368; Campbell, 1993: 616). But, primarily, doubts about whether shaping a post hoc 
parliamentary victory was a legitimate exercise drove contemporary criticism. Thatcher’s biographer Charles 
Moore’s (2014: 247) interpretation is that ‘although the rules permitted, public opinion was more impatient’. 
Willie Whitelaw (1989: 135) argued that ‘the proposed coalition would have been regarded as wrong on 
principle by the British people’ and Carrington (1988: 267), at the time an ardent supporter, in retrospect 
felt it may not have been ‘politically healthy or wise’. Civil servants pointed to the precedent of Baldwin: 
Heath’s Principal Private Secretary Robert Armstrong (Interview, 2016) argues it was ‘the newspapers, the 
media, who introduced the new idea that if you don’t get a majority, you resign. They didn’t regard the 
Baldwin precedent as relevant, really’. 
This perception forcing through co-operation would be electorally punished disguises burgeoning and soon 
surging, if somewhat incoherent and indecisive, support for both electoral reform and coalition government 
as 1974 progressed (ORC Report April/May, CCO 180/11/5/5; Liberals Survey 31/7/1974, CPA CCO 
180/27/9/2; Bale, 2012: 220). The prospect of coalition government also received some support, The Times 
(2/3/1974: 15) arguing that ‘coalitions are obviously stronger than minority governments ... there is in fact 
only one respectable majority in this House, that is a majority resulting from a combination of the two 
major parties’. Yet Wilson’s privately discussed the possibility of issuing a ‘denunciation of constitutional 
impropriety’ (Jenkins, 1991: 369), while Lord Crowther-Hunt, who served as a minister under Wilson, wrote 
to the Times to argue Heath’s actions were ‘bordering on the unconstitutional’ (Crowther-Hunt, The Times, 
4/3/1974: 15).  The claim of ‘impropriety’ was, also, the basis upon which Keith Joseph criticized Heath 
in cabinet discussions (‘Diary: 1/3/1974’ MS Hailsham 1/1/8; Moore, 2014: 248). Both claims were refuted 
by constitutional experts, such as AJP Taylor, and the constitution was relatively clear. But what was 
politically plausible or possible was less obvious. Heath was attempting, in part, to shape rules of a post-
electoral environment that ‘will have to virtually be rewritten as the game is played out to its unforeseeable 
end’ (Aitken, The Guardian, 2/3/1974: 8). 
Conservative Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
The legitimacy question was also a barrier to action by limiting the available time-frame for negotiations. 
Factors such as the perception of desperation, or that Heath would be thought to be ‘hanging on’, loomed 
large when thinking about the electoral effect of negotiations (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 16/231/6). 
This was a feeling that Heath himself did little to dampen down, and the press was briefed that both Wilson 
and Heath ‘were adamant that the most urgent need is for a government to be formed quickly to cope with 
one of the gravest constitutional and economic crises ever’ (Aitken, The Guardian, 2/3/1974: 8). A Wilson 
minority government was quickly assumed to be best placed to fulfil these criteria. Ken Clarke, then a junior 
whip, got the message from the prominent backbencher Kenneth Lewis that he ‘just tell that man to stop 
messing about. We have lost an election, we cannot form a government, we have been defeated and we 
must go with dignity’ (Ziegler, 2011: 441). While Lewis was an outspoken backbench critic of Heath, Clarke 
made it known that he was in broad agreement. Thatcher (1995: 239), writing later, argued ‘horse trading’ 
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went down particularly badly with a public that hates a ‘bad loser’. Thatcher was atypical among the cabinet 
in being vocally opposed to a deal – accounts vary on who among the mix of Thatcher, Keith Joseph and 
Maurice Macmillan expressed their discontent (Denham and Garnett, 2002: 234; Diary: 1 /3/1974, MS 
Hailsham 1/1/9). Yet there was an acknowledgement, even among advocates of co-operation, of this 
difficulty: Heath’s Political Secretary recounts that ‘as in 2010, the incumbent government, by not winning 
clearly, had lost’ (Armstrong, Interview, 2016). Conservative elites would have been more than aware of 
the potential costs of Heath being seen, as The Spectator (9/3/1974: 1) in any case christened him, the 
‘squatter in No. 10 Downing Street’. 
Heath’s decision to start a dialogue was based on an instinctive desire to cling to office and, while certainly 
not inevitable, was hung on the same majoritarian understanding of elections that led to others dismissing 
coalition out of hand. Heath was clearly desperate to retain power and sensed it possible. The devastation 
on 4 March when negotiations collapsed – ‘there was so much, or nothing, left to say’ – showed he remained 
hopeful, if not expectant, till the end (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM16/231/56).8 His behaviour during 
his first negotiations (Thorpe twice feigned to leave, after 20 and 45 minutes, and was both times stopped) 
suggested Heath took the negotiations extremely seriously (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM16/231/29; 
Bloch, 2014: 389-90). He calculated that the disadvantages of opposition and the political levers that 
governing allowed Wilson – factoring in the timing of any subsequent election, and the spending of North 
Sea Oil revenues – probably outweighed any potential benefits that may come from support ‘returning’ 
from the Liberals (Cabinet Conclusions 1/3/1974, CAB 128/53). Thorpe privately pointed out that if he 
had asked Ted Heath on 1 February whether he might be prepared to talk to the Liberals, he would have 
dismissed the possibility completely (Jeremy Thorpe, 19/7/1974, Hetherington 21). 
The acutely disappointing result, and the concept that each election has a clear winner and loser pushed 
Heath towards facing up to the necessity of co-operation with Thorpe’s Liberals, rather than pursuing his 
preference for a minority government. Yet Heath was, just as he had been over the timing of the election, 
at the mercy of events rather than the driver of them. He had previously said in conversation to his PPS 
Robert Armstrong on Election Day that, if his party had more seats than Labour but no overall majority, 
his inclination would be to stay in office and meet parliament, rather than make any approach to the Liberals 
(Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 16/231/60). The situation was more problematic than Heath had 
anticipated. Conservatives secured more votes than Wilson’s Labour but, with 297 to Labour’s 301, fewer 
seats. Their vote share was hardly vindicating, slumping from over 45 to under 38 per cent. In the absence 
of a clear victor, Heath felt that a new ‘anti-Socialist’ narrative of the result could be constructed based on 
a malleable Liberal vote that showed ‘the desire of the substantial majority of the electorate not to have a 
Socialist government’ (Aide Memoire for Thorpe Meeting, 2/3/1974, PREM15/2069/4). 
																																																								
8 Certainly Heath’s biographer argues that ‘until the last moment Heath believed it might be possible to cobble 
together some arrangement that would keep him in power. He desperately wanted to do so’ Campbell (1994: 586)  
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The question of what options were available to Heath was therefore based principally upon prime facie 
interpretations of legitimacy. Any strategic benefit in coalition or realignment gained credence as the result 
sunk in throughout 1974 – instead the post-electoral melee, by 2 March, was ‘fast disappearing into the 
realms of symbolic logic’ (Aitken, The Guardian, 2/3/1974: 8). This fluidity of the concept of legitimacy was 
exemplified by Lord Carrington – Conservative Party Chairman, Secretary of State for Energy and the first 
cabinet member consulted the morning after the vote. He viewed an advantage of ten seats for Labour over 
the Conservatives as insurmountable in the face of public opinion, but saw the eventual result as plausible 
grounds for retaining office alongside the Liberal Party (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 16/231/4). Lord 
Hailsham, formerly Quintin Hogg and by now Lord Chancellor and an influential part of Heath’s circle, 
felt these negotiations were highly likely to fail and that: 
 I think they will turn us down. If they do, I think they will have refused a chance of getting 
experience in Government and their best chance ever of electoral reform. (Diary: 
1/3/1974 MS Hailsham 1/1/8) 
Hailsham felt, on balance, that the Liberals ‘will be obliterated at the next general election’ (Ibid.), their 
rejection of coalition undermining their political credibility. If this suggests strategic intent on Heath’s part, 
an attempt to expose the Liberals to the hard choices of government formation and puncture their 
insurgence, he showed no sign that he was offering a deliberately derisory deal and a poisoned chalice. 
Heath’s preference was clear when prefacing cabinet discussions, suggesting that ‘the nation would expect 
him to attempt the formation of a right-centre coalition’ – the word ordering and phraseology perhaps 
significant, given the limited nature of mooted concessions to the Liberal Party (Cabinet Conclusions, 
1/3/1974, CAB 128/53).  
Liberal Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
Negotiation on policy terms appeared to be encouraged by Heath’s attempt to frame it as a skeletal crisis-
based deal in which, upon entering, both parties would shed policies ‘which did not have immediate priority 
in relation to the overriding requirements of the economic situation’ (Meeting with Mr Thorpe, PREM 
16/23/7). On these priorities, there was largely unalloyed success and agreement, particularly in the 
preliminary negotiations between the two leaders (Meeting with Mr Thorpe, PREM 16/23/7). Yet Thorpe 
was far from signed up to the implicit idea that the Liberals were compelled to act towards an ‘anti-Socialist’ 
solution, with the Conservative Party inevitable bedfellows. He was clear that ‘there was nothing to choose 
between a minority Conservative and a minority Labour government unless one or other of them is 
prepared to accept some sort of commitment towards electoral reform’ (PM/Thorpe Meeting, 3/3/1974, 
PREM16/23/15). When amplified to the public sphere, recounting negotiations to Liberal candidates in 
July 1974, Thorpe railed against the ‘arrogant assumption that every non-socialist voter owes Mr Heath a 
living’ (Thorpe to Liberal candidates, 2/7/1974, Meadowcroft 3/2/1). This was the result, in part, of a 
growing backlash against Thorpe’s seeming enthusiasm for negotiation at any cost, a feeling that ‘some deal 
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was being concocted’ for those with a personal stake in in obtaining the benefits of office (Dorey, 2008: 
31). This feeling of an elite-level stitch-up had its seeds in a meeting of ex and future leaders Jo Grimond 
and Lord Steel and a veteran of the Churchill-Liberal talks, Lord Byers.  
Yet all three were, to varying degrees, against co-operation. Concern from Steel and Grimond centred on 
the danger of antagonising the party membership and the practicality of any agreement, given the two 
parties in combination lacked an absolute majority (McManus, 2001: 319; Barberis, 2005: 165;). Robert 
Armstrong, Heath’s Principal Private Secretary, is clear that the Liberal Party, and Frank Byers in particular, 
were concerned about the party being ‘swallowed up’ and feared ‘a repeat of 1924’ (Armstrong, Interview, 
2016). Lord Hailsham felt Byers was anti ‘on the basis it seems as Lib chief whip at the end of the coalition 
in 1945’ (‘Diary: 2-3/3/1974, MS Hailsham 1/1/9).9 Thorpe also had an acute awareness of antagonism to 
a deal among Liberal candidates and members. The Liberal leadership were fighting a difficult battle. Of 
the 100 defeated Liberal candidates with the highest vote shares, 98 lost to Conservatives. The membership 
particularly in the South-West were thought to be against any co-operation, and Thorpe read a series of 
telegrams urging against a deal on his train from Taunton to London (Bloch, 2014: 388; Donoughue, 
Interview, 2016). In a key meeting of the Liberal Parliamentary Party, Steel expressed frustration that many 
in his party felt ‘under no circumstances should anything like this be contemplated’ (Steel, 1980: 15; 
Torrance, 2012), regardless of its make-up in terms of party or policies. Hailsham noted that ‘a number of 
intransigents do not wish to do business with us on any terms’ (‘Diary, 1/3/1974’: MS Hailsham 1/1/8). 
Peter Hain, at that time a radical member of the Liberals National Executive, who Thorpe had worked hard 
to keep onside, warned of the dangers of mass resignation if there was any ‘collusion’ with the Conservatives, 
regardless of their leadership (The Guardian, 3/3/1974: 16; Dutton, 2013: 205). 
Key Negotiation Themes 
Heath’s Leadership 
Heath had driven a minimalistic negotiating line with the aim of ‘forcing them to show their hand and 
discover what kind of programme they would support’ (Cabinet Conclusions 1/3/1974, CAB 128/53). He 
had his answer, and it involved the personally unmentionable and, in Heath’s view, the politically impossible 
– a reassessment of Heath’s position as leader of any coalition government, and an unequivocal move 
towards electoral reform. David Steel, the Liberal Chief Whip, felt their vote was ‘largely a protest against 
(Heath’s) incapacity to deal with the worsening industrial crisis’ (Steel, 1980: 14; Steel, 1991: 78-80). In as 
much as questions about what mandate their vote had supplied were relevant, there was an understanding 
that their vote owed more to ‘none of the above’ popular dislike of the other parties than positive support 
for Conservative-leaning policies (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 142). Heath was not willing to countenance 
																																																								
9 When the Liberal Party in 1923, led by Asquith, had received a significant uptick in support, supported a Labour 
minority government second in terms of seats to the Conservative Party, and had subsequently slumped in the 1924 
election a year later.   
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the prospect of resignation in the March negotiations, and there was little pressure on him within cabinet 
discussions or recorded conversations to consider his position. Yet the Daily Telegraph (2/3/1974: 1) 
reported that immediately following defeat Edward du Cann, the chairman of the 1922 Committee and no 
ally of Heath, was petitioned to force a leadership contest. Willie Whitelaw was widely touted by MPs ‘not 
all of them by any means Whitelaw men’ on the grounds there be an end to the ‘paternalistic government 
of Mr Heath’. It is notable that this left open the possibility of an immediate alternative Conservative Prime 
Minister.  
Heath assured his cabinet Whitelaw endorsed negotiations with the Liberals. The fact Heath mentioned 
Whitelaw’s position in his opening address to his cabinet was emblematic of his internal position (Cabinet 
Conclusions, 1/3/1974, PREM15/2069 CM (74)). The Spectator (9/3/1974: 3) judged there was ‘no sign 
that the plea of Mr Whitelaw was anything more than formal’. Whitelaw was the first Tory minister to 
publicly give first hint of concession that the party had been defeated, and senior colleagues saw him as ‘a 
man of total political instinct – after the election, sitting in Cumberland, he saw that this was the end of the 
road’ (Walker, The Times, 2/3/1974: 3; Young (Windelsham), 2008: 36, 5/6/1974). In his memoirs, 
Whitelaw is dismissive of talks with the Liberals (Whitelaw, 1989). But he clearly did see a route forward 
for the party that potentially involved inter-party co-operation, and following the February election ‘did 
conceive of some kind of deal with the Liberals, though a much lower priority than a National Coalition’ 
(William Whitelaw, 21/7/1974, Hetherington 21; Whitelaw’s memorandum ‘The Liberals’ 28/6/1974, LCC 
1/3/2/110-113)  
The Thatcherite historian Robin Harris (2011: 477-8) argues Heath’s persistence ‘does not say much for 
the party’s instinct for survival’ and that the idea of coalition government ‘was an incredible proposition, in 
the literal sense that no one outside (Heath’s) immediate circle could believe it’. Yet the prospect of coalition 
was being led by enforced circumstances rather than strategic statecraft. Almost any realistic leader, and 
certainly Whitelaw, would have at least weighed up the prospect of coalition. And while internal Liberal 
pressure on Thorpe was strong enough for the Liberal leader to mention the uncomfortable issue of Heath’s 
displacement, he assured him that it would not be a significant factor. Via the Conservative MP Nigel Fisher, 
Thorpe made it clear to Heath that he thought Heath ‘was by far the most able man we had and he would 
be happy to serve’ (Message from Nigel Fisher, PREM15/2069/11). There was an ‘us and them’ angle to 
discussions that showed a mutual appreciation of Heath’s predicament – Thorpe said he had ‘spoken to his 
boys’, he ‘could handle them’ (Telephone Conversation – PM/Thorpe, 3/3/1974, PREM15/2069/13).  
Electoral Reform 
What was unquestionable was Thorpe’s second demand, the changing of the rules of the electoral game. 
This was felt particularly keenly by Liberal elites and senior MPs who feared that otherwise, as Thorpe’s 
Political Assistant put it, ‘they would, sooner or later, be swallowed up’ (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 
16/231/28). This suggested an understanding, on top of losing protest votes against Heath’s government, 
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that the shift of temporary right-wing support could lead to the re-identification of the Liberal Party as a 
subsidiary centre-right party.  Certainly, the idea the Liberal insurgency was the result of contingent centre-
right support gained significant traction as an explanatory theory. Conservative cabinet discussion dwelt 
heavily on the belief that opinion polling was partly to blame for the result, recalcitrant and rebellious 
‘traditional Conservative voters’ swinging to the Liberals and inflating their support, due to a feeling a 
Conservative government was inevitable (Cabinet Conclusions 1/3/1974, PREM 15/2069/3). The 
Chairman of Opinion Research proffered ‘a theory, no more’ that Liberal and Labour support had been 
hardened by the seeming sureness of a Conservative victory (The Times, 4/3/1977: 14). Though analysis for 
the Nuffield series later ruled out the Liberal surge being to the benefit of any one party, there was a clear 
post-election feeling that Liberal votes had cost the Conservatives a majority (Steed in Butler and Kavanagh, 
1974: 313-5). 
Any electoral rationale for a deal therefore raised the question of where compromise could be made on the 
vexed issue of electoral reform, insuring Liberal independence. Thorpe argued the fact the Liberals’ 6 
million votes translated into just 14 seats ‘gave rise to strongly felt dissatisfaction among Liberal voters’ 
(Thorpe Meeting, 4pm, 2/3/1974, PREM15/2069/7). While there was certainly a sense of acute grievance 
at the result, this was a bit of a stretch. The waves of protests coming from around the country from Liberal 
members and associations centred primarily upon the prospect of an agreement with the Conservatives in 
and of itself, regardless of constitutional concessions. David Steel, his Chief Whip, had left his Borders 
constituency (after hearing of negotiations on the radio) with the warning of a local activist ringing in his 
ear, not on the merits or otherwise of electoral reform but ‘don’t you dare come back as a member of Mr 
Heath’s government… he hadn’t got his mandate’ (Richards, 2015). 
It was clear, if it had not already been, that for Liberals with direct sway over negotiations the absolute 
sticking point was a commitment on electoral reform. If anything can be made of Thorpe’s priorities by 
the order in which he addressed them in his first meeting with Heath, electoral reform ranked more highly 
than the prospect of sharing the burden of an economic situation that, they both agreed, ‘would require 
unpleasant measures’. Indeed, in their second conversation by telephone on 3 March Thorpe made it clear 
that ‘before there could be talk about an economic package, a very strong feeling is felt about the electoral 
system’ (Telephone Conversation, PM/Thorpe, 6pm, 3/3/1974, PREM15/2069/13). Thorpe was willing 
to move in Heath’s direction, offering the possibility that a Speaker’s Conference could be enough were 
both parties to guarantee they would endorse conclusions. The ‘Churchill compromise’ – PR in the form 
of STV for urban seats, and AV for rural seats – was also suggested by Thorpe, and was also seen in Liberal 
and academic circles to be the reform which would provide the greatest benefits for Heath’s party (Steed, 
The Observer, 3/3/1974: 22). But there was clearly a strong element of bargaining uncertainty and distrust 
from Thorpe about what any Tory proposals on a Speakers Conference might mean in practice. Steel 
(1980:13) was similarly of the belief that anything other than a cast-iron guarantee that bound the 
Conservatives was ‘fairly useless’. To aid this, Thorpe suggested any coalition government only be formed 
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after electoral reform and, in the way that epitomized the ‘mutual mistrust of the dedicated plodder and the 
brilliant lightweight’ (Bloch, 2014: 385; PREM15/2069/13), casually suggested this was a process that could 
take six to nine months to implement. 
This epitomised the limited buy-in from Liberals for Heath’s grounds for coalition. But, equally, the 
Conservatives were clear throughout negotiations that any reform could not pass through their 
parliamentary party. The disconnect between the cabinet and the backbenches – ‘a kind of corpus separandum, 
part of the parliamentary party and yet isolated from it’ – was perhaps particularly true on electoral reform, 
an issue which throughout 1974 ‘was becoming an establishment cause and was rapidly losing the taint of 
crankiness which had clung to it’ (Bogdanor, 1996: 378). Yet backbench opinion appeared solely 
represented by Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher in cabinet discussions, who asked ‘What would effect 
on parly party be of dabbling with electoral reform?’ (Moore, 2014: 248). Thatcher recited the twin concerns 
of the electoral implications and constitutional principle, arguing that ‘5m Liberal votes are non-Liberal. 
They are ours, and if we coalesce we lose them for ever. And don’t sell constitution for a mess of pottage’ 
(Moore, 2014: 248). Other members of cabinet showed significantly more flexibility. But there was a broad 
acceptance the parliamentary party was an immovable force who, like Thatcher, viewed the short-term 
expediency of retaining office to not be worth the longer-term electoral costs of electoral reform (Cabinet 
Conclusions, CAB15/2069/16, 4/3/1974; Robin Butler, Interview, 2016).10  
The extent to which Heath himself envisaged electoral reform as a plausible possibility, or even as a medium 
to long-term benefit to Conservative goals, is a moot point given he was resigned to its rejection by his 
cabinet and parliamentary party. Certainly, when questioned in 1992 in gave, in his biographer’s view, the 
strong impression that he favoured proportional representation when discussing the merits of different 
potential reforms (Campbell, 1994: 804). Bogdanor (2015) and, at the time, Thorpe both believed that 
Heath’s unwillingness to develop a strategy on electoral reform was in part due to personal opposition. But 
Heath believed that any cabinet endorsement of a Speaker’s Conference on electoral reform would have 
quickly shrivelled in the face of parliamentary opposition (Campbell, 1994: 805). The Chief Whip, 
Humphrey Atkins, put the number of potential rebels at 50, and believed many more would abstain (Diary, 
2-3/3/1974, Hailsham MSS 1/1/8). While seriously corroded intra party relations could not have helped, 
the mountain would have been near-impossible to climb in a more favourable context. Clearly Heath did 
not have the desire, nor the political capital, to push through a position on electoral reform that could have 
satisfied Liberal demands.  
Type of Agreement, and Personnel 
The formation and shape of any mooted agreement – whether it should be a fully formed coalition, or a 
confidence and supply agreement with the principal purpose of passing a Queen’s Speech – was also a 																																																								
10The pressure group ‘Conservative Action for Electoral Reform’ was established in 1974 and numbered about 100 
MPs, the majority were still against reform. (Fisher, 2003: 69) 
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source of significant, but not insurmountable, contention between the two parties. The day after polling 
day, 1 March, a series of meetings was arranged with Heath’s ‘Praetorian Guard’. The meeting was attended 
by Heath’s PPS William Armstrong, who noted that they gave ‘an indication of their inclination towards an 
attempt to come to an understanding with the Liberals’ (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 16/231/9). 
Cabinet discussions and conclusions – or, at the very least, their reporting – were similarly non-committal 
on the type of any agreement, merely that the Liberals should show whether ‘they wished to keep a 
Conservative or a Labour government in power’ (Cabinet Conclusions, CAB 128 CM(74) 9 1/3/1974). 
Heath, however, was personally in little doubt that full Liberal participation in government was preferable 
to other possible arrangements (Meeting with Thorpe, 2/3/1977, PREM15/2069/7; Heath, 1998: 518). In 
a letter, written between the first meeting of the leaders and their second conversation by phone, Heath 
crossed out many of the qualifiers first drafted. Heath was looking for ‘an arrangement with the Liberals’ 
rather than ‘some kind of arrangement’; there would be Liberal ministerial appointments, rather than ‘the 
possibility of ministerial appointments’ (Thorpe Letter, 3/3/1974, PREM15/2069/14). Heath changed the 
stipulation on granting the Liberal Party ministerial office from ‘on the other hand your party would be 
committed to support the government in the House of Commons’ to ‘at the same time, your party would be 
committed to support the government in the House of Commons’ – lexical semantics that suggest a pre-
occupation with maintaining the stability and coherence of both a united coalition cabinet, and some sort 
of legislative stability (Ibid.). Though it would far from guarantee executive stability, given a majority would 
not be secure, it would, theoretically at least, lock in Liberal MPs to a parliamentary bloc that would be 
larger than Labour’s.  
Inter-Party Discussions: March – October 1974 
Lord Hailsham (1/1/8 Diary, 2-3/3/1974 MSS Hailsham) noted, somewhat bitterly, that: 
 the Liberals have put Labour in power. In doing so they have done, I believe, damage to 
themselves. It remains to be seen far the country and the Conservative party will suffer 
too. 
As Hailsham predicted, the functioning to Westminster’s institutions ultimately seemed to adversely affect 
Liberal fortunes. A Conservative defence of First Past the Post had clearly constrained Heath and motivated 
those against a coalition in March. In October, both larger parties profited at Liberal expense. Yet the state 
of flux following the February election provided opportunity as well as difficulty. The result of October 
was not pre-ordained as soon as Heath left Number 10. An imminent election was assumed to soon follow, 
but the date was hugely uncertain. The public mood was consistently measured, both by internal 
Conservative and public polling, to be in favour of cross-party action, with a minority government seen as 
less preferable than formal co-operation (First/Second Post-Election Survey, ORC: CPA CCO 
180/11/5/5-6; Business Decisions Poll, The Observer 28/7/1974: 1). But the plausibility of its formation 
was damaged by the negotiations of March, and the type of any agreement mooted unclear. The only thing 
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that remained clear was strongly unfavourable ratings for Ted Heath.11 As a result any simplistic institutional 
explanation needs to be unpicked. Political circumstances seemed to rule out an inevitable return to the 
status quo of single party majority government, and many political actors’ assumptions were built on that 
basis. 
Indeed, by October 1974 many presumed another hung parliament was almost inevitable, committing what 
the academic Keith Ovenden described presciently in the Financial Times (21/9/1974: 16) as ‘the gamblers 
mistake, assuming that because it happened before it will happen again’. The feeling at large among 
politicians and commentators, overcompensating for previous failure to grasp the potential consequences 
of a hung parliament, was that, if any certainty did exist, a repeat was the most likely outcome. And, perhaps 
more significantly, that this would not be a freak outcome but the result of a collective, and irrepressible, 
desire for coalition and co-operative government. The behaviour of actors when considering inter-party 
deals must be viewed with an understanding that the fundamentals of British electoral politics felt, even to 
politicians not inclined towards such thought, as if they were being restructured and rewritten. Most 
believed following the February election as Willie Whitelaw did, backed up by strong internal and external 
polling evidence, that ‘the nation is in one of its coalition moods’ (The Liberals – Mr Whitelaw, 28/6/1974, 
CPA LCC1/3/2/110-113; Ziegler, 2010: 464). Either reluctantly or enthusiastically, plenty more took this 
to its logical conclusion and agreed with the understated view of Lord Windelsham, the Conservatives’ 
leader in the second chamber, that ‘a government not commanding an overall majority in the House of 
Commons might possibly occur a bit more frequently in the future’ (Steering Committee Minutes, 
1/4/1974, CPA SC/74/2-27). This step-change in discourse surrounding multi-party politics from the 
evening of the 28 February, to the eve of the election on the 10 October can be captured by an Evening 
Standard headline two days before the second contest – ‘Thorpe: Unity? I said it first’ (Evening Standard, 
8/10/1974: 1). 
Labour Party stance on co-operation 
Again, however, the idea of a new political climate did not convince the Labour Party. The decision of 
Wilson to appoint the triumvirate of Michael Foot, Tony Benn and Peter Shore to the ministries of trade, 
industry and employment provoked, two days after failed coalition talks, some Liberal MPs to talk of 
immediate cross-party parliamentary co-operation to overturn Wilson’s minority government (The Times, 
6/3/1974: 15). Benn (1989: 7/10/1974, 234), certainly, thought talk of a coalition of any sort continued to 
be advantageous to his party. The Labour position could continue to be explained by both institutional 
memory, and a wholehearted belief that their electoral position did not require a conciliatory approach. A 
Times (12/9/1974: 19) leader argued there was there was ‘no prospect of the Labour Party as now 
constructed joining such an administration: the ghost of Ramsay MacDonald still stalks the party corridors’. 																																																								
11 Dire polling reports conducted by Opinion Research Centre saw the party’s position go from ‘distinctly 
unfavourable on every important issue’ in April, to ‘now less unfavourable to the Conservatives than it was even a 
month ago’ in May  
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Certainly, Heath still discounted the prospect that Wilson, or indeed any Labour leader, would be prepared 
to lead the party into coalition (Steering Committee’, 1/7/1974, SC/74/2-27). Thorpe viewed the 
institutional conservatism within the Labour Party to be caused by trouble from the Tribune Group and 
significant Trade Union support if the idea of coalition were openly broached (Jeremy Thorpe, 19/7/1974, 
Hetherington 21). Bernard Donoughue (2016, Interview), then advisor to Wilson, recalls that ‘he had just 
had a fight that split the party over Europe. He had no intention of risking that again’ – with Wilson in his 
private justification recalling, explicitly, the Ramsay MacDonald experience. Thorpe did attempt to persuade 
Roy Jenkins – seemingly the exception who proved the rule – on the grounds of personal ambition and: 
had said to Roy and would say it again that (Jenkins) stood no chance of being Prime 
Minister in the present situation, whereas he did stand some chance under PR and with a 
multi-party arrangement. (Jeremy Thorpe, 19/7/1974, Hetherington 21) 
Yet even Jenkins’, although privately saying he was ‘thoroughly fed up with the party system, which he 
viewed as a conspiracy against the people’ (Campbell, 2014: 438), felt Wilson had sufficiently brokered an 
agreement with the party’s left on the party’s policy platform and publicly ‘hammered the coalition idea out 
of sight’ (Donoughue, 2005: 8/10/1974, 214). And while, in part, a residual and moral ethos played a role 
– Michael Foot described a coalition as ‘evil’ and ‘impractical’ (Stewart, 2015: 100) – there were also 
objective strategic realities at play. For Wilson, ‘all the talk of coalitions was just fine’ (Harold Wilson, 
10/7/1974, Hetherington 21). He calculated that Heath’s toxicity neutralized any plausible advantages of a 
national unity platform, a situation that could only be aided by Heath’s resignation. And while ‘the idea of 
Ted’s renunciation did worry the Wilson camp’, this possibility always seemed remote (Butler Interview, 
Donoughue 23/10/1974). His calculation was that ‘a vote for the Liberals would be a vote for the 
Conservatives, and the Labour waverers who had drifted away would come home’ (Harold Wilson, 
10/7/1974, Hetherington 21). Wilson calculated further Liberal gains were impossible unless Conservatives 
stood down (Interview, Donoughue, 2016) This would mean a net benefit to Labour, not any joint centre-
right force. Internal Conservative research conducted by ORC concluded the party was seen as ‘less 
competent in handling every major issue than Labour’ (ORC Post-Election Survey, 13/8/1974, CCO 
180/27/9/2). Although his advisors did not necessarily agree, Wilson believed the concept of co-operation 
was damaging for Heath’s leadership, and vice versa. Wilson firmly dismissed coalition as ‘Con policies, Con 
leadership by a Con party for a Con trick’ (Pimlott, 1992: 646; Donoughue, 2005: 24/6/1974, 146). 
Conservative Party stance on co-operation  
The rationale from senior Conservative figures was that an agenda of national unity was worth a punt, if 
only because a Heath-led majority was so unlikely. Several senior figures were clear that this was a route to 
victory, and an accommodating stance to the prospect of coalition was a clear advantage over Labour in a 
challenging political landscape. Ultimately Heath’s boldness in March was undermined by colleagues who 
desired more: faster earlier groundwork on coalition and greater emphasis on co-operation within the 
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conception of a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU), further attempts at a pre-electoral deal over seats 
and, similarly to the negotiations of March, a recognition that Heath may have to step down as leader to 
facilitate this (one that he was unwilling to give). But the combination of these demands was left largely 
ambiguous and unresolved. 
Many were driven by a reading of a changing electoral landscape and the opportunity it created for 
Conservatives, coupled with the prospect of an election boiled down to a Wilson vs Heath contest. There 
was broad agreement on the benefits of at least appearing to be constructive in opposition, though ‘there 
might be, in some cases, personality difficulties in direct links with opposite (Liberal) numbers’ (Steering 
Committee, 1/4/1974, CPA SC/74/2-27). In a letter to Heath in March, Ian Gilmour – who was a powerful 
confidante during this period as co-author of the October manifesto, and effective liaison with backbench 
party committees – argued that ‘almost the only chance of our avoiding defeat in the summer would be to 
make a limited electoral pact with the Liberals’, without which it was likely Wilson would ‘set the electoral 
and political mould for some time ahead’ (Letter: Ian Gilmour to Heath, CCO 20/2/7, 26/31974). Douglas 
Hurd, the former head of Heath’s office, similarly viewed the short-term tactics of coalition to be a necessity 
to neuter strong doubts over Heath’s leadership. He argued that ‘this is the best way for EH to disarm 
criticism of himself and win an election, if it comes’ (Ziegler, 2011: 463). William Waldegrave, Hurd’s 
successor as Heath’s Political Secretary, was similarly keen (Waldegrave, 2015; Sara Morrison, 2016, 
Interview).  
Support came from senior figures and ministers from both wings of the party. Julian Amery, a key figure 
in the right-wing Monday Club was in favour (although the club itself was certainly not), as was Peter 
Walker – a founder of the Tory Reform Group (Ramsden, 1996: 386; Ziegler, 2011: 463). Maurice 
Macmillan was also a vocal supporter of a ‘national government’ regardless of whom it included - though 
Butler and Kavanagh noted this had the hint of ‘unwelcome back-seat driving from Birch Grove, where 
Harold Macmillan lived in retirement’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 43). But there were other, perhaps more 
unlikely, sources of support for a fundamental change of position. Alec Douglas-Home believed that ‘the 
public are beginning to grow out of the ‘tu quoque’ fashion in party politics’, a feeling the Liberals had 
capitalized upon but an opportunity if ‘we can steal their clothes between now and the election’ (Paper by 
Sir Alec Douglas Home, CPA LCC 1/3/1/94). During the tortured drafting of manifestos in June he 
attacked a fifth draft – one that attacked the Liberals for having ‘neither the men nor the policies to carry 
Britain through the crisis’ – with his annotations noting that it ‘smacked of business as usual’ (Manifesto 
Fifth Draft, CPA LCC 1/3/4/2).  
The strongest advocates of co-operation suggested two forms of deal with the Liberals: an explicit promise 
to involve Liberals in any coalition, regardless of the electoral and parliamentary arithmetic, or a pre-
electoral pact between the two parties and a deal over seats. Conservative discussions about a division of 
seats were particularly pertinent immediately following the election – any deal with the Liberals that 
involved constituencies would be riddled with difficulty, and an election could feasibly be called at any 
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moment. From March until June Lord Carrington drove discussion as Party Chair and was keen to push a 
more active arrangement. Memos, old and new, flew about. Some talked about core principles, others the 
detailed calculations and machinations. Nigel Lawson, a strong proponent of the advantages of an 
arrangement with the Liberals in a limited number of constituencies, was aggrieved by what he saw as niggly 
and damaging short-sightedness by the Conservative machine. In a letter to Carrington that provided 
detailed calculations on a pact he told him he was right in sensing that ‘most of the work which is done in 
the party on this subject … is written on the assumption that these arrangements are a bad idea’. Lawson 
was critical of other attempts that were evidently designed to do down the prospect of a pact, and argued: 
 these Aunt Sallies are neither here nor there: what is needed is not to list various 
theoretical Conservative-Liberal electoral arrangements that manifestly do not make sense, 
but rather to see whether there is any such arrangement that does make sense.  
(Letter: Lawson to Carrington, 24/5/1974, CCO 20/2/7) 
He calculated that there were strong grounds for a limited pact in 67 constituencies – leading to 31 gains 
for the Conservatives, and 37 for Liberals. Generous terms and a near quadrupling of their parliamentary 
representation would provide short-term benefits for the Liberals, designed to override the urgent 
requirement for electoral reform. But, ultimately, ‘having used an electoral pact to gain an overall majority, 
we might then revoke the pact at the next election and annihilate the Liberals’ (Ibid.).  
Lawson was not alone in believing a pact to be desirable – a close advisor recalled Heath’s inner team ‘just 
talk and talk and talk about that’ (Ziegler, 2011: 464). Three factors were key in determining Conservative 
levels of support for Liberal co-operation: whether the Liberal vote was viewed as latent Tory support, or 
more difficult to pin down; the extent to which the National Unity message was seen to chime with voter 
preferences that had become more receptive to co-operation; and how much emphasis was put on the 
effect co-operation would have on Conservative members and local associations, who were assumed to be 
hostile to co-operation in theory and practice. Lawson was certainly right that others within the CRD had 
produced data that was significantly less positive, but this was not wholly true. In-depth research of four 
key Conservative-Liberal marginal constituencies found Liberal support particularly flimsy: 55% of Liberals 
who were former Conservatives admitted they were quite likely to consider voting Conservative. (Liberal 
Survey, 31/7/1974, CCO 180/27/9/2). It was not Liberal policies that were attractive – the highest 
approval, of a range of policies, was for a referendum on the Common Market (Ibid.). The task was instead 
reputational, and boiled down to ‘allowing our February 1974 image to die and replacing it with a ‘national 
unity’ image of moderation’ (Ibid.; Bale, 2012: 215). 
While the diagnosis was confirmed by repeated polling, the issue was whether the prognosis required the 
bold strategic manoeuvre of a pact, or a more nuanced position on coalition. Many of those inclined to 
bold strategy and an electoral arrangement were concerned about the practicalities of maintaining party 
morale and unity. Some on the moderate wing of the party, including then head of the CRD Chris Patten, 
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were worried that it would be thought of as expediency over principle, creating a ‘positive explosion within 
the party if it did not work (providing the best possible terrain for Enoch Powell)’ (Letter: Patten to 
Carrington, 23/4/1974, CCO 20/2/7). The CRD, although accepting that the party ‘could not afford to 
disregard any possibilities’ and containing figures such as James Douglas and Gilmour who were aware of 
the urgency of the Conservatives electoral position, was also producing documents that viewed the hurdles 
to be just too big (Letter: Nicholson to Douglas, CCO 20/2/7). Although they identified similar numbers 
to Lawson – including coming to an almost identical list of 31 seats – they came to strikingly different 
conclusions. The CRD concluded that the statistical analysis was not encouraging and ‘it is difficult for 
both Conservatives and Liberals to gain a large number of extra seats from an electoral arrangement’ (CRD 
Research Paper: Appendix A, CCO 20/2/7). Lawson, with the same data, felt ‘that it would need to be 
confined to a carefully chosen minority of seats is true; that this would not be worthwhile is palpably false’ 
(Letter: Lawson to Carrington, 24/5/1974, CCO 20/2/7). 
Whitelaw had also produced a memorandum outlining his belief both that Liberal support was near 
impossible to pin down, as it came from a broad range of right wing discontents and newer and genuine 
swing voters energized by the image of moderation and reform Thorpe had effectively channelled. In 
private to The Guardian he expressed a concern that ‘local Conservatives were very uneasy about the Liberals’ 
(William Whitelaw, 17/7/1974, Hetherington 21). Whitelaw, when Chief Whip in 1969, had previously 
pondered that coalition might be possible in Britain but it would ‘cause a great uproar in the Tory party, 
whose members still regard office as a prize they have no wish to share with others’ (Ramsden, 1996: 386). 
So, although Whitelaw was in favour of electoral reform, and ‘the party would have to change (as a result) … 
and the consequences would not be so disastrous’, he saw this as ultimately the result of a post-electoral, 
multi-party scenario in which the Conservatives could play a lead role (William Whitelaw, 17/7/1974, 
Hetherington 21). Not committing to a coalition contrasted strongly with Wilson’s sectional positioning, 
and was a stance ‘more likely than any other to attract the bulk of Liberal voters while not alienating our 
party members’ (The Liberals: Mr Whitelaw, 28/6/1974 CPA LCC 1/3/2/110-113). This position can also 
be explained by the fact he viewed a hung parliament as, at the very least, eminently plausible given the 
strong mood public towards party co-operation. Thorpe told Liberal supporters Whitelaw was personally 
convinced of the Liberal’s continuing resilience and place within party politics: ‘the hopeful thing is that we 
have (except for Ted, who is going anyway) convinced some Tories (e.g. du Cann and Whitelaw) that we 
are here for good, and may accept’ (quoted in Bogdanor, 1996: 383). But preliminary discussions and hints 
that the party would consult with competitors would not, others thought, cut through to the electorate. 
James Douglas, head of the CRD, felt the electorate held an embedded ‘illusion that the Tory party is a 
hard-abrasive party of confrontation … making cooing noises in opposition will not shake it’ (Letter: 
Douglas to Fraser 20/4/1974, CCO 20/2/7). 
Intra-party tensions within the Conservative Party were indeed initially exacerbated by co-operation talks, 
making the idea of pacts much more difficult. This was heightened by increasing friction between the parties 
	 92	
at a local level as campaigns tightened and intensified. The proportion of Conservative MPs who had 
Liberals as runners-up in their constituency had jumped from 6% in 1970 to 42% in February (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1975: 42). Edward du Cann, Chair of the 1922 Committee, felt this was again a particularly acute 
problem in the South-West – where some of the pacts would self-evidently have to take place, given the 
Liberals’ strength, but also where the party were particularly considered the ‘ancien ennemi’ (Du Cann, 
1995: 216). A close advisor to Heath in 1974, who managed relations between Heath and an increasingly 
disgruntled national Union, said talk of specific constituency-level pacts ‘showed Nigel Lawson living in 
cloud cuckoo land, where he has lived ever since’ (Private Interview, 2016). Ultimately a shifting of 
personnel in June within the upper echelons of the party precipitated a shift away from considering a pact 
a possibility. Carrington, who had showed a typical ambivalence towards the National Union (the name, at 
that time, for the party’s national voluntary body) handed over his position as Chair. Whitelaw replaced 
him and ‘and that, as one advocate (of Conservative-Liberal co-operation) put it, ‘was, in effect, the end of 
it” (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 44). Whitelaw’s chief task was briefed as principally to ‘restore the 
confidence of Tory voters in the constituencies, not least those who defected to the Liberal Party last 
February’ (The Times, 12/6/1974: 6). This suggested movements not to accommodate the Liberal Party in 
co-operation, but to recapture Liberal votes.  
Heath was, again, largely dictated by the prevailing winds. That is not to say he did not consider his options 
carefully. Butler and Kavanagh’s (1975: 44) account notes that ‘Heath, as usual, took time to think through 
the implications’. But he was hindered both by his inherent strategic conservatism, and the conflation of 
coalition with his own position as Conservative leader. The final manifesto draft, of which Heath talks 
about warmly in his memoirs, contained muzzled support for a coalition – suggesting the party would 
recruit from outside its ranks to endorse a government that could ‘transcend party differences’. The 
movement towards what was, by the end of the campaign, an explicitly pluralistic position was tortured and 
glacial. Despite the support of key advisors Heath was not a pioneer for a formal pact and Gilmour felt he 
made ‘no more than polite noises’ about the prospect (Ziegler, 2011: 463). A continuing fear of a 
majoritarian mind-set loomed large over discussions, and Heath felt moves towards pluralism would be 
met not by a welcoming electorate with a thirst for new politics but rather ‘cynics (who) were bound to say 
it was forced out of us by the expectation of defeat’ (Heath, 1997: 524). Nigel Lawson, in retrospect, 
observed that Heath was ‘never a fan of new ideas’ – and he clearly felt that the political environment had 
not shifted enough for calls for coalition to be met with acceptance rather than through the prism of the 
success and defeat of binary political positions (Ziegler, 2011). Indeed, Heath is recorded fearing in a 
meeting of his strategic steering committee of 1 April that ‘there was a real danger of creating a Conservative 
minority government through giving away seats to the Liberals’ (Steering Committee 1 April 1974, CPA 
SC/74/2-27). This was not a concern many shared.  
The movements towards the Conservatives’ final internal settlement on a coalition were conducted publicly. 
It would be unfair to characterize them as slapdash, desperate and last minute given the internal debate that 
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had taken place since March. But the party certainly gave their opponents every opportunity to label them 
that way. Heath’s memoirs suggest the eventual manifesto pledge to consult with other party leaders, and 
bring in talent from outside the sphere of politics, was an unambiguous call for coalition. But it was not 
received as such at the time. The figures mentioned, such as the chairman of Marks & Spencer Sir Marcus 
Sieff and senior Cabinet Office figure Lord Rothschild, were all either pointedly apolitical or publicly 
affiliated to the party (Hutchinson, The Times, 25/9/1974: 6). Certainly, if it mattered, policies were also in 
the end knowingly coalition-friendly. As Douglas Home had suggested, the Conservatives did their best to 
frame their campaign within a sense of economic crisis, and policy was largely non-specific and bargainable. 
Only Thatcher’s mortgage rates policy was both clearly unacceptable to Liberals, touted as immovable and 
kept as a flagship policy. Despite a specific request from Heath, Thatcher was unwilling to drop the policy 
live on Any Question’s? (despite her own personal reservations about the policy). 
Yet at the heart of the problem was that a nuanced position of conciliation was not enough to cut through 
and define the campaign or, worse, was incoherent. Stagnant opinion polls heightened the need for action, 
and post-election co-operation was the party’s remaining ace card. An Observer report leaked that there had 
been discussions about the possibility of Heath committing to standing down to facilitate an agreement. 
(Jenkins, The Observer, 2/10/1974: 1). Continual poor polling for the Conservatives emboldened Heath. His 
ambivalent position was largely down to the fact that he simply had yet to make up his mind, but he was 
partially carried by the logic that there was, by the closing weeks, nothing to lose (Hurd, 2004: 229). Demand 
for coalition, if we go by the polls, dipped as Election Day approached – in directly disproportion to the 
focus put on it in Conservative strategy. The same people who cautioned against inertia throughout 1974 
– Carrington, Wolff, Morrison – were also advocates of clarification of both the coalition stance and 
Heath’s position as leader (Cosgrave, 1985: 111; Ziegler, 2011: 464). This was because any advantage Heath 
and the party had from their coalition pledge (and some 69% of voters were aware of Heath’s pledge, a 
fifth saying it made them more likely to vote Conservative) was not translating into polling traction as 
polling day neared (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 125).  
Heath tried to clear up this ambiguity at the start of the last week of campaigning on 2 October as ‘the 
onion (of national unity) began to be peeled layer by layer’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 124); Heath 
promised that ‘if we secure a majority we will not form our administration from Conservatives alone’, and 
suggested a televised forum consisting of all the parties, modelled on the National Economic Development 
Council, to resolve economic and industrial policy (Aitken, The Guardian, 4/10/1974: 1).  Within the bubble 
of the Tory campaign, whether Heath’s should use the word ‘coalition’ was viewed as extremely important. 
Once he did, those around him commented on how much it liberated him in the final days of campaigning 
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 129). It also had the precise reaction Heath had feared; post-electoral scenarios 
were intertwined with his personal position. Liberals had, throughout 1974, put Heath’s leadership at the 
heart of the question (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 44). A meeting to discuss the reaction to the stance was 
leaked to the Observer, reported as aides confirming Heath would stand down if a post-election path to a 
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coalition opened up. On radio phone-ins and in media briefings, questions about Heath’s position, much 
to his chagrin, were constantly put. Carrington, privately a key proponent that Heath make ‘the ultimate 
sacrifice’, told Robin Day Heath would ‘never put his own personal position before the interests of the 
country’ (Ibid: 126). 
By the end of the October campaign a combination of both Heath’s enemies and allies were united in 
urging him to stand aside. Again, Whitelaw acted as a brake, attempting to avoid the conversation at all 
costs in meetings of the strategic steering committee he chaired, given the clearly symbiotic nature of his 
and Heath’s careers. Equally, Heath was never prepared to give his resignation letter before polls had closed, 
and was aided by loyalty among some senior figures, who saw no benefit in doing so. A conversation 
between Alan Clark and Deputy Chief Whip Jack Weatherill, recounted in Clark’s diaries, confirmed 
Carrington’s belief that ‘everything was becoming too sophisticated for the public to understand’ (Steering 
Committee, 1/7/1974, CPA SC/74/4). It is suggestive of the rift that existed between Heath and, 
particularly, sections on the right of his party.12 It also epitomizes the perception of the public mood on 
the timing of coalition pronouncements, and demonstrated the issue of Heath’s leadership continuing to 
dominate: 
“(Weatherill) ‘How’s it going?’ 
‘So, so, only’ 
‘No, I mean this Coalition idea. Are you getting it across?’ 
‘They won’t understand. It’s far too late trying to sell that…’ 
‘Well, that’s the line. Do your best.’ 
‘Look, Jack, we’re not going to get anywhere while Ted is leading us. He’s had it’ 
‘Later, that comes later. Leave it for the moment” 
 (Clark and Trewin, 2010: 3/10/1974, 36) 
Liberal Party’s stance on co-operation: March-October 1974  
Jeremy Thorpe, for his part, both publicly railed against Heath’s evasive position while being privately 
delighted. He argued that it is ‘rather strange that you invite people to dinner, but you do not order the 
food first’ (The Times, 9/10/1974: 5). But, equally, that stopped him from overtly having to RSVP, and 
accept or decline. While Thorpe stated that ‘it would be invidious and wholly devious to engage in any pacts 
or agreements with any other party’, this came just after tentative, brief discussions in June on just that 
topic, that fell apart upon mention of Heath’s leadership (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 44). Indeed, Thorpe 
was in constant discussion with Conservatives, though not Heath himself. Thorpe’s wholly uncertain stance, 
as unable and unwilling to give clarification of his own party’s position as Heath, was due to internal 
																																																								
12 News of Alan Clark’s selection as candidate for the Kensington constituency particularly deflated the leader’s 
office (Waldegrave, 2015) 
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discontent that had rumbled on from the moment he left negotiations at Downing Street in March. As the 
Daily Mail (3/10/1974: 15) pointed out: 
 the pressures of internal party politics make him mask his real intentions in a smokescreen 
of evasion … the prospect of power still hovers enticingly. And Jeremy Thorpe is out 
there chasing it. Just like a politician. 
 Yet if he was chasing coalition it was constantly with one eye on the mood of his extra-parliamentary party, 
and he was in no way ahead of his fellow MPs. Butler and Kavanagh argued that his parliamentary party, 
largely negative about the prospect of coalition in March, throughout 1974 became more receptive to the 
idea, driven in large part by the weight of polling evidence. Steel (1980: 18) also felt a strategy of coalition 
‘pursued aggressively’ had the support of Liberal MPs. Yet among activists, morale was reported to be low, 
and there was an increasing disconnect between parliamentarians and the broader Liberal Party – ‘party 
officials outside Westminster’ feeling the party was particularly vulnerable to the charge the party were 
‘mini-Tories’ (The Guardian, 15/7/1974: 1). The internecine warfare was kicked off by Steel in June in a 
Liberal broadcast, which argued that: 
In our crisis, we surely need a much more broadly based government, backed by a real 
majority of public opinion … what we Liberals ask of you now is that at the next election, 
whenever it comes, you give us sufficient numbers in parliament to ensure the end of the 
system of one party government (quoted in Steel, 1980: 17-18) 
Steel claims that the speech was toned down by Thorpe. It managed to be both overt and oblique, giving 
enough wiggle-room to backtrack and claim it was a call for a coalition of all the parties, rather than 
acceptance the party could fall one way or the other. And, when Thorpe’s conference speech in September 
only mentioned in passing the prospect of a multi-party government, and claimed ‘our objective will be 
nothing less than a total breakthrough’, Steel was extremely disappointed – particularly as, in truth, was 
targeting ‘between 40 and 50’ seats (Jeremy Thorpe, 8/5/1974, Hetherington 21). The mere fact of 
Thorpe’s consultations had contributed to a public idea that the Liberals were closer to the Conservatives 
than to Labour and had raised deep suspicions among an activist base wary of compromising their claim to 
be on the left of British politics. The campaign launched by Steel’s party broadcast, but also supported by 
Thorpe in a television interview, was an unexpected attempt to strong-arm a broad party that prided itself 
on internal consultation, and an influential Young Liberal grouping strongly against any agreement 
(Torrance, 2012: 68; Bloch, 2014: 403-4). This led the party’s National Executive at their next meeting in 
on 29 June (with all MPs absent) to pass a resolution that: 
The Liberal Party will not join a coalition with the Conservative Party or the Labour party 
separately and will make this clear to the electorate at the next General Election.  (NEC 
Minutes, 25/6/1974, Liberal Party/1/8) 
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The leadership, fully aware of what their statements had meant, cried foul and Thorpe – in a cool, 
emergency meeting between the Executive and the parliamentary Liberal Party – claimed media 
misrepresentation as an unwelcome by-product of the success of his leadership (Joint Meeting: NEC/PLP, 
11/7/1974, Liberal Party/1/8).  
The ill feeling, though, carried over the summer to the Liberals’ annual Autumn conference in Brighton. 
The Liberal monthly New Outlook, whose editorial team included many of Thorpe’s senior advisors, came 
out in August against a two-party coalition and in support of the Liberal Party working constructively with 
a minority government (Clark, The Times, 2/8/1974: 3). The Young Liberals denounced Thorpe as ’a traitor 
to the party’ and pressed against the idea of forming any coalition, while specifically attacking a centre-right 
arrangement given ‘the Tories have sheltered in the palaces of inequality all their lives … Liberals have been 
storming these palaces all their lives’ (Torrance, 2012: 68). The resulting triangulation led to a position that 
was mystifying to outside observers. The party passed two motions: one against a coalition, and another – 
by a majority of six to one – accepting the need for the parliamentary party, after a non-binding meeting of 
the Party Council, to decide come October. This gave Thorpe a degree of bargaining flexibility and was 
thought of as a personal success and mandate for post-election discussions. But clearly there was a widely-
held belief that committing to coalition would be a vote-loser. The party did not fully embrace the idea of 
coalition and Steel (1980: 19) felt ‘the party had really flunked the issue of participation in government as a 
mean of getting more Liberals into parliament’. 
Thorpe’s position throughout the campaign was almost defiantly flexible. When briefing Guardian 
journalists, he stoked the prospect of coalition and talks with both Wilson and Heath, and they ultimately 
came out in support for his party on the basis that the ‘attraction of a Liberal vote is that it makes agreement 
more likely, whichever party is dominant’ (The Guardian, 7/10/1974: 10). He continued to press Heath’s 
leadership as a barrier to agreement, thereby distancing his popularity from Heath’s toxicity: arguing that 
‘architect of confrontation in February is not exactly the apostle of unity to hold together all political parties 
in a government’ (Ibid.). Heath’s continued public association of a government of national unity with a 
Conservative majority was an effort to bypass pressure on himself. But, resultantly, Thorpe could argue 
publicly that an agreement was unlikely in the extreme while ‘making detailed contingency plans’, believing 
it was the most likely outcome and organizing a helicopter on standby to take him from his Devon 
constituency to London at short notice. In the end, although he flew the kite of coalition with some skill 
the electorate kept his helicopter firmly docked. 
Conclusion 
Institution-Facing Constraints 
Throughout 1974, there was a central paradox within discussions around co-operation, resting on 
perceptions of the institutional constraints of British politics. Heath’s call for National Unity and a coalition 
government were thought to be gaining wider credence and popularity. By October 1974, 48% of 
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Conservative supporters preferred the idea of a Lib-Con coalition, or co-operation in government involving 
all three main parties; 49% favoured a Conservative majority (ORC poll in The Times, 5/10/1974: 4). But 
Heath was an implausible and unpopular head of any coalition (Ibid.). Heath’s personal popularity was 
problematic before the first election of 1974, but his rapidly diminishing standing post-election must be 
seen principally as a by-product of his ejection from office in March 1974. This spoke to a truth about the 
party system and the role of perceptions of success and failure within it, and partially explains why the strain 
put on the two-party system throughout 1974 was an aberration, rather than a fundamental recalibration. 
The concept of parties working together to solve intractable crisis had a surface appeal. But the Liberal vote 
remained largely ‘negative’ rather than offering a positive endorsement of a new politics (Butler and Stokes, 
1974).  Sara Morrison (Interview, 2016), who was at the heart of Heath’s campaign in October 1974, judges 
in retrospect that: 
of course, we stuck to our guns and argued that there was a genuine democratic taste for 
it (a coalition government) in the broadest sense. Let’s face it, in terms of the sort of mood 
of the times, it is slightly more questionable at this distance than was convenient to think 
at that time.  
The concept of a burgeoning desire developing within the electorate for co-operation between parties was, 
indeed, probably over-egged. Jeremy Thorpe’s call for coalition may have been one that reflected, as he 
claimed, ‘the views of millions of people’ (The Times, 18/9/1974: 4). But despite a stretched number of 
candidates, the Liberal vote in October fell and, in 93% of constituencies the party fought in both contests, 
their proportion of the vote was squeezed (Cook, 2010: 159). The (correct) assumption of many political 
actors involved continued to be that the Liberal vote would ‘return’ to the two main parties in a second 
election. This points to the fact that co-operation and Liberal influence in government was not a potent 
message, and there was minimal evidence of tactical voting in support of the Liberal Party. The Liberal 
message on co-operation was defined by the two larger parties: stifled by Wilson’s refusal to discuss 
coalition, and damaged by Heath’s assumed leadership of any mooted coalition. As any Liberal gains were 
likely to be in Conservative-held seats, and only Liberal-Conservative co-operation appeared plausible, the 
imperative to vote Liberal was stifled. The inter-party politics of co-operation was damaging to the Liberal 
Party’s vote. Internal Conservative polling showed that people (rightly) felt the idea of ‘national unity’ was 
being pursued for partisan advantage, research describing it as a ‘trick’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 261). 
Indeed, the widespread assumption, by the time the election was called in the Autumn of 1974, was that a 
majority Labour government would be elected. The resilience of the two-party system in 1974 during a key 
period of challenge and institutional flux is, in retrospect, more striking than any sustained voter-led demand 
for a different party system.  
However, there was clear and recorded support among the electorate, when asked, for the idea of coalition, 
particularly in the Summer of 1974 – so much so that Labour politicians dampening down the possibility 
of coalition had also to talk down opinion polling: Michael Foot argued that the obsession with opinion 
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polling was ‘one of the diseases of our age’ (Hatfield, The Times, 20/7/1974: 2). Voters when polled were 
found to prefer coalition to a minority government during the short campaign (The Guardian, 6/10/1974: 
1). Polling by ORC in March 1974 on proportional representation showed 74% of Conservative voters in 
favour of a change to the electoral system (Bogdanor, 1981: 152). Much of the internal Tory push towards 
coalition was driven by internal research and polling (Bale, 2012: 215). Political scientists took to the media 
to argue that the result of the February election had led to the collapse of the post 1945 system, a voter 
rather than politician-driven change. Actors involved now downplay the extent to which a deadlock was 
forecast prior to the short campaign. But, much as in the run-up to the general election of 2015, many 
political elites were misreading the electoral runes, arguing the political system was in a ‘transition period’ 
(The Guardian, 15/9/1974: 10) and forecasting a recalibration when instead there was a return to the norm 
of single party government – albeit with a small Labour majority, the unravelling of which ultimately led to 
the Lib-Lab pact.  
Assumptions about how Westminster was supposed to function clearly drove the behaviour of actors, 
during the key flashpoint of post-election negotiations after the February election. Reacting to a hung 
parliament, the political reality for Heath was not necessarily based on constitutional and historical 
precedent. The idea that the election had a clearly defined winner – and that the winner was Harold Wilson 
and the Labour Party, and not Ted Heath and the Conservatives – clearly restricted these negotiations 
between Heath and Thorpe. Public opinion was used as a key justification for opposition to co-operation 
within the Conservative Party – Thatcher is recorded as reacting to co-operation in cabinet by arguing ‘my 
goodness me, we can’t do that – think how many votes we will lose’ (Bogdanor, 1996: 373). Heath and his 
inner cabinet’s attempted construction of the February result as an anti-socialist majority, formed from pro-
European sentiment, clearly suggested politicians unrestricted by their sources of support and their 
campaigns. In the immediate aftermath, both leaders were less ‘voter-facing’ and more concerned with 
intra-party pushback. But, equally, Heath clearly felt that co-operation required a narrative of 
exceptionalism and crisis as well an anti-socialist governing purpose. Any agreement needed to be framed 
as in ‘the national interest’, with the need for an administration that would be ‘sufficiently stable … to 
command the confidence overseas’ (Heath/Thorpe Meeting, PREM16/10, 2/3/1974). The Liberal Party 
resultantly found escaping the idea co-operation would be dominated by the Conservatives difficult. Thorpe 
perhaps may have been inadvertently guilty of accentuating this problem: by October 1974 he was boasting 
that he was ‘the only man in the country who was asked to join a Tory government and turned it down’ (Smith, 
The Guardian, 3/10/1974: 6). Defining Conservative-Liberal co-operation in government was clearly 
problematic. The Liberal call for a ‘classless coalition’ (The Guardian, 15/7/1974: 1) showed a party aware 
of the structural constraints, but unable to confound them. 
Party-Facing Constraints 
The need to placate intra-party opinion on co-operation clearly complicated strategic calculation on co-
operation. Whether Wilson would have pursued co-operation with the Liberal Party in 1974, of the kind 
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his predecessor Jim Callaghan entered into three years later, remains an untestable counter-factual. But 
Wilson’s consistent ‘no negotiation’ strategy was widely believed and understood – any Lib-Lab coalition 
or agreement was seen to be very unlikely. How much this was the result of political strategy, or whether it 
resulted from a genuine antipathy to coalition that Wilson shared with his party-at-large, is difficult to pick 
apart. The historical resonance of Ramsay MacDonald, and Labour’s reluctance to enter into any co-
operation with competitors was real. Bill Rodgers, later one of the key figures within the formation of the 
SDP as a member of the Gang of Four, argued for minority government without any deal with other parties 
on the grounds Labour voters felt ‘half a socialist loaf is better than no bread at all’ (The Times, 12/9/1974: 
4). The Labour Party’s strategy of ‘no-negotiation’ was imbued with the idea that co-operation was not just 
counter-productive, but chimerical. 
If the internal Labour position on co-operation was cohesive and united, albeit not fully stress-tested, the 
Conservative Party was instead fundamentally divided. There was an ideological tenor to disagreement 
about co-operation with the Liberal Party. Supporters of the National Unity concept, who argued it should 
be maximised to a full-blooded pre-electoral call for inter-party co-operation, were largely self-described 
One Nation Conservatives. They were largely supporters of Heath, who believed the strategy was the best 
chance of regaining office under his leadership. Those against were largely on the right of the party – not 
least Thatcher and Joseph in post-election discussions. This points to the intra-party balance of elite power, 
which remained largely supportive of Heath. As the October election drew closer and the party looked to 
be sleep-walking to defeat, the prospect of a renewed period of opposition brought clarity to the 
Conservative decision-making process. 
But Conservative MPs were largely sceptical about the benefits of co-operation, and were an intractable 
barrier to any movement from Heath on electoral reform. There was little real attempt by Heath to assess 
levels of support among his party grassroots, or to win around the body of MPs who remained resolutely 
opposed to co-operation. But the lack of any such attempt was largely because opposition to co-operation 
within the party-at-large was viewed as inevitable, and the possibility of constructing support for co-
operation within the parliamentary party seen as wholly remote. While, for example, The Daily Telegraph 
(27/6/1974: 18) talked up the idea of Con-Lib co-operation, these conversations on coalition and National 
Unity were thought to be principally driven by discussions taking place in ‘political circles’ which meant, 
reflecting the centralising tendencies of the British Political Tradition, Westminster and specifically the elite 
levels of the Conservative Party (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 44). The Conservative National Union – the 
party’s grassroots base, largely thought to be increasingly antagonistic to Heath’s leadership – were an 
unspoken presence throughout discussions within Conservative Central Office, among Heath’s advisors 
and within the Conservative Research Department. There was a tension between those working within the 
party’s central organisation, and those working within Heath’s inner circle: the former more likely to be 
supportive of co-operation, the latter viewing the intra-party and organisational obstacles as an intractable 
barrier to theoretical strategic manoeuvres such as tactical electoral pacts. This is why the replacement of 
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Lord Carrington with Willie Whitelaw as Chair of the Conservative Party was key. Whitelaw’s sensitivity to 
grassroots feeling made obsolete many of the discussions and calculations on co-operation that took place 
in the immediate period following the February defeat. 
The Liberal Party had clear lines of division on co-operation. Prior to February 1974 it was remarkable how 
little the prospect of coalition was discussed within the Liberal Party given it was the only realistic route to 
power. There was little or no institutional memory of the party’s scars from the post-war period of 
readjustment, largely as few who were involved remained active in the party (Steel, Interview, 2016). But it 
is also notable how much co-operation was debated in this inter-election period of 1974. Peter Hain (The 
Times, 10/9/1974: 8), then a prominent radical head of Liberal Youth, which consistently and loudly 
opposed movements towards co-operation, argued that any Liberal-Conservative coalition would mean ‘the 
bottom would fall out of the party, leaving only a public school rump’. This again spoke to both dynamics 
of intra-organisational power and ideology. Clearly the Liberal leadership was keener to pursue an 
agreement on a cross-party basis to ensure government than the party-at-large. Radical elements of the 
Liberal party ferociously opposed co-operation. The was a residual, but noted, institutional memory within 
the party that previous attempts at cross-party activity had meant ‘the smothering embrace of the 
Conservative giant’ (The Times, 12/9/1974: 10). There was consistent opposition to the concept of any form 
of inter-party agreement from a large minority of the party’s active membership. But, apart from Cyril Smith, 
there was relative agreement on tactics and strategy among Liberal MPs, whose support for co-operation 
appeared to harden as it appeared increasingly plausible. While the decision on entering into co-operation 
would be made by MPs, the Liberal Conference in September 1974 decided they would have to listen to 
(but not follow) the advice of a 250-member Liberal Council meeting. These battles were fought internally, 
and openly. A lot of energy had been expended on what turned out to be a hypothetical post-election 
scenario. But by October there was a truce that, if the electoral arithmetic had allowed it, would have given 
Thorpe a path to government.  
Heath: Defending ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
The idea of both a Lib-Con post-electoral coalition in March 1974, and a ‘national unity’ coalition in 
October 1974, were two different, rational answers by Heath to one fundamental question: how to use the 
concept of co-operation to maintain and regain political office. There is a sense among those who knew 
Heath that he saw a national government not only as an electorally expedient framing, but as an inherently 
superior form of governance to single-party majoritarianism (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 45; Armstrong, 
2016, Interview; Morrison, 2016, Interview). This judgement on Heath’s preference for co-operation can 
be levelled with his welcoming noises and actions around the SDP’s creation – not least his (somewhat 
presumptive) public pronouncement he was willing to act as a Conservative Prime Minister in a 
Conservative-Alliance administration, and later (albeit largely tacit) support for electoral reform (Haviland 
and Clark, The Times 28/11/1981: 6; Campbell, 1994: 804). But a belief in his indispensability does not make 
him unique among party leaders, in 1974 or any time before or since. The rhetoric of national unity and a 
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‘anti-socialist’ framing, with its clear echoes of Churchill’s promotion of Conservative-Liberal co-operation, 
came naturally to Heath, principally, because ‘he sincerely despised Labour and continued to see himself as 
the true national leader’ (Campbell, 1994: 637).  
Heath’s moves on co-operation in 1974 were, on the face of it, expansive and ground-breaking – a reaction 
to a growing public appetite for pluralism. But tracing the negotiations shows Heath operating what was 
principally a defensive strategy. The rational calculation, and the strategic workings of Heath and his 
advisors, were clear. The management and containment of a strengthening Liberal Party was the key 
imperative – those advocating coalition, including Heath, felt it would undermine the Liberal Party’s fragile 
electoral base. Aborted internal Conservative discussions about a pre-electoral coalition rested on their 
hypothesised effect, over two electoral cycles, of damaging the Liberal Party. It would lead to a ‘return’ of 
these voters to the two main parties and, principally, the Conservative Party. Heath’s preference for a 
Conservative-Liberal coalition over a minority government in March 1974 could perhaps suggest a 
sympathy for achieving reform of Britain’s political institutions, and the Conservative Party’s place within 
them, through co-operation. However, mooted pre- and post-electoral coalitions were grounded in 
exceptionalism and the language of economic crisis. Equally, the concept of co-operation and its perceived 
resonance was used as a strategy to blunt criticism of Heath’s leadership, the introduction of an issue 
dimension to shift the political debate away from Heath’s problematic leadership. The key aim was to 
defend Heath, and the Conservative Party’s, position within the existing two-party system. 
Peter Hennessy quotes William Waldegrave, a central advisor to Heath throughout 1974, who described 
Heath’s outlook as a belief that, ‘with the help of dispassionate and largely apolitical advice, previously 
intractable problems could be rationally solved (Hennessy, 2000: 344); he also cites David Owen, who 
described Heath as a ‘rather radical person’ (Ibid.: 333). But if Heath held a strategic mind-set that gave 
him the flexibility to pursue and conceive co-operation as a novel electoral strategy, he lacked the rhetorical 
skills to achieve it. The clear criticism to be made of Heath’s stratagems on co-operation is that they were 
ineffective. They clearly show that co-operation, if used as a strategy, must be matched with an effective 
rhetorical appeal. As Heppell (2014) argues, Heath is often unfairly used as a convenient ‘yardstick against 
which leadership and governing incompetence should be judged’. The concept of national unity showed 
Heath’s strategic flexibility, but his weaknesses caught up with him and he lacked the intra-party capital to 
realise his aims. And, if heresthetical manoeuvres are the art of pushing and reframing the possible in pursuit 
of the rational, it was Heath’s inability to master the art of selling a coherent vision of national unity that 
was problematic. Each time he reached for co-operation, either in March or through the gradual inter-
election movement towards a pre-electoral coalition position, it was a reactive decision to defeat, or the 
prospect of it. Heath’s national unity concept is largely forgotten. Those involved at the apex of the October 
1974 campaign defend its effectiveness and describe it as ‘one of the unsung successes of post-war 
campaigning since the Second World War’ (Waldegrave, 2015). However, what is most striking is Heath’s 
inability to reframe the political conversation to make the politics of co-operation central. This was both a 
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rhetorical and a strategic failure: internal critics argued the party could have been ‘tougher in attacking 
Labour for rejecting (a national government)’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1975: 259); in retrospect, it is less clear 
that the latent appetite existed that could have made it the key electoral cleavage in October 1974, 
particularly given Heath’s unpopularity. 
Thorpe: disrupting ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
Key to understanding the Liberal’s strategy throughout 1974 is their attempt to straddle two countervailing 
forces – an electoral surge for the party, driven by their positioning as a repository for discontent with the 
two larger parties (and principally the Conservatives) and a desire to benefit from what, particularly after 
the February election, appeared to be a real desire for co-operation in government among the electorate. 
In March the former political impulse, the vote-seeking tendency of a successful electoral insurgency, 
prevailed: there was very little enthusiasm for coalition, so much so that it is, in retrospect, largely dismissed 
by many of the key actors involved (Thorpe 2014; Steel, Interview, 2016). What was clear from the coalition 
negotiations is that there was no belief in coalition as a formative moment in recalibrating the Liberal Party’s 
appeal, and little trust in the Conservative offer of a ‘Speaker’s Conference’ on electoral reform – the 
(probably correct) assumption was that the Liberal Party would be ‘sucked up’ by any coalition, and there 
would be no institutional change to soften the blow (Dorey, 2011). Heath’s call for national unity in the 
inter-election period, if it had been matched by Wilson, would have meant the Liberal Party might have 
been able to ride both waves: appealing to discontented voters from both parties, while also able to push 
the idea that the party was serious about co-operation. In walking this tightrope between coalition and 
independence, Thorpe was more successful than his party’s decline in support between the elections of 
February and October suggests. The Liberal Party’s resilient polling continued throughout the summer of 
1974. Newspaper editorials may not be a guide to public opinion, but they are a useful indicator of how 
seriously those in Westminster continued to take the idea of the Liberal Party in government: both the Daily 
Mail and The Times endorsed the idea of a coalition with Liberals in government to its readers. There was a 
continuing belief that Britain was now operating in a party system where coalitions were increasingly likely.  
Robert Ingham (2015: 210) has noted that Thorpe was ‘a tactician rather than a strategist, at best dreaming 
up a new way of raising money but unable to develop and articulate a long-term strategy for his party’. The 
biggest priority for Thorpe was the maintenance of the electoral bubble that had led to the party’s success 
in February 1974. It meant a triangulation: leaving open the possibility of co-operation with other parties, 
but also indicating a hesitance to enter into any inter-party agreement except for a ‘limited period’, in 
response to what is ‘in the national interest’ (The Times, 12/9/1974: 1). This meant placating rather than 
challenging critics of co-operation. Thorpe reiterated at the party’s conference that only exceptional 
circumstances would lead to coalition. Agreeing the party-at-large via the Liberal council could advise the 
parliamentary party, rather than veto any agreement, opened the path to a post-election agreement. But 
there was no attempt to lead the party towards a position in favour of co-operation. Fear of internal criticism 
among MPs meant calls for coalition had to be offset by a renewed and continuing insistence that the party 
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could form a majority government leading, as in 1950, to a commitment to fighting over 600 seats (The 
Guardian, 15/7/1974: 1).  
David Steel’s principal criticism as Chief Whip – voiced internally at the time, and publicly afterwards – 
was that the party had said little about co-operation, and what they had said had been ineffectual and 
confused. The Liberal’s movement towards coalition was closely associated with Steel. Speculation around 
Jeremy Thorpe’s personal life increased from late 1974 onwards, and the sustainability of his leadership 
came under doubt, Steel was favourite to replace him but it was felt that ‘against him (Steel) is the party-
political broadcast he made between the two 1974 elections, reviving coalition talk, now seen to have sent 
party strategy on a misjudged course at a crucial time’ (Young, The Times, 19/9/1975: 14; Bloch, 2014).  
Thorpe’s ability to distance himself from this call for coalition, was emblematic of his party-facing priorities 
and an approach to leadership that prioritised internal support over bold action on co-operation. But the 
desire for co-operation was more transient than polling suggested. As the Liberal historian Chris Cook 
(2010) put it ‘the promised land had turned out to be a shifting mirage’.   
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CHAPTER FOUR – The Formation of the Lib-Lab Pact, April 1976-March 1977 
1976 
5 April – Jim Callaghan elected Labour leader. 
5 April – The government no longer has a technical majority, though continues to have reliable support 
from two Irish Nationalist MPs. 
9 June - Thatcher proposes a vote of no confidence in the government. The government win, 309-290. 
7 July – David Steel elected Liberal leader, in a contest against John Pardoe. He had called for a renewed 
attitude to inter-party co-operation during the campaign. 
18 September – Steel uses his leader’s speech at the Liberal annual conference to expound the benefits of 
coalition. 
22 October – Steel writes ‘an open letter from an admirer to Mrs Shirley Williams’, in which he outlines 
‘the need to co-operate with others’ 
4 November – Two shock by-election defeats, in Walsall North and Workington, erode Labour’s 
parliamentary strength. 
10 September – Roy Jenkins and David Marquand’s appointment to the European Commission further 
dents Labour’s parliamentary position.  
1977 
22 February – Labour lose a guillotine motion on devolution, thus losing the tacit support of the 
nationalist MPs. 
24 February – Michael Foot announces cross-party talks on devolution legislation, following cabinet 
approval 
3 March – Callaghan and Steel meet to discuss devolution legislation. 
17-18 March – Labour retreats on an Expenditure White Paper they are set to lose, prompting Margaret 
Thatcher to announce Motion of No Confidence. 
19-20 March – Bill Rodgers and Steel discuss the prospects for inter-party talks, and a meeting between 
Callaghan and Steel is arranged. 
21 March – Callaghan and Steel’s first meeting to negotiate a pact. 
21 March – Liberal MPs meet and discuss principle of pact, and potential terms. Broad support if aims 
are fulfilled, only Grimond and Penhaligon object. 
22 March 12.30pm – Steel, Callaghan, Michael Foot and Tom McNally discuss the terms for a pact Steel 
set out. 
22 March 5.00pm – Steel, Callaghan and Foot meet to discuss a pact. 
22 March 9.45pm – Steel, Callaghan, Foot and Pardoe negotiate. Pardoe leaves, negotiations continue 
and terms for a pact are agreed. 
23 March 12.30pm – Cabinet meeting endorses the pact, by 20 votes to 4. 
23 March 3.30-9.30pm – No confidence motion debated, Joint Statement by the Prime Minister and the 
leader of the Liberal Party announced. No confidence vote defeated by 24 votes.  
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Figure 1: Seat Distribution in the House of Commons, Wilson’s Resignation 16 March 1976 
 
 
Figure 2: Seat Distribution in the House of Commons, Formation of Lib-Lab Pact 23 March 1977  
 
 
Party Seats (% of total) 
Labour  318 (50.0) 
Conservative  278 (43.8) 
Liberal  13 (2.0) 
SNP  11 (1.7)  
UUP  6 (0.9)  
Vanguard/UUUP/ Ind. 
unionist  
3 (0.5) 
Plaid Cymru  3 (0.5)  
DUP  1 (0.2)  
SDLP  1 (0.2) 
Independent Republican
 
1 (0.2)  
Party Seats (% of total) 
Labour  312 (49.3) 
Conservative  280 (44.2) 
Liberal  13 (2.0) 
SNP  11 (1.7) 
UUP  6 (0.9) 
Vanguard  3 (0.5) 
Plaid Cymru  3 (0.5) 
Independent Rep.  1 (0.2) 
SDLP  1 (0.2) 
DUP  1 (0.2) 
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'The essence of the agreement was contained in the spirit in which it was struck, not in the number of 
immediate concessions of value.’ David Steel, The Times, April 18 1977: 12 
 
‘John Pardoe (Liberal Economic Spokesman) asked whether it had occurred to the Lord President (Michael 
Foot) that, if Labour produced a Bill to provide for proportional representation, the Liberals would 
campaign to form a coalition with them after the election? The Lord President said he recognised that the 
Liberal’s commitment to proportional representation was not entirely characteristic. Many members of the 
Labour Party thought that proportional representation exaggerated the power of middle-ground parties. 
Just as the Liberals had a permanent interest in PR, the Labour Party had a permanent non-interest’.  
Notes on a Meeting: Michael Foot and John Pardoe, 9.45pm, 21/3/1977 PREM 16/1399/44 
 
Overview: Political Context and Heresthetic Strategies 
 
The Lib-Lab Pact, a parliamentary agreement forged between a minority Labour government and the 
Liberal party, was the first formal cross party agreement in post-war Britain. It ran from 23 March 1977 to 
June 1978, and led to the Liberal party being consulted on the government’s activity as well as some 
legislative input, particularly on a proportional method of election to the European Parliament. The 
agreement was the result of negotiations conducted by both parties following slowly diminishing 
parliamentary support for the Labour Party. Philip Norton (2004: 190) described the period between 1974 
and 1979 as a unique period in twentieth century British political history because of the juxtaposition of 
two seemingly contradictory characteristics: the fragility of the Labour government, and its longevity. The 
period of Wilson time as Prime Ministers between 1974 and 1976 is one that is often overlooked in analyses 
of Wilson’s statecraft, which naturally focus principally on Wilson’s longer (and more thoroughly 
documented by contemporaries) period as Prime Minister (Crines and Theakston, 2017; Timmins, 2017; 
Seldon and Hickson, 2004 is a key exception). That this period encompassed the referendum on EEC 
membership, which saw a fostering of cross-party activity (Saunders, 2017), was the result of one of two 
sources of governing instability experienced by both Wilson and Callaghan: the parliamentary arithmetic, 
which ultimately created the critical juncture that led to the Lib-Lab pact; and the internal tensions and 
divisions within Labour intra-party politics, and the need to retain cohesion within the Labour 
parliamentary party, which created a persuasive logic against inter-party co-operation. The tactical 
advantage both Wilson and Callaghan both shared was a broad understanding of the fault lines in the 
Labour party (Bogdanor, 2004: 6). 
 
Historical analysis of Harold Wilson broadly perceives this to be a period of inexorable decline (Morgan, 
2017), with Wilson struggling to retain a governing grip amidst the problems caused by this political context. 
However under Wilson’s leadership, as this chapter shows, the clear vulnerability of the government did 
not translate into calls for inter-party activity. The memoirs of the chief secretary to the Treasury under 
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both Wilson and Callaghan, Joel Barnett, describe the Labour party as ‘so divided that it is difficult even to 
regard it as a coalition’ (Barnett, 1982: 84). The formation of the Lib-Lab pact, as this chapter demonstrates, 
was seen contemporarily by many on the left of the parliamentary Labour party as the end-point in a process 
away from a democratic socialist Labour party (Benn, 1990: 91-100). It exposed the extent to which the 
Tribune Group of Labour MPs – represented and led in the cabinet by Tony Benn and Peter Shore – were 
animated by the direction of travel of the Labour government, which they viewed as insufficiently radical 
in the face of continuing economic difficulty. A loan from the IMF imposed significant reductions in public 
spending, but was predated by a year of stringent cuts (Bogdanor, 2016; Hickson, 2005; Plant, 2004: 41-
53).  
 
The formation of the Lib-Lab pact provided, for both the left and the leadership, a key parliamentary 
breaking point in this battle in March 1977. Labour had been a minority in parliament for some time and 
had not looked towards formal inter-party negotiations. However, a series of electoral defeats, combined 
with the loss of votes on devolution and public expenditure led to the calling of a Vote of No Confidence 
in Callaghan’s government, a vote where victory without inter-party agreement looked impossible to win. 
This created a political choice for the left: accept the policy and strategy of Callaghan’s government, or vote 
for a new government in a vote of no confidence.  
 
In one sense, this basic context and rationale behind the Lib-Lab Pact bears striking resemblance to 
negotiations between Jeremy Thorpe and Edward Heath conducted three years earlier. For Callaghan, it 
provided an opportunity to continue his government with a stable parliamentary footing, reshaping the 
parliamentary arithmetic while retaining an electoral dynamic of independence from the Liberal Party. The 
heresthetic strategy was clearly to retain office with as little political disruption as possible. For the Liberal 
leader David Steel, this had provided a political opening for political co-operation he had been pushing for 
some time, not least in his election campaign to the Liberal leadership. Steel welcomed comparison between 
an agreement he forged as leader in March of 1977, and one he was vocally against in March of 1974 (Liberal 
Press Conference, 24/3/1977, PREM16/1399/18). He claimed, when announcing co-operation in 
parliament, that the ‘growing balance of hon. Members in the House, who do not belong to either of the 
major parties’ made such agreements an ever-increasing likelihood, regardless of whether the vote of no 
confidence, which precipitated the pact, led to an immediate election or not (Hansard, HC, 23/3/1977, v. 
928 c. 1319). Two counteracting forces, increasing partisan dealignment and lethargic Liberal polling, 
provided conflicting messages about the Liberals’, and Steel’s, political outlook. Steel willed the former to 
win out and for such agreements to be viewed within a context where hung parliaments – or ‘People’s 
Parliaments’ as he tried, with little success, to coin them – were the new norm (Steel Speech to LPC, 
20/5/1978, Liberal Party 19/1’; Bogdanor, 1981: 163). His revisionist claim to have agreed identikit terms 
to those offered by Thorpe to Heath added to the impression that he wanted to stress both continuity and 
change in the circumstances and operation of the Lib-Lab pact – a narrative that jars with his reservations 
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as Chief Whip, and his subsequent flexibility when the opportunity of co-operation arose as leader (Liberal 
Press Conference PREM16/1399/18).13   
 
There are some clear contextual similarities between the pact (though despite entering common parlance 
Steel, believing it could hold negative electoral connotations, was never keen to call it such) and the inter-
election machinations of 1974 (Michie and Hoggart, 2014: 96).14 In terms of functional parliamentary 
arithmetic, there were an equal number of moving parts to the creation of a working majority. On the key 
confidence vote that acted as a ticking clock for negotiations, the eventual majority of 24 was the result not 
only of 13 Liberal votes with the government, but also the ‘ragtag’ support of Independent Nationalist and 
SDLP MPs, and the agreed abstention of four Ulster Unionists. On the key policy threads that would run 
through the agreement, devolution and direct elections for the European parliament, there was an 
acceptance that support would have to be procured from across parliament (Lord President/David Steel 
Meeting, 24/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/18).15 The agreement’s public justification would be – and would 
have to be – principally economic. Privately, in elite Labour circles, the tag of ‘national recovery’ was 
rejected for ‘economic recovery’ as, while the latter was inherently restrictive, the former ‘smacks of 
coalition’ (Note: Stowe to Callaghan, PREM 16/1399/38). But it strongly resembled Heath’s call for an 
entente on the basis of national economic crisis. Many of the prerogatives of retaining office – the continued 
promise of North Sea oil, and the feeling whoever grasped power would be ‘inheriting a bonanza’ – were 
just as present in thinking in both cases (Callaghan Statement for Labour Weekly, PREM 16/1399/27; 
Donoughue, 2008: 167). Callaghan, his advisors and his cabinet believed an election was likely to be lost, 
and were frank in their forecasts; in March 1974, Heath knew the electoral implications of a further contest 
on Wilson’s terms (Owen, 1991: 192; Donoughue, 2008, 22/3/1977 166-70). The policy preferences of the 
major party were, again, to retain office under the guise of economic crisis. For the Liberals, constitutional 
demands loomed as large as ever. Certainly, by late 1976 Heath, aware of the deleterious effect of clinging 
to executive office in a climate of parliamentary and electoral weakness, assured David Steel that, soon, 
Callaghan would begin a direct dialogue with the Liberal leader (Steel, 1980: 27; Steel, 1989: 123).  
 
All this led The Times’ columnist David Wood (28/3/1977: 13) to question whether political discussion and 
analysis in 1977 could survive ‘without Aneurin Bevan's taunt: ‘Why study the crystal ball when you can 
read the book?’ Retrospectively, Steel argued that his talks with Jim Callaghan were a ‘very different 
proposition’ (Hennessy, 2014). These talks were, he argued in 2014, different to those in 1974 and 2010 
due to their timing (more than mid-way through a parliament) and the fact they were conducted in the face 
of a vote of no confidence (Hennessy, 2014). Steel’s account of the pact blames the fact it was ‘cobbled 																																																								
13 Steel claimed ‘the same proposal was put to the right hon. Member for Sidcup (Mr. Heath) when he was Prime 
Minister in February 1974’ (Hansard, HC, 23/3/1977, v. 928 c 1314) 
14 For example, in an article month after co-operation began, Steel refers to an ‘agreement’, ‘combination’, ‘bargain’, 
and ‘new political venture’ but never ‘pact’ (Steel, The Times, 18/4/1977: 12) 
15 To that end, free votes were described by Callaghan as ‘the hinge upon which this agreement rests’ 
PREM16/1399/31 ‘Cabinet: Liberal Party Agreement’ 
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together in great haste up against the deadline of a Commons vote of no confidence’ as a reason for the 
defects in its operation (MacGregor, 2013). But without these circumstances – and Callaghan’s frenetic 
search for parliamentary votes – it is difficult to believe that the pact would even have been mooted, let 
alone agreed. David Wood’s Times piece went on to question the ‘efficacy, duration, rationale and even the 
political morality of the Lib-Lab contract’ (Wood, The Times, 28/3/1977: 13). This implies enduring 
cultural conventions and institutional norms and underlines that, far from an inevitability given the political 
context, the creation of a pact between Labour and the Liberals is, instead, a puzzle to be explained. Wood’s 
judgements were prescient. The pact struggled to be effective. It did not last as long as many of its key 
actors thought it might at the outset. Ultimately its purpose, to both parties, was at best half-fulfilled. 
Callaghan would have contemplated including Steel in a coalition government if circumstances had dictated 
– Callaghan’s advisors claim that the office of Home Secretary was earmarked for Steel (Donoughue, 
Interview, 2016). But his biggest strategic decision as Prime Minister, the delaying of the general election 
assumed for the Autumn of 1978, was partially defined by his fear an overall majority was not possible, and 
a desire to avoid a repeat of the legislative deadlock that led to co-operation (Steel, Interview, 2016; MS 
Callaghan 2743, Handwritten Note). 
 
The strategic imperatives for Callaghan and his deputy Michael Foot are clear from the archival records 
analysed in this chapter – to retain the existing two-party equilibrium, and keep his party onside so the pact 
with the Liberal party would solve, rather than exacerbate, his arithmetic problem in the House of 
Commons. This meant downplaying co-operation by doing all he could through heresthetic manipulation 
– both rhetorically, and in his inter and intra-party strategic manoeuvrings, to demonstrate the temporary 
nature of co-operation . The way in which Callaghan’s leadership was defined by this Commons by the fact 
that Labour’s majority was lost on the day he became leader, and the slow erosion of the government’s 
ability to hold a majority in the Commons led, finally, to Labour reaching out to the Liberals. Callaghan’s 
biggest concern, voiced privately and publicly, was that ‘this may all go wrong, and they never forgave 
MacDonald’ (Clark, The Times, 23/3/1977: 2; McNally, Interview, 2016). This fear was unfounded: the 
pact’s limited scope and relatively broad base of support from the parliamentary party (Clark, The Times, 
28/3/1977: 10) and the unions (Letter: McCluskie to Hayward, 28/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/15) shielded 
him from the accusation that it was some sort of elite-level betrayal. The instincts of both cabinet 
government and the Labour Party towards centralized control, and away from inter-party power sharing, 
were clear in the agreement’s operation, guided by Callaghan’s wariness about the pact’s potential 
symbolism (Stowe to Callaghan, 28/3/1977, PREM16/1399/14). While Callaghan was willing to ‘put aside 
the prejudices I had as a young man’ about coalition, his reticence had not left him and he never embraced 
or even acknowledged that the pact could have long-term consequences (Callaghan Interview, ITN 
Archive, 22/3/1977 2405/77). It was a disappointment for those who saw the pact as a function and 
symptom of a paradigm shift towards consensus politics.  
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In Roy Jenkins’ judgement, rather than a key point in the path towards realignment, the pact instead made 
it ‘more difficult for David Steel to do what he wanted to do subsequently’ (Slade, 2003: 8). This is damning 
– and important. Judgments on the pact’s fate point towards the reasons why the Liberals acquiesced to 
Callaghan’s stringent terms in the first place. The focus of disappointment in Liberal circles – a failure to 
enforce policy aims, dysfunctional structures that prohibited significant influence, and frustrating 
intransigence by Labour politicians at a cabinet and parliamentary level – suggests that it was supported to 
change policies, institutional norms and the attitudes of its competitor towards co-operation. A post-pact 
Liberal motion, passed at their conference in 1978, also stated that a firm commitment to PR, and the 
explicit support of either the Labour or Conservative parliamentary parties, should be vital pre-conditions 
to any further co-operation – further emphasizing that Liberal priorities lay in both changing the ‘rules of 
the game’ and the outlook and norms of its competitors (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 96). In the mind of 
Alan Beith, then Liberal Chief Whip, one of the key lessons learnt was that ‘we’ve really got to take our 
members with us’, leading to the creation of institutions aimed at reigning in leaders (MacGregor, 2013). 
These criticisms also hint at the fact both that there was some circumvention of intra-party dissent, and 
that this impacted on the historical and institutional memory of, particularly, the Liberal Party and its 
successor. 
 
Steel regarded the deal as ‘a rather novel constitutional experiment’ (Dorey, 2011). It was certainly seen 
contemporarily as a new method of harnessing and controlling myriad forces and ‘a practical grappling with 
the dilemma of Westminster, in a day when any government is likely to be in a minority, therefore presaging 
the future way of life in the Commons’ (Wood, The Times, 26/9/1977: 12). Steel’s aim was to reframe British 
political culture to make it accommodating to the formation and durability of cross-party bargaining. It is 
not fair, as Michie and Hoggart (2014 (1977): 66) argued, to say that Steel ‘was more concerned with winning 
access to the ante-rooms of power than with the changes that might flow from that power’. He saw a direct 
causal connection between fostering an inter-party style of government and the likelihood of securing 
electoral stalemate and further power for the Liberal Party. The primacy of consensus and co-operation 
within public institutions were the crux of his political standpoint and he pursued it in electoral strategy. 
His political broadcast of 1979, widely praised, explicitly interlinked halting economic decline with ‘a better 
way of running Britain’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1980: 227; Election Broadcast, LLP 19/2). Yet, in the end, 
the underlying assumptions of single party government overrode the possibility of the deal flourishing 
enough to dent the precepts of majoritarian government.  
 
In complete contrast Jim Callaghan, according to his key political advisor Tom McNally a rigidly ‘small c 
conservative’ in matters of constitution and governance, set out for overtly minimalist terms to maintain 
his government (McNally, Interview, 2016). Steel argued that ‘it wasn’t so much a Lib-Lab pact as a Steel-
Callaghan pact accepted by our colleagues with widely varying degrees of enthusiasm (Steel, 1980:153)’. In 
terms of the creation of the pact, if not its operation, this both overestimates how keen Callaghan was on 
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the arrangement, and the levels of dissent within his cabinet. Both he and Michael Foot never disguised the 
fact the pact was born so it could die, naturally, through the reassertion of a Labour majority. The most 
remarkable aspect of the pact is that it was an amicable and constructive co-operation (indeed sustained, 
principally, by positive atmospherics between the two leaders concerned) by parties with largely compatible 
policy outlooks, but irreconcilable strategic aims (Callaghan, 1987: 455; Lippiatt, 2008). Divisions were, 
therefore, almost wholly over political strategy and statecraft. The sobering realities of the impending loss 
of office were married to the dizzying possibilities of constitutional and political change. This chapter 
analyses how an agreement was formed in these circumstances, and how contradictory aims were bypassed 
and triangulated both within, and between, the Labour and Liberal parties. 
 
(The Lack of) Discussion of Inter-Party Politics 1976-77 
 
Conservative Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
 
Just three years prior to the formation of the Lib-Lab Pact, Labour’s unwillingness to countenance co-
operation stifled the possibility of gaining office through coalition for the Liberal Party. It is striking that, 
by 1977, enthusiasm among the two largest parties had reversed. The change in leadership of the 
Conservative Party fundamentally altered inter-party dynamics and cut off the possibility of Conservative-
Liberal co-operation. Margaret Thatcher saw the Liberal’s decision to enter into an agreement as an 
impromptu act of self-indulgence, the ‘thrilling illusion’ (Dorey, 2011: 380), or ‘seductive whiff’, of power 
enticing a weak-willed party which had suffered enforced abstinence for far too long. Thatcher (1995: 327) 
later wrote that she was ‘astonished that they had signed up to such a bad deal, but I had left out the crucial 
element of vanity’. She was unmoved by the growing indicators that multi-party politics could be the new 
norm and remained resolutely opposed to countenancing electoral reform, which remained a ‘taboo subject’ 
at Shadow Cabinet meetings. This was despite Lord Hailsham’s Dimbleby Lecture in 1976, which had 
described the Westminster system of elections and governance as delivering an ‘elected dictatorship’, and 
up to half the shadow cabinet – largely, though not wholly, one Thatcher had inherited from Heath at this 
stage of her leadership – entertaining the possibility of supporting proportional representation (Campbell, 
2001: 362; Bale, 2011: 221). Heath’s speech to the 1976 Conservative Party conference described a ‘political, 
social and moral crisis’ and had the ‘unmistakable undertone’ of a call for a national government (Heath 
Conference Speech, Oct 1976, LBC Archive; Hutchinson, The Times, 24/10/1976: 12). In October 1976 
Harold Macmillan used a BBC interview with Robin Day to call for a ‘Government of National Unity’, 
though not a coalition – ‘a sort of dirty word now, one always has to use the right phrases for things’ –  and 
was supported publicly by some Conservative MPs (Interview: Harold Macmillan, BBC Tonight, BBC 
Archive, 20/10/1976). Views among Conservative elites towards co-operation had hardly altered. What 
had was who led the Conservative Party. 
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Thatcher’s belief, that irresolute and debilitating government would result from co-operation, was clear. 
The Liberals’ eventual decision in March 1977 to join the government in the division lobbies for the vote 
of no confidence, that effectively announced the Lib/Lab agreement, soured relations between Steel and 
Thatcher. Steel has said it ‘remains a mystery’ why Thatcher did not countenance liaising with his party 
prior to the confidence vote she called (Steel in Michie and Hoggart, 2014: ix). It led to a defeat he puts 
down to the ‘arrogant assumption’ of singularity that defined her in opposition (Ibid.). Thatcher’s quip to 
television reporters ‘look what we flushed out, look what we flushed out – my goodness me’ betrayed an 
awareness of the possible electoral impact, particularly on the Liberal Party (Vote of Confidence, 
24/3/1977, ITN News Archive). But it also showed a genuine and acute distrust of the realpolitik of inter-
party alliances. For Thatcher, the fact Callaghan had ‘admitted’ his was now a minority administration was 
tantamount to acceptance of guilt, and she strongly railed against a ‘shadowy deal’ based on ‘common dread’ 
that she felt to be chimerical, contentious and electorally damaging (Written Statement: Lib-Lab Pact, 
23/3/1977, Thatcher Archive). The ‘full blast’ of the ‘Conservative propaganda machine’ that Steel had 
anticipated certainly directed their ire particularly on the motive behind his decision, and the premise his 
party would prove ineffectual (Liberal Press Conference, PREM16/1399/18). There was no shortage of 
those who saw the Liberals as driven, above all else, by naiveté and the short-term validation that came 
with the agreement as The Sun (23/3/1977: 7) portrayed a feline Callaghan devouring the flailing Liberal 
mouse. 
 
Liberal Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
 
Steel’s call for Liberal candidates, the day following the act’s announcement, to ‘admire the photographs of 
the Liberal MPs in the Daily Mail!’ could be seen as validation for those that criticized the pact as born of 
short-term expediency (Steel - Letter to Liberal Candidates, 24/3/1977, LLP 19/2). Here the Liberal Party 
has been criticized from two seemingly contradictory angles: seen both to have been pursuing myopically 
rational ends, while also selling themselves far too short to sufficiently grasp the levers of power. The broad 
consensus was that Steel had been blindsided by the allure of temporary significance and ‘while Liberal 
ideas will be examined in the new consultative committee there can be no expectation that many of them 
will be accepted’ (The Times, 24/3/1977: 19). Unhelpfully for Steel, while the pact was midway through its 
life Jo Grimond (Daily Mail, 28/11/77: 6) commented that ‘intoxicated with small swigs from the bottle of 
government, some Liberals have now woken up with a headache’. In retrospect Michael Steed, both a 
significant academic observer and an active Liberal, points to the lack of active and sustained discussion 
about co-operation throughout 1976 and into early 1977 as a missed opportunity. Steed argues that ‘the 
Liberal Party as a whole was therefore to blame, in wasting those four months (from November 1976 to 
March 1977), [and] failing to mount a national debate about the reality of a hung parliament’ (Steed in 
Lippiatt, 2008). 
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This is a judgement Steel shares but is possibly unfair for as John Pardoe – Steel’s economic spokesman 
and de facto deputy – noted, disapprovingly, ‘David Steel had formulated the view years before that the 
future of the party lay in some kind of deal with Labour moderates’ (Slade, 2002: 17). Whether the charge 
of political opportunism and short-sightedness could have been avoided through a more assertive selling 
of co-operation, in the months prior to its creation, is questionable. The situated and limited agency of a 
Liberal leader operating amid stronger political forces and currents was clear. Steel had, from his early days 
as an MP, viewed partnership with another party (‘all the time with the Labour Party’) as key to a Liberal 
government (Hennessy, 2014). In Steel’s memoirs, his recollections of the 1970 Liberal Assembly at 
Eastbourne are coloured principally by a platform debate of party strategy with Pardoe: 
 
where I advanced my well-known arguments and John, buccaneering and bullish, wanted 
a commitment to fight every seat in sight … he won the cheers, the argument and the 
vote. (Steel, 1980: 71) 
 
In the bitterly fought leadership contest between Steel and Pardoe, Steel felt he had made it clear that his 
leadership would involve a reassertion of the necessity of co-operation (Cook, 2010: 163; Torrance, 2012 
86-7). In his speech announcing his candidacy, Steel called upon Liberal activists to hold a ‘readiness to 
work with others wherever we see what Jo Grimond has called the break in the clouds – the chance to 
implement any of (our) Liberal policies’ (Steel, 1980: 22). He leant upon a ‘new authority as democratically 
elected leader’ but, also, the themes of his leadership bid, an electoral mandate that was built upon a strategy 
he felt he personified within the party. Interestingly, despite Steel’s two to one margin of victory, internal 
party research found Pardoe had won a majority among ‘party activists, and people who had voted after 
attending election meetings’ (Cyr, 1977: 33). 
 
Emboldened by support from a magnanimous Pardoe, who felt that ‘the party could have only one leader 
and one strategy’, Steel used his first Assembly speech as leader to call on his party to be prepared to share 
power (Steel, 1980: 23-5). Emlyn Hooson, the MP and leader of the Welsh party organization, opened the 
conference by pronouncing his support for a renewed discussion of strategies of co-operation, signalling 
his support for Steel (Clark, The Times, 16/9/1976:1). Other senior Liberal MPs, such as the influential 
right-winger Clement Freud, and then key advisors and speechwriters, such as William Wallace and Richard 
Holme, were urging caution (Steel, 1980: 119). After some last-minute deliberation, Steel went ahead and 
told his party that ‘we shall probably have – at least temporarily – to share power with someone else’ in 
order to ‘bring about the changes we seek’ and ‘be the fulcrum and centre of the next election argument – 
not something peripheral to it’. While radical Liberals recall the reaction to his speech somewhat differently, 
Steel felt ‘the assembly had backed the new line’’ (Clark, The Times, 16/9/1976: 1; Meadowcroft, 2016, 
Interview). Certainly, Steel was right to feel it received relatively good press, The Times drawing comparisons 
to Hugh Gaitskell as a reminder that ‘a certain quality attaches to a leader who defies his rebels in open 
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conflict at party conference’. His power within his party had been enhanced and while ‘Mr Steel was Mr 
Grimond's protégé: he is no longer Mr Grimond's man’ (The Times, 20/9/1976: 19). 
 
Indeed, Jo Grimond remained unsupportive of Steel’s movement towards co-operation (McManus, 2001: 
331-3) and, if he had remained leader of the party, would have done little to stir up the prospects of a deal. 
That Grimond should have had such fundamental problems with Lib-Lab co-operation is surprising. 
Grimond had previously been the key progenitor in centre-left realignment, ending the Liberal’s glacial shift 
to the right under Clement Davies (Dutton, 2006). Consistently as leader, he had called for the creation of 
a new progressive party of the centre-left as a ‘radical non-socialist alternative to the Tories’ (Barberis, 2005: 
127). Yet he saw any calls for co-operation with Callaghan whilst in government as inherently problematic 
– ‘blurring the line’ between opposition and government in a way that would damage the party’s identity, 
and which could only be justified with a firm commitment to electoral reform (McManus, 2001: 331). 
Despite Grimond’s stated reservations, on the Radio 4 show ‘Analysis’ in November Steel went further, 
and tentatively set out his position on co-operation: 
 
I think what is required is some form of minimal agreement on what is required for the 
national good rather than what is required for the Labour Party, Liberal Party, or Tory 
Party ... I am demanding, if you like, a degree of policy self-sacrifice on the part of all 
parties, and I certainly don't intend that the Liberal Party should lean to one rather than 
the other. (Quoted in: Wood, The Times, 28/3/1977) 
 
Both Steel and Pardoe firmly associated themselves with Grimond. That his later objections to the pact did 
not act as an effective veto showed, however, that his influence was far from absolute. The fact Pardoe saw 
the leadership election quite differently to Steel, as a choice between ‘the Radical vs the Other’ (Slade, 2002: 
17), is linked to their different perceptions of their party, the man who had led it when both men had joined, 
and their perception of his long-held desire for party realignment. Their attitudes to co-operation directly 
stemmed from their understanding of Grimond and the weight they placed on activist feeling. In John 
Pardoe’s view, Grimond’s stance on the Lib-Lab pact was the result of the fact that, like himself, the ex-
leader saw realignment ‘through the Liberal Party’ as the ultimate objective. This, Pardoe argued, could only 
be achieved after a substantial popular breakthrough that legitimized realignment, as:  
 
unless it becomes very, very large, probably number two in terms of seats, the party cannot 
enter into any arrangement with another party safely without the absolute certainty that 
the next general election will be fought on PR. Otherwise you are opting for total disaster. 
(Slade, 2002: 17) 
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Steel, on the other hand, was sure that Grimond prioritized a willingness to grasp office if the terms and 
time were right, recollecting that while Grimond was against the talks of 1974, he had been at pains to tell 
his parliamentary colleagues to ‘be realistic, (for) we are a small party. If we ever hope to be in government 
– and we believe in electoral reform – coalition must be an inevitable route forward’ (Brack, James, Steel, 
2015: 437). Pardoe was closer to Grimond’s thoughts, who agonized to Hugo Young ‘how can we bust the 
system if we are part of it?’ (Young (Grimond), 2007: 28/4/1977, 111). 
 
For Steel getting drawn in to ‘the system’ was an inherent part of remaining relevant. While a short period 
of the pact convinced him of the need to step back before the next election (advice he claimed to impart, 
with little success, on the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015) upon its inception he was, although 
clear the ‘pact’ was not an electoral arrangement, careful not to set significant barriers to its development 
(Steel, The Guardian, 12/5/2010). Equally, being part of the conversation that social democrats in the 
Labour Party were having about the future was his principal political objective in the period of his leadership 
prior to the pact. In October 1976 Steel wrote ‘an open letter from an admirer of Mrs Williams’, published 
in The Guardian, in which he argued:  
 
we are not an exclusive sect, and we recognize that we need to cooperate with others to 
create that great progressive party which I have wanted to see ever since I became active 
in politics. (Steel, The Guardian, 22/10/1976: 12)  
 
That even the Guardian played down the reaction of Labour MPs as ‘particularly derisive’, with MPs in both 
main parties ‘unlikely to pay much attention to Mr Steel’, showed how little headway Steel achieved (Aitken, 
The Guardian, 22/10/1976: 1). Steel’s reframing of the idea of co-operation was a demonstration of the role 
of political leadership in determining the parameters of the Liberal’s electoral strategy. That he had such 
little success shows how difficult it is for smaller parties to gain traction for strategic initiatives. Steel sought 
a symbiotic relationship with Labour; yet, without their electoral and parliamentary decline, his shifts in 
strategy would have had little effect.  
 
Labour Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
 
If Steel’s election as leader provided tentative signs the politics of co-operation were creeping further up 
the Liberal Party agenda, the election of two ‘conspicuous conciliators’ from Labour’s right and left – James 
Callaghan to the leadership, winning on the third ballot against Michael Foot, who became his deputy – 
was no accident (Williams, 1982: 60). Callaghan had won ‘mainly because his style and affability made him 
the most acceptable candidate’ (Ibid.); Foot had garnered the support of the centre and left due to the 
display of a ‘new moderation and loyalty’, though his victory over Shirley Williams, by 166-128 votes, was 
much less convincing than his supporters had anticipated (The Guardian, 22/10/1976: 12). Yet the strategic 
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and political implications of a Labour government without a reliable and sustainable parliamentary majority 
were already apparent. On the day Callaghan took office, in April 1976, the party officially lost its majority 
with the defection of John Stonehouse.16 Although it was felt the party could count on the continued 
reliable support of smaller parties, Labour’s intra-party dynamics were fragile enough to cast doubt on the 
continued functioning and survival of the government.  
 
A defeat in March on an Expenditure White Paper had forced a vote of confidence, delaying Wilson’s 
planned departure. While won by a relatively comfortable 17 votes, it was ‘a bruising experience’ that 
showed the true sense of detachment of the left-wing Tribune Group of Labour MPs. Benn’s diaries note 
that ‘the defeat last night has transformed the situation; it has ended the phoney peace and people see now 
that … they can’t carry the Labour Party the way they have’ (Benn, 1990: 11/3/1976, 529-30). There were 
clear tensions within a party that remained forcibly bound together by parliamentary procedure: Chief 
Whip, Bob Mellish, argued in cabinet that ‘they are counting on a vote of no confidence to bail them out’ 
(Castle, 1990: 11/3/1976, 682), and Neil Kinnock, a key member of the group, admitted that ‘they’ve called 
our bluff, but only by threatening to commit suicide’ (Jenkins, The Guardian, 12/3/1976: 12). In retrospect, 
it is difficult to see any real threat that the Tribune Group would organize to defeat the government and 
force defeat in a vote of no confidence. But it was hardly viewed as a given – Wilson was ‘nervy’, ‘jumpy’ 
and ‘drank quite a lot of Madeira’ (Donoughue, 2005: 10/3/1976, 692). If not willing to push the party over 
the edge into opposition, the Tribune Group was clearly capable of destabilizing the government. Certainly, 
the loss of the vote prompted Roy Jenkins to remark to Barbara Castle that ‘I don’t think we can continue 
much longer with the system of ‘first past the post” – a reflection on either the lack of coherence within 
Labour as a united mass party, or on a system of majoritarian government he saw as systemically failing to 
produce majorities (Castle, 1990: 11/3/1976, 681-2).  
 
Richard Crossman (1976: 11/12/1966: 159-160), in his diaries, described one of Harold Wilson’s greatest 
strengths: his leadership meant that Labour never had to decide its nature and purpose, whether it was a 
social democratic party like Germany’s SPD (whose leader, Helmut Schmidt, welcomed the Lib-Lab Pact) 
or as a ‘genuine socialist’ party (Telegram: Schmidt to Callaghan, 24/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/26). His lack 
of ‘profound thoughts about the future of the Labour Party’ meant that his ‘main aim was to stay in office’. 
His ability to dampen intra-party strife came from his ambivalence about the long-term strategic future of 
the party. Wilson had also managed, in 1974, to deftly avoid the inter-party bargaining that could easily have 
disrupted this intra-party equilibrium. Callaghan was not afforded the same luxury. Two shock by-election 
defeats in North Walsall and Workington in November 1976 made Labour increasingly dependent on 
Republican and Scottish nationalist support. The Walsall loss, on a 22.5% Labour-Conservative swing, was 
partially put down to the fact that David Winnick ‘probably did not help their cause because, as a Tribune 																																																								
16 Three months before his conviction for fraud, eighteen months after faking his own death and six years before, in 
1980, it was revealed to Thatcher Stonehouse was a spy for Czechoslovakia. 
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group activist, he is known to be numbered among critics of the Government's policies’ (Wood, The Times, 
5/11/1976: 1; Guardian, 6/11/1976: 10).  
 
Callaghan’s reaction to the by-election defeat was to discuss ‘sorting out the left-wing hacks and deadbeats 
on the NEC’ (Donoughue, 2008: 5/11/1976, 96). But in the period before the pact and following its 
creation, Callaghan handled the left of his parliamentary party with kid gloves, rather than confrontation. 
Callaghan’s clear instinct, rather than any consideration of bolstering his majority through inter-party 
alliances, was to placate the Tribune Group. Callaghan had made concerted efforts, upon coming to office, 
to bolster intra-party consultation mechanisms: establishing regular contact between Ministers and 
shadowing subject groups within the PLP (PLP Committee: Government/PLP Relations, 6/8/1976, 
PREM 16/1399/22; Horam, Interview, 2016). Upon the Lib-Lab Pact’s inception he remained unsure of 
the machinery of Liberal consultation but reinforced to his cabinet that arrangements with the Liberals 
‘must not outbid or devalue’ his framework of intra-party co-operation ‘PM Briefing: The Liberal 
Arrangement, 24/3/1977, PREM16/1399/20; Cabinet minutes CAB128 CM(77) 13, 24/3/1977). 
Callaghan’s collegiate reputation was significant, and appeared to later give some scope to act in a more 
centralized way during negotiations, (even excluding key trusted advisors for part of the negotiation 
process) and allowing the pact to be delivered as a fait accompli. Callaghan felt this was a key element of his 
job description. When asked mid-negotiations with the Liberals whether he felt the Tribune Group would 
follow him into a pact, replied that this was ‘part of my job as party leader. It’s no use me being general of 
an army which doesn't follow me’ (Callaghan Interview, ITN Archive, 22/3/1977 2405/77).  
 
David Steel was keenly alive to these dynamics, and told Hugo Young, in a bullish interview in 1977, that: 
 
The effect of our intervention has been to entrench, if you like, the Manifesto Group 
against the Tribune Group in the Labour Party. I think that tension is more likely to 
demonstrate itself as a result of this agreement than if you had the Labour Party in 
opposition, crushed by a great Tory majority and feeling they must all unite against the 
wicked Tory capitalist machine. (Young, The Sunday Times, 31/7/1977: 15) 
 
Steel’s explanation could be easily dismissed as wishful thinking. Indeed, his two mentors, Jenkins and 
Grimond, both viewed a Conservative landslide as the most plausible precursor to centre-left realignment 
(Young (Grimond), 2007, 112, 28/4/1977; Campbell, 2015: 507). The message was clear that Callaghan 
saw the pact as a ‘device to enable him to get the Labour Party, in its existing structure, through to a general 
election which he might win’ (Mackintosh, The Times, 22/7/1977: 14). Michael Foot, in cabinet discussions 
on the pact, argued it was the only way to keep Thatcher at bay and ‘while he was by no means a coalitionist 
… said in meeting after meeting, we must be here when the oil comes in’ (McNally, Interview, 2016). 
However, Callaghan was aware of the intra-party benefits that came from the deal and Bill Rodgers recalled 
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that the Prime Minister’s hint “as much as I might like it, the Liberals wouldn’t agree’ occasionally provided 
him with a welcome excuse for not pursuing a course’ (Rodgers, 2000: 171). The Observer (‘The Price of 
Power’, 18/12/1977: 18) noted that, indeed, the pact has ‘coincided with, and assisted, a stiffening of the 
sinews of Labour moderates’. 
 
This is a theory Roy Hattersley dismisses. Hattersley argues that, prior to Lib-Lab co-operation, the party’s 
support for the Common Market and the abandonment of the ‘alternative economic strategy’ had already 
sufficiently weakened the left’s hand. He also rejects the idea the Liberal Party acted as a shield to facilitate 
a move in a more social democratic direction, and that ‘nobody in the Labour leadership believed that such 
a pathetic defence of government policy would work, or that it was necessary’ (Hattersley in Michie and 
Hoggart, 2014: x). Equally, Tony Benn believed the pact to be: 
 
 a phyrric victory for the right. They think it is a big re-birth of a social democratic party 
but it isn’t. The Liberals have nothing to offer, they have no power base (Benn, 1990: 
23/3/1977, 91). 
 
There was a case for Hattersley’s optimism in 1977. Certainly, at a cabinet level the left was in retreat. 
Wilson’s 1975 reshuffle, the result of the cleavage opened up by the referendum, had damaged the left. The 
broad balance of power in the PLP, as discussed above, was on the moderate right, and was chaired by 
Cledwyn Hughes – who would later act as one of the key first points of contact with the Liberals when 
negotiations began (see pp. 104-5; Kirkup, 2012: 71). But the impulse for re-alignment was weak. Grand 
strategic manoeuvres were unnecessary when, as has tended to be the case throughout Labour’s history, 
the social democratic wing was reasserting its strength while the party was in office (Borthwick, 1979: 57). 
 
In Crewe and King’s (1995: 167) judgement, ‘the average Labour MP, if asked during the 1960s or 1970s 
what he thought of the Liberal Party, would probably have replied that he barely thought of it at all’. When 
approaching Wilson’s vote of no confidence in March 1976, Donoughue (2005: 11/3/1976, 693) claims 
that Steel and Thorpe had both been keen to abstain as any election would be disastrous, and Steel seemed 
‘very depressed about (the Liberals’) future’. Certainly, there was little hint that a splinter group emanating 
from the Labour Party, four years later, would co-operate with the Liberal Party. All three of the ‘Gang of 
Four’ who were in the cabinet supported the Lib-Lab agreement, but only Bill Rodgers actively promoted 
it through discussions with David Steel. Shirley Williams, like Benn, remained sceptical of the Liberals, and 
Steel’s claims to be a ‘party of government’ had had little persuasive effect – Williams told David Butler 
Liberals ‘thought like she did when she was 19’, echoing Callaghan’s dismissal of the party as ‘adolescent’ 
in preliminary negotiations (Butler Archives, Williams Interview, 17/7/1978). Owen (1991: 192) judged the 
negotiations on their merits, and had personally informed Jeremy Thorpe that the cabinet were likely to 
accept proportional representation. However, there were no serious strategic discussions with senior 
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Labour social democrats on how an agreement between the parties could facilitate further co-operation. 
Steel’s key ally within Labour – much to the chagrin of many Liberals, including Pardoe, who tried to 
capitalize upon it in the leadership contest of 1976 – was Roy Jenkins. But the concept of coalition politics 
was, equally, distant from Jenkins’ mind given, by late 1976, he felt that Callaghan had done well enough 
politically as Prime Minister that the re-election of a majority Labour government was foreseeable 
(Campbell, 2014: 505). 
 
Perhaps more surprisingly among Callaghan’s close aides – in his view ‘a right wing lot’, naturally more 
inclined to a Lib-Lab deal than his parliamentary party – there was similarly no conception at the time that 
any intra-party problems could be resolved through inter-party action (Donoughue, 2008: 22/3/1977, 169). 
There was also very little explicit anticipation, prior to Thatcher’s vote of no confidence, that the 
parliamentary arithmetic may force a crunch decision upon Labour in the future. In the debate on the no-
confidence motion faced by Wilson, Jeremy Thorpe delivered ‘a strange, rambling speech. All about the 
need for consensus – almost coalition’ (Donoughue, 2005: 11/3/1977, 692). That this was Bernard 
Donoghue’s judgement, later a keen and significant advocate of co-operation, showed how distant the 
prospect was in March 1976. Yet as Labour’s parliamentary stability withered away, there was very little 
urgency to actively seek a resolution that might involving the support of other parties. This widely-shared 
reluctance adds weight to the idea that the negotiations of March 1977 were the result of absolute 
arithmetical and parliamentary necessity: the preference was clearly to muddle along for as long as feasible. 
Following the Walsall and Workington by-election defeats, Donoghue (2005: 5/11/1976, 97) still felt 
confident the government would last until 1978: ‘it is a tightrope, but I am enjoying walking it’. Electoral 
and policy considerations and goals were viewed as wholly subordinate to retaining office. It was only 
Labour’s defeat in a by-election following Tony Crosland’s death on 24 February that the government had 
become a minority and gone ‘back to 1974!’ (Donoughue, 2008: 24/2/1977, 153). 
 
Parliamentary Dynamics, February and March 1977 
 
Devolution Legislation 
 
Walking a tightrope can demonstrate deft skill and intelligence, but survival comes down to knowing when 
not to try. Callaghan had the ability to construct a co-operative agreement as the parliamentary situation 
drifted steadily against him. Whether he chose to wait till the political arithmetic crystallised into a vote of 
no confidence, or genuinely felt he could continue without co-operation, is in a sense a moot point. What 
was clear is that Callaghan held a clear preference for intra-party conciliation over the potential disruption 
of inter-party co-operation. If one issue showed this most clearly it was devolution for Scotland and Wales 
– ironically, the one policy that Roy Hattersley argued lent the Lib-Lab agreement a shared purpose 
(Hattersley in Michie and Hoggart, 2014: x). The lack of consultation in the government’s introduction of 
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a Guillotine vote on the legislation (limiting debate, to encourage their bill’s passage) infuriated the Liberal 
Party, leading to a defeat by 29 votes. Michie and Hoggart’s (2014 (1977): 2-14: 26) account suggested that 
Foot, who was guiding the bill through parliament, had acted with a ‘stubborn … high-handed’ attitude 
and had acted ‘as if the Government had a large, safe majority’. Callaghan (1987: 449), on the other hand, 
saw ‘intractable’ opponents ‘using every delaying tactic to prevent its completion’. The defeat put into 
serious doubt the policy aims of the government, reliant as it was on tacit support of Scottish and 
Nationalist MPs that hinged on this legislation.  
 
Callaghan’s lay two choices before his cabinet as binary alternatives. Either introduce legislation ‘which 
would be popular with the government’s own supporters, but likely to be defeated in Parliament’. Or, 
instead, take ‘special steps to obtain the necessary support for government legislation’ (Cabinet Minutes 
CM(77)  7, 24/2/1977). In truth, while Callaghan promoted the idea of parliamentary conciliation, his 
strategy was a fudge of both. His memoirs claim he took Steel’s devolution ideas seriously, but Donoughue 
(2008: 22/2/1977, 152) believed Callaghan to be ‘quite relaxed’ on whether the legislation passed as long 
as Labour ‘get the credit for ‘having tried to get devolution”. He privately criticized his Scottish Secretary, 
Bruce Millan, for having ‘no politics in him’ after discussing the way in which the aftermath of the vote 
should be briefed to the media (Ibid.). The cabinet agreed to form expansive cross-party talks. But, when 
announcing them on the floor of the House, Foot went out of his way to point out these were ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ and, on the whole, ‘the working ou  t of legislative proposals is best conducted by the normal 
processes of the House of Commons’ (Hansard, HC, 24/2/1977, v. 926 c. 1640). Foot told the cabinet he 
saw ‘no likelihood that interparty talks would lead to positive results’, their use being instead to ‘expose the 
hollowness of rival policies’ (Cabinet Conclusions, CAB128 (77) 7 24/2/1977). Following the creation of 
the pact, Foot was keen to push on with the legislation but for advantage in the two-party battle, given ‘the 
best way to embarrass them (the Conservatives) was to keep the subject alive’ (Devolution: Lord 
President/Steel, 24/3/1977’ PREM 16/1399/18).  
 
Callaghan’s attitude to Liberal ‘recommendations’ suggested he saw little practical benefit in working 
towards Liberal support, there being ‘no use (in) the government getting 10 Liberals if they lost 80 
supporters from their own party’ (Meeting: Callaghan and Steel, 3/3/1977 PREM 16/1399). Interestingly, 
when subsequent negotiations began this number of recalcitrant rebels had reduced, and Callaghan argued 
there was ‘no point in his losing 30 votes to gain 10’ on the issue of the method of election for the European 
Parliament (Meeting: Callaghan and Steel, 21/3/1977, 6pm, PREM 16/1399/45). Some ‘uncharitable 
speculation’ of ‘the possibility of dark deals’ emanated from these discussions between Steel and Callaghan 
over devolution, particularly given they were conducted on a one-to-one basis. Foot and Pardoe’s absence 
was noted in media speculation as significant. (Aitken, The Guardian, 4/3/1977: 6). Callaghan was instead 
shaping up to soldier on, preparing to adopt a ‘Berlin Bunker’ strategy – postponing or abandon legislation 
wholesale, rather than form any substantive inter-party agreement (ibid.).  
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Expenditure Vote, and Vote of No Confidence 
 
A mix of institutional perceptions and complacency combined to drive Labour’s belief they could continue 
to operate on an ad hoc basis without a binding inter-party agreement. There existed a ‘strong lethargy which 
sprang from the belief that Callaghan would always find a way of saving his scalp’ (Michie and Hoggart, 
2014 (1977): 24). The complicated array of smaller parties, and the glacial erosion of the government’s 
parliamentary safety net, meant there was no straightforward ‘pivotal moment’. There was a feeling that 
beyond expenditure votes, whether a vote built up into a matter of confidence was a narrative for the 
government to create; it was assumed that the Labour left would, in the end, support the government on 
any matters of expenditure, and Callaghan could otherwise pick his battles. Significant doubts existed about 
Thatcher’s ability to shepherd through smaller parties in any vote of no confidence (Mackintosh, The 
Spectator, 20/11/1976: 20; Aitken, The Guardian, 18/3/1977: 1). But following the collapse of devolution 
legislation, Scottish and Welsh Nationalists now had no policy cause to sustain the government and, in any 
case, they had voted with Thatcher in the two confidence motions of March and June 1976. Scottish and 
Welsh nationalist movements were also confident that their message to voters would be amplified in the 
wake of the failed legislation on devolution.17 Gallup, recording a 16% per cent lead for the Conservatives, 
predicted would be easily by Thatcher’s Conservatives with a landslide and 49% of the vote; furthermore, 
the SNP was registering support of as much as 36% in Scottish opinion polls (Forman, 2001: 85).  
 
The illusion of safety was partially sustained by Callaghan’s strategy of shelving any possible divisive 
legislation. It was punctured by the Government’s retreat on a White Paper on government expenditure. 
First the vote on the White Paper, containing key public expenditure cuts, was switched to a procedural 
adjournment debate, a ruse to reduce the number of left-wing rebels (Wood to Prime Minister, 16/3/1977 
16/1399/8). When it was clear that vote would be lost the whips then pulled out the ‘Rug Technique’ 
(Hoggart and Michie, 2014: 56), whips cancelling the vote and calling on MPs to abstain. It avoided a 
narrow (and, both the whips and Callaghan felt, more damaging) parliamentary victory for the 
Conservatives (and Labour MPs ‘roared with laughter’ at the division result) (Press Association 17/3/1977 
PREM 16/1399). But it was clearer than ever that the basis of Labour’s legislative support as previously 
constructed – that had carried them through previous votes of no confidence – no longer existed. 
 
Ministers privately briefed there was little chance of Thatcher pulling together a majority and defeating the 
government on a vote of no confidence. But the implications had quickly sunk in for Callaghan. During 
the three-week period – between the loss of the vote on devolution, and Thatcher’s tabling of a vote of no 																																																								
17 Ian Aitken (The Guardian, 19/3/1977: 12) described Westminster scenting the ‘whiff of grapeshot’ due to the 
‘increasing militancy of the nationalist parties’ and the ‘rising bloody-mindedness’ of Sillars and Robertson’  
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confidence – Callaghan received an informal approach by Cyril Smith, sanctioned by Steel, suggesting the 
parties should explore co-operation (Steel, 1980: 29). The issue was delegated to Cledwyn Hughes, the 
Chairman of the PLP and a strong supporter of an arrangement. It was only upon the news that the passing 
of expenditure legislation would be problematic – a situation that, surely, could have been pre-empted some 
time earlier by what was generally viewed as an extremely competent whips office – that his ‘thoughts 
reverted to it (Cyril Smith’s approach)’ (Callaghan, 1987: 452). Again, as in 1974, the practical implications 
of the parliamentary arithmetic had taken time to travel across Westminster. However, Callaghan was aware 
that, this time, the corner the government had been put in might be impossible to escape through the 
temporary construction of parliamentary alliances. What on Thursday night was still little more than the 
‘whiff of decay’ following the expenditure vote had, by Friday afternoon and Thatcher’s tabling of a vote 
of no confidence, become an ‘odour’ that ‘permeated every corner of the Palace of Westminster’ (Michie 
and Hoggart, 2014: 88). By Saturday Ladbrokes were offering 4/5 odds on a government defeat in the 
confidence vote, with the Conservatives 1/4 on to win any subsequent election (Cole, The Guardian, 
19/3/1977: 1).  
 
Any belief Thatcher would be reticent to put forward a vote of no confidence was quashed by a clear belief 
she would win, melded with her equal dislike of the parliamentary procedure and inter-party bargaining that 
any deal would rest on. Her belief that political legitimacy demanded a vote and an election gave her few 
doubts about calling the vote. But this also meant she made little effort to recruit the minority parties to 
her cause. In a speech that weekend, Thatcher said she was ready to ‘fight in the forum of the people’, while 
criticizing Callaghan for changing ‘the rules of the House’ and claiming his actions proved that 
‘Parliamentary democracy and Socialism go ill together. They cannot long exist side by side’ (Speech, Western 
Morning News, 21/3/1977, Thatcher Archive, CCO PR 342/77/2). 
 
Inter-Party Negotiations: March 19-22, 1977  
 
Discussions with Ulster Unionists 
 
If anything demonstrated Callaghan’s reluctance to pursue co-operation with Steel’s Liberal Party, it was 
the wholehearted nature of his approach to the Ulster Unionists. Pre-empting Thatcher’s tabling of a vote 
of no confidence, Callaghan’s memoirs recount him directing Cledwyn Hughes, aided by Bill Rodgers, to 
enter dialogue with the Liberals. In parallel the former and current Northern Ireland Secretaries, Merlyn 
Rees and Roy Mason, were directed to approach the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists respectively (Callaghan, 
1987: 565). Callaghan knew he would have to work for minority party support. But he still driven by an 
acute reluctance to move beyond a minimum winning, short-term and ad hoc coalition of support needed 
for short-term survival. Callaghan felt Ulster Unionists offered the path of least resistance to the votes 
needed for a vote of no confidence to be defeated. This was because, arithmetically, their bloc of eleven 
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votes was potentially viewed as enough (even despite the loss of nationalist votes that would result). But it 
was also as he felt they were ‘his kind of straight, tough old-fashioned conservative people’ (Donoughue, 
2008: 21/3/1977, 167).  Essentially, that meant they were willing to operate on a discrete, transactional 
basis without the need for, or even public acknowledgment of, any co-operative agreement. A key attraction 
of any deal with Unionists was that it would be limited to issues related to the province. 
 
Kirkup’s (2012: 76-80) historical account of the Lib-Lab pact suggests the role of Ulster Unionist votes has 
been overlooked, and David Owen argues the agreement with Unionists ‘was a more stable relationship 
and was at least as important in the survival of the Labour government’ (Owen, 1991: 190). Indeed, on the 
16 March, prior to the defeat on the Expenditure White Paper, Callaghan had approached members of the 
United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) – a disparate collection of ten Unionists, united by their opposition 
to the Sunningdale Agreement – to discover their views on parliamentary co-operation. In 1974 Heath, his 
Northern Irish Secretary Francis Pym and Willie Whitelaw, Secretary of State when the agreement was 
signed, were reticent to negotiate with a group who were elected on a ticket that ran counter to the 
government’s strategy in the province (Resignation of Mr Heath, PREM 15/2069/30). Callaghan was less 
perturbed, although some cabinet colleagues and senior aides expressed doubts. Denis Healey’s cabinet 
approval of the Lib-Lab pact was based on the fact it was a positive alternative to relying on ‘the minorities 
– the Nats and the nutters’ (Benn, 1990: 23/3/1977, 86). Bernard Donoghue (2008: 21/3/1977, 167) was 
similarly dismissive of the ‘awful’ Ian Paisley and Enoch Powell (looking, during negotiations, ‘as always, 
like a preposterous barrister’). There was certainly some surprise, from both left and right, that a Labour 
Prime Minister would look to unionist support: The Telegraph (22/3/1977: 18) argued it showed ‘Ulster’s 
cause … subordinate to the frustrations or eccentricities of a marooned British politician’; The Guardian 
(22/3/1977: 1) that the crutch of unionist support was ‘extraordinary’ and ‘bizarre’. The cabinet, the Irish 
Foreign Secretary and David Steel were all informed, and were working on the premise, that there had been 
no informal deal with Unionists (Cabinet Conclusions, CAB128 CM(77) 12, 13/3/1977; Steel, 1980: 110). 
That this deal was clearly and purposefully pursued is indicative of Callaghan’s attitude towards any 
expansive co-operation with Liberals that could impact upon Labour’s sole retention of office.  
 
In the end, three Unionist MPs abstained in the vote of no confidence that sustained Callaghan in office. 
The embittered Enoch Powell, and the self-avowed ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ John Carson and Harold 
McCusker, had reasons beyond any UUUC instruction to not vote against Labour. Both Carson and 
McCusker voted with the government in 1979, Carson becoming deselected by his local constituency party 
as a result. Ultimately, although this decision was co-ordinated to a degree, it remains moot as to whether 
the UUUC – increasingly riven by internal tensions – could ever have united to consistently and reliably 
prop up the government. Members of the group dismissed talks as a ‘waste of time’; William Craig, as leader 
of the three man Vanguard Party, was already committed by a party-wide decision to bring down the 
government (The Times, 21/3/1977: 2). Demands, beyond the patently transactional call for further 
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Northern Irish (an de facto Unionist) members of parliament, were set out to Mason and Foot as a Unionist 
‘shopping list’, but never likely to be achievable. Callaghan had promised, in discussion with Molyneaux, an 
increased number of MPs for Northern Ireland regardless of co-operation and ‘even if you are not able to 
carry your colleagues’. This was, in effect, a quid pro quo ‘deal’ (though Steel argued that ‘it doesn’t amount 
to a deal’) to reinforce Callaghan in office (Steel. 1980: 110). But any longer-term co-operation, capable of 
sustaining Callaghan would have required the most anti-Labour MPs  – Vanguard MPs Craig, Bradford and 
Dunlop, and the Rev. Ian Paisley – would have led to the loss of the nationalist support. The agreement 
only worked on its own limited terms and could not have carried the government, as Callaghan desired, for 
at least another year.  
 
Inter-Party Negotiations between Liberals and Labour  
 
As a result, a stable agreement with the Liberals was the optimal outcome if executive office was to be 
comfortably maintained. When selling the deal to cabinet Callaghan stressed the agreement had been 
formed to ‘establish a continuing basis for co-operation’ (Cabinet Minutes: The Political Situation, CAB128 
CM(77) 12, 23/3/1977). Callaghan told the media the day before the vote of no confidence that ‘all of us 
are interested in doing something that would last for a much longer period’, the white smoke that seemed 
to confirm co-operation with the Liberals was processing (Cabinet: Liberal Party Agreement, PREM 
16/1399/31). It was on these grounds of medium-term sustainability that Callaghan’s key political advisors 
– Tom McNally, Roger Stott, Tom McCaffrey and Bernard Donoghue – had urged a reluctant Callaghan 
to prioritise a Lib-Lab deal. A short-term partnership based on abstention would be endangered 
immediately if by-elections in Birmingham Stetchford and Grimsby were lost.18 This group of advisors, 
which formed Callaghan’s ‘kitchen’, were listened to. Although Callaghan had a reputation of ‘occasionally 
being quite intimidating and headmasterly’, they had a relationship where all ‘vied to put across ideas’ (Leigh, 
The Times, 21/2/1977: 2). The four had all met on Monday 21 March, following Friday’s no confidence 
motion, and agreed a deal had to be done (Donoughue, 2008: 21/3/1977, 167).  
 
Callaghan was convinced by this logic of no alternative. But he also became more enthusiastic as inter-party 
negotiations developed, and Steel’s minimalistic bargaining position began to be whittled away. Callaghan’s 
claimed to his cabinet the Liberals had ‘pitched their initial demands unacceptably high’, (Cabinet: Liberal 
Party Agreement, PREM16/1399). The opposite was true. Ultimately, Callaghan’s key concession was one 
based on mutual trust that had developed between the two leaders – Callaghan, off the official record, and 
without informing his cabinet when selling co-operation, had promised his personal backing for 
Proportional Representation in a free vote on elections for the European Parliament. This half-way house 
– neither a roll-call or whipped vote, but also the promise of leader-led impetus that made it more than a 
whipped vote – assuaged Steel, who believed, with some Tory support, proportional representation would 																																																								
18 Stetchford, Jenkins’ old seat, was lost in the subsequent by-election. 
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be passed (Steel, Interview, 2016).  The five stages of negotiations concentrate the core themes: Steel’s 
belief that co-operation would foster inter-party dialogue, as well as securing these institutional changes; 
and Callaghan’s aim that the pact should be undisruptive to the machinery of government, and 
unchallenging to his party.  
1) First contact and initial bargaining positions 
Bill Rodgers, following Callaghan’s instruction, rung Steel on Saturday 19 March and discovered the core 
Liberal aims, and their leader’s basic negotiating position. Rodgers found Steel’s demands limited and 
achievable. As a gauge of the Liberal’s negotiating strength, any call for proportional representation at 
Westminster was dismissed out of hand, with Steel telling Rodgers he did not see it as a possibility in his 
lifetime (Note: Discussion with William Rodgers, PREM 16/1399/54). Steel did, however, have three 
demands: a vote on proportional representation for direct elections to the European Parliament, backed up 
by a pay-roll vote; progress on devolution, with proportional representation for devolved assemblies; and 
a ‘formal Government/Liberal liaison committee’.  
Steel was aware the overriding consensus was that the Liberal Party was trapped rather than empowered, 
and he was ‘displeased by the tone of newspaper speculation’ (Steel, 1980: 31). Donoughue (2008: 
21/3/1977, 167) felt that ‘the Liberals are in a suicidal frame of mind: at least eight Liberals would lose 
their seats’; Benn argued Liberal representation would be down to no more than a few MPs and – against 
the conventional wisdom of the cabinet at the time, and historians subsequently – that, on that basis, they 
had extracted a deal more valuable than their position merited (Benn, 1990: 18/3/1977, 78; 23/3/1977, 
90). Steel’s candour with Bill Rodgers undermined his position. A report reached Callaghan that ‘Mr Steel 
had said he did not want an election, but his honour was at stake and he could not be seen to duck one’ 
(Note: Discussion with William Rodgers, PREM 16/1399/54). This gloss was somewhat surprising given 
the Liberals’ role as potential kingmaker – or, at the very least, their status as the only party which could act 
as an effective parliamentary bulwark for Callaghan’s administration. The party’s arithmetical importance 
in the House of Commons was undermined by their electoral weakness. But there were also concerns about 
whether co-operation with an incumbent government, with dwindling support, could mean the party’s 
electoral position was undermined further still. This wariness of ‘the nutcracker in which (the Liberals) are 
now caught’ (The Guardian, 22/3/197: 1) meant Steel, and his parliamentary party, were wary of seen as 
making the first move towards co-operation. Many senior figures in the party across the country, for 
example Ming Campbell, then Scottish Chair, were concerned less about policy concessions than being 
‘seen to keep an unpopular government in power’ (Geoff Tordoff Memorandum, 19/2/1977, LLP 19/2). 
This emphasis on how negotiating machinations would impact outside Westminster gives some indication 
of how Liberals viewed their potential symbolism and impact. 
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It is on the grounds, fear of the perception the party was propping up an unpopular government, that Steel 
justifies not meeting his party between leaving Westminster following the vote of no confidence on Friday, 
and meeting Callaghan at 6pm on Monday. Prior to Steel’s original discussions with Rodgers, and his first 
one-to-one meeting with Callaghan, Steel had deliberately not met his parliamentary party en masse. But, in 
a direct attempt to address their potential concerns, Steel did make sure his party was heard. But it is 
debatable whether the comprehensive consultation he commissioned of the party, conducted by Chairman 
Geoff Tordoff, had any notable effect on negotiations or Steel’s strategy (Tordoff, Interview, 2016). Some 
findings useful to Steel, that the party were more ready for an election organisationally than they had been 
in February 1974, were repeated in discussions with the media. Others, that constituency associations were 
looking for ‘cast iron’ guarantees (on electoral reform, devolution and ‘some economic element’) were 
acknowledged but shrivelled away in one-to-one discussion between Steel and Callaghan (Geoff Tordoff 
Memorandum, 19/2/1977, LLP 19/2). It perhaps helped in appeasing reluctant MPs and the parliamentary 
party, who were the only body with any hypothetical direct sway over the negotiation’s direction and 
ratification. Steel had consulted each MP by phone – particularly Pardoe – on Sunday 20 March after talking 
again to Rodgers and agreeing to meet Callaghan the following day. Steel’s rigorous account of the pact 
devotes just one page to that weekend, including a recount of a production of My Fair Lady by the Selkirk 
Amateur Operatic Society (Steel, 1980: 32). Accounts differ of how much time Steel devoted to consulting 
and cajoling colleagues prior to his first talks on Monday 21 March with Callaghan, which he insisted be 
conducted on a one-to-one basis. Chief Whip Sir Alan Beith recounted, in the context of the Lib-Lab pact, 
that ‘in a group of 13 it’s quite difficult to keep secrets, even though David did try for some of the time’ 
(MacGregor, 2013).  
2) Meeting between Steel and Callaghan, 21 March 
 
Steel recounts that his first meeting with Callaghan gave ‘sufficient encouragement that an agreement could 
be possible to put to some of my colleagues’ (Steel, 1980: 35); Donoghue’s contemporaneous diaries 
describe Steel as ‘bewildered’, and Callaghan as believing the talks were ‘very unpromising’ amid a general 
feeling that ‘it was a bad start’ (Donoughue, 2008 21/3/1977, 168; Morgan, 1997: 567). If Steel felt he was 
being particularly amenable to Callaghan’s demands, he would have to go further. Callaghan was particularly 
strident on the language of the agreement and Steel quickly retreated from an assertive stance on the framing 
of co-operation, the key area discussed in the first meeting. Callaghan wanted an expressly ad hoc 
arrangement, centred upon particular legislation and based upon the principle that ‘it was right for the 
government to see its (economic) policy through’; Steel ‘was not interested in a one night stand’ and wanted 
formal mechanisms for Liberal consultation, akin to those Callaghan had set up with the TUC to reinforce 
his internal position (Callaghan/Steel Meeting 6pm’, 21/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/45). Callaghan felt 
potential comparisons between the terminology Steel used, and that of the liaison mechanism he had set 
up with the trade union movement, could be particularly problematic. He told Steel ‘he was sure his party 
would find it unacceptable’ and that it would be ‘very damaging to his position as leader’. While prioritised 
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by Steel, this was not as issue discussed at length by the Liberal Parliamentary Party who were, conversely, 
concerned principally about an arrangement not having a break clause at the end of the parliamentary 
session (Kirkup, 2012: 123).  
 
While less emblematic of the Liberal psyche than wrangling over voting systems, this discussion over 
consultation was important. Steel subsequently suggested a much less structured concept, and parked 
discussion of the terminology and practice of consultation, to the long-term detriment of the agreement. 
This meant that consultation proceeded on a less structured basis. From the Pact’s commencement, 
Kenneth Stowe and John Hunt, the Cabinet Secretary, reigned in this type of consultation with Liberals 
that Steel desired, seemingly on Callaghan’s private instruction. Callaghan told Stowe that: 
 
 Liberal Party spokesman should only be given classified information if the information is 
intended to be published … classified information not intended to be published should 
be made available to the leader of the Liberal Party only after consultation with me.19 
 
This was not an arrangement Steel was aware of throughout co-operation. One of the core elements Steel 
felt crucial to achieving the aims of co-operation was the building of cross-party trust. How consultations 
would operate, and whether Liberals would have any civil service support, were left to be shaped after 
formal agreement. The day-to-day management of consultation was ultimately out of Michael Foot’s office, 
who was particularly keen to minimise the normalisation of cross-party co-operation (Callaghan Note: The 
Liberal Arrangement, PREM16/1399/20), and the Liberals received no administrative support from the 
civil service in the first six months of co-operation. But even this consultation mechanism was inherently 
limited by restrictions on information and resources. As Callaghan tellingly stressed to his cabinet ‘the 
Consultation Committee is just that. It has no powers’ (Cabinet: Liberal Party Agreement, 
PREM16/1399/31). 
 
3) Meeting between Steel, Callaghan, Foot and McNally 12.30pm 22 March 
Callaghan chose to use particularly conciliatory language between the first and second meeting of the two 
leaders, telling the BBC he was looking for an agreement ‘that preserves both our self-respect and their 
self-respect’ (Vote of Confidence, 21/3/1977, ITN News Archive). But the second meeting began with 
Steel on the back foot. Callaghan had been sent an outline of the Liberal position, formed following the 
first meeting of Liberal MPs. It was a low point in negotiations. Upon receipt, Callaghan threw the letter 
from Steel on the floor in disgust (Donoughue, 2008: 22/3/1977, 169; Morgan, 1997: 567). The second 
meeting subsequently began on the basis of a different document, drawn up by Callaghan’s advisor Tom 
McNally and PPS Ken Stowe (Aide Memoire, Callaghan to Steel, Annex B, PREM 16/1399/37). Steel 
																																																								
19 PREM16/1399, repeated on BBC Radio 4 – to Steel’s apparent surprise at Callaghan’s secrecy. 
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quickly described the document he had drawn up in consultation with Liberal MPs as only for consultation: 
‘there was only one other copy, and he did not intend that it should ever see the light of day’ (Meeting: 
Callaghan/Foot/McNally/Steel, 12.30pm PREM 16/1399/39. 
Prior to this meeting, Pardoe and Foot had also met – the only formal meeting between the two parties at 
which Callaghan and Steel were not present. Foot used Pardoe’s as an insight into the Liberal mind-set. 
This led Foot to seriously push for a minimal possible position in the final stages of negotiations. He seemed 
to hold great store in Pardoe’s hint, during private discussions between the pair (the only inter-party talks 
not to include Steel) that ‘the government and the Liberals would reach an agreement … it would have to 
be’. This was in large part due to the fact Pardoe ‘hadn’t come to Westminster to put Mrs. Thatcher in 
power’ (Meeting: Foot/Pardoe, 9.45pm, 21/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/44). So, as a historical quirk, the 
presence of Margaret Thatcher as head of the Conservatives helped keep Michael Foot in government for 
two more years. These assurances by the Liberal finance spokesman had a tangible effect. Callaghan was 
leaning towards offering a guarantee of proportional elections to the European parliament, on the grounds 
it was ‘of total obscurity in relation to the outcome of a general election’ and he was sure it would receive 
cabinet approval. Foot persuaded him, following discussion with Pardoe, ‘this was not a gnat to swallow’ 
(Foot/Callaghan Discussion, noted by Ken Stowe, PREM 16/1399/41, 22/3/1977). 
Pardoe’s subsequent absence at this second inter-party meeting, given Foot’s attendance, was notable. The 
discussions boiled down to negotiation on the electoral system used for the proposed devolved assemblies 
and direct elections to the European Parliament. Steel, due to Callaghan’s earlier reluctance to countenance 
proportional representation in Scotland and Wales, had suggested a free vote on the system used there, but 
with further guarantees on PR for Europe. The meeting was ended without resolution. Further discussion 
in the room after Steel left appeared to entrench the Labour position against a whipped vote on PR, foot 
persuading further concessions on PR were unnecessary to extract Liberal support. This time, McNally and 
Stowe took the lead with the post-negotiation write-up that recapped and entrenched the negotiating 
positions of the two parties – with the document suggesting that the government would do no more ‘take 
fully into account the known preference of the Liberal Party for a proportional system’, but also substituting 
other key passages: the pact would be for ‘economic’ rather than ‘national’ recovery, there was no 
commitment on a consultative committee beyond it ‘meeting regularly’, and any substantive commitment 
on the substance of economic issues was removed completely (Annex D, PREM 16/1399/41). 
4) Meeting between Steel, Callaghan, Foot 5pm 22 March 
This meeting was of equal length to the 12.30 meeting but official documentation, while considerably 
shorter, is notable for the fact Steel had, again, brought no Liberal colleagues and that negotiations had 
now boiled down, wholly, to proportional representation for Europe. Stowe’s write-up emphasised that 
‘the government could not give a pledge of Proportional Representation at this stage’ (Meeting: 
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Callaghan/Foot/Steel, PREM16/1399/37). Steel stressed that there was ‘much local feeling’ about the issue 
of PR. The key tension was what could be conceded within the ambiguous space between a whipped vote 
and a free vote, and Callaghan’s ambiguity in stressing the possibility of late action showed there had been 
some flexible thinking on how to proceed. The movement from a ‘pay-roll’ vote to something less 
significant began here, and culminated in the compromise that Callaghan would personally, and publicly, 
support any proposal for proportional representation. Some Liberal MPs pushed Steel on this issue, 
suggesting they could not support any agreement without a formal understanding that Labour would 
support proportional representation.  
5) Meeting between Steel, Callaghan, Foot and Pardoe, 9.45pm 22 March  
At this meeting, Steel felt confident in bringing John Pardoe to the negotiations. However, Pardoe recounts 
telling Callaghan, almost immediately, that his party ‘must achieve something concrete out of this, and the 
only thing the Liberals think is concrete is proportional representation’ (Kirkup, 2012: 125). It is notable 
the substantive progress made in these final stages of negotiations took place without Pardoe present after 
he had ‘left the meeting to record a TV interview in which he cast doubt on the likelihood of a pact’ 
(Meeting, Callaghan/Foot/Steel/Pardoe, 22/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/31). The issue of PR was not further 
discussed until Pardoe’s absence when Callaghan agreed a free vote on the floor of the House, and let it be 
known he would be publicly favour a proportional list system for elections. The meeting lasted for 45 
minutes, and Steel recounted that ‘we talked round and round the subject, with my doodling stronger drafts’ 
(Steel, 1980: 39). Some drafts of the agreement that night gave a written indication that Callaghan’s 
government would recommend a form of proportional representation and that there would, at least, be 
binding cabinet responsibility (Statement Drafts, PREM 16/1399). Yet this was an agreement forged on 
trust and the (faulty) assumption that Callaghan’s support would bolster the prospects of a vote, enough 
for it to have a reasonable chance of the legislation passing. Conservative cabinet ministers in private had 
noted that those within Labour implacably opposed to the European project, among them Foot, would 
welcome a chance for the prospect of proportional representation to be brought down in the House 
through a free vote (Young (Hurd), 2008: 30/3/1977, 106).  
Steel was convinced by the belief, following some discussion with Conservative MPs, that there was 
substantial support for proportional representation within the Conservative Parliamentary Party (Steel, 
Interview, 2016). Steel stressed that he had secured a private understanding Callaghan would support PR; 
Callaghan explicitly assured the Cabinet at this time that ‘there was no private understanding that did not 
appear in the statement which the Cabinet had before them’ (Kirkup, 2008: 125-26). In the end, the crux 
of the agreement, the passage on European Elections that had dominated the second half of negotiations, 
reflected the fact that Callaghan had not promised to push for proportional representation. It stated that: 
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The government is publishing next week a White paper on Direct Elections to the 
European Assembly which sets out the choices among different electoral systems but which makes no 
recommendation. There will now be a consultation between us on the method to be adopted 
and the government’s final recommendation will take account of the Liberal party’s 
commitment. The recommendation will be subject to a free vote of both Houses 
The final hurdle was for co-operation to be agreed by both parties. Steel’s fellow MPs were convinced that 
Callaghan’s verbal guarantee would be enough, and the concession the party needed. The majority, with 
two firm objections in Grimond and Penhaligon, supported co-operation and Grimond later noted ruefully 
that ‘the Liberal establishment backed David Steel when he went into the pact’ (Young (Grimond), 2007: 
28/4/1977, 111). Within the Labour cabinet, it is difficult to detect significant lobbying against a pact prior 
to the cabinet meeting that accepted it. At that meeting, there was a feeling that Callaghan had to persuade 
and cajole. Ken Stowe recalled it as a ‘virtuoso performance’ (Morgan, 1997: 568), while Donoughue’s 
(2008: 168) account has Callaghan telling him the meeting had been more difficult than expected. The 
presence of Michael Foot in negotiations was viewed as of great importance as a way of shoring up support, 
and his support and lead on negotiations was key. Callaghan particularly emphasized Foot’s role, as well as 
the limited nature of the agreement. The cabinet did not question whether there were further tacit 
agreements between the two leaders, or how Callaghan had come to such a favourable deal that was, on 
proportional representation, ‘extremely weak’ (Owen, 1991: 192). The official record not some discord, 
with the agreement likely to metamorphosis into a coalition government and would subsequently ‘make it 
difficult to develop a Socialist manifesto for the next election’ (CAB 128 CM(77), Cabinet Conclusions 12 
23/3/1977). But the faithful recording of this minority opinion was almost wholly concerns voiced by Tony 
Benn. By twenty votes to four, the cabinet supported the agreement. 
Benn was not completely isolated in opposition. He was, however, the only member of the cabinet to 
attempt to overturn the decision. Benn had uncharacteristically, and in striking contrast to other accounts 
of the meeting, been disappointed with Callaghan’s style of discussion in cabinet and railed against the lack 
of consultation more broadly. Benn left the cabinet meeting with a copy of the pact’s outline, against express 
instruction, and conspired against the collective decision to begin inter-party co-operation. This was 
important, cutting to the heart of the internal structures that had (just about) retained cohesion and 
maintained Callaghan’s leadership in the year preceding the Lib-Lab Pact. Benn’s clear disappointment with 
Foot’s role in co-operation, noting his relationship with him would never be the same again, also augured 
poorly for the internal battles within the party to come. In collaboration with the left-wing MP Ian Mikardo 
(who Callaghan ‘hated’), Benn organized the creation and dissemination of a letter signed by Tribune 
members which, while denouncing the Lib-Lab Pact, ultimately pledged support in a vote of no confidence 
(Letter 23/1977, PREM 16/1399/29). Benn was not among the 48 signatories of the letter. A frosty phone 
call between Callaghan and Benn gave him the choice of either keeping his name on the letter before 
publication (he had already signed it) and resigning from the cabinet as he had ‘said close to the wind in the 
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past, but this time he had come to the limit’. Benn reluctantly remained, but abruptly ended the conversation 
by telling Callaghan: ‘well, to get Steel in and me out would certainly complete it’ (Meeting: Callaghan/Benn, 
8pm 24/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/19).  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Institution-Facing Constraints 
If Benn was worried about Steel getting too close to the apex of government, this was a fear he shared with 
his Liberal counterparts. A key point of contention among Liberal MPs was the style in which the Liberal 
Party would be conducting themselves in co-operation, and the way the agreement was negotiated and sold 
to Liberal members and the wider public. Supporters of the pact, such as Liberal MP Emlyn Hoosen, felt 
it was ‘important to acknowledge the fact that there was a lot on brinkmanship involved in the agreement’ 
(Meeting of Shadow Administration, 30/3/1977, Steel A/3/1). Cyril Smith, who quickly became a vocal 
critic, felt that ‘the success or failure of the agreement in political terms depended on an aggressive public 
stance’ (Meeting of Shadow Administration, Steel A/3/1, 13/4/1977). There was a wariness here about 
the Liberal Party getting too close to the Labour Party. A key Conservative attack line, bemoaned by Pardoe 
at the first meeting of the joint Liberal-Labour Consultative Committee, was to repeatedly ask whether the 
Liberal Party was in opposition or government (Joint Consultative Committee, 30/3/1977, 
PREM16/1399/4). Similarly, ex-leader Jo Grimond’s concerns about co-operation were principally centred 
on the Liberal Party being gobbled up within a system unused to tallying the minutiae of policy concessions. 
The key charge, which Steel later levelled at Clegg in 2015, was naiveté – asking ‘what ice will we cut with 
our little concessions’ given that ‘we will be landed with all the bad things that Labour has done’ (Young 
(Grimond), 2007, 112, 28/4/1977; Steel, The Guardian, 2015) 
Steel took the opposite approach, and saw the ability to negotiate and act in confidence as important to the 
Liberal’s image as a prospective party of government. Instead of dulling the Liberal’s radical appeal it could 
reframe the party’s role within the party system as one of moderation and multi-party governance. He saw 
this as a more viable long-term position for the Liberal Party. As a result, Steel regarded some Liberal 
behaviour throughout the pact as obstructive or embarrassing, castigating fellow MPs for being ‘not always 
very effective or well briefed’ (Meeting of Shadow Administration, 13/4/1977, Steel A/3/1). For his 
internal critics in the Liberal Party, Steel was ‘was always going to be a good guy as far as Labour was 
concerned’ (Slade, 2002: 17). Steel attempted to define the Lib Lab Pact as a ‘unique experiment’, believing 
it could show the benefits of collegiate and co-operative government and directly strengthen support for 
proportional representation as a result. In one sense, these were the manifestation of two different, and for 
Liberals competing, pathologies within the British political tradition. There was a concern that the binary 
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distinction of government and opposition would mean that the electoral effect for a party in ‘quasi-
government’ could be damaging, which many Liberal MPs increasingly feared. But for Steel the agreement 
was about reformulating the Liberals as a party of government, and the idea that this requires parties to be 
able to function within a system of centralised leadership. 
Attempts to question the legitimacy of co-operation, and to cast it as an elite-level ruse that went against 
the culture of Westminster-style governance, did not gain as much traction as some Conservatives may 
have hoped. Lord Hailsham described the Lib-Lab Pact as showing ‘the evils of elected dictatorship’, as 
instead of going to the country both Labour and the Liberals had co-operated to ‘prevent the people 
expressing any opinion whatever’. This was in contrast, he argued, to the Heath-Thorpe talks, when the 
duty of politicians to ‘accept the verdict of the poll and to make it work’ had driven negotiations (The Times, 
5/4/1977: 2). It is not clear that any qualitative difference in perception – between an agreement forged 
midway through a parliament, and one formed from immediate post-election machinations – existed in 
practice. Michael Meadowcroft (Interview, 2016), a prominent opponent within the Liberal Party of the 
agreement, argues there was ‘considerable anxiety about the Lib-Lab Pact but there was hardly any attempt 
to argue that it was not legitimate’. While Margaret Thatcher railed against ‘shabby, devious manipulations’, 
this was not a criticism that sustained. Perceptions of legitimacy and public opinion were clearly factored 
into some of the elite-level negotiation dynamics, particularly Liberal reticence to publicly push for co-
operation. But few forecast that the agreement was inherently electorally deleterious, not least because both 
parties were already experiencing dire poll ratings in any case.  
 
This institutional environment did shape the arguments of advocates and opponents of co-operation. There 
was an awareness that, for the electorate, co-operation would be a shift change. But it was thought it could 
lead to changed electoral behaviour and the expectation was that voters would adapt to accommodate these 
new inter-party dynamics. Opponents in the Labour cabinet feared it ‘enhanced the position of the Liberal 
Party to the disadvantage of the Labour Party’ and, therefore, though: 
 
The accommodation was said to be a temporary and experimental one, it would tend to 
become permanent and could lead into something like coalition government. This, in turn, 
would make it extremely difficult to develop a Socialist Manifesto for the next Election. 
(Benn, 1990: 23/3/1977, 91) 
This belief that the pact could foster and develop favourable attitudes to co-operation clearly had an impact 
on negotiations. Callaghan and Steel both agreed that co-operation ‘should not end in a row’, given the 
possibility the agreement could have been renewed. But, equally, it hardly ended with the electorate calling 
for an encore. Steel hoped in the following election to campaign on the back of the pact, ‘notably providing 
the parliamentary stability which allowed the fight against inflation to be carried on’ (Steel, 2012). Steel 
blames the subsequent Winter of Discontent for his inability to argue a convincing defence of the party’s 
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time in co-operation. The party did run an overtly ‘realistic’ campaign, Steel stating their strategy had 
‘changed since 1974’ and arguing the benefits of co-operation with either of the main parties (The Times, 
10/4/1974: 10). But a defence of the Lib-Lab Pact itself was not a central feature, and co-operation had 
not had the transformative effect on perceptions of government that Steel may have wished for.  
How much of a critical juncture the Lib-Lab Pact was in shaping the Liberal Party’s electoral identity is an 
open question: certainly, both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Benn were united in seeing the Liberals’ 
electoral identity as re-shaped and damaged by the agreement. Indeed, the Liberal Party’s immediate 
electoral fortunes after going in to the pact were calamitous. The party’s Gallup poll ratings entered single 
figures for the first time since before their surge in 1974 (Cole, 2011: 61). But the party’s support had been 
drifting steadily downwards in any case (Butler and Kavanagh, 1979: 35). The loss of deposits in all but one 
by-election throughout the pact was damaging to Liberal morale. But the result in 1979 was stability rather 
than significant losses. Within the Lib-Lab strategy was the idea that any election could see the Liberal Party 
losing votes, but gaining seats as Labour voters tactically endorsed the party that had co-operated with 
Labour in government. Tactical voting of this kind did have an effect in some Conservative-Liberal seats, 
significant enough for John Curtice and Michael Steed to argue it saved one Liberal MP, and there was a 
clear loss of Conservative supporters who had previously voted tactically for the Liberal Party. But these 
changes were partially limited by the unexpected 7-month gap between the pact’s conclusion and the general 
election – the Liberal Party did begin a slow process of recovery from the moment the Lib-Lab Pact was 
wound up. 
 Party-Facing Constraints 
Tom McNally (Interview, 2016), a key figure in Callaghan’s administration, argues in retrospect that ‘one 
might have thought the most sensible thing would have been to fight the next election (in 1979) on a joint 
platform … that it was not was one of the great mistakes, built on the tribalism of both parties’. The fact 
electoral co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Party was not discussed in any significant way is 
perhaps surprising. What is clear is that the limited nature of the Lib-Lab Pact, and its clear electoral 
expediency, stifled internal criticism. The NEC National Secretary Sam McCluskie (also, at the time, 
Assistant General Secretary of the National Union of Seamen) wrote to Callaghan to tell him it was a 
‘cardinal error’ to bypass the NEC, and an approach, which ‘totally lacked any intention of involving the 
party in the country’, would bring the parliamentary party, and the government, into ‘internal dispute’ if 
repeated (McCluskie to Callaghan 28/3/1977, PREM 16/1399/15). But he still, reluctantly, supported the 
agreement. At Labour’s 1977 conference there was opposition to the pact among delegates, but the Tribune 
Group was largely attacked for its ineffectiveness in opposing the pact. Dennis Skinner, for example, 
bemoaned the ‘coalition’ for having the effect of damaging promises to ‘redistribute the wealth of the 
country’ (The Times, 3/10/1977: 6). But Michael Foot’s belief at a conference fringe meeting, that ‘the vast 
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majority of the Labour movement in the country know that we were wise to do it’ (The Times, 3/10/1977: 
5), was not seen as demonstrably absurd. 
However, there was no significant attempt by Callaghan to consult his party, either in parliament or the 
country, on the Lib-Lab Pact. But among moderate MPs there were indications of support. An impromptu 
focus group of four MPs conducted by Callaghan found three in support, and one against. Callaghan’s 
whips also took some positive soundings, from some unlikely places. The left-wing MP Audrey Wise was 
emblematic in that, ‘having consulted her tiny majority as well as her Marxist principles’, she told a whip 
that she supported ‘a deal at any price’ (Donoughue, 2008: 21/3/1977, 169). The letter signed by opponents 
of the pact was notable for its narrow ideological range of signatories, and its hollow ineffectiveness. Quite 
simply, if Labour MPs were wary of co-operation with Liberals, they were far warier of losing their jobs. 
Any medium-term calculation of party political advantage or tribal dislike of the Liberal Party was 
subservient to this short-term interest. 
 
The general temperature of the left was, though, more positive than opponents such as Benn had hoped 
for, and anticipated. The trade union movement was in favour of an agreement and allowing Callaghan 
space to negotiate, and the weekly Labour-TUC liaison committee supported a deal, though not ‘at any 
cost’ (Cabinet Minutes: The Political Situation, CM(77) 12, 23/3/1977). The level of fracture within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party in this period was significant. Stowe and Tom McCaffrey discussed ‘uplifting 
consultations with the PLP’ as a ‘precaution against the day when you may be criticised because consultation 
is moving faster with the Liberal Party than the PLP’ (PREM16/1399/14). That this was never the case 
shows the limited significance of the Lib-Lab Pact. The discord between the leadership of the Labour Party 
and significant sections of the PLP was clear, and this was not resolved. Seven months after the dissolution 
of the pact, in March 1979, the Labour and Liberal Chief Whips, Michael Cocks and Alan Beith, conspired 
to call the Liverpool Edge Hill by-election a month before Callaghan went to the country in a (successful) 
bid to aid the victory of the Liberal, rather than Tribune endorsed Labour, candidate (Beith, 2008; 
Meadowcroft, 2016, Interview). But the limited scope of the pact, and the lack of pressure on Labour MPs 
to deliver its key policy pillars, meant intra-party pressure was limited. 
Kirkup’s (2012) account of negotiations suggests that, if other senior Liberal figures had been more 
involved in negotiations, the Liberals would have extracted a higher price. Callaghan, on the other hand, 
used the spectre of an ambivalent or even antagonistic cabinet to extract more stringent terms from Steel. 
In negotiations Callaghan said it would be impossible for any commitment by his party supporting 
proportional representation to gain cabinet support. Senior members of his cabinet say the opposite was 
the case, and cabinet records appear to show a cabinet willing to listen to the case for electoral reform. It 
was clear Steel saw the Labour Party’s withdrawal from negotiations as a real possibility, and willed a 
negotiation at any price much more strongly than any of his parliamentary party. The equivalent body for 
Steel was local Liberal parties. Steel consistently reiterated to Callaghan that local Liberal parties felt 
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particularly strongly about proportional representation. However, the form of words eventually used in the 
agreement was far from the bold guarantee which consultation showed his grassroots desired.  
Yet one of the principle lessons Steel learnt from the Thorpe/Heath discussions was to retain the 
impression of conciliation and dialogue with his parliamentary party, and Thorpe’s biographer, Michael 
Bloch (2014: 479), noted Steel ‘took care to confer at every stage of the hurried negotiations’. Levels of 
consultation within the Liberal Party, despite their having little effect on Steel’s negotiating stance or 
flexibility, were certainly greater than those conducted by Callaghan – who made no overt effort to consult 
his parliamentary or extra-parliamentary party at any length, until the pact agreement was essentially a fait 
accompli. There was a tacit acceptance that the agreement was Callaghan’s alone to forge – leading Tony 
Benn to remark that ‘this is what happens with coalitions: you trust your leader and he does deals and you 
follow him out of loyalty. Much new thinking needs to be done’ (Benn, 1990: 82). Callaghan was reticent 
even to involve his close staff, telling them ‘you know I have to keep these things very close’ (Donoughue, 
2008: 21/3/1977, 169). This showed the importance of symbolic intra-party consultation in managing 
opposition to inter-party agreements. Steel feels that ‘there were always some voices against, but the party 
responded to it well’ (Steel, Interview, 2016). Given the disconnect between what his party wanted from 
co-operation, and what they ultimately gained, this was a significant achievement. 
Callaghan – defending ‘existing institution equilibrium’? 
 
Crucial to any understanding of the strategic purpose and effect of the Lib-Lab Pact is the parliamentary 
arithmetic that forced negotiations, and the short-term expediency that drove Labour’s bargaining aims. 
Given its limited long-term effect it must be judged a success on Callaghan’s terms. Callaghan’s strategy 
was a short-term parliamentary repositioning, and was rhetorically sold as such. There was no attempt to 
use co-operation with the Liberal Party to reconstruct the Labour Party’s electoral identity. Framing the 
agreement as forged in ‘pursuit of economic recovery’ rather than ‘national recovery’ was the result of 
Labour attempting to limit the practical scope of the agreement, as well as defining it as born from 
exceptional circumstances (Joint PM/Liberal Statement, PREM 16/1399/31). The method of extracting 
Liberal support – using internal deadlock about the method of election to the European Parliament to soak 
up vital Liberal legislative votes, and the chimera of consultative mechanisms that failed to operate 
effectively in practice – showed Labour paying little price for co-operation. The measure of Callaghan’s 
success lies in the fact it had no significant or direct effect on later co-operation:  those who saw it as a 
change in the reputation for co-operation and pluralistic governance were largely confined to the Liberal 
Party. As Callaghan’s biographer, Kenneth Morgan (1997: 570), judges:  
 
whether the pact implied the seeds of an SDP in the making … is highly debatable. What 
it did was to renew Old Labour and give it a credibility it had lacked since the election of 
1966. 
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Perhaps the strongest evidence of Callaghan’s success lies in how far the Labour Party was from embracing 
constructive and positive co-operation following the conclusion of co-operation. Margaret Thatcher’s 
forcing of a Vote of No Confidence in March 1977 created the legislative conditions for the Lib-Lab Pact 
through the near-certainty of the government’s defeat without any agreement. The next time such a vote 
was called, in March 1979, she did end the Labour administration. Michael Foot argued in that debate that 
David Steel had transformed from ‘rising hope to elder statesman, with no intervening period whatsoever’. 
More substantially, Foot argued that it is, and had always been, ‘the duty of the Leader of the House to be 
prepared to enter into conversation with representatives of all parties’, given that it ‘assists the House in 
transacting its business’ (Hansard, HC, v. 965 c. 577, 28/3/1979). Far from promoting the idea that the 
agreement could be expansive or a progenitor of a new model of party politics or realignment, Foot was 
representative of a party that saw any cross-party agreement in purely transactional terms. The emphasis 
on the agreement’s arena being principally the floor of the Commons, rather than the ministerial 
consultation that Steel had emphasized upon its creation, is also instructive. Foot was clear that co-
operation, past and present, should be seen as a legislative method of sustaining single-party executive 
power. It was a classic example of what legislative ‘logrolling’ – the trading of concessions as a means of 
constructing a temporary parliamentary majority.  
This short-term interest was matched by Callaghan and (particularly) Foot’s unwillingness to see Labour’s 
long-term position in the two-party system, and the institutions they felt underwrote it, affected by co-
operation. Callaghan briefly toyed with a more generous offer on electoral reform, given ‘the outcome 
would be one of total obscurity in relation to the prospective outcome of a General Election’ (Foot and 
Callaghan Meeting 12.30pm, PREM16/1399/41). However, Foot was resolutely against this concession: 
letting through PR for European parliamentary elections could have a ‘slop over effect’, and ‘was not a gnat 
to swallow’ (Foot and Callaghan Meeting, PREM16/1399/41; Aide Memoire: Stowe to Callaghan, 
PREM16/1399/38). What Foot described to the Liberal John Pardoe as Labour’s ‘permanent non-interest’ 
in electoral reform is key to understanding Labour’s positioning and stance. Callaghan and Foot’s aim was 
to minimize the political impact from co-operation, narrowing down discussion from Steel’s modest 
negotiating position, watering down the consultative structures and the practical effect of any parliamentary 
vote on proportional representation.  
Callaghan was perfectly willing to consider coalition with the Liberal Party after any general election, if the 
parliamentary arithmetic had dictated. He had discussed portfolios for Steel with his advisors – with the 
Home Office the likely destination (Donoughue, Interview, 2016). But this was an eventuality Callaghan 
was keen to swerve. The desire for a working majority and to avoid the crutch of further inter-party co-
operation was a key factor in Callaghan’s delaying of the general election – Callaghan’s archives hold a note 
written by Callaghan when calculating the merits of an Autumn 1978 during the summer recess, in which 
Callaghan scribbled ‘don’t make any alliances’ (MS Callaghan 19: 2743; Kirkup, 2014). Despite Callaghan’s 
continuing close relationship with Steel he made it clear he did not wish for a further agreement if possible, 
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and Steel was left surprised by Callaghan’s decision to delay the election.  For Steel it was a reminder that, 
in Westminster politics, plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. 
 
Steel: disrupting ‘existing institutional equilibrium’?  
John Pardoe believed that, for David Steel:  
the game of politics was not communication with people, it wasn’t even creating power, it 
was just being there. He loved every minute of it, he loved manipulating things, he loved 
manipulating beyond the scene. (Pardoe, cited in Maor, 2002: 74)  
Historians of the pact, and reactions of those present, are and were united in their incredulity and accuracy 
in noting that significantly better terms were on offer for Steel on the totemic issue of proportional elections 
for the European Parliament (see: Owen, 1991; Kirkup, 2014). Steel, too, accepts that he perhaps should 
have extracted further concessions. But that is to misunderstand, or at least underestimate, the extent to 
which he saw (or, alternatively, was blinded by) the incalculable possibilities of quasi-executive office. His 
announcement, both to the press and in private to Liberal candidates, that everyone should ‘forget the 
textual analysis of the agreement. It’s what we make of it that matters’ showed that policy, beyond that 
which enhanced his strategic aims, was of less importance than what the deal could do to reframe the 
Liberal Party as a party of government (Steel - Letter to Liberal Candidates, 24/3/1977, LLP 19/2; Liberal 
Press Conference PREM16/1399/18). But he also could be accused of a degree of naiveté. Steel was very 
aware of the acute problem for smaller parties in government and in 2015, following the Conservative-
Liberal coalition, claims he told his party that a ‘laundry list of alleged achievements in the coalition will not 
wash’ (Steel, The Guardian 11/5/2015). But Steel was also under the impression that enough concessions 
could be eked out. He admitted that he did not ‘know if the agreement was going to work. But I trust that 
it will work, and that is the most important thing’ (BBC Tonight, March 1977 (Repeated 2015)). 
Disappointment about the direction of the pact led Steel to have ‘underestimated how much the British 
people have been taught to think of politics as ‘picking sides’ … underestimated how frightened we have 
become in this country of innovation, of trying to do things a better way’ (Leader’s Speech: Brighton 
1977).20  
 
The political entrepreneur, Riker (1986: 64) argued, ‘probes until he finds some new alternative, some new 
dimension that strikes a spark in the preference of others’. At the heart of both Steel’s calculations and 
political ontology was a belief that the Labour Party, and Labour politicians, would be more hospitable to 
a politics defined by the language of conciliation and co-operation, and a leadership imbued with social 
democracy. Michie and Hoggart’s (2014: 67) contemporary account presciently argued that, for Steel, ‘the 																																																								
20 MORI polls in September 1978, and again before the election, found only 14 to 20 per cent agreeing that it would 
be a good thing ‘if no party achieves an overall majority’. 
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pact was an end in itself, or rather a stage leading towards wonderful new super-pacts in future’. The political 
historian Jonathan Kirkup (2014: 189) argues that ‘there is no evidence that either Steel or the social 
democrats in the PLP sought to use the Pact to engineer this process of ‘realignment”. Steel sees it very 
differently, and argues that that it is: 
 
 one of the responsibilities of being a leader –  to look ahead, and envision things a bit 
differently. And that is certainly what I did in the early years … nobody could have 
foreseen there would later be a realignment, but it was certainly helped along by the EEC 
Referendum and the Lib-Lab Pact.  
 
Steel’s agency over the political landscape in this period can be overstated. The direct effect of the Lib-Lab 
Pact on the SDP-Liberal Alliance, as discussed below, was patchy. The subsequent inter-party dynamics of 
the SDP-Liberal Alliance did not directly stem from the Lib-Lab agreement. But the Lib-Lab Pact can only 
be sufficiently understood, and its efficacy from a Liberal perspective analysed, as an attempt to shift both 
the rules and ideational perceptions that determine British party politics. Attempts to shift the rules through 
the introduction of proportionality were an unqualified failure. But there was a very clear attempt not to 
push for any specific realignment but instead to foster and encourage an institutional environment in which 
further realignment and co-operation could be made possible. Steel suggested that, if there were another 
hung parliament, it would be hard for either main party to argue against the Liberal claim they had ‘found 
a better and more acceptable way of running Britain’; it would be equally ‘difficult to see how either party 
could refuse a referendum on proportional representation’ (Speech to Liberal Party Council 20/5/1978, 
Liberal Party 19/1; Party Political Broadcast 31/1/1979, LLP 19/2). The subsequent SDP-Liberal Alliance 
points to the entrepreneurship that defined Steel’s leadership, and the tenacity of his approach to co-
operation. But it also provided further evidence of what Steel also knew: that his leadership was a necessary, 
but not sufficient, factor if inter-party co-operation could affect the institutional change that was the 
principal aim of his leadership. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – The Formation of the Liberal-SDP Alliance, June 1979-October 1981 
23 June Roy Jenkins and David Steel meet to discuss political events, and the prospects for political 
realignment. 
22 November Roy Jenkins delivers the Dimbleby lecture ‘Home Thoughts from Abroad’, which calls for 
reform and the creation of a new party of the radical centre. 
1980 
31 May Labour Special Conference at Wembley, at which pro-unilateralism and anti-EEC policies are 
endorsed. 
7 June Owen, Rodgers and Williams warn they will leave Labour if it supports withdrawal from the EEC. 
9 June Roy Jenkins delivers lecture to House of Commons Press Gallery, calling for a realignment of the 
‘radical centre.’ 
1 August Open letter to members of the Labour Party from Owen, Rodgers and Williams – named the 
‘Gang of Three’ in the media –  published in The Guardian. 
29 November David Owen visits Jenkins’ home in Oxfordshire, and sets out a vision for a party more 
firmly on the centre-left than the one Jenkins envisages. 
10 December Meeting in Williams’ flat, including Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, who outline considerable 
possible support for a new party. 
1981 
14 and 18 January Two meetings of the ‘Gang of Four’ to discuss the formation of a new party, and 
agreement about policy principles. 
24 January Labour Special Conference at Wembley. New electoral college for electing the leader gives 
trade unions the largest share of the vote 
25 January Limehouse Declaration issued by Gang of Four 
26 March Official launch of the SDP. Bill Rodgers suggests the party will fight half the constituencies in 
the countries; the Liberal Party the other half. 
3-5 April Anglo-German Königswinter conference, where Rodgers, Williams, Steel and Holme meet and 
agree on the outlines of an alliance between their parties. 
7 April A rancorous joint meeting of the SDP Steering Committee and the Parliamentary Party meet to 
discuss the principal of immediate SDP-Liberal negotiations on co-operation. 
5 May SDP Steering Committee endorses formal negotiations with the Liberal Party. 
11 June Roy Jenkins selected as by-election candidate in Warrington following meeting of the parties, 
standing as ‘SDP with Liberal support’  
16 June Publication of A Fresh Start for Britain, a joint Liberal-SDP policy statement 
16 July By-election in Warrington sees Labour’s majority cut from 10,274 to 1,759. Roy Jenkins hails the 
result his ‘first defeat in thirty years of politics, and by far the greatest victory’ 
16 September Liberal Assembly at Llandudno endorses the pact, just 112 out of 1600 delegates voting 
against. 
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Figure 1: General Election 1979, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 	
Figure 1: Seat distribution in the House of Commons, October 1981 	
								
 
Party	 Seats	(%	of	
total)	
Conservative	 339	(53.4)		
Labour	 269	(42.4)	
Liberal	 11	(1.7)	
UUP	 5	(0.8)	
DUP	 3	(0.5)		
SNP	 2	(0.3)	
Plaid	Cymru	 2	(0.3)	
UUUP/UPU	 2	(0.3)	
SDLP	 1	(0.2)	
Independent	
Rep.	
1	(0.2)		
Party Seats (% of 
total) 
Conservative  338 (53.2) 
Labour  248 (39.0) 
Liberal  12 (1.9) 
SDP  22 (3.7) 
UUP  5 (0.8) 
DUP  3 (0.5) 
SNP  2 (0.3) 
Plaid Cymru  2 (0.3) 
UUUP/UPU  2 (0.3) 
Independent  1 (0.2) 
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‘What I have proclaimed from the beginning was the need for a realignment of British politics which would 
unite those who agreed with each other but were separated by the artificial barriers of traditional party 
politics. And which would also uncouple those who fundamentally disagreed with each other but were 
locked in a loveless union, by the fear that the surrounding sea would be still less hospitable than the 
bickering raft’ 
Roy Jenkins, speaking in support of a Liberal-SDP merger, 1 February 198821 
 
‘Does this mean I’ll have to support proportional representation?’ 
Shirley Williams to Liberal Chairman Richard Holme, upon informally agreeing SDP-Liberal co-operation,  
4 April 1980. (Holme, 1998: 12; Peel, 2013: 312) 
 
Overview: Political Context and Heresthetic Strategies 
 
The Alliance between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Liberals, formed in 1981, is a case of a 
pre-electoral coalition successfully created between two distinct political parties. It followed a splinter from 
the Labour Party by social democrats – led by former Labour frontbenchers David Owen, Shirley Williams 
and Bill Rodgers, and joined by Roy Jenkins, recently returned from a spell as President of the European 
Commission. As this chapter shows, the decision to create a new party was prompted by three key factors 
in the Labour Party: policy change, particularly on the issues of unilateral nuclear disarmament and 
membership of the EEC; organisational change, particularly a move to an electoral college for electing the 
leader that Labour ‘moderates’ viewed as unacceptable; and what they saw as a permanent rebalancing of 
power in Labour towards the left, along with an inability after 1979 to counter the economic narrative put 
forward by the left of the party (Fielding, 2003: 126-27; Thorpe, 2015: 214; Wickham-Jones, 1996: 104). 
This chapter traces, over the course of 1980, how the concept of co-operating with the Liberal party fed 
into discussions about whether, and if so how, these MPs should splinter from the Labour Party. The 
creation of the SDP took place between January and March of 1981, with 10 MPs immediately joining the 
‘Gang of Four’ among the party’s ranks, with the party containing 22 MPs by the time SDP-Liberal co-
operation was ratified by the SDP and Liberal conferences in 1981.  
 
The SDP were ultimately able to attract 26 defections from Labour, 1 from the Conservatives and won 2 
by-election results, quickly giving them 26 seats and dwarfing the Liberals 12.  Consequently, the Alliance 
appeared to offer a symbiosis. The Liberals with a well organised, substantial grass-roots membership were 
able to join electoral forces with the new SDP, attaching itself to prominent figures with executive 
experience, gravitas and an unfettered approach to decision-making. Following the forging of co-operation, 
the ‘Alliance’ soon came to be seen as more than a basic electoral pact based on a transaction of seats. 																																																								
21Recording, reproduced by Gwynoro Jones, and available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDRNRflQ0QQ 
	 142	
Before the 1983 election Roy Jenkins, then SDP leader had been chosen as ‘Prime Minister Designate’ of 
the Alliance. By the 1987 election this had led to joint spokespeople, providing further consolidation to the 
two parties’ promise they would act as a unitary actor in any coalition negotiations (Steel, 1987; Joyce, 1999, 
243). In the 1983 general election the Alliance netted 25.4% of the popular vote, the highest third-party 
vote since 1923, but owing to the FPTP system this translated as only 23 seats, representing an overall 
significant loss of parliamentarians.   
 
Subsequently, Roy Jenkins also stepped aside in 1983 for David Owen to lead the SDP. The personal 
dynamics between the ‘two Davids’ that led the second Alliance magnified policy divisions particularly over 
nuclear disarmament, and publicly demonstrated the flaws in the alliance.  Commentators were quick to 
point out the immense difficulty of running an organisation with a plethora of leaders. After Neil Kinnock 
succeeded Michael Foot as leader of the Labour Party the Alliance found its support declining and in the 
1987 general election, when the latter returned only 22 seats. The ultimate fusion of the two parties into 
the Liberal and Social Democrat Party, and the speed with which the agreement followed the SDP’s 
creation, creates an illusion of inevitability to this original co-operation that this chapter analyses. This case 
study shows that the movement throughout the first half of 1981 towards co-operation between the two 
parties was far from certain, with clear and significant differences of opinion – particularly within the SDP 
–  about the strategic purpose of inter-party co-operation, and whether it would help or hinder the SDP’s 
aim to ‘break the mould’ of British politics. 
 
This is also a history of the party fundamentally contested by those involved. Roy Jenkins – who, as this 
chapter shows, drove co-operation based on a belief in its inherent strategic value – argued relationships 
outside the direct political sphere were better not divulged and, ‘like budget secrets, much better not talked 
about’ (Cockerill, 1996). Yet unlike personal political life histories, the creation of the inter-party Alliance 
– so often couched by key actors in the language of marriage – is crucial to understanding the political party 
Jenkins helped create. There has yet to be an explicitly theoretically grounded analysis of the processes 
behind the creation of the agreement. The essential academic work on the Social Democratic Party, Ivor 
Crewe and Anthony King’s SDP, is prefaced with the observation that it bears ‘a disconcerting resemblance 
to a biography of someone who showed early promise, but died young’ (Crewe and King, 1995: vii). Their 
comprehensive exploration of the party touches on whether two key areas that bookend the SDP’s story – 
the fissure and splinter of Labour moderates, and the ultimate fusion with the Liberal Party – result from 
structural and institutional constraints and pressures, elite agency and high politics, or both. Yet their 
observation that the party ‘went up like a rocket but came down like a stick’ (Crewe and King, 1995: 3) 
suggests that, in the early period of the SDP’s existence, it was able to defy political gravity with few 
problems.  That is not their argument, and Crewe and King explore the internal dynamics of the SDP – but 
the use of the British Political Tradition can help theoretically ground some of these internal debates had 
within and between both the SDP and Liberal parties, with access to internal party documents. Crewe and 
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King’s sub-heading and their structure, ‘the birth, life and death’ of a political party, is too suggestive of a 
transience that undermines the party’s inheritance, and undersells its continuing legacy today on the 
ideational structure of British politics.  
 
This inheritance is in party the inter-party co-operation that came before it, explored in chapters 2-4, and 
in part the differing political baggage that each of the key figures brought to the SDP - Placing the SDP, 
and the Alliance, within the context of inter-party British politics can uncover this context and continuity.  
Though not at the forefront of the decision of Owen, Rodgers and Williams to split from Labour, the inter-
party alliance with the Liberals quickly came to shape conflicting interpretations of the SDP’s intended 
purpose. The influence of the SDP and the Liberal Party’s agreement, not least its limited electoral success, 
is felt in an institutional framework within which attempts at inter-party co-operation are discussed and 
understood today. But also, the way mutual agreements on policy, campaigning and seat distribution 
between the two parties were fostered, and gradually sealed and expanded within the first year and a half 
of the SDP’s creation, is instructive. It helps in understanding the discourse involved in negotiations of this 
kind, and the dynamics of successful negotiations.  
 
Given that, it is notable Jenkins’ own account of the formative agreement between the SDP and the 
Liberals, from conception to realisation, is fundamentally contested. David Steel, when privately admiring 
Jenkins’ leadership strengths, remarked on his ‘ability to sweep grandly across hard issues … he can 
obliterate disagreements with the sweep of his hand. It’s his manner, and his experience, and his past, and 
his weight’ (Young (Steel), 2007: 25/3/1982, 178). An alternative view is that many key decisions were 
fudged or obfuscated to secure short-term support for a long-term strategy of deep Liberal-SDP 
integration. When Jenkins argued ‘we both want to bust the system … neither of us can be diverted by 
trying to bust each other’ he was promoting an inter-party agreement with the Liberal Party (Brown, The 
Guardian, 16/5/1981: 3). But it could just as well have been aimed at his ultimate successor as SDP leader, 
David Owen, who proffered an alternative political strategy to Jenkins’ proto-leadership of the party. 
Jenkins may have left the ‘bickering raft’ of the Labour Party. But disagreement on the direction of his new 
political vessel, and who was captaining it, were sharpened by the narcissism of small differences, and the 
political and personal risks that had been taken in the creation of the SDP. But they were also fundamentally 
a question of political strategy and heresthetics: about whether inter-party co-operation with the Liberal 
party would help to remake the underlying structural equilibrium of British politics, or dampen the SDP’s 
radicalism and make its chances of ultimately becoming a party of government more difficult. 
 
David Owen ruminated in 2015 that the rise of UKIP proved correct his longstanding view that the British 
party system could accommodate four distinct, major political parties (Hennessy, 2015). As a result, Owen 
wished to accentuate the different identities of the SDP and Liberal parties. In contrast, overtly combative 
politics was Jenkins bête noir: he considered himself to the left of Owen principally because he did not 
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share his ‘free market enthusiasm, or his respect for Mrs. Thatcher’s style of government’ (Hickson and 
Beech, 2007: 202; see also Jenkins, 1991: 617). This was a discord pivoted on (or, alternatively, fought 
through the proxy of) a different position on the heresthetic value of inter-party alliances. Importantly 
Rodgers and Williams had a more nuanced, or less fully-formed, interpretation than either Jenkins or Owen 
of the importance of institutional change, and how any new party should shape and respond to their political 
environment. Throughout the period of Liberal-SDP negotiation, swift in its agreement on fundamentals 
and protracted in organisational detail, the ‘Gang of Four’ operated on the principle of an increasingly 
frayed form of collective, and largely autonomous, leadership. All, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
agreed that an arrangement with the Liberals, in some form, was a necessary precondition to short-term 
electoral survival (Owen, 1991: 515-16; Crewe and King, 1995: 170; Rodgers, 2000: 212). But the key area 
of difference in accounts of the SDP and, Rodgers (2000: 219) claimed, ‘the focus of our differences’, was 
the party’s electoral co-operation with Steel’s Liberal Party. 
 
In this key respect, and in the prioritisation of co-operation, Jenkins was fundamentally at one with David 
Steel. Jenkins and Steel shared a frustration that discussion on how the two parties should co-operate was 
‘based too much on deciding how much water there was in the kettle, as it were, and how it could be shared 
out’ (Jenkins, 1989: 7/1/1980, 553). This thinking missed the point and purpose of the pact: as an additive 
arrangement with office-seeking objectives for its key participants, and a real desire to change the party 
system beyond adding a new silo for disgruntled Labour votes. Steel had drawn the conclusion from the 
aborted negotiations of 1974 and the Lib-Lab Pact that inter-party deals should be entered into by whole 
parties, rather than parliamentary elites (for party management, rather than any normative purpose) (Steel, 
Interview, 2016; see also: Crewe and King, 1995). The foundations of support for another inter-party 
alliance, when speculation began to mount in early 1980, were shaky. Yet by September 1981 and the Liberal 
conference vote on the Alliance, a constitutional necessity a direct result of the Lib-Lab agreement, Liberal 
compliancy with a new political party that seemed intent on stealing their electoral clothes was near-certain. 
Through each stage of the process, from Jenkins’ speech through to the enactment of a comprehensive 
electoral pact, the momentum of each decision to integrate with the SDP gave added impetus to Steel’s 
next move. So much so that, by the ratifying vote, The Times (Smith, 19/9/1981: 8) noted it had ‘been so 
much taken for granted that the Liberal conference would endorse the alliance, that the extent of his 
achievement may have been obscured’.  
 
Steel’s management of his party at an elite level gave him the position to pursue a strategy of structural 
realignment and overcome these intra-party hurdles. Just as Jenkins (1991) tied his view of negotiations to 
his rejection of the idea that any party is a ‘sacred tabernacle with those within it anointed and those outside 
damned’, Steel equally made explicit his belief that a minimalistic ‘non-aggression pact’ would be ‘little more 
than a cynical exercise for mutual convenience … the atmosphere would be one of grudging co-operation, 
rivalry and mutual suspicion. It would be a very poor second best’ (Hetherington, The Guardian, 27/3/1981: 
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2). So, there was a symbolic importance to an agreement, coupled with an understanding that there was no 
alternative if either party was going to be successful on its own terms. The SDP exists today as a byword 
and historical portent in British politics for the failures of realignment and the politics of electoral co-
operation. But the intra-party processes involved in the formation of co-operation must be seen as a key 
and underappreciated success: both for Liberals who had long advocated inter-party politics, and those 
within the SDP who envisaged from the start a party working closely in tandem with Steel’s Liberals. David 
Owen had privately resolved that ‘the essential is that a new party is not cast in Roy Jenkins’ image’ (Owen, 
1991:  566). The key puzzle, from conception of the SDP to the realisation of the Alliance, is how Jenkins 
circumnavigated a political operator like David Owen, and succeeded in doing just that.  
 
June 1979-January 1980: Jenkins-Steel Discussions 
 
Hugh Stephenson (1983: 14), New Statesman editor for most of the Alliance’s lifespan, pointed out that both 
Jenkins and Steel ‘had the luxury of being able to concentrate on the strategic aspect of these battles, safe 
in the knowledge that … the understandings and confidences between them were secure’. Long-term co-
ordination between Steel and Jenkins meant the key battlegrounds in securing the pact were within both 
parties, rather than between leaders. The two men first met alone in June, a few weeks following the 1979 
general election. There was already an apparent understanding that the election result and a Conservative 
majority created an opening for the political project both had long-desired. Steel was assertive and 
confident. Liberal support had risen from 6 to 14 per cent in opinion polls during the campaign, and Jenkins 
felt Steel was ‘underlining in the nicest possible way that in any future political arrangement he wasn’t to be 
treated as an office boy’ (Jenkins, 1989: 14/6/1979: 460; see also Butler and Kavanagh, 1983). The most 
striking element of these talks is that they were principally concerned with the structure of the party system 
and the potential dynamics of any relationship between a third and fourth party. Instead of encouraging 
Jenkins to join his party, David Steel actively discouraged him (Torrance, 2012: 134; Brack, James and Steel, 
2015) Party politics could only be fundamentally recalibrated if an electoral breakthrough was achieved 
through two parties working together. Unsurprisingly, this strategy provoked the ire of senior Liberals, 
including John Pardoe (Torrance, 2012: 134; Interview, Steel, 2016; Slade, Interview, 2016). For them, 
Jenkins could help bridge the Liberal credibility gap – giving the party electoral heft that, in addition to 
Conservative and Labour drift from the centre, gave them an electoral opening. An exclusive advancement 
in the Liberal Party’s relative political strength was simply much less of a political priority for Steel.  
 
Jenkins’ opening public manoeuvre was his near hour long Dimbleby Speech of November 1979, ‘Home 
Thoughts from Abroad’, delivered on BBC1 after Les Dawson and the Nine O’Clock News. In it, he called 
for a ‘radical centre’ and proportional representation, while arguing for the electoral viability of political 
realignment on the grounds that ‘if (the electorate) saw a new grouping with cohesion and relevant policies 
emerging, it might be more attracted by this new reality than by old labels’ (Reproduced in Jenkins and 
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Lindley, 1989: 24). Privately, he described it as ‘a new anti-party approach to British politics’, implicitly 
bringing with it the recurring tropes of national unity and economic stability that had appeared in multi-
party politics discourse throughout the decade (Campbell, 2015: 508). The moderate Conservative and 
touted Social Democrat Ian Gilmour, a key ally of Heath in the aborted talks of ‘74, told Jenkins ‘You and 
Ted would be a formidable combination’ though, having read a draft of Jenkins BBC lecture, ‘thought 
much of the end too right-wing’ (Jenkins, 1989: 3/11/1979, 518). Gilmour’s objection, Jenkins claimed, 
was to the use of the phrase ‘social market economy’, ultimately a political idea over which David Owen, 
not least with his setting up of the Social Market Foundation in 1989, later took complete political 
ownership (Baston, 1996: 62-72).  
 
In January 1980 Steel again saw Jenkins in confidence (Jenkins, 1989, 7/1/1980, 553). Given a new party 
was still a year from creation it is remarkable that Steel’s plans – plainly shared and supported by Jenkins – 
came to fruition in their entirety. Jenkins recollected that Steel ‘would like the closeness at the time of the 
election itself to take the form of a non-aggression pact, but of working together on policy and indeed 
sharing platforms etc.’ (Ibid.). Equally, they shared the aim that, ‘if things went well, to consider an 
amalgamation after the next election’ (Ibid.). Steel archly noted in March 1982 that Jenkins: 
 
said the other night that he and I had been associated for the last three years. When 
someone pointed out this took him back into his EEC days, he said there was nothing 
wrong with a little pre-planning.  (Young (Steel), 2007: 25/3/1982, 179)  
 
January-September 1980: Discussion of political co-operation  
 
Developing social democratic fission and splinter 
 
Jenkins and Steel’s broad-brush discussions in the first few months of 1980 meant the outline of any new 
party remained vague and blurred. Equally, how inclusive and impactful the party would be depended on 
how big a portion of the Labour Party would join. When the fact of these meetings began to be leaked, 
Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers were mentioned as potential allies while, if any venture went wrong, ‘the 
Owens and the Hattersleys’ would be on hand to say ‘I told you so’ (Hoggart, The Guardian, 21/2/1980: 
15). Williams personally told Jenkins in confidence that she would be unlikely to run for parliament under 
anything other than a Labour banner; equally, she told the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs (though she 
was, following the 1979 election, at this stage not in parliament) that she saw no future in any centrist 
grouping (Stephenson, 1983: 24). The working assumption from Steel (who felt ‘it would be foolish to think 
more than one or two Labour MPs will come across to Roy’) was that it would be a largely lone venture, 
with no more than a handful of MPs involved (Young (Steel), 2007: 26/2/1980, 142).  
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When a ‘new third party’ was discussed – publicly by Jenkins, as much as in newspaper speculation – it was 
unclear whether he was calling for a recalibrated and renamed Liberal Party, or a new party altogether. In 
January 1980, the Conservative Party were working on information from ‘close to Roy Jenkins’ that he was 
seeking to join the Liberals and fight the next plausibly winnable by-election as a Liberal candidate and 
‘build up’ the party (Gow to Thatcher, 10/1/1980, MS Thatcher 2/6/2/74). It was in these early stages 
where problems were identified, and a joint direction of travel was resolved between Jenkins and Steel. 
Many close to Jenkins, including Bill Rodgers, were briefing that they doubted his resolve towards 
realignment – Rodgers arguing that ‘he does not think Roy in the end is a big enough risk taker’ (Young 
(Rodgers), 2007: 8/11/1979,134). But Steel was consistently encouraged by their conversations and told 
Hugo Young that Jenkins overt commitment to PR in public had ‘made it possible to talk turkey’ (Young 
(Steel), 2007: 26/2/1980, 142). This was an optimism Jenkins shared (Jenkins, 1989: 22/8/1980, 625; 
29/11/1980, 650). In a speech to the Press Gallery in June – a speech Jenkins’ memoirs couple with his 
Dimbleby Lecture as part of a sustained process – he acknowledged press speculation over realignment was 
not matched by optimism about its success. Toying with historical precedent and political nomenclature, 
Jenkins argued that, just as George Dangerfield had spoken of The Strange Death of Liberal England, 
commentators would soon to discussing ’the strange and rapid revival of liberal social democratic Britain’ 
(‘Jenkins Press Gallery Transcript’, The Times, 10/6/1980: 16). 
  
Far from a fuzzy grouping of the centre, the SDP’s other three future co-leaders all started from the point 
that any new party would be explicitly ‘democratic socialist’ (Owen, Rodgers and Williams, The Guardian: 
11). Shirley Williams had warned off Jenkins from pronouncing a Liberal and Social Democratic Britain in 
a previous draft of his lecture (the capitals and conjunction purposefully pre-emptive) and, publicly, derided 
the possibility of a centrism with ‘no roots, no principles, no philosophy and no values’ (Rodgers, 2004: 
216; Campbell, 2015: 549). David Owen’s immediate reaction to Jenkins’ Dimbleby speech was to reject 
any call for proportional representation out of hand, and to dismiss Jenkins as a ‘siren voice from outside’ 
who had ‘given up the fight from within’ (White, The Guardian: 24/11/1979: 26; Jenkins, 1991: 521). Their 
equivalent actions to Jenkins were a dismayed statement on Europe in June, and an open letter in The 
Guardian (Owen, Rodgers and Williams: 1/8/1980: 11) and the Daily Mirror (Owen, Rodgers and Williams: 
1/8/1980: 5) which explicitly raised the possibility of an ‘acceptable socialist alternative to a Labour 
government’ – though one that notably reiterated a commitment to ‘international socialism’. The ‘Gang of 
Three’ ignored Steel’s attempts to mount a case for a coalition that evoked the ‘radical tradition’ (Steel, The 
Guardian, 8/8/1980: 11). His call for inter-party co-operation received a ‘dusty reception’, both in private 
(it was sent, unacknowledged, to all three before publication) and public (Rodgers, politically and personally 
closest to Steel, described his intervention as ‘predictable and routine’) (Aitken, The Guardian: 9/8/1980: 1; 
Steel, 1991). That it was signed off ‘Yours fraternally’ particularly rankled (Owen, 1991: 448).  
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The fact Williams, Owen and Rodgers had not mentioned the Liberals explicitly in their letter was not a 
deliberate slight. Instead, all three had not crossed the rubicon to believing a new party was necessary, let 
alone assessing future electoral arrangements with competitors. Crucial to the potential dynamics of any 
new party, and its relations with the Liberal Party, was the lack of control Jenkins had over the ‘Gang of 
Three’s’ process and the mood, described by The Guardian’s political editor Peter Jenkins (The Guardian, 
18/6/1980: 15), that he ‘might find himself joining their party instead of trying to recruit them to his’. This 
distinction was crucial to Owen. He felt that if any new party was perceived to be emanating from Labour, 
and led by one of the ‘Gang of Three’, it would have a much looser association Liberal association. Owen’s 
memoirs describe a meeting in July 1980 with David Watt, a confidant he shared with Jenkins, and his 
realisation Jenkins’ motives were much more intertwined with the Liberal Party’s than his. He notes that 
‘perhaps this should have worried me more this stage’ (Owen, 1991: 446) but, emblematic of his wider 
thinking, Owen was still more preoccupied with Denis Healey and the prospect of continuing to fight from 
within Labour. This meant he spent little time discussing the prospect of the nature of any future agreement 
with the Liberals.  
 
Throughout 1980, Jenkins’ machinations were conducted largely in parallel with the internal battles of what 
increasingly came to be known as Labour’s ‘Gang of Three’. Steel and Jenkins’ efforts were boosted by 
these increasingly public shows of discontent, but that was not their intention. Unrest among the ‘Gang of 
Three’ was caused by internal party machinations described above (p. 135) and Jim Callaghan’s complicity 
in their acceptance. Callaghan, in Shadow Cabinet, accused Owen and Rodgers of being complicit in 
Jenkins’ Dimbleby Lecture calling for realignment, but Denis Healey was aware there remained a disconnect 
between their and Jenkins’ thinking (Healey,1989: 480). Steel (1989: 216) was ‘getting a little impatient with 
their running at a different tangent’, but his approach – to ‘embrace them, smother them with kindness and 
assume a putative alliance’ – was irrelevant to their actions (Steel, 1989: 218). Crewe and King (1995: 168) 
are clear that ‘the Liberals certainly played no part in the Gang of Three’s decision to leave the Labour 
Party’. 
 
Owen was still, in June, firmly against a split from Labour, and believed Williams and Rodgers were too – 
Hugo Young’s papers reinforce that there was little sustained thought about a centre party, or what its 
relationship would be vis-à-vis the Liberals (Young (Owen) 20/3/1980, 144-5, Young (Williams, 6/6/1980, 
146-8; see also: Josephs, 1983: 18-19). The aim was to impress upon the Labour Party, particularly the 
unions, that ‘while they could afford to lose one of the three, they could not afford to lose all three’ (Young 
(Williams, 6/6/1980, 146-8). Certainly, in early September, Bernard Donoughue felt it ‘virtually certain that 
Owen etc. would never go with Jenkins’ (Young (Donoughue), 2007: 3/9/1980, 152). Explicitly, the Gang 
of Three’s public letter in August wrote that ‘we will not support a Centre party for it would lack roots and 
a coherent philosophy’; more brutally, according to Owen, such a party would ’reflect the attitudes of a 
London based liberalism’ rather than his aim to ‘particularly cut into the Labour vote in the Northern part 
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of the country’ (Dutton, 2014: 224). The principal point of any new party, Rodgers privately told Jenkins 
in January 1980, would be to ‘take over 90% of the Labour vote’, something that could be achieved only if 
the party was unabashedly of the left. For Rodgers, even then willing to countenance and discuss a pact, 
there would be: 
 
a division of responsibility: Liberals fight (and win) existing Conservative seats; a fourth 
party fights (and wins) existing Labour seats. To me, this is not only the reality but also 
the motive, justification and prospect for a fourth party (Rodgers to Jenkins, 3/1/1980, 
B2, Rodgers Archive) 
 
Where SDP figures stood on the nature of the party’s natural constituency was indicative of how willing 
they were to dilute distinctive radical social democracy through further alignment with the Liberal Party. 
David Marquand (arguably the most prominent, and most ardent, Jenkinsite) argued privately with Rodgers 
that ‘I would be very surprised indeed if we don’t end up getting more ex-Conservative votes than ex-
Labour ones’ (Marquand to Rodgers, 6/8/1981, Box 2, Rodgers Archive), while Jenkins (1991: 539) was 
certain that his best chance of by-election success in the SDP’s early stages would be in a seat where 
Conservative, rather than Labour, voters were predominant. 
 
Simon Hoggart argued that Jenkins’ political failure, and a likely fault of any future manoeuvrings, was that 
‘he tends to imagine that everyone sees the issues in the same mighty global, economic, historical and social 
terms as he does’ (The Guardian, 21/2/1980: 15). This criticism was fair, but overlooked his capacity for the 
political organisation involved in forming and organising an effective and active political faction, one that 
kept up, albeit more sporadically than Jenkins and Steel communicated themselves, discussions and dialogue 
with senior Liberals. The consolidation of a Jenkinsite clique that would form a key slab of any future party 
was a clear priority for Jenkins throughout 1980, and they sustained a degree of momentum in the idea of 
cross-party fertilisation in a period where, according to Stevenson (1983), ‘it looked increasingly like the 
Jenkins initiative might come to nothing, or at least very little’. A group that looked unpromising in 1979 – 
Jenkins had only been able to name 3 MPs who would support him – was growing, and becoming more 
vocal (Horam, 2016, Interview; Josephs, 1983: 11; Rodgers, 2004: 216). 
 
Liberal Intra-Party Discussion of Co-Operation 
 
Although Steel’s discussions with Jenkins were determinedly based on a rough political vision rather than 
the minutiae of party management, the nuts and bolts of any elite-level party reformulation were always 
going to be problematic within the Liberal Party. A Westminster focus on defection and electoral surges, 
driven by the popularity and name-recognition of individual politicians, could be the final nail in the coffin 
for community politics as the dominating strategic purpose for the Liberal Party. Its adherents, largely 
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dominant within the vocal Association of Liberal Councillors, would be fundamentally weaker as a result. 
All this added up to the fundamental complaint that Liberals had been sailing in Jenkins’ choppy 
surrounding sea for some time already; Jo Grimond, far from welcoming the flighty rhetoric of Jenkins, 
suggested that ‘if (he) agrees, let him come down into the battle. Let him shove with the rest of us’ (Barberis, 
2005: 185).  
 
In the first few months of 1980 the content of discussions was kept within Steel’s inner circle, and Alan 
Beith (2008: 132-3), Steel’s Chief Whip, recalled that Steel ‘played his cards very close to his chest’ and 
‘most of us knew nothing about the conversations David had had with Roy Jenkins’. Speculation about a 
new party was incendiary for many Liberals. But Steel, nevertheless, began the work of assuaging Liberal. 
Roy Jenkins’ recorded Steel, in May 1980, having to attend ‘a Liberal gathering at Worcester in May which 
would be less favourable that the Assembly in some way or other’ (Jenkins, 1989: 13/4/1980, 547). This 
was the Liberal Party Council meeting in May, where a motion on party strategy (‘of such length and 
tortuousness that it might almost have been modelled on the River Severn’) was debated (The Guardian, 
17/5/1980: 8). Steel’s belief that the Council – with its representation of key members of the ALC – would 
be challenging was well founded. Michael Steed, who had recently stepped down as Party President, recalled 
a ‘dominant feeling’ of ‘cautious willingness’, and Steel secured the backing of the party to conduct 
negotiations with Jenkins (Torrance, 2012: 140). However, leaks from the meeting described reticence due 
to the historical Liberal record of deals and coalitions: the party was ‘being asked to commit suicide again’ 
(Johnson: The Guardian, 19/5/1980: 3). The sanctioning of talks was coupled with a statement of the party’s 
independence and prospects for success, and a statement that ‘Liberals must contest elections at all levels, 
at every opportunity without any electoral pacts or alliances with non-Liberals’ (Ibid.). 
 
Senior Liberal figures who would, by early 1981, strongly support a comprehensive pact with the SDP – 
such as the party Chairman Roger Pincham, and former chairman and Pardoe’s campaign manager for his 
1976 leadership bid, Tim Beaumont – denounced talks, and it was felt that ‘Steel has a long way to go to 
carry the bulk of his party with him’ (Jordan, The Guardian 8/3/1980: 4; Stephenson, 1983: 126). But the 
lack of any specific new party or political vehicle made the fertilisation of discussion easier. While quiet 
over the summer of 1980, by the Liberal’s annual conference in Blackpool in September 1980 speculation 
had heightened. Simon Hoggart (The Guardian, 12/9/1980: 13) described Liberals as finding themselves ‘in 
the position of a spiritualist investigator trying to shake hands with the ectoplasmic forms pouring from Mr 
Jenkins’ mouth’. Bypassing policy specifics to avoid intractable policy conflicts was a strategy that persisted 
throughout the formation of the Alliance, so much so that Roy Jenkins wished to vaccinate his new party 
to pre-empt the onset of ‘manifestoitis’ (LBC/IRN, ‘Weekend World - Roy Jenkins interview’, 
29/11/1981). This continued vagueness about what they were fighting against did not stop discord about 
the possibility of an electoral pact with any new force. Michael Meadowcroft, chairing Marquand’s 
discussion, said he felt ‘inter-party arrangements must follow elections rather than proceeding them. 
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Otherwise we fudge principles and policies, and undermine political discussion and debate’ (Hoggart, The 
Guardian, 10/9/1980: 22; Interview, Meadowcroft, 2016). Cyril Smith evoked his opposition to the Lib-Lab 
Pact in dismissing the idea of ‘housing socialist dissidents’ (Emery, The Times, 10/9/1980: 2). According to 
Stephenson (1983: 28), senior Liberals’ accepted warm words about any new party but felt it would be 
‘politically suicidal for him to go further and suggest pre-electoral understandings’.  
 
But while the reported mood of the 1980 conference was undeniably against a pre-electoral coalition with 
social democrats, it passed without any policy statement being debated or adopted to restrict Steel. Steel 
continued to prepare the ground for the future party, increasingly aware local constituency parties would 
begin selecting general election candidates that could impede the workings of any electoral pact. Reports 
‘from the grassroots’ in strong Liberal constituencies continued to paint a broadly reluctant picture among 
activists ‘not much interested in pacts with social democrats’ (Bradley, The Times, 9/2/1981: 4). Steel 
attempted to stoke up the benefits of realignment and the possibility his party, working with allies, could 
create a ‘blocking third’ of seats in the Commons (Langdon, The Guardian, 3/12/1980: 3). And within the 
elite of his party, Steel’s project was gaining increasing levels of traction. In part, one journalist felt, this was 
due to an ability to ‘corner the right person at the right moment for a chat and a drink’; Shirley Williams 
noted that Steel ‘used lunches with influential members of his own party very effectively’ (Williams, 2009: 
240; Slade, 2016, Interview). A political party broadcast, in which Steel claimed that if the Liberals did not 
embrace potential allies ‘the voters of this country will never forgive us’, was a ‘plea to party supporters … 
that reflects the anxiety of many Liberal leaders about the potential backlash from the party’s rank-and-file’ 
(Aitken, The Guardian, 29/1/1981: 1).  
 
Steel continued to privately foster closer relations with social democrats within the Labour Party, using 
whatever influence he had to stimulate action by ‘chivvying’ MPs into action (Torrance, 2012: 139-143). 
Crewe and King (1995: 57-8) described John Horam (who had spoken since 1979 of the need for a new 
party) and Tom Ellis as two Labour MPs who considered the possibility of directly defecting to the Liberal 
Party, and both by the end of 1980 were circulating memos to Labour MPs memos calling for a social 
democratic party (Stephenson, 1983; Horam, Interview, 2016). David Marquand also moved to join the 
Liberals, but Steel rejected his offer on the grounds he should work to encourage the formation of the SDP. 
Steel’s memoirs recall a meeting with Robert Maclennan, while he also met with Neville Sandelson (who 
was considering defection to the Conservatives) and Richard Crawshaw – though these could all be 
categorised as ‘Jenkinsites’ (Gow Memorandum 10/8/1980, MS Thatcher 2/6/2/74); Steel, 1989: 167). 
Steel produced a policy paper ‘a ten point plan for economic recovery’ – a performative act, combined with 
a party broadcast, with the purpose of drawing out comment and approval in public from social democrats 
(Steel, 1989: 222). It was sent to 400 MPs but, not coincidently, the coordinated praise it received – it was 
described as ‘excellent’, ‘sensible’, ‘positive’ and ‘down to earth’ – came from those who had already liaised 
with Steel (Brown, The Guardian, 13 1/1981: 1). 
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October-December 1980: Political co-operation and the creation of the SDP 
 
This remained a process largely distinct and tangential from the ‘Gang of Three’, despite a gradual shift 
from an internal Labour campaign to the potential and plausibility of a new battle. By the end of 1980 the 
need for a new party had crystallised, yet thoughts of its electoral strategy remained unresolved. The Labour 
conference in late September passed votes to withdraw from the EEC and in favour of unilateral 
disarmament. Williams had promised resignation if EEC withdrawal became Labour policy, while Owen 
had staked his battle against the Bennite wing on the totemic issue of nuclear weapons, and lost. The 
election of Michael Foot, and Denis Healey’s defeat, made exit from the party significantly easier to 
contemplate (Owen, 1991: 458; Rodgers, 2000: 200-4). The continuing lack of explicit discussion about the 
Liberal Party was remarkable, particularly given speculation about an inter-party agreement had dominated 
coverage of the Liberal’s annual conference in September. This was, again, due to a need for internal 
cohesion as the splinter from Labour took place. Rodgers feared that Williams would not leave Labour; 
doubts that were reciprocated, as both knew of each other’s attachment to the party (Rodgers, 2000: 204; 
Peel, 2009: 146). Rodgers, with his deep roots in the Labour movement, ran for the Labour Shadow Cabinet 
(Owen did not) and was being constantly positioned by Labour moderates to stay in the party.  
 
Yet Owen was, by the end of 1980, both firmly in favour of a new party and against an agreement, and was 
acutely aware that the strategic path of a future party would be directed by its leader. On 29 November, 
Owen visited Jenkins’ home in Oxfordshire and, Jenkins’ diaries note, reiterated that ‘it was in his (Owen’s) 
view to be not a centre party but a ‘Socialist International’ party, and I was joining them rather than vice 
versa’ (Jenkins, 1989: 29/11/1980, 650). While Jenkins’ account does not mention it, Owen is adamant that 
the pair agreed any eventual leader of the party would be chosen by one member one vote – an outcome 
Owen felt would guarantee Shirley Williams’ election as leader and, with it, a distinct non-Liberal direction 
(Crewe and King, 1995: 152). Jenkins remained though, fairly sure that he would get ‘much more the sort 
of party I want than the sort of ex-Labour Party that for the moment he wants. But we will see.’ (Jenkins, 
1989: 29/11/1980, 650). There is a clear distinction in the actions of Owen and Jenkins, who had already 
a clear conception of what co-operation involved and viewed it as a key strategic question and Williams and 
Rodgers, who had not thought of, or prioritised, the electoral implications to anywhere near the same 
degree. 
 
A key meeting took place on 10 December 1980 in which Rodgers, Owen, Williams and six MPs received 
a presentation by Ivor Crewe and Anthony King on the electoral prospects for a new social democratic 
party. Throughout, the two academics ‘took it for granted that any new party would have to form some 
kind of alliance with the Liberals’ (Crewe and King, 1995: 85-6). Rodgers take home point from the meeting 
was that a new party could only prosper in conjunction with ‘an electoral alliance with the Liberals, because 
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there was simply not enough room on the centre ground for two parties in competition’ (Rodgers, 2000: 
213). In striking contrast, Owen felt it was a shame that Jenkins could not be there, for ‘the message was 
that a social democratic party would have a significant impact’ and ‘it became ever clearer what sort of party 
we needed, and a strong consensus emerged’ (Owen, 1991: 520). Owen did not do enough in this period 
to truly cement a genuinely detached attitude to the Liberal Party within the SDP’s DNA, and away from 
the centrist conception of the party Jenkins had advocated for over a year. Denis Healey held the feeling 
that Owen ‘should have played it differently – he ought to have organised the trade unionists’ (Radice, 
2004: 43). Certainly, Rodgers (2000: 201) ‘cannot recall discussing relations with the Liberals during the 
stormy, closing months of 1980’.  
 
As with much discussion of the SDP-Liberal relationship, the two perspectives gleaned from Crewe and 
King’s presentation were compatible in the abstract, but would lead to later tensions when decisions were 
made about electoral strategy. On key issues that quickly came into play as soon as the new party was 
secured – joint candidate selection, policy co-operation, and dual party membership – Owen was then 
effectively running at political cross-purposes to the growing momentum for political co-operation. Owen 
felt the question of leadership, and with it the strategic direction of the new party, had been adequately 
resolved. But as breakaway became almost certain, Jenkins asserted his control over the project. Jenkins, or 
a member of his inner circle, leaked news of a meeting of the four on 18 January that led to an Observer 
front page story that ‘Mr. Roy Jenkins has asked Mrs. Shirley Williams, Dr. David Owen and Mr. William 
Rodgers to a summer meeting at his Oxfordshire home’. This was construed by Williams (2009: 281-2) as 
part of a concerted attempt to create the impression Jenkins was the driver of the process.  
 
Jenkins underestimated the rancour this would cause; certainly, when two subsequent meetings did take 
place and policy discussed, agreement was quickly reached on a statement that bore far greater resemblance 
to the type of party Williams envisaged than the one Jenkins imagined. Politically, the key passage of the 
statement that created the ‘Council for Social Democracy’, which quickly became known as the ‘Limehouse 
Declaration’, was the phrase ‘we do not believe in the politics of an inert centre purely representing the 
lowest common denominator between two extremes’. Owen (1991: 481) subsequently remarked that 
‘looking back on the Declaration we signed that day it is hard not to be struck by how orientated it was to 
the Labour Party’. Equally striking, and interlinked, was the fact that the statement gave no hint that the 
party they were about to create would be prepared or willing to interlock comprehensively with another, let 
alone delve into pre-empting what that might involve in practice. 
 
January-June 1981: The Königswinter conference and ‘A Fresh Start for Britain’ 
 
At least for Williams and Rodgers, questions about SDP-Liberal co-operation were left unaddressed 
because they had genuinely not entered their radar. Between leaving Labour, and forming the SDP, they 
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simply had other things on their mind. This lack of discussion was notable when, in the press conference 
announcing the pact, a journalist asked what the distribution of seats between the Liberal and SDP parties 
might look like. Rodgers answered there would be a roughly 50:50 split in candidatures between the parties. 
Owen was furious Rodgers had seceded so much ground (Owen, 1991: 506; Rodgers, 2000: 212; Thomas, 
2016, Interview). Owen and his allies claim an agreement had been staked out beforehand; Rodgers was 
nonplussed, and views this claim in Owen’s memoirs that a co-operation strategy had been agreed ‘one of 
the more tendentious passages – and there are several’ (Rodgers, 2000: 212). He argued his impromptu 
answer would have been much more generous to the Liberals (he thought he might have said the SDP 
would fight something like 60 seats) had press enthusiasm, and preliminary polls, not been quite so 
favourable to the new party (Rodgers, 1998: 9).  
 
Initial levels of support for co-operation with the Liberal Party among the ‘Gang of Three’ can be 
overplayed: all three still saw, at the SDP’s creation, the party’s aims as independent to that of Liberals. A 
paper by Rodgers in March 1981 reiterated that ‘our aim is to win as many seats in the House of Commons 
as we can; and to win more seats than the Liberals’ (Rodgers Memorandum, Organisation Committee: 
Fighting Seats at the General Election, 6/4/1981, Box 20, Rodgers Archive). Rodgers, too, was firmly of 
the belief that the SDP-Liberal ‘Alliance’ would only be electorally effective if discord between the parties 
was minimalized (Rodgers to Thomas 21/9/1981, Box 4, Rodgers Archive). Key to the development of his 
position was intra-party power politics within the ‘Gang of Four’. Rodgers was a longstanding ally of Jenkins, 
and the growing intensity of their political relationship correlated with an increasing belief in the Alliance, 
not least his personal championing of the Alliance nomenclature to reinforce the impression of unity beyond 
a transactional coalition (Jenkins, 1991: 567; Rodgers to Thomas, 21/9/1981, Box 4, Rodgers Archive). 
 
The period between the SDP’s creation and June 1981 was significant, in that the agreement between the 
parties crossed the rubicon from furtive negotiation to reality. This was both in electoral and policy terms: 
Roy Jenkins was chosen to fight the first available by-election in Warrington under a joint banner, and the 
two parties agreed a shared policy document. Yet this period, within the leadership of the SDP, was also 
characterised by a fear of strategic drift. Owen believed this was Jenkins intention, allowing the party to be 
easily moulded to suit an agenda of ramped up co-operation. It was, also, something he attempted to pre-
empt – three days before the party’s launch he called for a meeting as he worried ‘how little time we four 
have for what I would call strategic thinking’ Owen to Jenkins, Rodgers, Williams, 23/3/1981, Box 2, 
Rodgers Archive). Meanwhile, Jenkins was publicly calling for a ‘Partnership of Principle’ – a phrase that 
would become well-worn within the Alliance for years to come – five days after the launch of the party (The 
Times, 1/4/1981: 2). 
 
Owen had led the process of co-operation between dissident social democrats and Liberals in the Commons 
with some success, but it sharpened his antipathy to close electoral relations. Owen was clearly hopeful that 
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a constructive but detached approach in parliament would set a precedent for wider political activity. A 
weekly ‘consultative committee’ was conducted solely between Steel, Owen and the whip operations, but 
Owen was keen to stress the arrangement was transactional and that the Liberals ‘could never be relied 
upon to maintain confidences, and members of the Committee were asked to bear this very much in mind 
in any discussions with them’ (Steering Committee, 2/3/1981, S5(81), Box 2, SDP Archives). Owen was 
anxious the two parties be treated independently and, in June, wrote to the Speaker to point out that ‘our 
parties stem from different traditions and have their own identities’ and that, while he was ‘neither a 
historian nor a constitutional lawyer … what has made parliament, and the House of Commons in 
particular, such a great institution has been its ability to adapt to changed political circumstances’ (Owen to 
Speaker, 29/6/1981, File (b) CSD/SDP Parliamentary Committee, Box 14, SDP Archives).  
 
Owen was fearful that the practical effect of making ad hoc decisions about the party’s relationship would 
mean a drift towards unification, the result of institutional assumptions and Jenkins’ tactical interests. 
Jenkins’ (1991: 535) memoirs note that, following the Limehouse Declaration, ‘our course became more 
the product of the strong currents of public opinion running in the open sea than of over-prolonged 
harbour conferences’. Opinion polling provided momentum for the belief a pact would be advantageous, 
but initial polling also showed the electoral strength of any Alliance would be predominantly provided by 
the SDP. During a lunch with Rupert Murdoch six days before their official launch, Hugo Young noted 
that ‘they keep saying they are the major partner: that no one is joining the Liberals now, all are joining 
them’ and that ‘Shirley and David insist they are not centre. They are democratic socialists. But there is 
clearly tension here’ (Young (Murdoch Lunch for Gang of Four), 2007: 20/3/1981, 161-2). Inter-party 
politics was driving discussion of the party’s purpose, and there was no clear consensus. So, for Jenkins and 
Steel’s project to be a success, there was still a need for some strategic planning – if not Jenkins’ harbour 
conference, some movement at the helm to precipitate and entrench co-operation. Jenkins arranged a 
dinner on 5 March between Steel and Williams with ‘the mood of a nervous duenna who hoped that the 
young people would get on well together’ (Jenkins, 1991: 545).  
 
In early April (before the ‘5 to 6 hour’ meeting Owen had arranged for Sunday 12 April to discuss strategy) 
Rodgers and Williams went to the Königswinter Anglo-German conference in the Rhine Valley (Owen to 
Rodgers, 20/3/1981, Box 3 Rodgers, SDP Archives). Among other attendees were David Steel and Richard 
Holme, then Liberal Party President. It was there that Williams and Rodgers, with Jenkins and Owen absent, 
agreed the ‘Königswinter compact’ – which committed the SDP to sharing candidates in any oncoming by-
elections, a document outlining broad agreement on principles, and a Joint Policy Commissions on major 
issues. The event was given an air of impromptu inter-party diplomacy by the fact it was worked out on a 
paper napkin, then written up on ‘a lined piece of greenish paper that looked like it had been ripped off an 
office ledger’ (Holme, 1998: 12). John Campbell (2015: 572) argues that Steel had ‘played them very 
skilfully’, yet both had been aware that Steel had pre-empted the opportunity – Rodgers (1998: 10) noting 
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that ‘with typical sense of occasion, he had even tried to hire a motor launch to ensure publicity for the 
event’. But this was a genuine negotiation, and Holme was surprised the consensus was reached so easily.  
 
Jenkins (1991: 545) made an active decision to be at one remove from this process because he ‘wanted the 
links between the two parties to become more organic and less dependent upon me as the sole hinge’. 
Rodgers (2000: 219) ‘returned to London well pleased, believing our agreement was totally consistent with 
previous understandings’; Williams (2009: 284) left the conference ‘feeling pleased with what we had 
accomplished’. It showed a clear and fast-developing disconnect between Owen (1991: 505), who believed 
that Königswinter meant ‘a trend had been set in motion that was impossible to reverse’, and Rodgers 
(2000: 219), who felt the agreement was ‘totally consistent with what we had said at the launch of the party’. 
Williams and Rodgers clearly did not anticipate the levels of objection within the SDP – most vociferously 
within the party’s Steering Committee – that did take place. All thirteen dissident Labour MPs that left 
Labour in March 1981 (along with a sole Conservative, Chris Brockelbank-Fowler) and the twenty-seven 
that joined by the time seat negotiations with the Liberal Party were completed in October 1982, were sure 
of what they were escaping. It is fair to say that there was no fixed idea on what, exactly, they were joining. 
None had, unsurprisingly, been part of the vocal opposition, led by the Tribune Group, to the Lib-Lab 
Pact. They were far more likely than the average Labour MP, if they had been in parliament, to vote in 
favour of Proportional Representation for the European Parliament, a bill inherently intertwined with the 
pact’s continuation.22 Others such as Tom McNally and, among the Gang of Four, Bill Rodgers had aided 
and supported the process of the Lib-Lab Pact’s creation, and saw it as a successful experiment in multi-
party politics. But the makeshift nature of the party at this stage meant there had been little discussion on 
co-operation, beyond that of Jenkins and his inner circle. On 6 April, as the conference in the Rhine Valley 
was taking place, Mike Thomas was circulating a memorandum among the SDP parliamentary party urging 
a slow timetable for any co-operation with the Liberal party (reproduced in Owen, 1991: 508; Thomas, 
Interview, 2016). 
 
The joint meeting of the Steering and Parliamentary group called following Königswinter was rancorous 
(Aitken, The Guardian, 8/4/1981: 22). Roughly half the SDP MPs opposed the agreement, due to the 
perceived negative effect it would have on the SDP’s electoral popularity and membership growth (Joint 
Meeting of Parliamentary Committee and Steering Committee, 7/4/1981, Box 1 S12(81), SDP Archive). 
In discussion Shirley Williams particularly noted a regional divide, with those representing in Northern 
working class constituencies viewing the identity of the Liberal Party as problematic. Ian Wrigglesworth 
argued there was considerably stronger support for the SDP than the Liberals, and that ‘the public perceived 
the Liberals loaded down with all their historical baggage as representing failure’. Robert Maclennan, one 
of the first MPs to support Jenkins in creating the SDP, argued that ‘institutional co-operation’ would create 
problems of ‘image perception’ at this stage. Edward Lyons ‘felt we were in bed with the Liberals far too 																																																								
22 Only two of the eventual 27 defecting Labour MPs had voted against the legislation 
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early and this could damage recruitment’. Mike Thomas was concerned about ‘public perceptions’, 
reiterated the ‘general perception of the Liberals as weak, associated with failure’ and felt ‘there should be 
no statement for some months and electoral arrangements should not be discussed for 12-18 months’. The 
Times reported that some of the former Labour MPs, after reflecting on past fights with Liberals, ‘wish to 
go slower, or, as one source put it, ‘up the price" (The Times, 8/4/1981: 2). There was also support for the 
actions of Williams and Rodgers: Richard Crawshaw expressed a belief that ‘working together in alliance 
with the Liberals was what characterised recent developments’ and was ‘how the sterile pattern of politics 
would be altered’; Tom Ellis, David Marquand, Tom Bradley and Neville Sanderson all focused on their 
belief an agreement should be made to encourage David Steel, and that any national agreement would have 
a positive knock-on effect on assuaging troublesome Liberal local associations. (Joint Meeting of 
Parliamentary Committee and Steering Committee, 7/4/1981, Box 1 S12(81), SDP Archive). 
 
The Gang of Four took on board the feelings of this meeting, and its reporting was a short-term setback 
for the concept of the alliance that, in Owen’s view, allowed for a few weeks of productive organisational 
capacity as talks were put on hold. For Owen, countering the mounting momentum of a comprehensive 
pact meant supporting decisions that undermined the logic of inevitable closer inter-party arrangements. 
These discussions took place on the party’s constitution, including the banning of joint-membership of the 
two parties. Discussions also began about the way in which the leader would be selected – Owen’s 
(ultimately faulty) assumption being that Jenkins would suffer, rather than benefit, among the party’s wider 
membership from being intrinsically associated with the pact (Crewe and King, 1995: 158-60). Williams 
(2009: 286-7) felt the meetings following Königswinter signalled that ‘the days of the Gang of Four acting 
autonomously were over’. Yet, at least in retrospect, it appeared to have little long-term effect. Rodgers 
called the meeting, ostensibly, to resolve the level of disagreement and agree a strategy on electoral strategy. 
No vote was taken by the parliamentary party and, when it was agreed and slightly amended by the SDP 
Steering Committee less than a month later, it was presented as a fait accompli: Owen made pointed mention 
that already ‘in all public speaking the leadership of the SDP was recognising some form of electoral 
arrangement with the Liberals for the next general election’ (Steering Committee Minutes, 5/5/1981, 
S15(81), Box 1, SDP Archives).  
 
David Steel’s main wish was for an agreement to put to his party’s annual conference in September. This 
was achieved by mid-June, with negotiations that first met on 19 May, a week after widespread local elections 
and close to 400 gains for the Liberal Party. What these negotiations ultimately produced was a joint policy 
document, A Fresh Start for Britain. The SDP’s party committees held little sway over the drafting of the joint 
policy statement. David Marquand – the only member of the Steering or Parliamentary Committee, after 
Königswinter, to explicitly refer to the importance of Steel’s conference commitment in key committee 
meetings – was the SDP key drafter of the agreement, working in conjunction with the Liberal Richard 
Holme. Importantly it was Williams who had led these negotiations and, in pictures splashed across 
	 158	
newspaper front pages, she and Steel were compared to ‘superannuated student lovers’ (Stephenson, 1983: 
51). In content and policy terms, Williams again claimed to be surprised by the level of agreement. The 
historian Mark Peel (2009: 163) argued it was a step away from social democratic principles but it is hard to 
say, exactly, one policy area specifically could be said to run counter to the Limehouse Declaration or the 
more substantial ‘Twelve Tasks for Social Democrats’ which was announced at the party’s launch and, too, 
placed ‘a reformed and liberated electoral system’ at the top its list of policy priorities (12 points for Social 
Democrats, 9/3/1981, S6(81) SDP Archive). 
 
It is notable that the period from the SDP’s creation to A Fresh Start for Britain was one of relative dissent 
in SDP, rather than Liberal, ranks. The Liberal negotiation team – David Steel, Stephen Ross MP, Richard 
Holme and Roger Pincham – were all supporters of a pact, and there was no clear dissent about the 
formation of this group (LPA 1/10, NEC Minutes 15/5/1981). Indeed, the fact of the negotiations was 
reported on by Steel in an appearance at the party’s National Executive Committee, rather than any 
consultation on whether they should have taken place. A Times (17/6/1981: 15) editorial recorded that ‘Mr 
Steel's handling of his party at national level has been consistently impressive; the tide is running strongly in 
favour of an alliance among Liberals these days’. In the first test of Liberal support, at the Scottish Liberal 
Party conference, the pact was strongly endorsed by delegates (The Guardian, 30/3/1981: 3). In part, this 
chimes with a general conception of the Liberal Party: problems that did arise were localised and election 
centred, principally around the party’s constitution and the autonomy of local associations to select 
candidates. Terms of agreement on policy priorities – electoral reform, devolution, co-partnership in 
industry, and environmental policy – were not difficult to achieve. 
 
Instantly gratifying local election results helped Steel’s cause, as did some positive results for independent 
social democrats against Liberals that reaffirmed the possibility both that an agreement would be additive 
electorally, but the electoral landscape could be subtractive for Liberals without one. There was subsequent 
public agreement between the SDP’s Bill Rodgers and the Liberal David Penhaligon that the two parties 
needed to ‘get together, shake up and make a deal’ as soon as feasible (ITV Local Elections, 7/5/1981). 
Consistently, around 40% of those polled in the period from mid-May to mid-June said they would back a 
joint-party initiative, against 30% for the two parties separately (The Economist 23/5/1981: 35). Polls were 
also showing, as Steel reluctantly noted in a meeting of the Liberal Party Council prior to negotiations 
commencing, that SDP support was receding slightly and had dropped below that of the Liberal party. But 
Steel continued to emphasise the compatibility of the parties’ support geographically, and the image benefits 
of co-operation. The key danger for Steel was that his party would begin to be more demanding: The 
Economist (5/6/1981: 30) described the Liberals ‘becoming uppish in its approach to the prospective 
nuptials’, and foresaw Liberal associations in more winnable areas in south and west England closing ranks. 
 
June-September 1981: from Warrington to Llandudno, via Croydon 
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The conventional narrative of most of the key elite actors places the first by-election fought in tandem, Roy 
Jenkins’ narrow defeat in Warrington in July 1981, at the centre of the Alliance’s creation. Jenkins (1991: 
543) argued that ‘the Alliance was made upon the grounds of Warrington’, and Steel’s aide Jeremy Josephs 
(1983: 37) argues it acted as ‘the greatest catalyst for the subsequent formation of the Liberal-SDP Alliance’. 
To take this literally would be to dilute the importance of earlier, formative steps – confusing the public 
blossoming of the pact with the roots dug by Steel and Jenkins, and the branches of the Königswinter 
process and the policy agreement. The assumption among the Gang of Four was that either Jenkins, 
Williams or possibly David Marquand would fight the seat as a joint SDP-Liberal candidate (Campbell, 
2015: 574; Crewe and King, 1995: 150-2). The Guardian’s Simon Hoggart had forecasted acute Liberal anger 
16 months earlier, if they saw a by-election ‘handed over to a carpetbagger with a conscience like Mr Jenkins’ 
(a view shared by David Marquand (Young (Marquand), 2007: 3/6/1980, 145)). Campaigning in tandem 
certainly advanced inter-party relations. But that co-operation took place at all is a useful snapshot of the 
extent to which Jenkins had already ingratiated himself with the Liberal membership.  
 
Writing to Steel, the Liberal’s regional chair explained her enthusiasm for Jenkins as born from his vigour 
and persuasiveness ‘which cut a swathe through any Liberal doubts’ (Josephs, 1983: 54). It perhaps helped 
that the seat was electorally problematic for the burgeoning alliance: there was a small Liberal vote in 1979, 
and it was solid Labour territory. Steel had already managed to prime his party to accede to a prominent 
Social Democrat, far from a given for a party whose by-election triumphs had so often been a key driver of 
their electoral fortunes. Before the SDP’s launch Jenkins had privately considered it ‘silly’ for either he or 
Shirley Williams to run in a seat that would be subsequently lost at a future general election, while Rodgers 
had said they would not feel the need to contest every possible by-election ((Young (Murdoch Lunch for 
Gang of Four), 2007: 20/3/1981, 161-2). The reversal of this stance, by the leadership and the SDP Steering 
Committee, did have an impact on inter-party relations. David Owen points to several crossroads where his 
party took the wrong route to stronger Liberal integration. But his counter-factual analysis sees the fact that 
Shirley Williams rejected the chance to run as crucial: Owen feels Williams would have won the by-election 
through a ‘predominantly SDP campaign’, and the party would subsequently have been able to ‘negotiate a 
far better seat deal with the Liberals than the miserable one we ended up with’ (Owen, 1991: 520).  
 
This reading is predicated on two false beliefs. Firstly, that Williams did not already feel a strong political 
commitment to an alliance. And, secondly, that the by-election could have been fought with noticeably less 
emphasis on co-operation. The formation and entrenchment of pre-existing co-operation pre-Warrington 
may have been underplayed, but the fighting of the Warrington by-election certainly boosted the 
development of relations between the parties. Retrospective and contemporary accounts describe the 
campaign starting cold, but enlivening as relations between the two parties on the ground gathered 
momentum (The Times, 6/7/1981: 2; Williams, 2008: 288-9). Remaining scepticism among Liberal MPs 
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softened: Jo Grimond went to Warrington uncertain but ‘found himself quite impressed’, with Jenkins 
believing it was the first time he could envisage the Alliance as something akin to his conception of 
realignment (Barberis, 2005: 186; Jenkins, 1991: 543). Clement Freud’s suggestion that the Liberal central 
by-election fund should be spent in Warrington had been rebuffed prior to the campaign; in future by-
election organisation became increasingly integrated, and former Liberal MP Paul Tyler had moved into 
SDP headquarters by the campaign’s conclusion (Interview, 2016, Tyler; Steel, The Times, 1/7/1981: 18). 
Jenkins reinforced this sentiment, arguing that ‘the reality is even more important than any document, and 
it has been sealed in practice here’, while Steel made overt note of the fact Jenkins had used the pronoun 
‘we’ in his post-count speech to demonstrate the level of unity between the two parties (Johnson, The 
Guardian, 18/7/1981: 1). Polls the week before the vote had seen Jenkins trail the Labour candidate by 30%, 
with support coming mainly from disgruntled Conservatives (The Economist, 11/7/1981: 22). In the end, the 
SDP cut into both parties almost equally, interpreted as showing that the SDP could thrive where Liberal 
support had long been stagnant. 
 
Given the poll was a boost during a period of relative decline in the SDP’s polling numbers, vis-à-vis the 
Liberals, it was noticeable that the SDP’s leadership made no effort to gain bargaining advantage from the 
widely-held perception that only SDP candidates would be able to achieve such a result. Indeed Williams, 
Rodgers and Jenkins sought to aid Steel in his efforts to dampen intra-party difficulties in the run-up to the 
vote on the pact that was to be held at the Liberal’s conference in Llandudno, in September 1981. Though 
there was a strong belief among both the SDP and Liberal membership that the next by-election to be 
fought, Croydon North West, should be fought by Shirley Williams, Steel found it impossible to get the 
prospective Liberal candidate, William Pitt, to stand down. (Steel, Interview, 2016; Tyler, Interview, 2016). 
This defeat illustrated Steel’s long-term success, and the extent intra-party battles had been driven principally 
by an ability to cajole and persuade his party. A joint committee to select a candidate was mooted, and was 
highly likely to support Williams’ candidacy, but Owen leaned on the local SDP party to reject the idea as 
damaging the SDP’s independence (Owen,1991: 522-23). To Owen’s frustration, the SDP and the Steering 
Committee – due to ‘a change in the party’s perception’ he felt resulting from Warrington – decided to 
support the Liberal candidate (Ibid.: 523).  
 
The SDP’s Steering Committee had, in early May, endorsed their leadership attending a fringe meeting of 
the Liberal conference, though Owen’s language in objecting during the meeting gave off ‘a whiff of caucus 
politics’ that Jenkins found ‘repugnant’ (Steering Committee Minutes, 27/5/81, S18(81), Box 1, SDP 
Archives; Jenkins, 1991: 58). Jenkins claims not to have expected or co-ordinated the raptuous reception 
that he and Williams received, or the front page splash on almost all the broadsheet newspapers the next 
day. Owen feels his decision not to attend had been ‘subconscious’, arising from a fear of being ‘sucked into 
an Alliance with a big a rather than a small ‘a” (Owen, 1991: 525). What was billed as a fringe event instead 
dominated the conference. Certainly, while a victory for Steel had been expected, the levels of enthusiasm 
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caught pundits by surprise –surveys by Liberal organisers found the debate around the Alliance was by far 
the most popular, and well received, event of the conference (‘1981 Conference Survey’, LPA 8/50). Steel, 
Jenkins and Williams were joined by Jo Grimond, who spoke passionately without notes, and implored the 
party to ‘seize the chance’ rather than getting ‘bogged down in the niceties of innumerable policies’ (Barberis, 
2005: 182; Jenkins, 1991: 546-7). The endorsement of the pact was overwhelming – of 1600 delegates, just 
112 voted against (though multiple historical records note the result as 1600 to 112, forgetting the number 
of senior Liberals who were against the pact, but abstained) (Meadowcroft, 2016, Interview). In case the 
rebellious nature of the Liberal Assembly, and the scale of Steel’s achievement, was in danger of being 
forgotten, the party membership defeated the leadership on the issue of nuclear weapons. This policy 
rebellion, foreshadowing the key rupture within the Liberal-SDP Alliance, was led on the floor of the 
conference by the Liberal Party’s prospective candidate for Yeovil, Paddy Ashdown. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Institutional Constraints 
 
The SDP is remembered as a failure, a parable for the dangers of trying to effect party system change in 
Britain. Any defence made by its key figures principally rests on the idea it acted as a progenitor for New 
Labour, rather than any direct effect on the party system (Williams, 1995; Bush, 2016). Crewe and King 
(1995: 556) argued that: 
 
It is a measure of the British party system's resilience, and of the power of the first past 
the post electoral system that the most serious challenge to the system in half a century 
ended in such failure, making no discernible impact. 
But revisiting and tracing the SDP-Liberal alliance during its electoral peak, when co-operation was in its 
formative period, is instructive. In isolation, this flashpoint of co-operation between the parties could be 
an indication of the party system’s fragility rather than its durability. The electoral underpinnings of the 
two-party system no longer felt secure. And dealignment was thought to have created plausible conditions 
for realignment: while intra-party discontent within Labour may have caused the splinter, an electorate 
more volatile and with weaker allegiance to the two main parties made it possible (Crewe, 1982; Denver, 
1983). It was not seen as self-evident that the mechanisms of first past the post could not be overridden. 
Evidence of electoral demand, principally through opinion polling, was a key factor in driving those within 
the Labour Party to consider splintering (Interview, Cartwright, 2016; Interview, Thomas, 2016). What was 
dubbed the ‘Heineken Effect’ (Owen, 1991: 536) – where the Alliance parties, through collaboration, could 
reach voters other parties could not reach – was borne out by polls repeatedly showing that support for the 
Liberal-SDP Alliance was consistently higher, by one or two percentage points, than the combined support 
for the Liberals and SDP (Crewe, 1982). The promise of these figures was seen at the time to ‘underlie the 
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decision of the Liberal council and the SDP steering committee to suppress some of their doubts about the 
negotiations’ (Watt, The Times, 22/51981: 7). By-election successes were therefore seen as key, providing 
evidence of support that fuelled the idea of a clear demand for party system change. The pact between the 
two parties, at least in these formative months, could therefore be described as ‘super additive’ (Kaminski, 
2001) – not only providing a crutch to get around problems of demography and geography, but also 
mutually enhancing the overall popularity of both parties through the act of coalition.  
Shirley Williams’ brave argument to Rupert Murdoch when pitching for his support was that ‘younger 
people, in and out, see the need for change: they are thirsting for an end to the two-party system’ (Young 
(Murdoch Lunch for Gang of Four), 2007: 20/3/1981, 161-2). If this was ultimately an overstated 
enthusiasm, it was something the Conservatives feared. Michael Ancram, then a Conservative MP, argued 
the SDP was caused by ‘a resentment of the electorate at the two party slanging match’. Conservatives 
needed to be careful a ‘belief in the two party system’ blinded them to the real threat of tactical voting that 
could entrench the SDP-Liberal Alliance (Ancram: Memorandum, 19/81/1981, MS Thatcher 2/6/2/150). 
Thatcher and her advisors, dismissive of the Lib-Lab Pact’s potential to redefine party politics, demanded 
a strategy on the SDP. A new party was seen as the cumulative result of the fact that, ‘over the past decade 
there have been unmistakeable signs of dissatisfaction, as shown by protest votes, abstentions and 
weakening party allegiances’.  
 
However, this was both a cause for optimism and a key weakness. Evidence showed the Alliance’s principal 
weakness was the low partisanship of their voters, and their dependence upon the weaknesses of the two 
larger parties: the surge for the two parties was defined by the fortunes of their larger competitors. 
Thatcher’s advisor Alfred Sherman argued ‘the deep differences between them could be made to turn the 
plus sign into a minus one’, and that the SDP needed to be flushed out: they could not be neither left nor 
right (Sherman, The SDP-Liberal Alliance: towards a strategy’, 13/11/1981, Thatcher MSS 2/6/2/153).  
Questions about how co-operation would function in practice – particularly the concept of dual leadership 
and who was ‘Prime Minister Designate’ – dogged the two parties (Butler and Kavanagh, 1983: 76-77; 
Butler and Kavanagh, 1987: 270). But contra the hypothesis that the assumptions of British politics made 
co-operation more difficult, it pushed the two parties closer together. As the Alliance gathered pace 
following its first by-election victory, Steel argued to Hugo Young that Liberals had ‘learned in 1950-51, or 
rather from that period, when they consistently split down the middle about giving or withholding support’ 
for either Attlee’s government, or Churchill’s opposition (Young (Steel), 2007: 25/3/1982, 180). The key 
difficulty, Steel argued, was learning ‘how to live when there are only two lobbies to go into’. His key lesson 
was that close co-operation was necessary, as the two parties could not be seen to be working at cross-
purposes. Bill Rodgers argued that ‘the evidence is overwhelming that the electorate doesn’t like rows, our 
two parties must appear to be more united than either the Labour or Tory parties.  
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How much can be gleaned about the operation of inter-party co-operation in British politics from an 
example that could be seen as sui generis – between two parties, neither of whom were one of the two largest 
–  is moot. However, the size of the parties, and the idea that advantage in negotiations was dictated by 
perceived size and being the ‘senior partner’, was a key factor that frustrated advocates of close co-
operation. It was a key part of the early strategy of the SDP – Hugo Young (op. cit.) noted that ‘they keep 
saying they are the major partner: that no one is joining the Liberals now, all are joining them’. This was an 
urgency encouraged by advocates of a close working arrangement but opposed by those who felt, as Owen 
did, that the SDP should ‘remember the whole situation is a political bargaining situation’ (Joint 
Parliamentary Committee/Steering Committee Meeting’ 7/4/1981, Box 1). To that end, the argument 
went, they should first firmly establish themselves as an independent national force of superior electoral 
strength to the Liberal Party (Owen, 1991: 516-518).23  
 
Party-Facing Constraints  
 
How a newly created fourth party with ambitions of high office should operate within Britain’s electoral 
landscape was unclear. What a third party’s collective emotional response should be, let alone any practical 
manoeuvres, was equally uncertain. Clement Freud, the Liberal MP, described his reaction to the SDP’ 
creation as ‘a dichotomy between ambition and pride. They further my ambition, they obviously dent my 
pride’ (Clement Freud on SDP’, 27/3/1981, LBC/IRN Archive). The Liberal Party Council’s first move 
following the public pronouncements of their leader and his prospective partners was both to reaffirm its 
‘independence and unique radical philosophy’, while also sanctioning Steel to privately negotiate. The rise 
of the SDP provided two conflicting sensations. Success and momentum were intoxicating, changing the 
mind-set of key figures initially sceptical of the merits of embracing the SDP. But it also undermined and 
swept away the party’s ‘community politics’ approach which had, since its 1970 conference in Eastbourne, 
meant a commitment to ‘a dual approach to politics, acting both inside and outside the institutions of the 
political establishment’.  The SDP surge was inherently ‘top-down’ and Westminster-led, and powerful 
enough to partially dilute the importance of Liberal electoral footholds (Pridham and Whiteley, 1986). 
 
In early 1980 Bill Rodgers epitomised the broad feeling among prospective Social Democrats of the Liberal 
party by noting his  
 
… great respect for David Steel, who might be more concerned with a major realignment of 
politics than his own party’s precise position in it. But that is far from true of all of his 
colleagues and the Liberal party has its own sentimental and institutional ties. (Rodgers to 
Jenkins, 3/1/1980, Box 2, Rodgers Archive) 																																																								
23  Ian Wrigglesworth argued it was ‘Nonsense to enter a deal when we are weaker but have the potential to be 
stronger’ Joint meeting of Parliamentary and Steering Committee, 7 April 1981 
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The institutional and personal memories of the Lib-Lab Pact, which had concluded a little over three years 
before SDP-Liberal co-operation was ratified, remained raw. They were certainly a factor for both 
opponents and advocates of co-operation within the Liberal Party. Liberals who had been at the apex of 
decision-making during the pact. These included David Steel of course – who, his biographer says, 
produced his account of the Lib-Lab Pact in 1980 with ‘strategic timing’ (Torrance, 2012; 213). But others 
such as Chief Whip Alan Beith (1983) believed in the positive restraining power of the Liberals, and felt 
the medium-term effect had been an enhancement of the party’s electoral standing. Steel also felt any 
strategy based on the inherent benefits of co-operation would have to be fought over two electoral cycles, 
at least (Joseph, 1983: 53). This meant bruised memories Liberals had of the Lib-Lab Pact were also real. 
Kirkup (2012: 13) argues that ‘the pact had no discernible impact on the creation of the SDP or the 
subsequent SDP-Liberal Alliance’. But the Liberals’ experience had clearly acted to firm up opposition to 
any inter-party co-operation among some prominent figures within the Liberal Party. Michael Meadowcroft 
(1998: 13), an ardent critic of the pact, felt that ‘to a larger extent than is often realised, one’s perception of 
the potential and the frustration of the Alliance years is coloured by one’s experience of previous 
opportunities and failures’. The principal failure, Meadowcroft (2016, Interview) felt, had been Steel’s 
inability to extract significant enough concessions from the Labour Party. Tony Greaves, the Secretary and 
driving influence of the consistently anti-Alliance Association of Liberal Councillors (ALC) and ultimately 
the only platform speaker against the pact in September 1981, felt ‘in the Lib-Lab Pact we gave everything, 
and got nothing’ (Slade, 2004: 32).  
 
But shepherding disparate internal party groups was a significant task for a leader armed only with tools of 
persuasion and the same legitimacy as leader that had underlined his progress towards the Lib-Lab 
agreement. Steel held an attitude he neatly summarised as: ‘you make the bullets and I’ll fire them, but don’t 
expect me to come to the executive or the council or the policy committee’ (Brack, James and Steel, 2015: 
442). But he did have to go to many more meetings of the Liberal Party Council than he may have liked in 
this period. Steel’s open position as a political entrepreneur, and his belief parties and electorates could be 
dragged towards realignment through inter-party decision-making, had not wavered following the Lib-Lab 
Pact. Sceptical SDP MPs felt that Steel was bouncing their party into an agreement but were also all aware, 
while expressing wildly differing levels of sympathy, of the difficulties Steel had in carrying his party with 
him as the finer elements of the pact were finalised.24 Steel (Interview, 2016) feels that, ultimately, ‘whatever 
the grumblings were in the Party Council or in the columns of Liberal News, the fact was that the party was 
always very supportive – overwhelmingly so’.  
 
																																																								
24 David Marquand felt Steel ‘needed some indication the SDs were willing’ and Tom Bradley felt Steel ‘should be 
given some encouragement’; Robert Maclennan felt that ‘SDs did not have to accept Steel’s interpretation of what 
he needs’ Joint meeting of Parliamentary and Steering Committee, 7 April 1981 
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Any splits in the SDP from its creation to October 1982, and the finalisation of the nationwide constituency 
agreement with the Liberals, were related to differing emphasis in tactics and strategy. Given the crux of 
the relationship with the Liberals was about symbolism, positioning and the ordering of rational political 
goals, rather than matters of direct policy and ideology dispute, it made sense as the centre point of intra-
party contention. Discussion of the Liberal Party quickly developed into a Jenkinsite/Anti-Jenkinsite split. 
This is a more loose, binary distinction in the analysis of the SDP’s inter-party relations than the three-way 
divide Crewe and King (1995: 125-27) cautiously offered on the party’s core conception and purpose. They 
distinguished between ‘centrists’, who advocated Jenkins’ conception of ‘Butskellite’ political consensus; 
‘radical idealists’, a hawkish social democracy to which Owen’s faction subscribed; and those advocating a 
‘Mark II Labour Party’, essentially revisionist Gaitskellites – a camp occupied by Williams and Jenkins, with 
both leaning towards support for Owen’s radicalism. But the most immediate strategic decision upon the 
party’s creation was on the nature of any SDP-Liberal relationship. Ultimately it was Jenkins’ (and David 
Steel’s) belief, that the two parties should begin integration as fast as was feasible that clearly captured the 
support of the Rodgers and Williams in those early months and, with them, the party’s Steering Committee 
and a more reluctant parliamentary party. 
 
The SDP and the Liberal Party have often been contrasted. MacIver (1996: 24), for example, argued that 
the SDP was ‘an elitist patrician (party) in which the strategic and the more important tactical decisions 
were usually taken at the centre’. Contemporary accounts, such as those of Steel’s political advisor Jeremy 
Joseph (1983: 56), cited David Owen’s frustrated demand that Steel wrest control over regional negotiations 
over seats as revealing a ‘profound ignorance about the fiercely autonomous and independent nature of a 
local Liberal association’. Yet these differences are seemingly overstated: all of Steel’s inter-party objectives 
were ultimately achieved. While some concerns were raised about the autonomy Steel’s faction held in 
relation to the Parliamentary Liberal Party, these surfaced principally following the 1983 election (Cole, 
2012). It would be hard to argue there were not significant problems caused by the Liberal Party in the deal 
the parties made over constituencies. Steel had to constantly wrestle with his party, particularly sections of 
his party that he had never loved and whose patience had been frayed by the ultimately minimal political 
success of the Lib-Lab pact.  
 
That look of political tranquillity and party discipline was hard earned, and the level of personal and political 
agency that Steel put into assuaging concerns about a pact should not be underestimated. Michael Steed 
argued in 1982 that, in the status given to individual MPs for winning elections, many regarded as personal 
victories and fiefdoms, the party did, haphazardly, reflect ‘its tradition as a parliamentary party with British 
political habits’ (Steed, 1983: 74). Steel and his key allies and (slightly detached) faction at the top of the 
party – particularly Party President and key Steel advisor Richard Holme, vice-chair of the Standing 
Committee William Wallace and the head of Steel’s private office Stuart Mole – were able to navigate each 
key element of the pact, and progress with the long term strategy Steel envisaged. At times this involved a 
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reassertion of central power, and Steel threatened not to give help from the centre to candidates or 
associations who pushed against co-operation (Steel, Daily Telegraph, 14/9/1981: 12). He was almost 
comprehensively successful in securing the support of his parliamentary party for these ideas and, by 
September 1981 the party’s overwhelming ratification of the pact at their 1981 conference was a ‘triumphant 
culmination of David Steel’s skilful matchmaking over the previous eighteen months’ (Crewe and King, 
1995: 177-78). 
 
Roy Jenkins and David Steel: Disrupting the ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
 
A Scotsman editorial during the early months of the SDP suggested that:  
 
David Steel is in a curious position these days. Instead of trying, sometimes desperately, 
to make things happen they are happening all around him. He is at the still point of a 
turning world. (quoted in Steel, 1989: 185) 
 
However, this perception of serenity was hard-won. Steel consistently used the concept of co-operation as 
a performative strategy, developing the Liberal identity in light of the shifting make-up of party politics. 
While this maddened radical Liberals concerned with the party’s independence, it was an archetypal active, 
strategic heresthetical manoeuvre. It was a clear attempt to reshape the Liberal position to improve its 
chances of success; enhancing the party’s electoral strength through reshuffling the party system and 
increasing the dimensionality of party politics from a two-and-a-half to a three-party system, rather than 
any substantive rhetorical or policy change. This preoccupation with the machinations of inter-party politics 
as a signalling device, and changing the formal institutions of British politics, offers a classic example of 
hersethetic manipulation. William Riker (1981) argued that heresthetics acted as a challenge to conventional 
rational choice theory, by pointing out how political choices can be defined by creative leadership strategies. 
The long-term political fate of the Alliance disguises the fact that the intra-party heresthetic strategies both 
leaders used to form the Alliance in the early period of its existence were a clear success in defining the 
terms in which inter-party politics was discussed. 
 
Steel was aware the Liberals had not achieved the plausibility as an office-seeking party he had tried to 
achieve from the Lib-Lab Pact. ‘Breaking the mould’ through a strengthening of the ‘radical centre’ was a 
different method of achieving this result. The forging of formal co-operation allowed the Liberal Party to 
surf the SDP wave. Instead of the drift that could have followed the party’s survival after 1979, co-operation 
gave Steel and his party renewed electoral direction. Steel also crucially formed and framed a clear intra-
party choice, so those within Steel’s party ultimately had little alternative than acquiescence to the Alliance 
strategy. In analyses of the formation and fate of the Alliance, the role of the Liberal Party is often viewed 
as inevitable. This has meant Steel’s role in the early months of the SDP has been overlooked.  
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The principal area of doubt surrounding the efficacy of Steel’s strategy was the change it affected on those 
within the Labour Party prior to the SDP’s creation. If Steel was structuring the political alternatives for 
the social democrats within the Labour Party to make splintering more attractive, it was not clear at all that 
they noticed. The rational calculus of those defecting from Labour was internal to the Labour Party and 
had little to do with Liberal positioning as potential electoral partners. This ambiguity was helpful to Jenkins. 
It increased the number of MPs who defected to the SDP, many of whom were – as far as they were 
concerned – joining an explicitly social democratic party principally looking to usurp Labour on the left. 
Owen, and his political allies, felt they were sold a false prospectus. But if they had made different intra-
party strategic choices and more clearly secured the SDP’s identity in its embryonic stage of development, 
it would not have been as easily reshaped by Roy Jenkins.  
Crewe and King (1995: 159-60) explicitly link Jenkins’ prioritisation of gaining political office as quickly as 
possible, and his acute electoral realism, to his advancing age – and he strongly believed an election, assumed 
to take place in 1984, could only lead to government with a close Liberal-SDP alliance. While David Owen 
advocated a ‘bridgehead rather than a breakthrough’ strategy, with the Alliance most likely to gain office as 
a de-facto joint third party, working in combination with Labour or the Conservatives, Jenkins was adamant 
that the Alliance, in combination, could form a majority government. This is paradoxical, given Jenkins 
position was premised on electoral realism and a belief in the intrinsic value of cross-party co-operation, 
while Owen’s was not. Yet it epitomised conflicting temporal horizons and strategic priorities. The 
disagreement can be distilled by asking whether the first two stages of Crewe and King’s life cycle – the 
birth formed from a breakaway by a chunk of Labour’s social democrats, and the party’s life of (relatively) 
brief electoral prosperity and decline – were a precursor to a death by merger that was effectively 
preordained.  
 
Owen felt the party’s inter-party strategy hindered the creation of a radical policy platform. The relationship 
between the SDP and the Liberal Party sat at the nexus of his internal criticism of the party’s electoral 
direction, and his objection to the way the party’s identity developed. But for Jenkins the aim of any new 
party was very different – as were the electoral calculations. Just as he disparaged Owenite social democrats 
in 1988 for wishing to ingrain policy in the party’s constitution, so he felt any new party should downplay 
policy goals given that their electoral ambitions were, in and of themselves, radical. For Jenkins, the eventual 
fusion of the parties, into what in 1988 became the Liberal and Social Democrat Party, was a direction of 
travel that motivated the creation of the SDP. In the rancorous debate in February 1988 on whether the 
party should merge with the Liberals, Roy Jenkins conceded it was legitimate for members to ask why he 
had not, instead of creating a new party, merely joined the Liberal Party.   
 
For both Jenkins and Steel interests and ideology intermingled with the short and medium-term rational 
calculation that necessitated co-operation. David Marquand (1991) described Jenkins as ‘a mercurial half-
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Celt, given to intuitive leaps rather than plodding calculation, and swept by powerful emotions’. The 
Alliance, and the formation of close bonds between the two parties, was an attempt to increase the salience 
of a ‘new’ style of party politics that Jenkins saw as inherently. The objective was to disrupt a party system 
that undermined effective, moderate executive decision-making, while also in the short-term working within 
its constraints to achieve the votes and the office to this end. This was almost certainly, as Jeremy Thorpe 
had remarked to Jenkins in 1974, a more likely path to the premiership than through the Labour Party. But 
it also had the benefit of being the epitome of the radical, progressive, pluralistic liberalism in which he 
believed. Likewise, for Steel, there was a clear attempt not just to reposition the Liberals so they were more 
likely to win, but also to challenge a political culture – crafting and creating further demand for a party 
concerned with political reform and change. These cultural shifts Steel and Jenkins aimed for, breaking a 
two-party mould that was as ideational as it was bound up with the mechanics of the voting system, were 
not achieved. In the end, Steel remarked to Hugo Young (Torrance, 2012: 212) ‘Jenkins wants to be PM, 
or else to have changed the shape of British Politics’. This made an agreement with the Liberal Party both 
desirable, and a pre-requisite.  
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CHAPTER SIX - The Blair Ashdown Project and Lib-Lab Politics, 1992-1999 
9 April 1992 Conservative Party win a fourth general election. Result seen in part as a rejection of the 
possibility of coalition and an unstable Kinnock-led government. 
9 May 1992 Paddy Ashdown delivers his ‘Chard Speech’, signalling a change in strategic direction away 
from a policy of ‘equidistance’ between the two main parties. 
4 November 1992 Liberal Democrats vote with Conservatives on a key vote on the Maastricht Treaty, 
playing a key role in the bill’s (and, arguably, John Major’s) continuation. 
1993 
1 March 1993 John Smith delivers a speech to the constitutional reform pressure group Charter 88, calling 
for wide-reaching constitutional and political reform (though, notably, not electoral reform) 
1 December 1993 Blair and Ashdown meet for the first time to discuss strategy and the political landscape. 
1994 
21 July 1994 Blair confirmed as Labour leader. John Prescott elected Deputy Leader. 
4 September 1994 First meeting between Ashdown and Blair, with both leaders of their respective parties. 
5 September 1994 Ashdown sets up Jo Group, an informal advisory group to discuss Lib-Lab relations. 
1995 
3 May 1995 Meeting between Ashdown and Chief Whip Archy Kirkwood, and Blair and Robin Cook. 
Agreement both parties will explore areas of constitutional agreement, led by Cook and the Liberal 
Democrats’ Robert Maclennan. 
25 May 1995 Liberal Democrats’ Federal Executive endorse a party statement formally ending the party’s 
policy of ‘equidistance’ between Labour and the Conservatives. 
27 July 1995 Liberal Democrats narrowly win the Littleborough and Saddleworth by-election, a campaign 
damaging to Lib-Lab relations. 
1996 
29 October 1996 Labour and Liberal Democrats announce Cook/Maclennan talks, setting up a Joint 
Consultative Committee (JCC) to reach agreement on legislative programme of constitutional reform.  
1997 
5 March 1997 The Cook-Maclennan Agreement calls for broad constitutional reforms and a commission 
to come up with an alternative to First Past the Post.   
1 May 1997 General election, 1997: Labour win 418 seats and a majority of 179.  
23 July 1997 Joint Cabinet Committee is set up, served by the Cabinet Office and formed of 6 Labour 
ministers and 5 Liberal Democrats, to discuss constitutional affairs. 
1998 
5 November 1998 – The Jenkins Report on electoral reform is published, advocating a move towards AV+ 
as a method of election for the House of Commons. Labour distances itself from the report. 
11 November 1998 – Ashdown and Blair announce an expansion of the Joint Cabinet Committee.  
19 January 1999 – Paddy Ashdown resigns as leader of the Liberal Democrats 
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Figure 1: General Election 1992, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
 
 
Figure 2: General Election 1997, seat distribution in the House of Commons 
 
  
Party	 Seats	(%	of	total)	
Conservative	 	 336	(51.7)		
Labour	 	 271	(41.2)	
Liberal	Democrat	 	 20	(3.1)	
UUP	 	 9	(1.4)		
SDLP	 	 4	(0.6)	
Plaid	Cymru	 	 4	(0.6)	
SNP	 	 3	(0.5)	
DUP	 	 3	(0.5)	
UPUP	 	 1	(0.2)	
Party	 Seats	(%	of	total)	
Labour		 	 418	(63.4)	
Conservative	 	 165	(25)	
Liberal	Democrat	 	 46	(7)	
UUP	 	 10	(1.5)	
SNP	 	 6	(0.9)	
Plaid	Cymru	 	 4	(0.6)	
SDLP	 	 3	(0.5)	
DUP	 	 2	(0.3)	
Sinn	Féin	 	 2	(0.3)	
UK	Unionist	 	 1	(0.2)	
Independent	 	 1	(0.2)	
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‘The ultimate objective is a new political consensus of the left-of-centre … firm in its principles but capable 
of responding to changing times, so that those values may be put into practice and secure broad support 
to govern for long periods of time … To reach that consensus we must value the contribution of Lloyd 
George, Beveridge and Keynes and not just Attlee, Bevan or Crosland.’ Tony Blair, 1945 Anniversary Lecture 
(1995: 4) 
 
‘The mould is cracking. We haven’t broken it. But we are the fixed point, the fulcrum. We are ready.’ 
Paddy Ashdown, (Young, The Guardian, 11/4/1997: 21) 
 
‘I know some of you are a bit nervous about what I am doing with the Liberal Democrats. Though not 
half as nervous as they are.’ Tony Blair, Labour Party Conference, 1997 
 
Overview: Political Context and Heresthetic Strategies 
 
The negotiations conducted between Labour and the Liberal Democrats between 1994 and 1999 – 
throughout New Labour’s period in opposition, and continuing into the early period of the Labour 
government – principally hung on the dynamic between the two party leaders, Tony Blair and Paddy 
Ashdown. Blair and Ashdown first met to discuss their parties’ strategic direction in 1993, while Tony Blair 
was Shadow Home Secretary. Ashdown Chard Speech, following the 1992 general election, had called 
specifically for anti-Conservative co-operation, though had rejected the idea of an electoral pact with 
another party (Brack, 2016; Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005: 36-40). As this Tony Blair was impatient with 
John Smith’s style of opposition, and agitation for Lib-Lab co-operation provided an outlet for some of 
these frustrations; Smith had no interest in the pre-electoral exploration of links between the two parties 
(Stuart, 2006: 410). However, following Blair’s election to the Labour leadership, the possibility of Lib-Lab 
co-operation quickly formed a significant aspect of New Labour’s political strategy (Fielding, 2003), and 
analyses of the New Labour project 
 
Ultimately, however, Labour achieved a landslide victory operating independently of the Liberal 
Democrats, albeit with an agreement to keep media attacks between the two parties to a minimum. A Joint 
Consultative Committee on constitutional issues beget a Joint Cabinet Committee on constitutional reform 
in government, and led to co-operation’s short-lived (and wholly symbolic) expansion into further areas of 
social policy and Europe. Formal links informally rested on the progress of institutional changes Blair was 
unable to deliver – principally the sidelined Jenkins Report, which recommended proportional 
representation. Both Blair and Ashdown saw their political aims as aligned and their party’s strategies and 
success as interdependent. But this chapter demonstrates their imperatives for co-operation, and their 
strategic vision for what it involved in practice, ultimately conflicted. Inter-party co-operation swiftly fizzled 
out following Ashdown’s resignation as Liberal Democrat leader, with Charles Kennedy supportive of 
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Ashdown’s ideological direction but not the heresthetic strategy of inter-party he viewed as fundamental to 
achieving these policy aims (Francis 2010: 93-95; Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005: 43-44). 
 
The extent to which Lib-Lab co-operation remains a missed opportunity for the right of the Labour Party 
remains contested. The historian Richard Evans (2014) noted, disapprovingly, that the inherent 
seductiveness of historical counterfactuals lies in ‘freeing history from the straitjacket of determinism’ by 
‘treating individual human actors – generals or politicians, in the main – as completely unfettered by larger 
forces, able to make decisions without regard to them in any way’. To this end, Anthony Seldon offered a 
striking hypothesis on the Lib-Lab ‘project’ of the 1990s, and the role and influence of Roy Jenkins in the 
elite machinations of New Labour. Seldon (2004: 277) argued that: 
 
What is clear is, had Blair followed his frustrated mentor’s advice, his place in history, and 
that of the Labour Party, would have been very different.  
 
That Seldon conforms to Evans’ criticism does not discount his analysis. The striking prioritisation of 
agency in accounts of the Labour-Liberal Democrat dynamic in the 1990s can be traced, in part, to the 
source of existing evidence: well-resourced journalistic accounts, and the recollections and diaries of those 
present (Ashdown, 2000; Rawnsley, 2001). But it also reflects the reality of negotiations initiated and 
developed at an elite level. Roy Jenkins was both a symbolic progenitor and instrumental driver of the 
strategy of Lib-Lab co-operation. He was evidence of intellectual and historical continuity with previous 
cross-party collaboration, but also, as Blair’s ‘personal history teacher’, of the importance of personality and 
persuasion. Jenkins felt, and wrote in 1994, that Blair had inherited an ‘immensely malleable party compared 
with that of Gaitskell, or any of his other predecessors’. Blair was, also, the ‘most exciting leader since 
Gaitskell, holding an inspirational quality of leadership … (that has) become almost extinct in British 
politics’ (Jenkins, The Times, 23/7/1994: 14). If inter-party co-operation is predicated on powerful, strategic 
leaders pushing against obstructive intra-party forces, there were grounds for thinking Tony Blair – who 
had privately told Liberal Democrats, prior to becoming leader, of his desire to ‘reformulate the politics of 
the left’ – could be successful in this aim (Ashdown, 2000: 1/12/1993, 242).  
 
Blair claims his designs towards rapprochement with the Liberal Democrats were, in his own words, ‘in 
part intuitive, in part reinforced by Roy Jenkins’; appealing both to Blair’s ‘sense of history’, and his ‘general 
approach to politics’ (Blair, 2010: 119-120). The crux of this chapter lies in part in an unpacking of these 
two interlinking concepts: the interaction between a historical understanding of British party politics, and 
a rational reading of the electoral landscape and the scope for a Labour victory before 1997 – and further 
success once in office. The possibility of a Lib-Lab agreement could be viewed as, inherently, a matter of 
arithmetic. Blair and Ashdown apparently saw their political fortunes as symbiotic, and their aims as largely 
interdependent. In a sense, therefore, the project had a clear electoral rationality: the result of a shared 
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experience of persistent failure and the need for strategic co-operation as a heresthetic to short-circuit what 
had begun to look, by 1992, like a ‘predominant’ party system and near-permanent Conservative political 
hegemony (Sartori, 1976: 192-201). Key advocates of co-operation within the Labour Party, such as Peter 
Mandelson, were motivated principally by this short and medium-term electoral logic (Macintyre, 2000: 
390; Mandelson, 2010, 258). From this angle, too, the Blair-Ashdown project was retrospectively a victim 
of its own success, its phased abandonment the result of the magnitude of Labour’s 1997 general election 
victory.  
 
The survival of the Lib-Lab concept, and Blair’s continued attraction to it beyond 1 May 1997, suggests a 
wider, longer-term purpose beyond gaining a foothold in office. Blair declared he was ‘not interested in 
governing for a term, coming to power on a wave of euphoria, a magnificent edifice of expectations, which 
dazzles for a while before collapse’ (Blair, 1995: 5). While this life-cycle of growth and decline was a 
reminder of the brief history of the SDP, any overt public links to the Liberal Democrats’ antecedent were 
actively discouraged and quashed. For many Liberal Democrats, the memory of problematic inter-party 
negotiations over seats with the SDP – Simon Hughes describes them as ‘hard, unexpectedly difficult and 
painful’ – was still strong (Ashdown, Interview, 2016; Hughes, 2016, Interview). Within Labour, the idea 
their leadership should ‘hang out the flags’ for those who had ‘sought to destroy the Labour Party’ was 
difficult to take (Straw, BBC Today 4/8/94, 1994). Yet that did not stop links being made privately, within 
both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Ashdown, in his diaries, records putting to Blair that:  
 
the SDP had unlocked one wave of hope, his election as leader of the Labour Party had 
unlocked a second and that, if we could pull this off at the beginning of 1996, we would 
unleash a third and decisive wave which would sweep the Tories away. (Ashdown, 2000: 
4/9/1994, 277) 
 
A theoretical Lib-Lab coalition as a final act, in a movement that had begun with Jenkins in 1979, makes 
sense if the key people involved viewed themselves as part of a broad progressive milieu, sharing a history 
in which the SDP were a necessary juncture in Labour’s electoral history. Both leaders’ personal relations 
were bolstered by frustration with the constraints of partisan politics and, as with Steel and Jenkins, a pre-
occupation with questions of strategy and positioning.  
 
There was an essential ambiguity to the relationship between Labour and the Liberal Democrats throughout 
this period, and any overarching judgment is hindered by the sheer opaqueness of talks conducted, 
principally, between Blair and Ashdown. But this ambiguity was not coincidental, and there were conflicting 
heresthetic aims at the heart of negotiations. Pat McFadden, tasked with managing (and, at times, 
obfuscating and obstructing) the development of inter-party relations, noted in 1998 that ‘nobody really 
knows what TB is planning on PR’ (Price, 2005; Young (Lester), 2008: 510, 29/1/97). Deep into the second 
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year of New Labour’s first term in office, as the Jenkins Report brought the question of electoral reform 
to a head, there was a presumption that electoral reform and pluralism was ‘what progressive politics will 
soon be almost all about’ (Young, The Guardian, 23/7/1998: 16). Ultimately, for Ashdown it came down to 
an even narrower conjunction: between electoral reform, and the political priorities and instincts of Tony 
Blair. 
 
Blair clearly had a commitment to pursuing and entrenching a Labour-Liberal Democrat connection, in the 
hope of ultimate fusion of the parties. Whether he felt it either desirable or possible strategically to pursue 
instrumental changes in the Lib-Lab relationship, which would necessitate institutional reform in his party 
and Westminster, is much less clear. The possible intra-party difficulties Blair anticipated remained largely, 
though not wholly, hypothetical – a key figure in negotiations on the Labour side says ‘we got nowhere 
near thinking about the mechanics of it, it was still a ‘Grand Idea” (Powell, 2016, Interview). The progress 
towards co-operation shared many of the characteristics of New Labour’s broader constitutional reform 
agenda – reform and Lib-Labbery were clearly intertwined, and the policy goal on which the plausibility of 
a cross-party agreement waxed and waned. Both processes were unprecedented and potentially 
transformational, but ultimately stunted. Bold if piecemeal constitutional reforms provided the core 
sustainment, and justification, for Liberal Democrats wary of becoming a ‘specially constructed bungalow 
annex in the grounds of Transport House’ (Ashdown in Riddell, The Times, 11/5/1992: 12); ultimately, 
Labour’s (and Blair’s) constitutional conservatism was the undoing of co-operation and, with it, Ashdown’s 
leadership of his party.  
 
Existing accounts of the constitutional reforms of the period stress a distinction between, on the one hand, 
elite political agency and strategic errors – such as ‘confusions, changes of mind… (and) Machiavellian or 
manipulative behaviour’ – and, on the other hand, a more organizational, and more prosaic, ‘situational 
logic’ defined by internal Labour division, and extra-parliamentary pressure from electoral reform 
campaigners such as Charter 88 (King, 2007; Dunleavy, 2009: 618). This is a false dichotomy. The process 
of the constitutional agenda, and the cross-party mechanisms that were created to support it, cannot be 
understood outside the sphere of Blair and Ashdown’s decision-making. Dunleavy (2009: 645), in his 
critique of the exaggerated bias of academics who take a Westminster Model ‘narrative of power, that takes 
little account of events outside two-party elite circles’ (Dunleavy, 2009: 645), ultimately overshoots by 
underplaying the explanatory role of elite decision-making, and the narratives of power that form and 
inform these judgements. While Dunleavy is correct in saying that no one has full ‘privileged access to the 
psychological workings of Blair and the collective government’ (Dunleavy, 2009: 645), Blair’s decisions can 
only be usefully understood as those of a politician who ultimately subscribed to a majoritarian political 
viewpoint. This compelled his view of ‘The Project’, a heresthetical attempt to construct a ‘big tent’ centre-
left political force within the existing institutional framework of Westminster politics. It was less radical 
than the view of Ashdown and Jenkins, for it downplayed the permanent change that would be compelled 
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by electoral reform. It was also, in another way, profoundly more radical: driven by another aim oft-repeated 
aim to gobble up the Liberal Democrats and permanently merge the two parties as an end destination 
(Robin Butler, Interview, 2016; Powell, Interview, 2016). 
 
As a result, co-operation, like New Labour’s constitutional reforms, was dampened by dominant 
institutional traditions and norms which defined, and constrained, the parameters of any agreement: the 
ingrained adversarial parliamentarism of the British Political Tradition; an entrenched partisanship, which 
formed a major impediment within both parties at an elite and parliamentary level; the sense formal electoral 
co-operation would be unachievable, and inimical, to both party’s interests; a clear idea of executive 
legitimacy, that made the formation of a surplus majority coalition difficult to manage. Addressing these 
issues meant a series of untested and unresolved paradoxes and contradictions emerged at the heart of ‘the 
project’. Both parties aimed to enhance their electability through mutual association; it was assumed that 
any formal electoral collaboration would be damaging to electoral prospects. Negotiations operated on an 
ultra-elite basis and, at least at first, with privacy; yet the formal mechanisms created by Lib-Labbery were 
little more than an intensive, albeit largely symbolic, public exercise. The continued momentum of inter-
party relations was reliant upon elite personalities and leadership dynamics. It also provides compelling 
evidence of the limited power of agency, in overcoming the structural and institutional constraints to 
collective action between parties. There was clarity and cohesion in the historical diagnosis of both Blair 
and Ashdown, and the long-term temporal vision of a ‘progressive century’; in the end, short-term electoral 
realities and intra-party necessities trumped broad-brush strategic imperatives. Whether this was born from 
tactical imperatives or unresolved intellectual disagreement is key to understanding what was achieved, and 
in evaluating the extent to which the objectives of both parties, and their leaderships, were aligned.  
 
 
The Smith-Ashdown dynamic and constrained inter-party dialogue, May 1992- June 94 
 
Labour Intra-Party Discussion of co-operation 
 
Despite patchy evidence in support, a strong narrative took hold both within and outside the Labour Party 
that the 1992 Conservative majority had been caused by the vote-repelling prospect of a hung parliament 
and a Lib-Lab coalition government. Peter Mandelson felt ‘nudging and winking’ (Baxter et. al, Fabian 
Review, 1992: 5) about a Lib-Lab arrangement has made Labour look weak and muddled. Dennis Skinner, 
on election night, pinned Labour’s defeat on the ‘nonsense of ‘getting into bed with Liberals’, and engaging 
with the ‘chattering classes’ who supported proportional representation (Skinner, BBC Interview, 1992). 
Butler and Kavanagh (1992: 130) concluded that ‘fear both of a Labour government and a hung parliament 
drove voters from both the opposition parties in the last few days’. There was very little sense prior to the 
short campaign of 1992 that Liberal Democrat strength was taken seriously: Robin Cook, who would go 
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on to be the most senior, and most sincere, cabinet supporter of the Liberal Democrat’s constitutional 
agenda, argued Liberal Democrats would have too little clout to demand any more than a ’Speaker’s 
Conference’ on electoral reform (Young (Cook), 2007: 337-39 12/2/92). While Kinnock would not 
replicate Wilson and ‘do another 1974’ he would use any hypothetical hung parliament to do no more than 
offer minimal terms, to a party whose future did not seem wholly certain (Ibid.). However, in the run-up 
to election day, the prospects for a hung parliament became clearer. Jo Phillips, Paddy Ashdown’s Press 
Secretary from 1992 till his resignation, found on her first day in the role:  
 
the plan that had been laid out for the ’92 election of where Neil Kinnock and Paddy 
would hold their separate press conferences and announce this great new deal, a new dawn 
and all the rest of it (Phillips, 2016, Interview). 
 
Ashdown wrote, in a post-election strategy paper of April 1992, that it ‘must now be virtually certain that 
Labour will adopt PR’ (Ashdown, 2000: 572); equally, Robin Cook felt the implementation of electoral 
reform would be an inevitable process, flowing from the wider constitution reforms to which Labour was 
committed (Young (Cook), 2007: 12/2/1992, 338). Ashdown cites ‘a prolonged period in which the 
Conservative government appears unreplaceable’ (Ashdown, 2016, Interview) as a key necessary condition 
for centre-left pluralism, and it was clear that Labour’s 1992 defeat led some to doubt the plausibility of a 
majority Labour government. For advocates within Labour the nature of the defeat and of 1992, a ‘cold 
shower year’ (MacDonald, 2016, Interview), had created an opening: the shock of electoral defeat and 
protestations from political scientists that a Labour majority was, potentially, permanently unviable. Bill 
Rodgers wrote to Smith in April 1993 to argue anyone with ‘a historic feel for the sweep of politics’ would 
know that ‘the Liberal Democrats are not going away’. He also tried to persuade Smith of the ‘energy, 
enthusiasm and hope you would release by ceasing to pretend that Labour can do it alone’ (Rodgers to 
Smith, 16/4/1993, Murray Elder Papers). Blair saw this process following defeat as a cyclical pattern of 
behaviour – ‘the defeat is like being caught in a shower of cold rain … but it dries out terribly quickly’ – 
and, privately, felt the party was falling short and ‘not doing enough’ (Sopel, 1996: 165; Wright, 2016, 
Interview).  
 
Ashdown’s optimism appeared to fundamentally underestimate the level of antagonism towards reform 
within the Parliamentary Labour Party – calls for electoral reform in PLP meetings came from a few isolated 
figures such as Tony Wright and Jeff Rooker, and were invariably badly received (Stuart, 2006: 410; 
MacDonald, 2016, Interview). Neil Kinnock, in July 1993, put the number of Labour MPs close to ‘Liberals’ 
as a ‘half-dozen’ (Young (Kinnock), 2007: 6/7/1993, 388); some of those six or so MPs paint an equally 
grim picture, though the Labour Campaign for Electoral Reform had 69 MPs ‘sponsors’ prior to 1997 
(LCER Conference Newsletter, 1997). The problem with talk of reform is that ‘it couldn’t come from the 
Libs, the default attitude was that they were losers trying to grab on to our coat-tails’ (MacDonald, 
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Interview, 2016). Labour post-mortems continued to refer to the party as the ‘Liberals’, while Blair only 
spoke euphemistically of Labour creating common cause with other parties internationally (Baxter et. al, 
Fabian Review, 1992: 5). Fringe conference events at the 1992 Labour and Liberal Democrat conferences, 
‘Cross Party Dialogue, an Agenda for the 90s’ were organized by the Labour’s Calum MacDonald and the 
Liberal Democrat Simon Hughes (who would go on to be broadly antagonistic to Ashdown’s ‘project’). If 
they were a way of testing the water, reports emanating from the conference (‘rank and file spits bile at Lib-
Labbery’) suggested their reception was, at best, muted (Aitken, The Guardian, 1/10/1992: 8). A New Agenda 
Forum was set up within the PLP by MPs, largely from the more recent intake of MPs, with the aim of 
promoting policy dialogue that was ‘neither sectarian nor exclusive’ and drew inspiration ‘from a long and 
rich tradition of radical and socialist thought’ (Campbell et. al, 1993: i, ii). 
 
Labour’s new leader, John Smith, was actively dismissive of the idea of any formal co-operation. There are 
competing accounts of a convivial car journey with Ashdown to Southampton, while Smith was Shadow 
Chancellor, on the prospects for Lib-Lab politics and proportional representation in exchange for minority 
government support in the style of the 1977-78 Lib-Lab arrangement (McSmith, 1993: 326; Grice, The 
Sunday Times, 3/4/1994: 5; Stuart, 2005: 293).25 But Smith clearly that the idea of electoral pacts should be 
dismissed as Labour would govern alone, and told Ashdown so (Ashdown, 2000: 11/5/1989, 42); equally 
he consistently believed, during his period as leader, that pacts and alliances were neither achievable nor 
deliverable (Stuart, 2005: 293; Young (Smith), 2007: 22/4/1993, 379). Bill Rodgers told Smith the idea that 
‘we could never win with Neil, but with John Smith it will be different’ was ‘profoundly dangerous’, and 
that Smith was surely ‘too shrewd to take that at its face value’ (Rodgers to Smith, Letter, 16/4/1993, 
Murray Elder Papers). Smith’s reading of the electoral landscape was that a Labour majority was eminently 
possible under his leadership. Polling evidence, from October 1992 onwards, showed consistent double-
digit Labour leads on voting intention, leadership popularity and economic competence. But self-avowed 
modernising MPs were consistently unconvinced – just a week after polling was published in November 
1992 showing a Labour lead of 19 per cent, less than 6 months into Smith’s leadership, New Agenda co-
founder Nick Raynsford was warning Labour was in ‘a state of anaesthetized torpor … sleepwalking into 
electoral oblivion’ (Grice, The Sunday Times, 22/11/1992: 11).  
 
Smith did not actively resist burgeoning attempts within his party to foster the idea of co-operation. 
Ashdown certainly got the impression that Smith would potentially acquiesce to the idea of locally agreed 
constituency-level pacts, initiated at a grass-roots level. This was the core aim of Labour MPs who were 
attempting to forge cross-party links, a belief if they could ‘sow attitudes or some kind of openness at a 
grass-roots level’, this could be the first stepping stone to encouraging co-operation (Macdonald, Interview, 
2016). But there were clear limitations given Smith viewed the idea as neither particularly intellectually 																																																								
25 The story appears to stem from a reference by Andrew Grice in the Sunday Times in 1993, and subsequently 
appeared in Andy McSmith’s biography. It goes unmentioned in Ashdown’s diaries which, as Smith official 
biographer Mark Stuart notes, are generally thorough in their detailing of Lib-Lab discussions. 
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desirable or electorally expedient. David Steel, having spoken to Smith, was less positive about the 
possibilities for co-operation: if Smith had ‘the nerve and the sense’, he would say he was open to pacts 
built on a constituency-by-constituency basis, but the Labour leader seemed ‘unable to face the party 
problems that might ensue’ (Young (Steel), 2007: 8/6/1993, 383-84). Throughout the long campaign of 
the Eastleigh by-election from early February to June 1994, Labour’s campaign was principally motivated 
to damage Liberal Democrat chances, in a seat where the Liberal Democrats were strong favourites. Led 
by Jack Straw, who was known to be keenly anti Lib-Lab, the campaign’s core aims were two-fold: to 
undermine the perception they were the Conservatives’ principal opposition in the South, and to dent the 
possibility of Liberal Democrat momentum given fears a significant advance – despite the psephological 
data – could be electorally damaging to Labour (Kellner, The Sunday Times, 27/2/1994: 4).  
 
By the time the Eastleigh campaign had reached its conclusion, John Smith had died, and Blair was leader-
in-waiting of the Labour Party. The desire to prove to Smith the need for inter-party co-operation and the 
failure to do so defined the relationship between Ashdown and Smith, and severely constrained dialogue 
among advocates of deeper organizational and electoral co-operation in both parties. The two leaders and 
their teams did co-operate over parliamentary tactics, particularly briefings and preparation for Prime 
Minister’s Questions (Leaman, 2016, Interview). But little personal chemistry between the two leaders. 
Smith told Ashdown their two offices should ‘defend the habit of friendship, even if it’s not the time for 
formal co-operation’ (Ashdown, 2000: 19/10/1992, 196-7). But there was a clear sense during Smith’s time 
as leader that inter-party schemes of the kind he was pushing for had little, if any, chance of gaining traction.  
 
It is a notable irony, therefore, that the principal victory claimed by Liberal Democrats from the Blair-
Ashdown dynamic – the raft of constitutional reforms seemingly emanating from the Joint Cabinet 
Committee and the Cook/Maclennan report – were almost wholly changes advocated by Smith during his 
two years as Leader of the Opposition. In a speech to Charter 88 on 1 March 1993, Smith supported the 
concept of devolution for Scotland and Wales, a freedom of information bill and House of Lords reform 
(A citizen's democracy, 1/3/1993, Shore/16/54). The one area of distinct failure for the Liberal Democrats 
throughout this period, an inability to secure a referendum on an alternative voting system, was equally 
noticeably absent from Smith’s offer. Smith did not want to actively reject the idea of electoral reform – in 
part due to a calculated desire not to ward off tactical Liberal Democrat votes (Stuart, 2005: 295). A further 
area of reform that had to be prised out of Blair when in government, a form of PR for European elections, 
was one that Smith had privately undertaken to adopt in opposition – it had been noted that Steel and 
Callaghan’s defeated bill of 1977 provided a ready-made, off-the-shelf draft (Young (Cook), 200: 337-39 
12/2/92). This did not mean a shift away from what Flinders (2009) describes as Labour’s ‘traditional 
acquiescence with majoritarianism’, but it does cast doubt on the tangible, institutional and constitutional 
gains that Roy Jenkins pointed to – upon Ashdown’s resignation – as his defining policy and political legacy 
(Campbell, 2015: 715).  
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However, a shared frustration with John Smith’s ‘One More Heave’ strategy as Labour leader served both 
to unite an increasingly hostile group of senior moderate MPs within Labour and, significantly, led Blair to 
reach out to Ashdown.26 Blair was consistently frustrated that Labour was ‘not doing enough’ in opposition 
towards modernization of the party. This crystallized into consistent pressure on Smith to dilute the union 
link – first through the removal of the union ‘block vote’, and then the exclusion of trade union ‘levy payers’ 
– moves, when announced, welcomed by Charles Kennedy as ‘bringing down Labour’s ‘Berlin Wall’ 
(Macintyre, The Independent, 21/9/1993: 1; Sopel, 1995: 162-3). But as a precursor to his bullishness on 
internal party reform, and reluctance to formally consolidate Lib-Lab ties, the tentative nature of Blair’s 
movements towards Ashdown under Smith’s leadership are notable. When the two first met in 1993, 
organized by Liberal Democrat MP Anthony Lester, Blair was concerned about being ‘squashed by the 
unions and the left wing’ (Ashdown, 2000: 14/7/1993 228-29); On their second meeting, in December 
1993, Ashdown recounts Blair as overt in his support for realignment, but repeating that he would have to 
see if there was ‘room in the Party for this’ (Ashdown, 2000, 1/12/93 242-44). Willing but uncertain of its 
plausibility, dictated by electoral logic but also constrained by it, these informal discussions, as Ashdown 
tells them, appear prescient as to what would later shape and define discussions on ‘the project’.  
 
Liberal Democrat Intra-Party Discussion of co-operation 
 
For Liberal Democrat strategists, following the 1992 general election, the ‘sense was that we got burnt in 
the last week of the campaign, because hung parliament equals uncertainty equals unstable government’ 
(Leaman, 2016, Interview). Ashdown, in a strategy paper come electoral post-mortem (senior party 
members had anticipated more than a gain of one seat, and coalition negotiations) set out his perception 
that the core problem was ‘Britain is simply not educated on coalition government, and our hopes that we 
may be able to sell the concept foundered’ (Ashdown, 2000: ‘Strategy Paper, June 1992’, 575; Hurst, 2006). 
For Ashdown, and his inner circle of advisors and senior MPs, there were two clear conclusions to draw. 
Firstly, the concept of coalition government needed to be ‘reframed in the public imagination’ (Phillips, 
2016, Interview). And, secondly, the party needed to work detoxify Labour and ‘drive a real wedge in the 
party on PR’ (Ashdown, 2000: ‘Strategy Paper’ 572-578). To that end, Ashdown (Interview, 2016) made 
what he argues was the most importance intervention of his leadership of the Liberal Democrats: the ‘Chard 
Speech’, in his constituency a month after the 1992 election, which outlined the party’s strategic direction. 
Ashdown confronted Liberal Democrats resistant to any dilution of political independence, or – as 
Ashdown saw it – their ambivalence to political power. He called on his party to ‘take risks to shape and 
influence events in our favour’, to aid the ‘construction of post-socialist, non-Conservative Britain’. This 
would not require ‘mathematically constructed pacts and alliances … (which) would be a waste of precious 																																																								
26 ‘One More Heave’ is a leitmotif in British Politics for defensive opposition, coined by Jeremy Thorpe’s Liberal Party 
between the two elections of 1974. 
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time – at worst positively damaging’, but would need Labour to come to terms with the ‘new reality’ that 
‘Labour can no longer win on their own’ (Ashdown, 1992 in Brack and Little, 2001). 
 
In some senses, what Ashdown was proposing was not all that isolated. Post-election articles in the Fabian 
Review from Labour politicians (including Blair and Mandelson) also bore striking comparison to Ashdown’s 
speech, not least Blair’s call to ‘work with others in a common cause’ (Baxter et. al, Fabian Review, 1992: 5). 
However, Ashdown’s principal hurdles were within his own party. A clear reluctance to be defined by its 
tension with other parties was played out through the terminology of ‘equidistance’. This meant Ashdown’s 
clarity in his internal strategic position was unmatched by a public stance that could not fully commit to a 
rejection of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat agreement – which had been discouraged but had lingered 
through, for example, David Owen’s endorsement of Major in the 1992 general election (Young, The 
Guardian, 11/3/1992: 23). Blair’s reaction to the Chard Speech was to argue it was unclear whether 
Ashdown believed his party was a ‘left-of-centre grouping opposed to the Conservatives or a wishy-washy 
centre who would do a deal with anyone’, before adding that ‘the public would not buy pacts or deals, based 
on adding the Labour vote to the Liberal Democrat vote’ (Wood, The Times 11/5/1992: 16). Butler and 
Kavanagh (1997: 68) described the Chard Speech as a change in the party’s ‘basic stance’. But internal 
pressure meant it was far from certain that Ashdown’s strategic mindset and political will would inevitably 
shifted the Liberal Democrats towards co-operation, as he felt he was ‘wading waist-deep through treacle’ 
(Ashdown, 2000: 22/6/1992 169).  
 
The Chard Speech of May 1992 was a signal Ashdown was keen to tie the party firmly to Labour but 
remained, as one Lib Dem MP argued, ‘the outrider in terms of that view’ within his parliamentary party 
(Private Interview, 2016, Interview). Although ‘to outside observers … equidistance came to look more 
like fiction than fact’, (Leaman, 1998: 162) Ashdown was still constrained by a party (particularly a 
parliamentary party containing ‘very hostile voices’) who, following his speech, were principally angered he 
was ‘railroading everybody into positions they don’t want to be in’ (Ashdown, 2000: 12/5/1992, 164-5). 
The 1992 result cemented the Liberal Democrats electoral position and therefore, in the minds of Ashdown 
and his advisors, the policy of equidistance had now served its purpose. But others had been well served 
by the party’s vagueness on co-operation. While anticlimactic, it had not only secured the party’s 
continuation but also led to the ‘discovery’ of a regional impact in the South West, which would later be of 
significant tactical interest to Blair. The extent to which Ashdown was shepherding disparate and reluctant 
troops could be seen not just in the difficult reaction from expected to be wholly supportive, but the mixed 
reactions from those who could be, on paper, expected to support his position (Ashdown, 2016, Interview). 
A quip, attributed to both Russell Johnston and Ming Campbell, later a keen advocate of ‘the project’, and 
the nearest Ashdown came to a supportive successor in 1999, described the Chard speech as a ‘burnt 
offering’ (Hansard, HL, v. 712 c. 773 9/7/2009; The Guardian, 1994: 8).  
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The problem for Ashdown lay in shifting his party – something he felt, almost a year after the election in 
March 1993, he was beginning to do through consistent reiteration and intra-party persuasion (Young 
(Ashdown), 2007: 30/3/1993, 369). Ashdown’s public call for ‘a change in the climate of politics’ 
throughout the period from 1992 to 1994 was aimed at voters – for ‘it all does depend on people accepting 
the hypothesis that coalition politics is better than one-party politics’. But his party, particularly key sections 
of his parliamentary party resistant to any dilution of the party’s independence, were also a targeted audience 
(Young (Ashdown), 2007: 30/3/1993, 369). At the 1992 annual conference, Ashdown won a mandate for 
his strategy paper and a more overt endorsement to ‘explore’ political co-operation – a vote that Ashdown 
felt, had he lost, would have meant the end ‘of my whole Chard strategy and probably me with it’. A majority 
of delegates, 594 to 341, backed the inclusion of a call for inclusivity and co-operation. However, this was 
a work in progress: ratification was almost halted by a draft resolution, aimed at making a vote on the 
conference floor much less winnable (Ashdown, White, 1992: 24). The eventual motion proclaimed the 
‘Liberal Democrats should develop and debate ideas by working with people, of all parties and none and at 
all levels’ – anodyne enough for a Guardian editorial to dismiss it as ‘narrow and negative in tone’ (The 
Guardian, 17/9/1992: 18). The task of working together, they argued, was ‘clear’: ‘but it is equally clear that 
most Liberal Democrats, those in Harrogate at any rate – want to do no such thing’ (Ibid.). A united 
position was at the expense of strategic coherence. 
 
There continued to be residual opposition to any attempt to practically develop Ashdown’s Chard concept. 
His diaries note his exasperation, following an informal meeting of party members: questioning, ‘why is it 
that the rebels always have the best tunes?’ There was a sense the growing number of Lib Dem MPs (20 in 
April 1992, 23 by June 1994) were coming around to the idea of explicit links to Labour. This process of 
gradual parliamentary acquiescence was familiar to David Steel – a figure who was, at this point, was 
potentially ‘a bit jealous of Paddy because he had a chance to do it in a different way, at a different time’ 
(Leaman, 2016, Interview). His Director of Strategy Alan Leaman recalls that, during this period: 
 
 there was a lot of Paddy touring the country, talking to people. He was very skilled at the 
‘I’m taking you into my confidence’ thing. (Leaman, 2016, Interview) 
 
It did appear that there was some cut-through. By April 1993, an ICM poll found 85% of Liberal Democrat 
voters would support a Lib-Lab government. An academic survey of Liberal Democrat members showed 
majority or plurality support for informal policy discussions (76-12), formal policy talks (41-34), locally 
negotiated electoral pacts (58-28) and a coalition government (57-24) with the Labour Party (Rudig, Bennie, 
Curtice, 1993). Whether this growing coalescence around a Lib-Lab position was the direct result of 
Ashdown’s intervention, or the Major government’s plunge in popularity, is a moot point. But given their 
equidistance approach in 1992 had been matched by an almost equal split in second preferences for Labour 
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and the Conservatives, it is certainly plausible the apparent shift among supporters was driven, at least in 
part, by Ashdown’s attempts to reposition the party.  
 
One criticism of Ashdown, following the Chard Speech, was that he put ‘too much emphasis on long-term 
strategies, given the uncertainties of politics’ (Riddell, The Times, 11/5/1992: 12). Political events, specifically 
the machinations around Major’s approach to the Maastricht Treaty, led to the parliamentary ties between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats weakening. The passing of the Maastricht Treaty was a bruising 
experience for Labour-Liberal Democrat relations. On the one division where Lib Dem votes mattered – 
the vote on a ‘paving’ motion, to restart the bill’s progress in November 1992 – Ashdown supported the 
Major government. Ashdown argued that it had sharpened the Liberal Democrats’ appeal and showed the 
possibility of political co-operation, working to establish distinctiveness and political credibility in the long-
term (Young (Ashdown), 2007: 30/3/93, 369). But it was wilfully optimistic to see his public line – ‘we 
worked with the government for nine months to ensure Britain’s future in Europe’ – as anything other than 
harmful the concept of a Lib-Lab arrangement (‘Ashdown Interview’, LBC/IRN Archive, 23/9/1993). 
Certainly, it gave ammunition to those pre-disposed to dampen down inter-party connections. Jack Straw 
described the vote as ‘an historic betrayal by the Liberals for which they will not long, not lightly, be 
forgiven’, Dennis Skinner believed realignment as ‘dead as a dodo’ (White, The Guardian, 5/11/1992: 1; 
Travis and Wintour, The Guardian, 6/11/1992: 2). A key member of Ashdown’s office said that ‘Tristan 
Garel-Jones (the Conservative Whip guiding Maastricht through the Commons) virtually lived in the Lib 
Dem whips office most of the time’ and, far from co-ordinating PMQs with John Smith, Ashdown prepared 
Major with his questions so he could attack the Labour Party position (Ashdown, 2000: 3/11/1992, 199; 
Phillips, 2016, Interview). Assessing the political repercussions of John Smith’s death, Peter Riddell, then a 
Times political commentator, believed Ashdown had been regarded by the Labour leader as ‘an irritating 
outsider who was a bit sanctimonious’ (Riddell, 15/5/1994, BBC On the Record Archive). It was not 
immediately clear whether his successor’s relationship with the Liberal Democrats would be, or could be, 
any different. 
 
Blair and Ashdown, 1994-1997 
 
It was also not widely known that Lib-Lab co-operation had already been discussed between Ashdown and 
Blair prior to his accession as Labour leader. But it was clear a new leader, emanating from Labour’s 
modernizing wing, would mean further convergence of the two party’s electoral platforms. Given that, it is 
perhaps surprising – particularly given a key by-election was being fought in parallel to the leadership 
campaign – that links to the Liberal Democrats were not discussed at any length throughout the Labour 
leadership campaign. The nearest exposition was at a Guardian/Fabian Society sponsored conference 
Whatever Next? (in which Blair and Shirley Williams’ contributions were carefully stage managed, to avoid 
clashing (Williams, 2009: 234). A panel of political scientists and advocates from both parties discussed the 
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idea of a formal pact and its merits, in comparison to more ‘organic’ ways of fostering tactical voting. There 
was almost unanimous agreement ‘things that smack of deals in smoke-filled rooms’ would be counter-
productive – Vernon Bogdanor the sole supporter, pointing to the precedent of local agreements in 1950 
and 1951 (The Guardian, 20/6/1994: 6). Blair’s acceptance speech upon winning the leadership was also 
dissected in two ways: some delegates took Blair’s leadership acceptance speech contribution to be ‘the best 
statement of the Liberal Democrat core message I have ever heard’, others saw it as an explicit affirmation 
of a Christian, ethical socialism inspired by R.H. Tawney (Liddle, The Guardian, 23/7/1994: 24; Rawnsley: 
The Observer, 2/10/1994: E17).  
 
The arrival of Blair was not viewed as an immediate fillip, and his Chief of Staff is clear that ‘1994 was a 
bad year for Paddy’ (Leaman, 2016, Interview). The strategic question became ‘not just how do you detoxify 
Labour, but how do you ride this and become part of the broader movement’ (Leaman, Interview 2016). 
Polling conducted by MORI for the Times, midway through the leadership campaign, showed the Liberal 
Democrats would suffer the most immediate drop in support due to Blair’s leadership, and their support 
did fall by 5% (The Times, 22/6/1994: 9; Sopel, 1996: 246). However, it was also clear Blair had continued 
to give thought to the Liberal Democrats in the immediate period following his victory. Campbell’s diaries 
note strategy on ‘the Libs’ and ‘a progressive alliance’ as a key talking point when Blair was discussing his 
potential role as Director of Communications, and he was keen that ‘Owen, Jenkins, Williams could support 
most of what we do’ (Campbell, 2010: 10/8/1994). But the immediate short-term effect was a weakening 
of Ashdown’s position. His diaries record it was ‘very galling’ to see Blair receiving glowing praise for using 
‘phrases and ideas I was using 5 or 6 years ago’. After his urging Blair to stand in the days following Smith’s 
death, his diaries do not record any contact with Blair. A senior advisor, who watched Blair’s acceptance 
speech with Ashdown, says ‘it was like the old Gore Vidal phrase – when a friend succeeds, a part of me 
dies’ (Interview, Phillips, 2016). 
 
One immediate reaction to Blair’s election was the vocal support for Blair from Liberal Democrats who 
had been a senior part of the SDP. Many of these figures’ subsequent departure also ultimately had the 
effect of shifting the centre of gravity within the Liberal Democrats (Glover, Interview, 2016; Liddle, 
Interview, 2014). Senior Lib Dems who were strongest supporters of Blair – such as Andrew Adonis and 
Roger Liddle, who would both go on to be key architects of New Labour’s policy platform – were critical 
of Ashdown’s early stance, and his decision not to immediately redefine the Liberal Democrats’ public 
positioning (Leaman, 1998: 165; Interview, Liddle, 2014; Interview, Phillips, 2016). Liddle (The Guardian, 
23/7/1994: 24) described watching Blair’s speech not as an exercise in grudging admiration that it was for 
Ashdown, but instead as a ‘moving experience’. The ‘A1 Dining Club’, an informal group composed of 
senior figures from the Alliance, was a pressure group consistently pushing for bolder strategic action. 
Ashdown appeared sensitive to these developments: an intervention by Bill Rodgers in The Times, a month 
following Blair’s victory, particularly rankled. Rodgers proclaimed he and many ex-SDP figures were ‘fed 
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up of being in a political backwater’, and that Ashdown ‘had not struck the right chord yet’ (Sherman, The 
Times, 3/8/1994: 2). Privately, Rodgers was telling journalists that ‘we (Jenkins, Rodgers and Williams) are 
interested in Big Politics, many Lib Dems are interested in Little Politics’ (Young (Rodgers), 2007: 13/9/94 
433). The spectre of potential irrelevance was one that clearly concerned Liberal Democrats. As Ashdown 
notes in his diaries: ‘the press report that I am getting rattled. Probably right, too’ (Ashdown, 2000: 
3/8/1994, 272).  
 
Blair’s reaching out to Ashdown in August 1994 via an intermediary in Tom McNally, a previous advisor 
to Callaghan in Number 10 and SDP MP, changed the dynamics between the two parties. The two leaders 
met in September, at Blair’s house in Islington, and Ashdown records discussing some immediate practical 
elements of co-operation – for example between media advisors, over parliamentary strategy and PMQs, 
and shared briefings on policy direction. This would remain secretive, however, for fear of pushing their 
respective parties so far that they revolted. The party conferences in 1994 avoided overt discussion of co-
operation. But Ashdown began to talk about the restructuring of political opportunities in a way that 
suggested its increasing likelihood, telling Hugo Young ((Ashdown), 2007, 13/9/1994, 431) that ‘at last 
there is a shift, a rumbling, a shake-up, a crack in the system’. By late September, and a second meeting, 
Ashdown records that both agreed their end destination to be a formalized agreement before the next 
election, with Ashdown saying ‘the more up front we can make our relationship the better’ as ‘uncertainty 
was the killer at the last election’ (Ashdown, 2000: 16/9/1994, 279-81). In May 1995, a further meeting 
between Ashdown, Archie Kirkwood (his Chief Whip), Robin Cook, and Tony Blair gave further credence 
to the idea that co-operation would involve significant formal ties, and guarantees over the policy 
commitments on the constitution – a meeting that Blair privately described as difficult particularly as Cook 
was bullish on proportional representation and its prospects (Ashdown, 2000: 3/5/1994; Campbell, 2010: 
4/5/1994). 
               
Ashdown’s meeting with Blair in September 1994 had also led to the creation of a new internal structure 
within the Liberal Democrats to discuss party strategy vis-à-vis Labour. In theory, only members of the ‘Jo 
Group’ were aware of its existence – senior figures such as Director of Communications Olly Grender, and 
Scottish Leader Jim Wallace, were not updated on the group’s activities (Phillips, 2016, Interview). Alan 
Leaman, Ashdown’s Director of Strategy, says that its main role was not to ratify Ashdown’s decisions but 
to act as a restraining force and: 
 
What would normally happen is Paddy would come along and say ‘here’s what I want to 
do next’. And he’d lay it all out. And then there’d be a process of pulling him back. Then 
Bill Rodgers would come to the occasional meeting and say ‘you shouldn’t trust these 
bastards (Leaman, 2016, Interview) 
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Indeed, despite being broadly composed of advisors, strategists and MPs supportive of co-operation, 
Ashdown’s characterization of the meetings in his diaries is often one of being reigned in during key 
decision-points. When the prospect of ending ‘equidistance’ was discussed with Ashdown’s parliamentary 
party, it was on the basis both of a ‘national consultation exercise’ and that he would resign as leader if the 
‘myth of equidistance’ were not abandoned. According to Ashdown, and others present, the parliamentary 
party was clearly divided, while the party’s Federal Executive was unanimous in its support (Ashdown, 
2016, Interview; Hughes, 2016, Interview). Ashdown claims to have been annoyed at coverage framing the 
end of equidistance as the announcement of a pact with Labour. However, the assumption within Labour 
was that leaks pre-empting the move away from equidistance, and painting it as a clear development towards 
a Lib-Lab ‘pact’, came from either, or both, Peter Mandelson and Ashdown (Campbell, 2010: 6/5/1996). 
This blurred framing was expedient for Ashdown’s inter and intra-party strategy. It persuaded his party to 
mark a break from the pretence of equidistance, while Ashdown could rail against Lib-Lab convergence 
with specific policy pledges on education and taxation; equally it aimed to convince Blair of a shift change 
in the Liberal Democrat positioning, without explicitly pledging the party’s support for any future Labour 
government.  
 
Ashdown’s involvement of a wide range of voices in negotiations was not an approach Blair shared. While 
he agreed with Ashdown on the need to build a ‘super-structure’ around negotiations, in practice he retained 
an approach that kept discussions closely guarded. There were clearly competing tensions and views within 
New Labour about the party’s approach to the Liberal Democrats. Later when in government, perhaps in 
part due to a lack of persuasion and discussion when in opposition, this crystallised into a cabinet with a 
strong majority against the continuing development of ‘the project’. Alastair Campbell thought it necessary, 
when hearing of media discussion of equidistance prior to Ashdown’s announcement, to ‘talk them down 
from over doing Lib-Labbery’ (Campbell, 2010, 3/5/1995). Clearly, he saw no benefit in these ties being 
implied or leaked. Campbell, despite working closely with members of Ashdown’s team on media matters, 
did much to dampen down discussion of Lib-Lab co-operation. A story in The Guardian in July 1995, again 
thought to be sourced from Mandelson, called for the Labour constitution to be modelled on that of the 
SDP. Much of this discussion emanated from a decision by Mandelson together with Roger Liddle (a 
former SDP member, and advisor to Bill Rodgers during the Lib-Lab pact) to produce a book, The Blair 
Revolution, ultimately published in July 1996 (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996). The Blair Revolution was widely 
taken as a blueprint for Blair’s political thinking, and an outline of the party’s plans for government. Within 
its early drafts was a call for an electoral pact with the Liberal Democrats, which was taken out at the behest 
of Campbell – one reviewer noted that ‘where some books are cannibalised, this one has been Campbellised’ 
(Kettle, 1996: 95). An encounter between Campbell and Liddle in July 1995 summed up the extent to which 
overt comparisons and links with the SDP were welcomed: 
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I bumped into Roger Liddle in the central lobby and warned him off doing too much on the 
theme of Labour becoming like the SDP. I think he got the point. (Campbell, 2010: 
20/7/1995, 253) 
 
The Blair Revolution (or, as Campbell christened it, ‘Peter’s bloody book’) exemplified the divide within New 
Labour, and Blair’s unwillingness to unequivocally support those who were pushing a Lib-Lab strategy 
internally (Campbell, 2010: 23/12/96, 342). The view of Liddle was that it was ‘very strange’ Blair did not 
turn up to its launch, and Blair’s attempted detachment from the book did not stop his public association 
with its contents by all strands of the left (Kettle, 1996: 94-97; Milne, 1996: 3-5; Liddle, 2014, Interview). 
When published – despite its omission from the final draft – the book’s thematic scope inevitably led to 
discussion of coalition. Mandelson, in a promotional BBC interview, was forced to state that it was: 
 
Absolutely clear that they're (Blair and Ashdown) not interested in pacts or deals, or 
coalitions, or individuals taking positions up here, there, or anywhere else.  What we're talking 
about is the principled co-operation between likeminded people. (Mandelson, 1996) 
 
The creation and announcement in October 1996 of a Joint Consultative Committee, after a year of Cook 
and Maclennan meeting one-on-one, was envisaged as part of a two-step process. Firstly, discussions would 
continue on constitutional and electoral reform. This would lead, in February of 1997, to a joint 
announcement of shared areas of agreement beyond the constitution. However, within Labour the 
emphasis was on downplaying the importance of these institutional, formal structures, rather than using 
them as a launch pad for further action. Campbell’s media management efforts went into downplaying the 
significance of these discussions; in meetings of the committee, apart from Robin Cook, Labour efforts 
went into obstructing the talks and minimizing positions of agreement. Roger Liddle (Interview, 2014) 
describes them as ‘at once, something and nothing’. In large part, this can be put down to a reassertion of 
majoritarian instincts as an election approached. What had seemed feasible in the late summer of 1996, in 
discussions with Ashdown and Jenkins, wilted as the potential intra-party and electoral complications 
became clearer. By January Blair was contemplating ‘just offering Ashdown a seat in Cabinet, as Churchill 
had done to the Liberal leader, Clement Davies, in 1951’ (Seldon, 2004: 272). There were significant fears 
of the election period being dominated by discussion of proportional representation which would have the 
effect of dividing Blair’s party, uniting the Conservative Party in opposing a change in the ‘rules of the 
game’.  
 
At times, Blair pushed back against anti-Liberal Democrat forces within the elite of his party - for example, 
Jack Straw’s consistent criticism of Liberal Democrats annoyed Liberal Democrats and Blair in equal 
measure (Campbell, 2010, 8/8/1994; Liddle, 2014, Interview; Rodgers, 2000: 286). But the extent to which 
Blair was willing to autocratically and actively challenge the perception of Liberal Democrats as equal 
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opponents to the Liberal Democrats was consistently patchy. Blair’s ‘Napoleonic rather than a Feudal’ style 
of leadership meant it is perhaps unsurprising negotiations should be kept away from key figures within the 
party (Hennessy, 2000: 490). Blair adopted a ‘horses for courses’ approach, which meant those in favour of 
a Lib-Lab strategy, and the policy areas that would arise from it, were kept abreast of developments 
(Macintyre, 2000: 389).  
 
At key points the input of figures such as Gordon Brown and John Prescott hindered talks. Seldon (2004: 
277) is clear that ‘if Brown had supported Blair (on Lib-Lab talks) … the outcomes would have been very 
different’. Others, including Ashdown, describe Prescott as the ultimate break on ‘the project’ (Rawnsley, 
2001: 193; Interview, Ashdown, 2016; Interview, Liddle, 2014). Immediately following the talks at Derry 
Irvine’s house Prescott made clear his opposition to Ashdown’s inclusion in government, promising his 
resignation if that were to happen. Brown’s antagonism towards co-operation was often assumed and pre-
empted. But, particularly following the setting up of Cook/Maclennan committee in October 1996, his 
opposition to ‘the Liberals’ was made clear – upon hearing of the news of the creation of the constitutional 
committee, Brown went ‘on the rampage’ (Richards, 2010: 142). Robin Cook’s personal association with 
the process of constitutional reform was a hindrance to gaining the support of Brown and Prescott: an 
advocate of co-operation notes that ‘one of the principal complications, in Labour terms, is that Cook was 
largely identified as wanting to make it happen’ (Liddle, 2014, Interview). More widely among the cabinet 
and indeed the parliamentary party, negotiations between Blair and Ashdown were widely dismissed as a 
ruse to extract Liberal Democrat support, and ‘in as much as they knew about it, thought he was just playing 
along the Liberals to try and help us in an election victory and stop them running interference’ (Interview, 
Powell, 2016). Blair’s PPS is clear, even in retrospect, both that there was no clear discussion on the prospect 
of Liberal Democrats entering cabinet and, regardless of the post-electoral parliamentary arithmetic, that 
such a prospect was unachievable (Grocott, 2016, Interview). Fear of detachment from the PLP pervades 
contemporaneous accounts of opposition and the early years of New Labour’s government. Campbell 
(2010: 28/10/1996) was concerned the announcement of the Cook/Maclennan committee ‘might just push 
the party off the deep end’. 
 
Blair’s own indecision was also important in stalling co-operation. A key example was the Littleborough 
and Saddleworth by election of July 1995, which became a Labour-Liberal Democrat battle, with the Lib 
Dems favourites in the seat. Despite being conducted during a period in which the two parties’ connections 
appeared to be expanding and policies overlapping, it resembled ‘a pair of pizza parlours fighting over a 
franchise on the edge of town’ (Kellner, The Sunday Times, 30/7/1995: 6). Mandelson, ostensibly a pro-
collaboration figure, conducted a strident campaign focusing heavily on the Liberal Democrats’ candidate. 
Following focus groups of potential Liberal Democrat-Labour switchers, Labour particularly targeted the 
Liberal Democrat candidates’ position of a Royal Commission on drug reform. Patrick Wintour (The 
Guardian: 14/7/1995: 13) commented that ‘so lurid is Labour’s portrayal that one expects hypodermic 
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needles to spill out of Mr Davies’ pockets’. This was despite pre-campaign discussions between Blair and 
Ashdown, in which Ashdown (2000: 9/6/1995, 323) had described it as ‘a test case of whether you are 
prepared to make sacrifices to get the project to work’; an awareness that ‘a good second’ was the best that 
could be hoped for; as well as specific, albeit not forcefully enacted, instructions that Blair wished the 
campaign to be fought on positive terms. This clearly weakened the relationship and levels of trust between 
the two parties and, albeit seemingly temporarily, between the two leaders.  
 
However, the most unambiguous benefit from the Lib-Lab ‘project’ was ultimately the clear electoral boost 
it gave to both parties in the 1997 general election. Analysis by Ashdown put this down to strategic 
management – ‘a nudge and a wink’ both in private and in public that ensured electoral campaigning, both 
in terms of campaign messaging and constituency targeting, did not overlap (Ashdown, Butler Interview, 
20/5/1997). Certainly, there were daily conversations between Peter Mandelson and Richard Holme 
throughout the campaign (Mandelson, 2010: 255-6; Brack, 2016: 210). The extent to which planning activity 
in the short campaign had a significant effect is a moot point. The rise in Lib-Lab tactical voting in 1997 
may well have owed less to the signalling of Ashdown and Blair than the Major government’s historic 
unpopularity. Polling conducted by Chris Rennard, the Liberal Democrat’s director of campaigns and 
elections, showed that Ashdown and Blair campaigning overtly in tandem would have a negative effect 
(Brack, 2016: 209). The objective that the Liberal Democrat leadership had set out in 1992, to create a 
political environment where discussion of coalition would be normalised, had not been achieved. Railing 
against this failure had led Ashdown to place significant weight on polling that, at best, produced a cloudy 
picture of popular support for a Lib-Lab coalition: David Butler noted Ashdown, in January 1997, ‘delighted 
in the inaccurate statement that 54% would prefer parliament hung’, and his diaries note a poll showing 
30% support for a Lib-Lab government among Labour supporters (Interview, Butler: 8/2/1997; Ashdown, 
2000: 4/1/1997, 499).  
 
Nevertheless, on these more limited terms, the evidence clearly shows the dynamic between the two parties 
had some impact. While the practice of tactical voting was not all that widespread – the percentage of the 
electorate who favoured the Lib Dems but voted Labour rose by 0.7% from 1992, and vice versa 0.5%. 
Had the movement of votes from 1992 to 1997 been uniform, Labour would have secured a majority of 
131 rather than 179 (Evans, Curtice, Norris, 1997: 73). The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, would have 
won just 28 seats rather than 46. The Daily Mirror, the day before the election, urged its readers to ‘get 
practical, vote tactical’ and published a list of 20 seats where ‘if you’re Labour and want the Lib Dems out 
... vote Lib Dem here’, 18 of which were won by Liberal Democrats – and it was in the closest Con/Lib 
Dem marginal seats where the effect of tactical voting was clearest (Daily Mirror, 30/4/1997: 7; Evans, 
Curtice, Norris, 1998: 65-79). Stephen Twigg, who defeated Michael Portillo in the most iconic result of 
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election evening in Enfield Southgate, paid tribute to the ‘hundreds of Liberal Democrats, who put aside 
their national preference, (and) voted tactically for Labour to insure a non-Conservative victory’.27 
 
The end of co-operation: Blair’s victory to Ashdown’s defeat, May 1997-January 1999 
 
On election night, it became clear that Labour had exceeded expectations, damaging the prospect of 
deepened post-election Lib-Lab collaboration. Any agreement would have to run contrary to the 
expectation of single-party government. Those involved in both the Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
were aware the perceived illegitimacy of any coalition government involving the Liberal Democrats 46 MPs 
after a landslide majority of 179 seats had been produced – Ashdown (2000: 1/5/1997, 557) was ‘plagued 
by the idea it would be seen as an undemocratic, self-serving act’. However, it was Blair, not Ashdown, who 
was ultimately responsible for any decision on the issue. Prescott, helicoptering over to Blair’s constituency 
of Sedgefield, made it clear that he was not in the mood to countenance any deal with the Liberal Democrats 
(Interview, 2016, Powell). Robert Harris (The Sunday Times, 27/9/1998: 17), the only journalist alongside 
Blair throughout election night, claimed Blair was ‘surprisingly subdued’ because he saw the prospect of 
Lib-Lab co-operation ending with the scale of the landslide. Both Ashdown and Powell also put the 
rejection of negotiations down to Britain’s rushed government formation process. Ashdown partially 
blames ‘the baleful influence of just about the worst constitutional mechanism Britain has, the Downing 
Street Removal van’ and believes, if a week of deliberation had followed prior to the government’s 
formation, the Liberal Democrats would have negotiated more formal layers of co-operation with Blair 
(Ashdown, Brack, Little, 2015, 454; Ashdown, 2016, Interview). Powell names the decision to avoid 
involving the Liberal Democrats immediately as one of New Labour’s biggest mistakes, arguing it was best 
to operate such co-operation from a position of strength and ‘the resistance would have been at its least 
because no one was expecting it’ (Powell, Interview, 2016). 
 
Though a strand of backbench opinion felt a coalition was unconscionable regardless of the result, there 
was a settled acceptance that a Lib-Lab agreement would have been negotiated had the parliamentary 
arithmetic demanded it (Grocott, Interview, 2016). But the election result, while ruling out this type of 
coalition that had been partially prepared for on both sides, did not end inter-party discussions. Seldon 
(2004: 274) believed that Blair was ‘anxious to show that he had not cynically used the Liberal Democrats’, 
and there was certainly a feeling within the Lib Dems that they had not only benefitted from association 
with Blair, but been clearly been useful electorally. Ashdown’s line that his party would be useful in the 
operation of a second term government fell on fertile soil since the second term, and the prospects for it, 
continued to define New Labour’s activity. However, the continuing levels of co-operation – principally, 
the formal movement of the Cook-Maclennan talks from a Joint Consultative Committee to a Joint 
Consultative Cabinet Committee – always fell short of what had been originally envisaged. Despite being 																																																								
27 Footage of Twigg’s acceptance speech available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVvWE6V9ulE 
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the strongest institutional result of ‘the project’, they were in a sense its most symbolic element. Their 
creation, and their subsequent (albeit extremely brief) expansion beyond the constitution, did little to bolster 
co-operation. Far from creating the institutional conditions for deeper co-operation, they were broadly seen 
as dysfunctional. For Liberal Democrat members of the committee, they were ‘strange events’ which ‘did 
a few things, but it didn’t really work’ (Hughes, 2016, Interview; McNally, Interview, 2016). Their purpose 
was, as with Steel and the Lib-Lab pact, a means of constructive engagement as much as an end in and of 
itself. Blair predicted on election day that ‘if you sit on opposite benches of the House then the natural 
process of politics will mean the drifting apart of the two parties’ (Ashdown 2000: 1/5/1997, 556). Powell 
also believes that ‘once we missed it at the beginning it was going to be very hard, frankly, to return to’, 
although with the caveat that ‘I’m not sure I thought that at the time, otherwise I wouldn’t have participated 
in the JCC and all those other things’ (Powell, 2016, Interview). Many key Liberal Democrats continued to 
be scarred by the ‘bad blood’ created by half-formed, and half-enacted, constitutional commitments from 
the Lib-Lab pact of 1977, as discussion about the prospect of proportional representation for the European 
parliament got underway (Seldon, 2004: 270; Young (Maclennan), 2007: 12/2/1997, 515). 
 
The irregular meetings of the Cabinet Committee, announced in July 1997 and beginning in September, 
were defined principally by the lack of enthusiasm by Labour participants. Indeed, in retrospect Ashdown 
says he ‘never thought it would deliver very much, but it was a useful framework to keep Blair on board 
with us’ (Ashdown, Little, Brack, 2015: 454). This lack of support from within the Labour cabinet was a 
sustained problem, and Liberal Democrats at the time, and in retrospect, could name only Mo Mowlam as 
someone straightforwardly in favour of fostering closer links through the committee throughout its 
timespan (Young (Holme), 2007: 19/1/1999, 583). Peter Mandelson’s resignation from the cabinet in 
December 1998 was, as a result, hugely significant, weakening whatever support remained on both sides 
for co-operation. Indeed, upon Ashdown’s resignation a month later, one commentator described him as 
‘the fourth victim of the Mandelson Affair’ (White, The Guardian, 21/1/1999: 21). Robin Cook was 
increasingly seen to be isolated, particularly on the issue of electoral reform. It did yield the creation of the 
Jenkins committee, which would provide an analysis of the present electoral system and (it was tacitly agreed 
in its remit) call for proposals and changes to the system for Westminster elections.  
 
The assumption was that the steady creation of a report forged on a cross-party basis would provide the 
path dependence and momentum to make change seem an inevitability. But as Straw delivered the 
government verdict to Jenkins’ Report (in a speech Blair claimed to have toned down, but was still 
provocative) Jenkins told Ashdown he had to turn off the television on which he was watching, and his 
personal relationship with Blair – while cordial – never fully recovered (Ashdown, 2001: 6/11/1998, 325). 
Blair argued in September 1998, in a fax that led Ashdown to say that it would force his resignation, that 
he still wanted ‘a great progressive alliance for the twenty first century’ but that electoral reform, while 
‘certainly for the Lib Dems the most obvious way’ to this objective, was not the only route. Instead Blair 
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suggested a delay, strengthening of joint co-operation and local deals to secure the position of 15-20 Liberal 
Democrat MPs and insulate them from potential electoral pushback (Ashdown, 2000: 11/9/1998, 257-60). 
Instead of the existing constitutional reforms New Labour had introduced leading naturally to electoral 
reform, he believed the public was ‘constitutionally satiated’, and that a referendum on electoral reform 
would be lost. Blair’s letter to Jenkins, making it clear that his proposals were unlikely to be swiftly taken 
up by the government, cited both institutional and intra-party difficulties: the case for reform needed to be 
made ‘within government for the notion of co-operation, and its value’. 
 
The expansion of the Joint Cabinet Committee’s remit was recompense for the abandonment of the Jenkins 
Report – Lance Price (2005), at the time Labour’s Deputy Director of Communications, recorded Blair 
saying that he did not want ‘co-operation with the Lib Dems to crumble away after our body swerve on 
PR’. Ashdown also appeared to believe the abandonment of a referendum on proportional representation 
was the final nail in the coffin for fruitful Lib-Lab negotiations but, given the amount of political capital 
invested in a road half-travelled, it could not be abandoned. As a result, Ashdown’s rationale to Blair was 
‘since you have done less, I will have to do more … and see if I can use Jenkins, even in its very weakened 
state, to wind things on’ (Ashdown, 2001: 3/11/1998). The sense that momentum, and the need for 
negotiations to give renewed purpose to Lib-Lab relations, was palpable both in accounts of the talks and 
their public announcement. The committee’s widening to areas such as ‘health, education, modernizing the 
welfare state and European integration’ was viewed contemporarily as significant, both inside the parties 
and outside. But within Labour the move was, remarkably, not discussed formally in cabinet. The Liberal 
Democrat Parliamentary Party, Federal Executive and Federal Policy Committee also felt ‘bounced’ into 
an agreement, and prompted significant internal tension with a ‘furious’ national party. According to 
Ashdown, long-term supporters of his initiative in the Jo Group were also against. MPs felt Ashdown’s 
language did not preclude the possibility of merger, suggesting that their party was increasingly being 
subsumed by New Labour rather than achieving desired constitutional concessions (White and MacAskill, 
1998).  
 
Yet despite the furore, in practical terms Blair clearly saw it as little more than a symbolic concession – one 
that was likely to have significant party political, but very little public policy, effect. The specific mechanics, 
which some Liberal Democrats (most prominently Simon Hughes) questioned in private and public, 
remained hazy. Blair, retrospectively talking about Lib-Lab politics, said that: 
 
I know there's some dispute about this, but my recollection very much was that they were 
prepared to cooperate on constitutional stuff but not on public service reform, and, for me, 
you know, you have to have both. (Blair, 2013) 
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Blair either feigned not to be aware of why Ashdown needed concessions on electoral reform to progress, 
or had grown impatient of an obsession with constitutional minutiae. A recurrent feeling among senior 
Liberal Democrats was that he had no feeling or patience for the party’s specific character and political 
priorities. And, as with the original creation of the Cook-Maclennan talks in 1996, Labour’s operation 
expended as much energy playing down the importance of the talks as the Liberal Democrat leadership 
did emphasising their significance and evidence of a recurring ‘slip between what Blair says and what 
Campbell actually does’ (Price, 2005: 53). The way in which this development was portrayed was as a 
negotiating victory for Blair, a Times leader (13/11/1998: 23) commenting that ‘The closer the two parties 
become, the easier it will be for Mr Blair to achieve what he has always wanted – a realignment of the 
centre-left, without the need for PR’. It was immediately clear the increased scope of the Consultative 
Committee was illusory. Ashdown’s resignation followed inevitably from his failure to extract key 
constitutional concessions necessary to make the journey worthwhile.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Institution-Facing Constraints 
 
Dunleavy (2009: 626) argues the Cook-Maclennan agreement was ‘the most consequentially significant and 
wide-ranging constitutional reform document ever agreed between two major UK parties across the 
twentieth century’; Ingle (2008: 136) has observed that ‘although history may have overlooked the fact, 
Ashdown's strategy turned out to be very successful vis-a-vis the enactment of party policy’. But an audit 
of Liberal Democrat influence on Labour policy in government and opposition, and the (ultimately limited) 
structures created, would offer little more than a partial understanding of what ‘the project’ was about. The 
repeated refrain, and for Ashdown the eternal crux, was both a need to change the political culture of 
Britain, and the institutional rules. This meant two clear goals. Firstly, the Liberal Democrat objectives on 
electoral reform, and ensuring they were broadly supported by New Labour in government and opposition. 
And, also, long term changes in the structure of party politics, so that his successors saw themselves as 
inheriting a party that was a constituent part of a long-term centre-left project.  
 
Both aims were, at best, half fulfilled. Ashdown was clear in July 1997 he felt he had already secured ‘a new, 
less confrontational culture in British politics’. David Miliband, then Head of Blair’s Policy Unit, felt ‘Blair’s 
interest (in Lib-Labbery) was much more in the philosophy than the mechanics’ (Young (Miliband), 2007: 
15/9/1998, 572). The Jenkins Report, which proposed an AV+ system of semi-proportionality, was 
ultimately left – as Jenkins (1998) noted of previous legislative efforts to reform the electoral system – to 
‘lie mouldering on the shelf’. As Jack Straw set out the government’s reaction to the reform in parliament, 
in a tacit rebuke to a report he damned with faint praise, he noted that ‘those who win form a Government, 
who have power over those who lose’ (Hansard, HC, 5/11/1998, v. 318, c. 1039). Fear of electoral defeat, 
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and subsequently the difficulty of a second victory, is a key explanation for a lack of radical zeal in the early 
years of New Labour’s government (although, questioned off the record in 1997, Blair admitted that he 
believed predictions of a big Labour victory ‘more than he let on’ (Butler, Blair Interview, 17/7/1997). But 
equally, the continuing expectation of single-party victory fundamentally undermined calls for reform. All 
this did few favours to Liberal Democrats hoping New Labour would embrace institutional change. 
 
Ashdown’s question asked with increasing frustration in private, and in public to demonstrate his growing 
disconnect, was whether Blair was ‘a pluralist or a control freak’. The ‘Blair Paradox’, which Marquand 
outlined in 1998, was that he was both at once. Radical constitutional commitments were made and 
delivered without a driving belief in their necessity. The working assumption was that radical changes 
committed to in the early years of government could beget a loosening of New Labour’s centralizing ethos, 
generating ‘a dynamic of its own, carrying the transformation further than its authors intended or expected’ 
(Marquand, 1998). Marquand (1999: 1) felt ‘the architecture of British democracy … the web of 
understandings and assumptions that tell its managers who they are and how they ought to behave, are 
back on the agenda’. This is partially true: while Blair was a continuing advocate of first past the post, he 
did see the benefits of electoral co-operation and felt that it could be used as an electoral benefit. But it was 
for Labour gain, as a means of cementing single-party governance. The basis of co-operation was that it 
was on a tactical manoeuvre to neuter and engulf the Liberal Democrats. According to Chris Mullin (2011: 
23/7/1997), Blair told his parliamentary committee of backbenchers that co-operation ‘makes it easier for 
Liberal voters to switch to us in the West Country and, if we lost a few votes to Liberals in places like 
Richmond, so what?’  
 
Ashdown based his political strategy in part on encouraging tactical voting, because ‘it all does depend on 
people accepting the hypothesis that coalition politics is better than one-party politics’ (Young, 2008: 370). 
His privately encouraged Blair to ‘create the expectation of co-operation to encourage tactical voting’ (Ibid. 
337). In this sense, it was a success for Ashdown: tactical voting did ultimately have a significant effect in 
1997, and voters were willing to think beyond the two-party system to give his party a greater foothold in 
parliament. However, this was third party progress within the constraints of a two-party system. It was 
dependent upon a positive strategic symbiosis with the Labour Party that was inherently restrictive, and 
ultimately short-lived. A persistent criticism of the Liberal Democrats’ political strategy throughout 
Ashdown’s period as leader was the charge of self-aggrandisement by a party whose ‘importance can easily 
be exaggerated, not least by themselves’ (Riddell, The Times, 11/5/1992: 12). That is an unfair 
characterisation – Ashdown was aware the job of a Liberal Democrat leader is to ‘tack to prevailing winds 
and take advantage where they can’ (Leaman, 2010: 68). Ashdown (Interview, 2016) was consistently aware 
that his political fortunes were dependent on Labour, ‘the polar point around which you had to gather, 
because of its dominance’.  
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Viewed in terms of an inherited historic narrative, or as an attempt to secure game-changing reform, it is 
hard to view Lib-Lab politics as a success. But as a method of advancing his party electorally, and a method 
of adaptability to changing political circumstances, its success – in terms of parliamentary seats and political 
oxygen for his party – is difficult to question. Ashdown’s (2016, Interview) claim that ‘the project’ ‘laid the 
groundwork for the biggest expansion the party has ever seen’ is hard to dispute. Ashdown was able to 
carrel his party into a commitment to abandon the pretence of equidistance between the Conservatives and 
Labour, and then to begin formal channels of co-operation. He also never fully ruled out the idea of merger 
as an end destination, though claims to have made clear that: 
 
This will never happen under me, but if we have the habit of co-operation in government, 
if we jointly put up with the pressures of government, who knows – at the end of that 
process you may have created enough amity between the parties for that to happen. 
(Ashdown, 2013) 
 
It also showed the extent to which co-operation was a road half travelled, a strategic staging-post Ashdown 
himself would struggle to retreat from. Ashdown’s objectives were, ultimately, unachieved. Ashdown never 
convinced Blair to think pluralistically. The political implications of a formal and extended working 
relationship between New Labour and the Liberal Democrats can only be approximated. That they should 
be approached as a failure of inter-party negotiation may seem overly reductive, given that ‘Lib-Lab’ politics 
developed and stretched the institutional mechanisms of British politics in some unprecedented ways, while 
both parties were in opposition and government. The journalist Steve Richards (The Guardian, 10/8/1999: 
16) noted, upon Ashdown’s resignation, that ‘Blair has made the Liberal Democrats relevant when he could 
have swallowed them alive'. Instead, through a gradual realization Liberal Democrat and Labour objectives 
were irreconcilable, Ashdown’s strategic aims suffered a slower, but no less painful, death. 
 
Party-Facing Constraints 
 
David Steel (Interview, 2016) is clear on the reason for the resignation of his de facto Liberal successor, 
Paddy Ashdown. Steel says Ashdown told him that towards the end of his leadership he was ‘miles ahead 
of his party, and that’s why he decided to throw his hand in as leader. They weren’t prepared to follow him 
in the direction he was going’. Certainly, Ashdown felt he was unable to stretch his party’s acceptance of 
co-operation any further than he had, without concrete compromises that Blair was either unable, or 
unwilling, to give (Ashdown, Interview, 2016). Ashdown was unable to bequeath Blair a Liberal Democrat 
leader who would develop channels of inter-party co-operation, or even continue pre-existing routes of co-
operation. Both Labour and Liberal Democrats note Charles Kennedy’s leadership qualities, while putting 
his abandonment of Lib-Lab politics down to, variously, strategic unwillingness or incoherence (Ashdown, 
2016, Interview; Leaman, 2016, Interview). What is more significant in the dynamics of the 1999 Lib Dem 
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leadership contest is the lack of any candidate willing and able to run in full support of Ashdown’s strategy, 
despite his continued popularity (Francis, 2010: 93-95). 
 
Maintaining a connection with the Liberal Democrats appeared not to require any co-operation on electoral 
reform, merely the continual promise of it. Yet there was a limit: dragging on the promise of a referendum 
until after Labour’s first term, across three electoral cycles and into Labour’s anticipated second term, 
ultimately meant Blair would have to do without the continued support and presence of Paddy Ashdown. 
And Ashdown’s leadership, along with the chimera of electoral reform, provided the two necessary 
conditions for Lib-Lab politics to continue. Ashdown, in retrospect, is clear that ‘the moment this didn’t 
succeed, as this was my primary strategy, I would have to stand down’ (Ashdown, 2016, Interview). 
Ashdown put an ever-higher price on his leadership and held his resignation as a key bargaining chip 
(Ashdown, 2000 10/5/95 319; 2001: 331, 11/11/1998). In a clear echo of Jo Grimond’s call for Liberals 
to ‘march towards the sound of gunfire’, Ashdown described his political strategy as ‘fix bayonets and 
charge. I don't have the concept of the right time. I can never wait for it. I would always try to make 
[political forces] do something else’ (Riddell, 2003). Often, this meant what many thought was an 
overemphasis on fixed strategic aims within a political landscape in constant flux (Hughes, 2016, Interview). 
Ashdown saw this as not just a trait of his leadership, but an inherent role for Liberal leaders and: 
 
coming from a party that had Jo Grimond with this idea, Jeremy Thorpe with this idea, David 
Steel with this idea. And here was given to me the best opportunity a Liberal or Lib Dem 
leader to pursue this as leader. It would have been a dereliction of my duty as Lib Dem leader 
were I not to pursue this. (Ashdown, 2013) 
 
Consistent Lib Dem advocates of co-operation began to lose faith in the project, as Blair remained unwilling 
or unable to accede to their central requirement of electoral reform. Key players and observers mark the 
day after the general election landslide, and the initial post-election period, as the point at which the 
prospect of a strong Lib-Lab agreement fell apart (Ashdown, 2016, Interview; Leaman, 2016, Interview; 
Powell, 2016, Interview). But Blair’s confirmation he planned to downplay the Jenkins Report in September 
1998 was the first time, according to Ashdown’s diaries, when he saw the prospects of realignment reach 
the end of the road (Ashdown, 2000, 11/11/98 257-59; Ashdown, Brack, Little, 2015, 454). This speaks to 
Liberal Democrat priorities, and the extent to which the promise of proportional representation was a sine 
qua non for any lasting agreement. Ashdown was aware of the need for consultation, and the inevitable 
conflict between intra-party conciliation and strategic clarity. Indeed, he told David Butler it ‘wasn’t 
necessary for a party to love their leader, but it is rather necessary for a leader to love his party’ but he was 
seen to be ‘torn between his desire to be unlike Sir David (Steel), by keeping in close touch with the rank-
and-file, and his national ambitions’ (Butler Interview, 18/02/97; Riddell, 1994: 18). Ultimately, Steel 
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(Interview, 2016) felt, this led to a strident attitude well beyond anything Steel himself had displayed as 
leader.  
 
In Blair’s case, soothing concerns about the Lib-Lab dynamic was often prioritized over any attempt at 
coercion or persuasion of senior cabinet colleagues. Hugo Young noted in July 1998 – four years after 
negotiations with Ashdown had begun, and during a crucial period where the possibility of a referendum 
on electoral reform was being seriously discussed – that ‘few in his government have any idea why he is 
doing any of this stuff … his grasp of the bigness of the picture is unique to him’ (Young, 1998:16). At key 
points – the creation of a formal Lib-Lab consultative committee, immediately following the general 
election result, the announcement of the Jenkins Report on electoral reform – reticence among critics 
hardened to direct and clear opposition. Just as Steel had repeatedly ‘bounced’ and coerced an unwilling 
party so Ashdown, accruing goodwill in the early years of leadership, chose to expend it on pursing Lib-
Lab accommodation. Blair’s intra-party strategy was, on the other hand, based around circumventing 
dissent and delaying key confrontation. When Blair used ex cathedra pronouncements without consultation, 
such as on the creation of a Joint Consultative Committee, this caused problems within his cabinet and 
parliamentary party (Mullin, 2011, 18/11/1998). But, generally, Blair’s priority on the big decisions 
regarding his party’s relationship with the Liberal Democrats appeared to be to pre-empt and delay the 
inevitable pushback against a strategy, which, at times, he seemed wholly isolated in pursuing. 
 
Reform of the Labour party and the idea of co-operation were related causes, and themes Blair and 
Ashdown (and, indeed, opponents such as John Prescott) partially interlinked. The General Secretary of 
the AEEU Union, Ken Jackson, observed that 
 
Modernisation is not the same as ditching the Labour Party. Yet that is what some people 
seem to think it means. They would rather have a middle-class army of technocrats than a 
party of working people. They would rather merge with the Liberal Democrats than keep the 
link with the unions. (BBC News, 14/1/1999) 
 
This was a key split among self-professed modernisers within the party. The two clearest tracts advancing 
undiluted modernization, Liddle and Mandelson’s (1996) The Blair Revolution, and Philip Gould’s (1998: 398) 
The Unfinished Revolution, both contained calls for Lib-Lab co-operation;28 key advocates of a broadly defined 
modernization such as Jack Straw, Gordon Brown and Alastair Campbell, were significantly more 
antagonistic to the idea (Richards, 2010: 142; Seldon, 2004: 270; Wager, 2017). From Blair’s first significant 
meeting with Ashdown in 1993, while Shadow Home Secretary, Blair was acutely concerned about internal 
opposition to Lib-Lab connections of any sort, given the level of hostility that continued to exist within his 																																																								
28 Though references to an electoral pact were removed from the final publication of Liddle and Mandelson’s book, 
they were widely reported. 
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party (Ashdown, 2000: 242, 1/12/93). Exponents of Lib-Lab politics and constitutional reform in the mid-
1990s were aware their cause had little support either in parliament or in the wider party (MacDonald, 
Interview, 2016). In the run up to the 1997 election, Ashdown commented that ‘the mismatch between 
Labour as reflected in the words of New Labour and as it exists on the ground – as I know it to exist – is 
immense, and Tony Blair understands that’ (Young, 1997: 21). By 1999, Ken Livingstone said that, should 
Lib-Lab co-operation and merger be put to a conference vote (as, it was understood by Blair’s inner circle, 
it would have to be), he would be surprised if it mustered more than 20% support (BBC, 1999; Powell, 
2016, Interview). Clearly, this element of party modernisation, bringing with it the toxicity of the SDP and 
the tribal loyalties of the Labour party, never came close to gaining the traction Clause IV reform achieved.  
 
Blair and Ashdown professed and partially demonstrated a loyalty to, and a detachment from, their 
respective parties. Each held an acute awareness of (and frustration with) the intra-party obstacles to an 
ever-closer relationship between the two parties. As a result, negotiations, just as with Jenkins and Steel, 
were noticeably detached from key elite figures who could act as an immediate roadblock. Views 
representative of key strands of their parties that were less enthusiastic were sidelined, though Blair’s 
continued reliance on senior figures ardently opposed to any co-operation (and who, subsequently, Jenkins 
came to regard as intellectual and political lightweights) concerned senior Liberal Democrats (Campbell, 
2014; Leaman, 2016, Interview). Talks, when they eventually were expanded beyond advocates, led to 
increased levels of disconnect and disillusionment within their respective elite and parliamentary parties. 
Senior advisors within both leaders’ offices feel the level of tribal opposition was severely underestimated. 
Ashdown claims ‘Blair hit a rock first. But I could have hit a rock next’ (Ashdown, 2013).  
 
Blair – defending ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
 
The hurdles to a comprehensive agreement – either a pre-electoral agreement, or a form of post-election 
coalition – were, therefore, clearly organizational and institutional. The key is whether the agency of the 
politicians involved could have worked, given the political will, to overcome these barriers; indeed, 
principally, whether Tony Blair ever held the desire to follow through with an inter-party strategy that would 
have created short and medium-term pressures on his leadership, for longer-term gains. Lib-Labbery was a 
manifestation and a symptom of Blair’s ‘big tent’ approach. New Labour wanted to, in the words of Philip 
Gould (1998: 6), ‘remake the political map by establishing new dividing lines, new prisms through which 
politics was perceived’. But, instead of piecing together a new coalition with new party labels it would always 
be ‘a new party trapped within the structures of the old, like a butterfly trapped within its own crystalis’ 
(Gould, 1998, 240).  
 
Analyses of New Labour’s ‘modernization’ have noted its rejection of aspects of its past, and a selective 
rejuvenation of areas that complemented its claims to novelty and radicalism. But during key formative 
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periods in opposition, and in historically-weighted speeches before 1997 – in particular the bold setting of 
a Fabian Society 1945 Anniversary Lecture, which senior advisors claimed acted as the best guide to Blair’s 
intellectual thinking – Lib-Lab politics was a principal theme (Miliband, Butler Interview, 5/12/95). Blair 
emphasized a linkage between liberalism, and his concept of socialism, as ‘intellectual cousins’ (a 
relationship which, as Fielding (2003) noted, suggested an equal footing). This was the language and rhetoric 
of centre-left co-operation, while neatly avoiding the institutional disruption of formal electoral co-
operation or electoral reform. Electoral reform could not only be irrelevant to Blair’s desire for a ‘big tent’ 
political party, but also incommensurate with the type of hegemony he envisaged for the centre-left. Blair’s 
Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, spells out that: 
 
we wanted to eat them … I don’t know what they wanted really. I guess they wanted to carry 
on, because of course electoral reform made little sense unless they wanted to carry on as a 
minority party. Our idea was to form a great, big progressive party so you wouldn’t have 
needed electoral reform.  Indeed, it might have been a setback. (Powell, 2016, Interview) 
 
Blair’s adoption of this language of co-operation as a rhetorical device was, therefore, unproblematic 
ideologically and politically. But Neil Sherlock and Neal Lawson, consistent intellectual and political 
advocates of a ‘progressive alliance’, wrote despairingly (in a book with a foreword by Jenkins) that their 
problem with New Labour was that ‘what was never ‘modernised’ was the notion that there was one party, 
one history and one future’ (Sherlock and Lawson, 2001: 6). Tony Wright, a firm backbench advocate of 
electoral reform, felt at the time that a radical constitutional reform agenda could fill the perceived void in 
strategy that existed in opposition following Clause 4 (Young, Wright Interview, 2008: 479, 2/5/1996).  
 
It speaks to Blair’s strategic priorities that, despite his clear advantages it would have in encouraging Lib-
Lab connections, the constitutional agenda played a muted role in his opposition pitch. It was clear the aim 
was ultimately always to absorb Liberal Democrats within the existing coalition that was New Labour. 
Blair’s Fabian call to liberalism, hailed at the time and retroactively as emblematic of Blair’s determination 
towards co-operation, can be easily misconstrued (Blair, 1995; Richards, 1999: 16). Perhaps knowingly, Blair 
never clarified whether he envisaged liberalism and socialism existing in partnership or under one party 
label. It is better to think of Blair’s rhetoric as ‘a leader trying to reach out beyond the traditional boundaries 
of his party’, while also maintaining a tight grip on his own (McFadden, 2013). It was a case study in, as 
Riker put it, ‘managing and manipulating and manoeuvring’ to achieve optimum outcomes (Riker, 1986: 
ix). The management of inter-party talks to avoid discussion of institutional rule-change, altering the 
political questions for the Liberal Democrat leadership so co-operation was achieved without the key 
demand of electoral reform; and the electoral manoeuvring that played a small (but significant) role in 
ensuring the party’s majority. 
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This is notable, for a Lib-Lab agreement was an example of the bold strategic action that Blair was keen to 
associate with his leadership, as well as potentially enabling and signifying a clear movement towards the 
type of politically and strategically flexible social democratic party Blair wished to create. As Hugo Young 
(1998: 16) noted, a Lib-Lab coalition appealed equally ‘to Blair the reformer and Blair the big-picture 
strategist’. When discussing the possibility of Liberal cabinet ministers and possible merger with Campbell 
(2010, 730, 26/4/97), just over a week before the election, Blair had ‘the Clause 4 glint in his eye’. Alastair 
Campbell worried that, ‘once Clause IV was over, the drama would be replaced by a ‘so what?’ factor’ and, 
indeed, felt as the election drew nearer the ‘internal dynamics were tending to make [Blair] a bit defensive, 
take fewer risks, settle for the centre of gravity’ (Campbell, 2010: 157 3/3/95, 457 1/6/96). But viewed as 
a further step towards modernization, and a sidelining of the left of his party – as it was, by both ardent 
exponents and opponents of co-operation – its benefits were ultimately only temporarily achieved. As 
Jonathan Powell (2016, Interview) notes, ‘there is a limit to how many radical things you could do, and in 
the end it didn’t happen.’ 
 
Ashdown – disrupting ‘existing institutional equilibrium’? 
 
Jenkins and Blair apparently tussled over who had come up with the phrase ‘the progressive century’ (a 
concept, Ashdown says, that ‘may have been a revelation to Tony, but was something that had driven the 
Liberal Democrats for the best part of thirty to forty years’ (Ashdown, 2013)). But Ashdown and Jenkins 
equally laid claim to the metaphor of Blair carrying an expensive vase towards the end destination of 
government – consistently fearful and paranoid about ‘the narrowness and difficulty of winning at all’ 
(Ashdown, 2013; Campbell, 2014; Young Ashdown Interview, 457, 27/11/95). Blair was consistently of 
the opinion that ‘there was too much complacency around’ in government and opposition, and he told 
Jenkins, three weeks after the election, that ‘the vase arrived intact, but now I feel I am carrying a new one 
– altogether more valuable!’ (Campbell, 2010, 115; Campbell, 2014, 709). It was unclear whether the Liberal 
Democrats place within Labour’s strategy would be as insurance against a downturn in Labour’s popularity, 
or as a proactive change in the party’s approach and an evolution in New Labour political identity.  
 
When asked to assess Blair’s strength as a Prime Minister in 2003, Ashdown remarked that ‘great prime 
ministers, in Roy Jenkins's phrase, change the weather. I don't think Blair has changed the weather’ (Riddell, 
New Statesman, 6/10/2003). Ashdown, Blair and Jenkins all used the lexicon of a ‘progressive’ or ‘radical’ 
century’. But the Blair-Jenkins-Ashdown dynamic epitomizes the problematic nature of ‘progressivism’ as 
a creed and historical concept. For Blair’s New Labour, association with progressive causes ‘provided a way 
of critiquing current Labour politics, while maintaining fidelity to its traditions’ (Robinson, 2016: 118). 
While Jenkins was closer to Blair personally, at least at the outset of Blair’s leadership, his idea of what 
progressive politics entailed in practice was more sharply aligned with Ashdown. Both Jenkins and 
Ashdown saw electoral reform as a means and an end, interested in ‘creating a pluralist system of politics, 
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not in preserving the present structure in a new configuration’ (Ashdown, 2000: 1/12/1993, 243) As a 
result, Blair’s talk of the merging of the two parties consistently troubled Ashdown (2000, 2/5/1997 560; 
2001, 6/5/1997 6). The inherent balancing act between having the same project, while retaining distinct 
identities, was one Blair wished to answer through a move towards the Liberal Democrats’ absorption. It 
was a question Ashdown was never able to fundamentally resolve, and a question whose importance only 
increased in line with levels of co-operation – so much so that it became increasingly important to Ashdown 
that he and Blair ‘pretend to treat each other as equals’ – a far cry from the equality of status that Blair had 
hinted at in 1995 when speaking of the importance of Lloyd George, Beveridge and Keynes (Ashdown, 
2001: 322 3/11/98; Blair, 1995).  
 
Despite his effort to ‘reach beyond what appears to be the possible to make things happen’ (Ashdown, 
Interview: 2016), the constraints of the political system meant there appeared to be little significant long-
term change in the structure of political opportunities for his party. Given this form of institutional change 
–  ‘the restructuring of the political world so you can win’ –  was the key aim of Paddy Ashdown’s leadership, 
his strategic success has to be questioned. However, just as with is quasi-predecessor David Steel, the intra-
party strategic battle he conducted with significant swathes of his party was won. As Voeten (2011: 275) 
has pointed out, the effectiveness of strategic actions is often conditional on the actions of others.  Moves 
towards Labour often had to be matched by increasing differentiation, creating tensions with Blair and New 
Labour that (particularly in opposition) caused inter-party co-operation to be put into question. Blair (2010: 
121), argues retrospectively that the need to placate strains of Liberal Democrat opinion, and prove 
independence and convergence were compatible aims, meant the question was ‘is this cooperation for real?’ 
Blair also pressed far more heavily and consistently than Ashdown on the idea of a formalized pre-electoral 
coalition that could work on a seat-by-seat basis. This was something he suggested both prior to the 1997 
election, and as a means of maintaining inter-party relations once electoral reform had been sidelined. 
Campbell (2010: 27/12/1995) recorded that, over time, Blair got ‘a bit fed up with Paddy, who had to 
realize there was always the other strategy, which was going full frontal for the Libs’. Ultimately, in 
attempting to balance integration and separation, Ashdown ran out of road. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - Conclusion: Roads Travelled and Routes Forward 
 
In retracing what happened in each of the cases examined, this thesis aims to be both inductive and 
systematic. Each flashpoint of inter-party activity provides, in the lexicon of an increasingly qualitative turn 
in the comparative study of government and coalition formation, a ‘puzzle’ to be explained. The framework 
introduced here suggests an analytical route through which we can understand how British politics reacts 
to the idea of co-operation and, in so doing, contributes to our understanding of the British Political 
Tradition. By positing the dynamic interaction of a path dependent historical institutionalism and strategic 
agency through an extension of the concept of heresthetics, it advances discussion about what can, or could, 
lead to the disruption of a predominant majoritarianism that continues to pervade party politics in this 
country. This conclusion first summarises each analytical narrative. It then looks at the research questions: 
how parties and institutions operate as constraints, and how they manifest themselves, and whether the 
strategic position of actors, combined with their strategic and rhetorical ability, determines leaders’ and elite 
actors’ willingness and ability to use co-operation to bring about a more pluralistic political system. It is also 
valuable to take a step back, and discusses what the implications might be for the British Political Tradition,  
and what this approach adds to the concept of heresthetics. Finally, this conclusion considers the 
contemporary applicability of this study in Britain and elsewhere, and how the framework posited here 
could be built upon – the theoretical advances that can be used to understand the dynamics of inter-party 
politics in the British case.  
 
The cases summarised 
 
The role a diminished Liberal Party would play in the post-war political landscape was unclear as the 
wartime coalition ended in 1945. Unhappily for Liberals, their diminished place in the party system had 
been cemented by the time Clement Davies rejected the offer of a place in Churchill’s cabinet in October 
1951. Toye (2010) has suggested Liberal voters were the primary, and underappreciated, target of 
Churchill’s infamous Gestapo Speech in 1945. Chapter 2 takes this further, and suggests that garnering 
Liberal support was a key driver throughout Churchill’s period as Leader of the Opposition. The extent to 
which public tussles over inter-party co-operation undermined the Liberals’ drive for independence, and 
helped entrench the two-party politics that lasted until 1974, is not easily calculable. But the Liberal 
leadership rallied against co-operation – and therefore, any possibility of structural changes to the party 
system that could boost their competitiveness – on the grounds, as Davies put it, of the existential danger 
of the ‘Tory Spider’. That a fragmenting liberalism was cannibalised after 1945 from the right rather than 
the left was an extension of an inter-war trend. But it was by no means inevitable, and was a clear strategic 
aim within the Conservative Party. However, the personal archives of Churchill and Lord Woolton reveal 
an internal battle over Conservative identity played out through the proxy of Liberal-Conservative co-
operation. The party’s archives suggest this tension was also an organisational split. Churchill as leader and 
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key allies saw co-operation with the Liberal Party as important. Conservative Central Office and Woolton 
were less supportive. This was premised on different interpretations of the party system and the structural 
place and role for a third party within it.   
 
While this grinding down of Liberal strength was a long-run process that culminated in electoral success 
for the Conservative Party in 1951, by 1974 the dynamic between the two parties was ultimately defined by 
failure. However, Chapter 3 argues the post-election negotiations of March that year precipitated a 
discussion about inter-party co-operation that only ended following a conclusive, if slim, Labour victory in 
October 1974. It was clear from internal memos that almost all the senior figures in two largest parties had 
not taken a sustained Liberal resurgence seriously. All this changed after the February 1974 result. Robert 
Armstrong’s thorough contemporary account of the Heath-Thorpe negotiations, released in 2010, showed 
Heath’s decision to pursue post-electoral co-operation was – despite some later claims from those involved 
– viewed seriously at the time. The nature of any agreement that would be perceived and tolerated as 
legitimate was important, and provides an insight into how political elites interpret inconclusive results in 
Westminster’s majoritarian system. Accounts of the negotiations suggest Heath’s attempts to frame the 
election as an ‘anti-Socialist’ victory were never close to success. Perhaps more significant were the 
Conservatives’ subsequent internal strategic discussions about embracing the concept of coalition. What 
stands out from the archives is how the idea of an electoral pact and, more seriously, overt support for 
coalition government was strongly debated. A moment where inter-party co-operation was a real possibility 
was nullified by the interaction of Wilson’s refusal to countenance discussion of coalition, Heath’s inability 
to provide a compelling electoral case for a form of national government, and Thorpe’s attempt to 
simultaneously call for political co-operation while riding an anti-political wave. 
 
Some of the mechanical similarities with 1974 were notable, and noted, as the Lib-Lab Pact was bargained 
and sealed. But in March 1977 there were different political circumstances and a different outcome, the 
synthesis of seemingly mutually advantageous objectives leading to the formation of a limited agreement 
on co-operation. Kirkup’s (2012) study of the Lib-Lab Pact points out the importance of the synergy 
between the two leaders, while also arguing the pact should be viewed as an isolated event distinct and 
separate from Steel’s later leadership of the Liberals into the Alliance. Analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that 
Callaghan’s success and Steel’s failure – the institutional stasis that resulted, and Steel’s inability to extract 
meaningful constitutional concessions – is only clear when placing the strategic objectives of both party 
leaders in a wider context. Steel’s stance in private negotiations, and public pronouncements willing the 
agreement to be more than the sum of its parts, show he hoped co-operation could, and would, beget 
further co-operation on the centre-left. The influence of Michael Foot was key to Labour’s negotiations, 
setting and maintaining a firm line on the consultative commitments and constitutional changes that explain 
why Steel was so supportive of an agreement in the first place. Foot’s insistence on, and achievement of, 
minimalistic terms suggests that the seeming success of the pact, and the initial goodwill surrounding it, 
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disguised the existence of real winners and losers. That the Liberal Party extracted little of any medium to 
long-term value from co-operation perhaps unsurprising – as Steel (2017) argued, when commenting on 
the Conservative-DUP confidence and supply negotiations of June 2017, ‘the tail should not expect to wag 
the dog’. However, the Lib-Lab Pact does show that any attempt to extract strategic and systemic objectives 
from a tactical, survival-driven exercise is fraught with difficulty for smaller political parties. 
 
Roy Jenkins’ judgement was that the Lib-Lab Pact, far from laying down the institutional groundwork for 
further co-operation, made co-operation between the SDP and Liberal parties more difficult. If the creation 
of the Alliance speaks to a lack of any continuity across each flashpoint of co-operation – despite many of 
the same key actors – it also reaffirms that intra-party factors, and the management of discord and 
disagreement, are key to understanding how inter-party co-operation develops. The remarkable prescience 
of Steel and Jenkins’ private post-1979 strategy of co-operation and eventual amalgamation suggests elite 
agency and leadership can play a key role in defining the path of political co-operation. It also shows the 
importance of garnering elite-level and wider party support for co-operation – a gradualist process made 
easier by evidence of electoral success in the formative period of the SDP. The SDP and Liberal archives 
show that this process within both parties, despite retrospectively appearing so, was far from inevitable. 
Steel’s ability to guide his party from a position of reluctance to overwhelming support for the Alliance was 
achieved through its clear electoral momentum. But Chapter 5 also casts doubt on the significance of Steel 
and the Liberal Party in the creation of the SDP. It is clear from interviews with SDP MPs that there was 
a lack of clarity about how the new party would interact with Liberals but there was, at least initially, limited 
enthusiasm for the type of co-operation ultimately pursued. Still, Owen soon found it difficult to obstruct 
burgeoning, and soon surging, support for comprehensive co-operation between the two parties. It also 
shows the role that co-operation can have in defining the character of the electoral and political offer of 
parties – SDP-Liberal co-operation was both a proxy and a vehicle for intra-party tension within the SDP, 
because it was the key to defining the party’s electoral identity.  
 
The continuing role for key figures within the SDP in the politics of the 1990s is unsurprising, but the 
significance of Roy Jenkins suggests significant overlap between his vision for the SDP and Tony Blair’s 
New Labour. Yet the ultimate rejection of the Jenkins Report also showed a significant mismatch of 
strategic and political priorities. The negotiations between Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown were broadly 
successful for New Labour: the party benefited from tactical voting, and gave little (if anything) away in 
constitutional terms that had not been put forward by Blair’s predecessor, John Smith. In a sense, therefore, 
these negotiations on co-operation bear a strong resemblance to Steel’s failed attempt in 1977 to use co-
operation grounded in short-term expediency, as a means towards medium and long-term institutional 
change. However, Chapter 6 makes clear that Blair did also have some (muddled) medium-term strategic 
aims, and wanted to achieve significant party system change that involved the integration of both parties in 
a ‘Big Tent’ approach. That this never came close to success speaks to a party system in which, just as in 
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the immediate post-war period, third parties put down enough roots to survive but not enough to prosper 
without a symbiotic relationship with one of their larger competitors. 
 
Research questions revisited 
 
This thesis started from the assumption that British political discourse is defined in part by a British Political 
Tradition, and that there are clear reasons for thinking this leads to co-operation being viewed as counter-
cultural. This thesis is inductive and reflexive: frameworks can help us understand complex phenomena 
and draw out key areas of explanation, but subjecting them to the rigours of an empirically-led and 
historically-driven analysis is crucial. This conclusion seeks to complete this feedback loop, pulling together 
each case study to assess the validity and usefulness of a framework that looks at both party and institutional 
barriers to co-operation, and seeks to unite them with an understanding of agency through the concept of 
heresthetics. This framework helps us isolate some of the causal mechanisms that make co-operation 
problematic in British politics, and helps understand what political actors hope to achieve when, 
nevertheless, they co-operate with their competitors.  
 
RQ1a) Do ideational institutional norms exist in British Politics that inhibit inter-party co-operation?  
 
RQ1a posited majoritarianism, and a subsequent aversion to inter-party co-operation, as a near-permanently 
entrenched and fixed institutional norm of British party politics. We would expect to see elite actors 
working under the assumption that mooting or developing co-operation would be electorally damaging – 
in other words, the clear manifestation of Disraeli’s oft-repeated (if almost wholly decontextualized) idiom 
that ‘England (sic) does not love coalitions’. In fact, this was not clear in each and every one of the five case 
studies analysed in this thesis. In one sense, this is unsurprising: these case studies were chosen specifically 
as significant flashpoints in the post-war period, where at least some of the assumptions of two-partyism 
were challenged. But the assumption was that these were agency-driven strategic exercises, stifled and 
undermined by a pervasive desire for single-party government.  
 
In 1974, this cause and effect was clearly reversed. Rather than voter resistance prohibiting the construction 
of co-operation, supply-side changes in the party system emanated from the perceived desire for a move 
towards pluralism in the electorate. The Liberal vote share in February 1974 punctured the idea that the 
Liberals were a perennially latent force in British party politics, and disrupted the assumed permanence of 
a party system defined by two monolithic parties. What mattered was not just a hung parliament acting as 
an exogenous shock to Labour and Conservative politicians. It was also the subsequent interpretation of 
the result as the manifestation of a sea-change in public attitudes. There was a clear feeling within 
Westminster in the first half of the inter-election period in 1974 that bottom-up demand for change, if 
facilitated by the Conservative Party’s proposal of a government of ‘National Unity’, could lead to partisan 
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advantage for the party, halting, if not reversing, its drift under Heath. The same was also true in the period 
of early momentum in SDP-Liberal co-operation, between the SDP’s creation in the Spring of 1981 and 
the confirmation of the Alliance’s formation at the party conferences in the Autumn of that year. It was 
felt that co-operation could enhance the credibility of the two parties, crystallising and embodying the key 
message of political change through the party system. Therefore, particularly for Jenkins and Steel, inter-
party co-operation was not just static and transactional, a necessary manoeuvre for a third and fourth party 
under a single-member plurality voting system. The early polling evidence showed this co-operation with 
the Liberal Party to be at least part of the SDP’s early appeal: the two parties in combination were an 
additive electoral force, winning more votes as a united ‘Alliance’ than as two separate entities. One 
surprising element is the extent to which two party assumptions can quickly shift. If there is an ideational 
underpinning to two-party politics based upon an elite fear that co-operation will be electorally harmful, 
these flashpoints show it is certainly open to periods of pressure and contestation.  
 
That said, the persistence of two-party politics despite these periods of disruption suggests there is 
explanatory power in the institutional norm of majoritarianism and single-party government. In each case 
the internal arguments within political parties, and the public rhetoric of actors who rejected or fought 
against the idea of co-operation, were imbued with the pathologies and ideational institutional structures of 
the British Political Tradition. How inter-party bargaining and co-operation fit with the liberal notions of 
representation and conservative notions of responsibility that characterise critical interpretations of the 
British Political Tradition is all-important. It leads to three areas where friction exists between, on the one 
hand, attempts at co-operation and, on the other, politicians’ understanding of a dominant political tradition 
that privileges centralized, single-party government and a party system premised on two-party competition:    
 
1) The assumption that voters are happy to accept lower levels of accountability for a trade-off with 
the blunt but effective instrument of clear electoral winners and losers pervaded each case study. 
Verney (1991: 637) described the Westminster Model as a ‘doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, 
which takes precedence over popular sovereignty except during elections’. The exception is key – 
politicians are free to operate uninhibited within the sphere of Westminster unless it impedes 
electoral choice, and co-operation clouds the clear link between electoral choice and government 
formation. Both supporters and opponents of co-operation were clearly concerned that co-
operation would (and, in the case of the latter, should) be viewed as an illegitimate bypassing of 
the will of the electorate.  
 
Internal critics within Conservative Central Office in 1950 argued co-operation with the Liberal 
Party would be viewed an elite stitch-up; equally, Macmillan, Butler and other supporters of co-
operation were worried about the optics of an agreement forged in private. Margaret Thatcher and 
Keith Joseph as cabinet critics in February 1974 argued Heath was bypassing the expressed 
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electoral will of the people by negotiating with the Liberal Party. Wilson, too, argued Heath was 
‘conning’ the public through promoting a cross-party coalition. This also shaped the behaviour of 
both Labour and Liberal politicians unwilling to fully embrace the consultative mechanisms Steel 
insisted upon within the Lib-Lab Pact’s agreement. Following the Lib-Lab Pact, Steel was keen to 
defend the concept of co-operation, but both he and Callaghan knew a pre-electoral period of 
distance was necessary if the two parties were to campaign independently and successfully. Steel’s 
concern about the political nomenclature of co-operation was particularly revealing about his fears 
about its symbolism. Key allies of David Owen within the SDP felt that co-operation with an 
electoral ‘loser’ in the Liberal Party undermined perceptions of the party as a fresh alternative, 
showing them as part of an existing party system rather that a break from it (Thomas, Interview, 
2016). Paddy Ashdown’s concern that ‘cosying up’ to Blair without the concrete promise of new 
pluralistic structures would be seen as undemocratic was well founded – to some he was guilty, as 
a member of the Liberal Democrat executive put it, of a ‘betrayal of everything that Mr Ashdown 
ever said he stood for’ (Grice, The Independent, 13/11/1998). 
 
2) There was a widespread working assumption in each case that voters would fit their electoral 
choices to the core framework of the Westminster Model – a structure determined by two-party 
politics and the centralization of executive power within one party. Dunleavy (2009: 622) has 
argued that the British Political Tradition ‘in the most brazen fashion … is used by governing elites 
to justify massive disproportionalities in the way that the UK voting system treats different parties’. 
This meant that, for the Conservative and Labour parties, discourse around co-operation was 
framed as an accommodation within existing ways of doing party politics and government – an 
assertion of their relative dominance within changed circumstances and an unwillingness to 
concede changes that diluted their relative power. However, this political structure was sustained 
by more than self-interest. Within the Liberal Party, and the Liberal Democrats, there was a 
recurrent feeling the party needed to conform to the expectation of the role of parties within this 
model. This meant operating under the pretence they were a plausible vehicle for single-party 
government, precluding the interaction with other parties necessary to create formal pre-electoral 
coalitions. This clashed with the reality of their electoral resources and their place in the party 
system, as well as with their support for proportional representation and pluralism.  
 
Post-1945, the Liberal Party’s decline was widely assumed to be self-perpetuating. Proof of its 
electoral weaknesses would beget further decline, in a system of party competition designed for 
two opposing parties. Churchill’s rhetorical framing touched upon and amplified this existing 
structural problem for the Liberal Party. In October 1974, Harold Wilson bet his premiership on 
a belief that voters would continue to view their electoral choice as a binary one, based on a 
preference for his leadership over Ted Heath’s. Both Conservative and Liberal politicians were just 
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as aware that appeals to ‘National Unity’ were hampered by Heath’s leadership. Heath’s signalling 
he would invite non-Conservatives into his cabinet was a radical attempt to subvert the 
assumptions of governance that underpinned this electoral logic. But the pull of majoritarianism, 
and the questions this sort of coalition would create about the maintenance of his leadership meant 
he never pursued this with the boldness necessary to succeed. The Liberals continued to claim to 
be a government-in-waiting, and Thorpe attempted to recreate his surprise success of February 
rather than make a strong claim for a new form of governance. The failure of both strategies proved 
Wilson correct, and suggested that many politicians, academics and commentators had brought 
too strongly into the concept of institutional flux.  
 
By 1977, the idea of co-operation as a means of Callaghan staying in power was a surprisingly 
unexpected and unplanned development in Westminster, despite the almost inevitable movement 
towards minority government. Callaghan’s desire to retain executive power was evident through 
his reticence to move towards an agreement with the Liberal Party. A key concern for those leading 
the SDP in 1981 was that co-operation with the Liberals would damage their attempts to replace 
the Labour Party within a two-party system. Key to the failure of Lib-Lab politics in the 1990s was 
the fact that Jenkins and Ashdown never persuaded Blair away from a majoritarian mind-set. 
Ashdown’s desire for structural party change and the maintenance of an independent Liberal 
Democrat party meant consistent rejection of overt pre-electoral co-operation with the Labour 
Party. This constrained his political strategy. In contrast Blair saw the possibility of co-operation 
creating radical change within the two-party system, with co-operation a means of accentuating 
and continuing New Labour’s claim to dominance within a two-party system. This meant both 
leaders working at cross-purposes. 
 
3) Economic or political crisis, or the construction of crisis within justifications of the pursuit and 
enactment of co-operation, were a recurrent theme in actors’ rhetorical attempts to legitimise cross-
party co-operation. This tallies with a trend that Bogdanor (2011) identified in the way the National 
Government of 1931 and the wartime coalitions were publicly sold. This was equally clear in the 
rhetoric surrounding the creation of the coalition government in 2010, and Nick Clegg (2016) 
argued, when defending it, that ‘providing a stable government necessary at a time of great 
economic turbulence was the right thing to do’. This was clear in Churchill’s claim to embody a 
national cause that attempted to delegitimise the Liberal Party’s insistence upon independence. Ted 
Heath’s calls for coalition with the Liberal Party were defined by working in the ‘national interest’ 
to deal with the ‘economic crisis’. Discussion within Labour about whether to frame the Lib-Lab 
Pact as borne from the need for ‘national’ or ‘economic’ ‘recovery’ was about how much the idea 
of coalition should be imbued in the agreement. The idea that flashpoints of co-operation are born 
from exceptional economic circumstances could suit political actors with a stake in the 
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maintenance of two-party politics. It is an example of where process of contestation of the ‘rules’ 
of party politics could act to reinforce the ‘rules’ themselves – the language of exceptionalism and 
crisis minimalizes the normalization of co-operation, as well as reinforcing the status quo of single-
party majority government. It is a clear manifestation of the pathology of strong government within 
the British Political Tradition, and the idea that ‘Westminster and Whitehall knows best’. 
 
RQ1b) Do British political parties provide ideational hurdles and/or organizational barriers to inter-party co-operation? 
 
David Steel (Interview, 2016) noted, somewhat antagonistically, that ‘the thing about the 2010 negotiations 
is those leading them had very little grasp of the party’s history, and I include in that Nick Clegg and Danny 
Alexander’. Two inferences can be drawn from this. Firstly, Steel suggests a defining role for political 
leadership within the organisational structure of parties when co-operation is a strategic option. Leaders 
have agency and are not inherently driven and determined by path dependent precedent. Secondly, he is 
arguing that there is a dominant historical narrative within the Liberal Democrats around co-operation with 
other parties. Steel clearly felt he was, as leader, driving his party forward along a road half-travelled when 
pursuing co-operation with the Labour Party in 1977 and the SDP in 1981.  
 
Similarly, Paddy Ashdown argued that not pursuing centre-left co-operation would have been a ‘dereliction 
of duty’ as leader of the Liberal Democrats. The extent to which leaders of the Liberal and Liberal Democrat 
parties can claim to be fulfilling a core duty of their role as party leader, by exploring centre-left realignment 
through co-operation, is debatable. McAnulla (2007) has identified a conflict between tradition as non-
reflective and habitual, or as a rational and reflective instrument that can be evoked by strategic actors; 
Weller and Haddon (2016: 483), similarly, have spoken of ‘convenient myths: constructed traditions … 
used to justify current positions’. This tension existed in the discourse around co-operation. Wrapping calls 
for co-operation within a convenient mythology or lineage is useful in advancing intra-party support for 
co-operation within the Liberal Party and the Liberal Democrats. However, Jo Grimond’s private concerns 
about the Lib-Lab Pact, and his slow embrace of the Alliance, suggest attempts by Steel and Ashdown to 
frame their leadership as a continuation of his calls for realignment are problematic. Indeed, both advocates 
and opponents of a strategy of co-operation within the Liberal Party in the 1970s and early 1980s cited 
Grimond as an influence.  
 
Steel’s criticism of the pace of Ashdown’s attempts at co-operation, if not their core purpose, suggest there 
is a limit to levels of continuity, as do Steel and Ashdown’s differing views on Nick Clegg’s entry into 
coalition. But there are obvious reasons why a radical, energetic Grimond would be a useful touchstone for 
political leaders looking to pursue co-operation. Through each case study, from the pre-1945 Radical 
Action, through Liberal Youth and the Association of Liberal (later Liberal Democrat) Councillors (ALC), 
there has always been a significant ‘radical’ tendency within the Liberal Democrats and its antecedents, one 
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that eschews a central role for leadership and questions the value of co-operation. That advocates of 
pluralism through inter-party co-operation have to operate within a closed, elite and Westminster-centred 
negotiating environment – with parliamentary parties almost as excluded as the wider membership and 
voters from the negotiation and bargaining process – consistently jars with a subset of the Liberal Party 
most concerned with retaining policy influence and independence. Jeremy Thorpe shied away from the 
intra-party confrontation necessary to gain the full flexibility to accept any foothold in office he was offered. 
However, Steel and Ashdown’s success in gaining support for measures allowing the exploration of co-
operation is notable. This was done through persuasion and dialogue, the placing of co-operation at the 
centre of their leaderships, and the presentation and framing of co-operation. Both leaders proved the intra-
party hurdles were difficult and draining, but ultimately surmountable. 
 
Just as both Steel and Ashdown argued Grimond’s focus on realignment formed a lineage and justification 
for co-operation, so the memory of Ramsay MacDonald was repeatedly evoked as a warning of the inherent 
intra-party dangers of co-operation for leaders of the Labour Party. Yet a shared vocabulary about the 
potential pitfalls of negotiations did not amount to a shared political logic regarding co-operation. The 
memory of MacDonald was present in cases where co-operation was pursued somewhat enthusiastically by 
Tony Blair, as well as reluctantly or not at all by Callaghan and Wilson. The assumption that the Labour 
Party was institutionally averse to co-operation was largely accepted under Wilson’s leadership, while 
Callaghan’s Lib-Lab Pact was – apart from Tribune Group protests – largely accepted as a necessary means 
for the government’s continuation. However, what was evident across cases was a Parliamentary Labour 
Party and a union movement that were very hostile to negotiations. There was little attempt by Callaghan 
or Blair to challenge the negative perception of inter-party co-operation. Instead, both leaders operated in 
a secretive way as a means of bypassing opposition – Callaghan by not informing his cabinet of explicit 
promises he had made to Steel on his support for proportional representation, Blair by attempting to 
circumnavigate his sceptical colleagues. What seemed clear from negotiations was a relatively weak form of 
institutional memory, and a cyclical quality to the importance of prior negotiations within parties. Jenkins’ 
conception of realignment and the SDP played a significant role in Ashdown’s motivation for pursuing his 
abandonment of the policy of ‘equidistance’, but also in the thinking of Tony Blair. Equally, for opponents 
of co-operation, the SDP’s splinter from the Labour Party in 1981 was a reason for tribal opposition. But 
there was little, if any, institutional memory of the Lib-Lab Pact when co-operation was considered in the 
1990s.  
 
There were some attempts, most notably by Nick Boles (2010), to link the creation of the coalition 
government to the Conservatives’ co-option of the Liberal National Party in the immediate post-war period 
under Churchill’s leadership. But there was little attempt – perhaps for understandable reasons, given 
comparisons may have fallen flat – to link the conception of ‘National Unity’ under Heath to attempts by 
Churchill to similarly forge an ‘anti-socialist’ government founded on a ‘national’ appeal. It was left to 
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Thorpe in negotiations to invite comparisons on electoral reform with Churchill’s ideas about mixed 
electoral systems for urban and rural areas. What was evident in both the forties/fifties and the seventies, 
however, was the powerful role of the Conservative Parliamentary Party in vetoing movements towards the 
kind of institutional changes necessary to entice the Liberal Party into an agreement. This also spread into 
a disconnect between the leadership and the party-at-large, with those set against co-operation claiming to 
represent a wider organisation wary of giving Liberal competitors the legitimacy that would come with co-
operation. It is perhaps cold comfort to David Cameron to know that he was not the first leader to operate 
under fear of a membership backlash from Lib-Con co-operation. Indeed, alienation of a section of the 
Conservative Party membership was viewed as a significant side-effect of the 2010 coalition government, 
even if survey research suggests that a clear majority of the wider membership would, in fact, have been 
receptive to (or at least tolerated) continued at coalition in 2015 had circumstances dictated (Webb et. al, 
2017).  
 
RQ2: Do strategic rationales of actors instigating and negotiating co-operation conform to the 
framework of disruption/defence of the existing institutional equilibrium? 
 
How institutional and organisational context shapes these flashpoints of co-operation, and how this 
empirically translates into recurrent themes, has a clear knock-on effect on the question of strategic agency, 
which forms the second area of structured analysis. Key to RQ2 is not just whether actors operating from 
different strategic positions within the party system approach inter-party co-operation differently. That 
much is almost self-evident. The crux is whether a lens which sees actors engaging strategically with their 
institutional context could shed more light on why co-operation between parties is attempted, and succeeds 
or fails. The proposition is that elite actors function fully aware of the potential institutional effects of co-
operation, within a British political system that grants actors significant power over how political contexts 
feed into informal institutional rules and norms. Therefore, actors approach inter-party discussion in a way 
that attempts to either limit or exacerbate levels of disruption to the ideational and mechanical 
underpinnings of a British Political Tradition that hinges on the core tenets of two-party politics and single-
party government. Although the strategic choices actors made did vary in each case study, this binary 
framework did have significant heuristic power in explaining their actions.  
 
This actor- and strategy-centred lens showed, unsurprisingly, that the relative political strength of parties 
and leaders drives their ability to dictate the direction and scope of co-operation. Clement Davies’ Liberal 
Party struggled to break out of the shadow of Churchill’s Conservative Party; equally, Churchill was not 
able to push through his full strategy of Con-Lib co-operation due to the constraints imposed upon him 
by powerful colleagues. Jeremy Thorpe’s electoral pitch for the Liberal Party was defined by the two largest 
parties – undermined by the relative weakness of the Conservatives and stifled by Wilson’s unwillingness 
to engage in discussion around co-operation. Heath’s inability to carry through a radical pitch centred on 
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co-operation stemmed from strategic indecisiveness, but was also a product of personal political weakness 
created by his defeat in February 1974. The negotiations between Callaghan and Steel ultimately skewed 
heavily towards Callaghan’s preferences because Labour held the ability to promise change through the 
asymmetric power accruing to the party in government. Ashdown’s gains from ‘the project’ were limited 
by Blair’s alternative strategic vision, and ultimate unwillingness to engage in the political reform Ashdown 
and his party wished for. Ashdown argues that:  
 
what the Cook-Maclennan agreement did was to shape the climate for the debate between 
ourselves and Labour, and with the country. It was the framework that enabled the coalition 
to follow – it placed coalition on the agenda (Brack, Little and Ashdown, 2015: 454)  
 
Any claim to cause and effect between the Cook-Maclennan agreement and the coalition government in 
2010 is, in reality, rather weak. However, it provides a useful indication of what leaders may hope to 
achieve from co-operation, as well as the limitations on their capacity to do so. The SDP-Liberal Alliance 
provides a useful comparison here. Both parties could make a serious claim to being the larger and more 
significant political force. That it provides the only case where both party leaders fully achieved their 
objectives – co-operation, and widespread integration forged with the support of both party memberships 
– serves to highlight the fact that smaller parties normally struggle to achieve their aims from discussions 
around co-operation. However, a key element of heresthetics is that agency is not a function only of 
environment and position, but is dependent instead on something less easily tangible, namely the 
temporal and strategic horizon of political actors. Steel’s political strength within the Liberal Party during 
this period, as well as Jenkins’ ability to win the intra-party battle within the SDP over the style and pace 
of co-operation, were the result of strategic decision-making as well as shared objectives.  
 
Disrupting existing institutional equilibrium? 
 
Each of the Liberal and Liberal Democrat leaders had clear aims and ideas regarding the party system, and 
how co-operation would affect their place within it. This interaction with their institutional environment 
took precedence over any other specific policy aim. However, whether co-operation with other parties was 
seen to be strategically expedient differed in each case. This difference can be seen through an analysis of 
the leaderships of Clement Davies and Jeremy Thorpe on the one hand, and David Steel and Paddy 
Ashdown on the other. Davies and Thorpe operated with shorter temporal horizons, aiming to consolidate 
the Liberal position within an existing party system, with institutional questions an important but less 
immediate priority. Steel and Ashdown both saw the reconstruction of the system of party politics as 
necessarily the key priority for their leaderships, believing that their parties’ short-term electoral position 
meant little unless they had the opportunity of office. 
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In part, this also reflected different political contexts.  The post-war political flux Davies inherited as leader 
quickly settled into a two-party contest, with the Liberal Party (seemingly terminally) marginalised. This 
partially explains why Davies felt maintaining an independent Liberal Party was the overwhelming priority. 
Davies did little, if anything, to weigh up the medium-term benefits of electoral reform against the short-
term loss of electoral independence. That Churchill ultimately offered a position in cabinet, without such 
reform, validated his scepticism about the value for the Liberal Party in entrusting Lib-Con co-operation 
to lead to institutional change. Thorpe, similarly, was principally concerned with consolidating the Liberals’ 
newfound electoral strength. This meant an attempt to diffuse the potential damage links to the 
Conservative Party could cause, rather than pressing forward the concept of co-operation. Again, perhaps 
wisely, he put little faith in Heath’s noises about a Speaker’s Conference on electoral reform. In practice, 
this meant that both Davies and Thorpe shied away from private manoeuvres towards co-operation, and 
publicly created some distance from Conservative calls for co-operation.  
 
On the other hand, Steel and Ashdown were operating in electoral circumstances where co-operation had 
a stronger short-term electoral logic. Steel arguably, and in the view of many Labour figures almost certainly, 
had little choice but to explore co-operation in 1977, given his party’s precarious polling position. Similarly, 
the squeeze Ashdown’s Liberal Democrats felt upon Blair’s accession to the Labour leadership meant they 
could seek to either profit from New Labour’s political energy, or be overwhelmed by it. This could only 
come through a recalibration not only of the electoral system but also the expectations of voters. They felt 
– in what was, ironically, a manifestation of the British Political Tradition’s tendency towards the 
asymmetric centralisation – that this was achievable through a top-down, Westminster-centred 
demonstration to voters of the validity and value of co-operation. Tracing the decision-making of each 
leader shows both Davies and Thorpe unwilling to make the strategic choices and undertake the necessary 
intra-party discussions to increase the possibility of co-operation at any electoral cost. On the other hand 
Steel and Ashdown, within the institutional constraints outlined above, carried their party into co-operation 
without the guarantee of changes to the voting system, in the hope that the act of coalition itself would 
demonstrate pluralism in action. Steel and Ashdown put their (perhaps, ultimately misplaced) faith in the 
performative effect of co-operation, and the belief that co-operation would beget co-operation. Once inter-
party politics gained momentum pluralistic institutions could, and would, follow. That neither the Lib-Lab 
Pact nor ‘the project’ had the desired impact is a measure of the difficulty in shaping the path of co-
operation as the junior partner. 
 
SDP-Liberal dynamics show objectives around co-operation are the function of a party’s place and size 
within the party system, as well as elite agents’ interpretation of the strategic value of inter-party politics. 
Jenkins and Steel pursued co-operation as a means of disrupting the party system. However, not all the key 
figures agreed that co-operation was the route towards a new politics. David Owen particularly had a 
different reading of the purpose of co-operation. Jenkins felt co-operation could demonstrate the value of 
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political change, and from there electoral success would follow; Owen felt ever-closer co-operation diluted 
claims to radicalism, damaging the party’s ability to gain a strong electoral foothold. Jenkins’ understanding 
of the importance of winning this internal battle affected the timing of co-operation: Jenkins wished for 
co-operation to begin immediately and therefore embedded into the SDP’s identity. Owen argued any co-
operation be confirmed only once the SDP’s status as the senior partner was cemented. What helped in the 
intra-party persuasion of both parties was evidence that the institutions, the mould, of British politics was 
breaking through co-operation. The later failure to break through in 1983 and 1987 has meant this moment 
of brief electoral breakthrough is largely forgotten. Nevertheless, it provides a partial route-map of how 
parties might begin to challenge the two-party monopoly in the future. 
 
Defending existing institutional equilibrium 
 
None of the leaders of either the Conservative or Labour parties embraced the idea that co-operation 
would, or should, lead to pluralistic institutional change. Each leader sought to use co-operation as a 
counter-intuitive way of maintaining two-party majoritarianism. This meant that the policy-value or short 
term costs and benefits of co-operation were, if not superseded by readings of the medium and long-term 
implications of co-operation, at least balanced alongside expectations of how co-operation could affect 
both the institutional norms and the shape of British party politics. However, the attempted maintenance 
of two party politics through co-operation was approached in two quite different ways: on the one hand, 
the open embrace of parties was seen merely as a means of ‘eating up’ the Liberal or Liberal Democrats; 
on the other, minimalistic agreements that produced the desired short-term benefits would limit, as much 
as possible, the medium and long-term effects of co-operation. 
 
For Winston Churchill and Tony Blair, co-operation provided the possibility of expanding their party’s 
electoral appeal. Both saw the road to power, and the maintenance of it, running through appeals to Liberals 
and Liberal Democrats. This was achievable through a posture towards co-operation as much as the formal 
enactment of any inter-party agreements. While both were open to formal structures of co-operation as a 
means of achieving this, entertaining the idea of instrumental changes to the electoral system was a means 
towards integration of either a broadly anti-Socialist force in 1950-51, or an anti-Conservative one in 1997. 
Both leaders’ strategies should be assessed both in terms of their long-term vision of party system 
restructuring, which remain elusive, and in terms of their contribution to the electoral coalitions that led to 
majority governments in 1951 and 1997 which, at the very least, partially justify their attempts to co-opt the 
Liberal Party and its successor. 
 
The aim of the Labour Party in March 1977 when legislative (and, it was felt, almost certainly, electoral) 
defeat loomed was to maintain their grip on executive power by any means possible. That Callaghan was 
able to do so, while in March 1974 Heath was unsuccessful, was the result in part of the legislative 
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arithmetic. It was also due to the fact Callaghan was able to offer Steel (a leader with a significant interest 
in co-operation) enough to allow him to convince his party of its merits.  Both Heath and Callaghan hinged 
their offer on the pursuit of political stability in a time of crisis, but only Callaghan was able to offer Steel 
an offer on electoral reform. That PR for Europe was a chimera, with no plausible legislative path, was the 
result largely of Michael Foot’s negotiating belligerence, as well as the fact that Callaghan was able to face 
both ways, privately pledging his support for the proposal, but determinedly underplaying the obligations 
within agreement to his cabinet when seeking their approval. Heath’s slow acceptance that he would need 
to open up to the concept of co-operation throughout 1974 acted to dilute the radicalism of his proposal. 
It was a stark example of the need for both sharp strategy and strong rhetoric if strategy is to be successfully 
enacted. Heath’s reluctance to put his leadership under question and increasing intra-party dissent meant 
he possessed neither. 
 
Framework revisited, and routes forward 
 
Framework, revisited 
 
A key contention of this thesis was that the direct implications of the British Political Tradition on party 
politics had yet to be fully fleshed out. The research questions posed and probed above sketch out some 
areas in which the pathologies of the British Political Tradition impact upon the dynamics of British Party 
Politics: the perception among elite actors from all parties of majoritarianism as a norm that constrains 
party strategies, entrenched within the preferences of voters and parties; the conception of crisis during 
flashpoints where co-operation is mooted that sees co-operation as a deviation; the idea top-down change 
is the way advocates of pluralism can achieve their goals; and the disparities in power between smaller and 
larger parties that negate efforts to provoke this institutional change. These are all processes which explain 
the continuing power of the idea of Westminster as an inherently two-party system, and the hold that this 
has over British party politics 
 
Those who have noted the revival in the study of a British Political Tradition have remarked that it prompts 
meta-theoretical questions about the relationship between institutions and ideas, and the material and the 
ideational (Marsh and Hall, 2016: 125). This thesis engages with both these questions. It proposes the 
relationship between institutions and ideas as a self-conscious interaction by strategic political leaders and 
elites, who either support continuity (the maintenance of two-party politics and majoritarianism) or change 
(the entrenchment of a multi-party politics, and pluralism). Agents work in conscious tension within an 
institutional environment – an environment that conditions the political context in which strategic choices 
about co-operation are made, while also acting as the key areas of contention and negotiation in inter-party 
co-operation. The short, medium and long-term institutional and structural effects of co-operation 
therefore provide both the context and the content of discussions around co-operation. 
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This is an attempt to move beyond what Hay and Wincott (1998: 943) described as ‘the unhelpful dualism’ 
of institutional context and political conduct. It also appears to hold water empirically. There is enough 
evidence here to suggest that political actors are very conscious of what co-operation with competitors 
could mean for the party system and the potential longer-term effects of the structures of party politics. 
Hay and Wincott (Ibid.: 954-5) approvingly argued that historical institutionalists believed institutional 
settlements to be:  
 
less a functional means of reducing uncertainty, so much as structures whose functionality 
or dysfunctionality is an open – empirical and historical – question … (with) institutions 
as the subject and focus of political struggle 
 
Each leader’s calculations on the value and purpose of co-operation (and they were ‘calculations’ in as much 
as they were imbued with a thin rationality, in their interpretation of self-interest) was self-consciously aware 
of these institutional effects.  Party leaders and party elites made (sometimes flawed) judgements about how 
much change co-operation could cause in both the mechanical institutions of British Politics, and the 
ideational environment in which politics takes place.  
 
The distinction between a ‘Westminster politics’ as a set of ideas, and as a set of institutions, was also subject 
to agency and dependent on the creativity of individual leaders. Some leaders, like David Steel and Paddy 
Ashdown, believed co-operation could foster pluralism, and saw the possibility of co-operation as 
something that could fundamentally alter the path of politics in Westminster. The act of co-operation was 
as key a part of a wider strategy to shape politics, and their party’s likelihood of success, as any institutional 
concessions on electoral or constitutional reform. Churchill and Blair, albeit from a different starting point, 
also saw an ideational purpose to mooting and discussing cross-party co-operation. The rhetorical act of 
co-operation as an electoral signal to voters was part of a longer-term attempt to retain a two-party system. 
While the aims were different, what these two logics shared is a belief in the creative and performative 
possibility of co-operation (even if co-operation was not ultimately formally realised) as a means of 
achieving objectives. These politicians, while certainly aware of the need to defend or change existing 
institutional arrangements, were also acutely aware of the impact their strategies could have on the ideational 
context in which these political battles over institutions were contested. 
 
What is also clear from these case studies is that the heresthetical categorisations proposed – leaders of 
smaller parties urging disruption of an existing majoritarian structure, and leaders of larger parties acting to 
limit institutional effects – are heuristics through which to understand political strategies rather than 
determinate logics that mean the strategies that leaders choose are inevitable. Political strategy is a product 
both of a party’s position, and the role of agency and leadership vision. As such, both context and what 
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Riker (1986: 51) called the mastering of the ‘heresthetician’s art’ are important. These case studies show 
that the temporal horizons and strategic decision-making of actors is not something that can be detached 
from the agency of individual political elites. Actors in similar sets of circumstances and social locations do 
not have the same preferences, so these case studies are not wholly institutionally and contextually 
determined. The instincts of Jeremy Thorpe and David Steel towards co-operation were not the same, just 
as the instincts of Ted Heath and Margaret Thatcher were very different. Winston Churchill and Tony Blair 
both shared an instinctive belief in the possibility of a ‘big tent’ strategy, pursued through loose co-
operation; they were operating with Liberal and Liberal Democrat leaders, in Clement Davies and Paddy 
Ashdown, with significantly different levels of enthusiasm to co-operate. However, what the heuristic offers 
is a benchmark from which to understand the temporal horizon of political leaders, and the extent to which 
they felt they can – given their political position within their party and the party system as a whole – act to 
affect their strategic environment. Political action is not inherently an exercise in straightforward utility 
maximisation, which means understanding motivation involves researching – which this thesis has done, 
through analysing the primary interview and archival evidence – the processes of strategic deliberation that 
led to leaders, elite actors and parties to approach inter-party co-operation in particular ways.  
 
Heresthetics, with its offer of theoretical purchase without being bound by instrumental rationality, has 
provided a route through which to navigate the politics of inter-party co-operation. This thesis has shown 
that its sustained application can lead to supplementary ways to understand the relationship between 
structure and agency, and new ways to conceive of heresthetics as a descriptive and explanatory concept. 
Uses of heresthetics ‘have tended to focus on the heresthician more than the heresthetic’ (Finlayson and 
Martin, 2008: 452) – which suggests that the focus of analysis has been on understanding and explaining 
individual-level behaviour through a lens of political strategy, rather than finding ways in which recurrent 
themes can be explained by institutional and structural environments. The suggestion of conceiving 
strategic activity as concerned principally with the disruption or defence of existing institutional equilibrium 
provides a way of thinking about heresthetics that is explicitly concerned with medium and long-term 
institutional change. Actors pursuing co-operation are concerned with their institutional legacy as much as 
short-term goals of maintaining office or gaining votes.  
 
In-depth analysis of these case studies show the short-term logics that guide basic rational choice 
explanations of coalition understanding are at best only part of the picture. Even when clearly acting on 
short-term rationales, for example when Callaghan pursued a Lib-Lab Pact to stay in office in 1977, 
restricting long-term institutional effects were a key motivation. It is only by understanding Paddy 
Ashdown’s wider goals of wide-reaching and long-lasting structural change in the way British politics is 
conducted, that his relative failure can be fully understood. This temporal dimension is an expansion on 
Riker’s typologies that focused on the scope of strategies – whether they were concerned with particular 
votes, or the strategic manipulation of wider issue agendas – rather than their temporal horizon. It is a 
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distinction that could potentially be useful to understand the interaction of structure and agency in other 
areas of party politics and public policy. 
 
 
Application of theory and findings 
  
Political events since this thesis was first proposed in early 2013 have further justified the study of co-
operation and inter-party politics in British Politics, and prompted research questions that branch out from 
those asked within the space constraints here. What Richards and Smith (2015) described after Cameron’s 
unexpected victory in the general election of 2015 as ‘the strange resurrection of the British Political 
Tradition’ has, to some extent, continued apace within the sphere of party politics. The two largest parties 
hold a share of the vote that, while not at the same level as in 1951, suggests a (perhaps transient) move 
away from what many thought was an inevitable trend towards a British multi-party system. Whether 
smaller parties in Britain should embrace co-operation to remain relevant, or reject it to stay alive for fear 
of being eaten up by two large parties, remains a key question. Although the Liberal Democrats have 
returned to the era of fitting in a mini-bus (and show little sign of being able to half-fill a reasonable-sized 
coach in the near future) hung parliaments, wherein smaller and regionalist parties potentially hold the 
balance of power, remain a plausible continuing feature of British politics in the medium-term. This leads 
to the obvious question of how the core theoretical framework, uncovered by the historical analysis here, 
could be used to address the incentives and hurdles to co-operation between parties in British politics in 
the future. Here are four important additions: 
 
Firstly, the core overall finding of this thesis is that politicians from different parties, with very similar short-
term imperatives, may have conflicting long-term strategic motivations. These longer-term temporal 
horizons of politicians are about shaping the institutional environment in which decisions about co-
operation take place. These longer-term imperatives often (though do not inevitably) clash between actors 
with different interests in maintaining or disrupting the institutional status quo. The concept of an 
‘institutional equilibrum’ that elite actors engage with is a useful heuristic when trying to understand the 
dynamics of co-operation. Surface-level ‘irrationality’ may disguise goals related to the institutional structure 
of British politics, and are about the interaction between ideas and institutions during periods of political 
flux. When co-operation in the future is analysed, the actions and language of actors should be viewed 
through a lens that understands that the context of British politics creates a specific interaction between 
institutions and ideas when realignment and inter-party co-operation is mooted.  
 
This can mean that political actors approach co-operation very differently despite – on the face of it – 
having the same objectives. Partly, the size of parties is a predictive determinant of what the rational 
incentives of politicians are, when co-operation is proposed. But this goes beyond the way that size is used 
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in a game-theoretical sense by political scientists. So as a further addition, this thesis suggests that future 
research should assess how the British Political Tradition is used by politicians during frenetic periods of 
inter-party bargaining as a way of shaping outcomes. Interpreting the language that is used by elite political 
actors to explain co-operation between parties is as important as other methods, such as content analysis 
of coalition agreements, or large n comparative models of government formation. For larger parties, this 
often means constraining the choices of smaller parties and limiting their bargaining power. It can also 
mean justifying co-operation through the recurrent tropes of the BPT – a search for strong, decisive 
government that frames co-operation as a paradoxical means to reinforce majoritarian norms. In other 
words, what Dunleavy (2009: 62) described as a recurrent framework of ‘a balanced and ‘self-adjusting 
constitution” that absorbs political change. The pathologies of the BPT provide a way of explaining how 
actors justify co-operation the way that they do, based on their interaction with the Westminster Model. 
This conceptual lens has an explanatory power that can be used to understand future co-operation. 
 
So political actors exist in conscious tension with the party system, particularly in times of institutional flux. 
Future research, aiming to understand party strategies around the issue of co-operation, will benefit from 
using the lens of the BPT. Institutional barriers to co-operation are writ large in most assessments of the 
plausibility of party political office-seeking outside single party government within the two largest parties. 
The historical experience of smaller parties when they attempt to disrupt the existing equilibrium or change 
the party system is worn heavily by those in favour of advocating either new political parties or co-operation 
across existing political parties. Realignment is not a dirty word in British politics, but it is a historically and 
institutionally loaded word. Future research on co-operation in Britain should ground itself in an 
understanding that co-operation is mooted within a political system that sees inter-party activity as counter-
cultural.  
 
It is also a question of statecraft and agency, and the interaction of elite agents with political parties as 
organisational institutions. Attempts at co-operation are a question of, and there are patterns in the types 
of practice and heresthetic strategies developed by the politicians analysed here: skilled herestheticians will 
not repeat the mistakes of the past (in fact, and the SDP is often used as an exemplar, it may utilise the past 
as a means of avoiding its mistakes). But finding commons regularities in how leaders approach co-
operation will come as further cases emerge. So the heresthetic framework suggested and taken forward 
here also suggests we need to look at mooted co-operation as a question of political leadership. If the 
structural constraints facing parties will continue to make forming majorities harder, at the same time as 
non-majoritarian governments remain denormalised, then political reality will continue to rub against the 
cultural norms of British politics. Each political leader will react to this in subtly different ways. Internal 
battles within parties about their broader purpose and direction can often be viewed through the proxy lens 
of inter-party co-operation. This was true of the Conservative Party in the immediate post-war period. It 
was true of the SDP, and the internal schism between followers of Jenkins and David Owen. It was true of 
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the Liberal Party, at first divided between an elite that grew strongly, and the wider organisation but then 
led by David Steel. Inter-party dynamics will become could well become more central to questions of 
statecraft in British politics. This thesis suggests that attitudes to co-operation can be an inviable and 
overlooked way of understanding the broader strategies of political parties – their leaderships, and their 
wider organisation – that reveals .The argument here is that if attempts to forge co-operation are to be 
understood at their root cause, then we must understand key factors relating to cross-party co-operation: 
the relative strength of parties in relation to each other and the institutional framework of British politics, 
but also the outlook of party leaders and party elites in relation to co-operation and to the broader party 
system.  
 
While prompted as a search for historical and party context for the 2010 coalition, the framework used here 
can be applied and extended to its creation. This would build on Heppell’s use of heresthetics, and the ever-
growing number of primary accounts that, with increasing candour, are shedding light on the dynamics of 
the coalition government. The build-up to the 2015 general election would also provide a fruitful study for 
understanding how the expectation of interaction between parties shapes campaigning behaviour and 
electoral strategy, and it is another case looks in danger of being overlooked as pre-election expectation and 
inter-party activity is either whitewashed and wilfully forgotten. This thesis subscribes to a degree of 
Westminster Model exceptionalism. It is only in majoritarian systems where a majoritarian political culture 
and practice can be a point of contention. So there is scope for its findings to be tried in other settings and 
systems where debates about co-operation and institutional reform are conducted in the context of 
majoritarian rules and norms. Contemporary debates about electoral reform in Canada, for example, are 
conducted through the complex interaction of short and long-term rational incentives of political actors, 
and a majoritarian political culture and environment that continues to provide obstacles to democratic 
reform (Dias, 2017; Winer, 2017). There is significant scope for the theoretical advances here to be both 
utilised and further tested. 
 
Relevant historical portents continue to emanate from these flashpoints of co-operation. The Conservative 
minority government elected in June 2017 brought with it the prospect of the relentless drumbeat of the 
slowly diminishing parliamentary arithmetic that led to the Lib-Lab Pact in 1977. The Conservative-DUP 
agreement prompted a similar reaction to the prospect of an overt deal between Callaghan’s Labour and 
the Ulster Unionists. Theresa May’s call for cross-party action in July 2017 summoned up the key fault with 
Ted Heath’s concept of a Government of National Unity: forged from leadership weakness, it was, fairly 
or otherwise, defined as divisive and an electoral liability. The prospect of a centrist splinter from the Labour 
Party, and an ‘SDP Mark II’ perhaps diminished following June 2017. The Brexit process, however, 
maintains the internal fissure within both main parties. The political actions of discontent politicians within 
both parties are clearly determined by a feeling that Certainly, the assumption co-operation was a 
structurally necessary route to a Labour government no longer exists. The type of Lib-Con co-operation 
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on Europe that Heath envisaged with Jeremy Thorpe, and that damaged Ashdown’s relationship with the 
Labour Party, is highly unlikely. Instead, Corbyn’s parliamentary leadership on Europe brings with it the 
possibility for dissent, revolt and cross-party co-operation on the Labour benches. It is likely the party-
political flux has yet to settle, and another flashpoint of inter-party politics is far from impossible.    
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